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
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
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
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ELEMENTS
OF
PSYCHOLOGY:

INCLUDED IN

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF LOCKE'S ESSAY ON THE HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING.

BY VICTOR COUSIN, *Esq.*


PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY OF THE FACULTY OF LITERATURE AT PARIS; PEER OF
FRANCE; AND MEMBER OF THE ROYAL COUNCIL OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH,

WITH

AN INTRODUCTION, NOTES, AND ADDITIONS,

BY C. S. HENRY.



HARTFORD:
COOKE AND COMPANY.

1834.

Page
1502

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ADVERTISEMENT.

It may be proper to say a few words in regard to the portion of M. COUSIN's Lectures which makes the body of this work, and the form in which it is here presented to the public.

In the year 1829, M. COUSIN delivered a course of Lectures, which was published in two volumes octavo, under the title of "History of Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century." Of this course, the *second* volume contains an extended critical analysis of Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding. The Lectures, from the 16th to the 25th inclusive, are taken up with this analysis. These are the Lectures of which a translation is here given to the public.

This examination of the Essay on the Human Understanding, is pronounced, by the writer of the article on the "Philosophy of Perception," in the EDINBURGH REVIEW for October 1830, No. 103, Art. IX., p. 191, to be "*the most important work on Locke, since the Nouveaux Essais of Leibnitz.*" By those who are acquainted with the article referred to,—remarkable alike for philosophical learning, and ability of the very first order,—a higher authority cannot well be imagined.—Of this same work, the accomplished translator of Cousin's "Introduction to the History of Philosophy," likewise remarks, that it "*must be acknowledged to be perhaps the greatest master-piece of philosophical criticism ever exhibited to the public.*"

The *Nouveaux Essais* of Leibnitz is, unquestionably, an admirable work on Locke; but it is rarely to be met with, and is, besides, impaired by the spirit of a system at the present day abandoned. Reid and Kant have also incidentally given criticisms of Locke, on many important points. A

regular, complete, and thorough examination, at the present day, seemed, however, to be needed. This, the work of M. Cousin supplies.

In regard to the form of the work, I have thought it best to print the ten Lectures of which the work is composed, as so many distinct Chapters; changing the numbering, to give it the form of a work by itself. As to the rest, I have aimed to give an exact translation, with no other changes than the omission of some of the more direct forms of address used by a Lecturer to his audience, and also an explanatory word or clause occasionally inserted in brackets.

In the Appendix, I have brought together,—without any pretensions to a regular plan of elucidating the text, and without having any particular class of readers in view,—such remarks as occurred to me in the progress of preparing the work; and also, extracts from the author's other writings, and from other sources,—partly as they were indicated by the author, and partly as they occurred to my own recollection.

In the Introduction, I have endeavored to give briefly such an account of the life, philosophical labors, and system of M. Cousin, and of the connexion of this with his other works, as might be interesting and useful to the readers of this volume.

The whole is committed to the candor of the public, with the hope that it may do something to increase the interest in these studies, and to promote the great cause of Truth and of Science.

C. S. HENRY.

Hartford, Ct., September, 1834.

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INTRODUCTION.

At the time when the influence of the Cartesian philosophy in France was giving way to the new spirit of the 18th century, nothing was more natural than the ready reception of the system of Locke, claiming as it did—and to a certain extent, justly—to be a fruit of the movement of independence, and of the experimental method. Thus put upon the road of Empiricism, the activity of the French mind continued to develop its principles, and carry out its consequences to their last results. Condillac, exaggerating the already partial and defective, and therefore erroneous principles of the Empiricism of Locke, rejected reflection, or natural consciousness, as one of the sources of knowledge; and analyzed all the phenomena of the mind, into forms of sensation. By the admirable logical precision, the clearness and perfect system which he gave to his analysis, he became the metaphysician and acknowledged chief of this new school; while Helvetius, d'Holbach, and others, carried it boldly out to the Materialism, Fatalism, and Atheism, which are its legitimate moral consequences. From that period, Sensualism, as a philosophical theory, maintained an almost exclusive predominance. Exceptions to this remark are scarcely to be met; and those that may be regarded as such, were merely the fragmentary or inconsequent outbursts of a higher inspiration than Sensualism could supply, not the regular and scientific exposition of a better system.

Sensualism was the reigning doctrine. All knowledge and truth were held to be derived from Experience; and the domain of Experience was limited exclusively to Sensation. The influence of this doctrine extended throughout every department of intellectual activity,—Art, Morals, Religion, no less than the physical and economical sciences. It became, according to Damiron, "a new faith, which was preached by the *philosophes*, as its priests and doctors; and, among all ranks, and first, among the

higher orders, including the clergy, it superseded the forgotten or ill-taught doctrines of Christianity. It was in all books, in all conversations ; and, as a decisive proof of its conquest and credit, passed into instruction, and for many years before the Revolution, it had taken every where, in the provinces as well as in Paris, the place of the old routine of education."

Subsequently, the exciting and terrific scenes of the Revolution occupied all minds : the speculations which had, in no small degree, prepared the way for those scenes, gave place to the absorbing interest of that period. Philosophy, in its more extended sense, was abandoned : all speculation was directed towards political theories, to the neglect of science, and even of public instruction ; and nothing was done in the cultivation of philosophy, until 1795.

At that time, the reign of violence began to give way to something like order and repose. With this return to comparative quiet, the philosophical spirit began to re-awaken. It was natural, however, that this movement should recommence where it had been arrested—namely, with Sensualism.

The instruction at the *Normal* schools, and the organization of the *Institute* by the Directory, contributed to renew and extend the philosophy of Condillac, and to make it in some sort the doctrine of government, the philosophy of the state. During this period, we have several works produced in the spirit of the Sensual system,—among the most important of which may be named the *Rapports du Physique et du Moral* of CABANIS, and the *Ideology* of M. Destutt de TRACY ; and, by a strange fortune, the word Ideology became in France the distinctive appellation of the doctrine of exclusive Sensualism. From this time to the Consulate, we may trace a lively philosophical activity, though always in the direction of Sensualism. (Hitherto, if any opposition to Sensualism had appeared, it was indirect and literary, rather than scientific. It may be found in writers of sentiment, such as St. Pierre, rather than in works of reflection.)

Thus, up to the time of the Empire, there was in strictness no philosophy opposed to the Sensual system. But from this period the tokens of a reaction become more distinct. Still, as is entirely natural, it manifested itself at first and most clearly in works of

imagination and sentiment, in poetry and eloquence, rather than by scientific exposition.

This reaction was favored by Napoleon, though not from any sympathy with the direction which the movement against Sensualism afterwards displayed. From the cast of his mind and habits of education, and partly also from motives of policy, the Emperor had a strong dislike to all metaphysical and moral speculations, and did all in his power to discredit Ideology, which was then the exclusive form of speculation. When he reorganized the *Institute*, he excluded that class of studies; and in every way endeavored to repress their pursuit, and to excite the cultivation of the mathematical and physical sciences. Thus, under the Empire, the philosophy of Condillac sensibly declined. It no longer produced important works, its former authorities lost in credit, and there was no longer the brilliant propagation of its doctrines which distinguished the preceding periods.

There was still another cause of the decline of Sensualism. It was in the character of several works written about this period, by writers avowedly belonging to the school of Condillac; but who, by the distinctions and modifications which they introduced, actually favored a contrary doctrine. Among the most important of these works, may be named the Lectures of M. Laromiguière. By distinguishing between the *idea* and the *sensation*, he makes the latter the *matter*, and the first the *form received*; and this form is given by the intellectual activity. This activity is therefore admitted as an original attribute of the mind, and a co-ordinate source of knowledge; which is certainly contrary to the exclusive origin in sensation. Laromiguière, therefore, comes much nearer in this respect, to Reid, and particularly to Kant, than to his master Condillac.

A little subsequently to this time, we come to *Royer-Collard*. Distinguished by eminent ability in every department, this celebrated man appeared in open and systematic opposition to Sensualism. From 1811 to 1814, as the disciple and expounder of Reid, he advocated the doctrines of the Scottish philosopher, and annihilated the exclusive pretensions of the Sensual school to be the last word and highest result of philosophy. The able translation of Reid's works, and of Stewart's *Outlines of Moral Philosophy*, by *Jouffroy*, the scholar of Royer-Collard, contributed

still further to extend the reaction against the system of Condillac. From the time when Royer-Collard commenced his lectures to the present day, and through the impulse which he imparted, philosophy has been cultivated with the most lively activity, by many of the finest spirits of France. Of these, some, carrying the zeal they had imbibed from their master into a still more extended sphere, pursued their investigations into the modern German speculations, which had already attracted some attention, and exerted some influence, through the writings of Madam de Stäel, the expositions of Villiers, and others.

The reign of Sensualism was thus at an end. It came to be looked upon with as great a degree of aversion and contempt, as it had formerly enjoyed of credit and authority. Its few partizans were almost exclusively to be found among the naturalists and physicians. In the only important work recently written in the interest of Materialism—*Sur l'Irritation et la Folie*, by Broussais—the author complains of the injustice and prejudice with which the once predominant doctrines of Sensualism are now regarded. In truth, nearly all the names of eminence and celebrity in every department of intellectual activity, are ranged on the side of a spiritual philosophy. Its influence pervades almost all the celebrated works that have appeared for nearly twenty years, in Art, in History, and in Literature at large.

Among those who imbibed and have contributed to extend the spirit of this new activity in philosophy, there is no one who occupies a more brilliant position, or has exerted a greater influence, than VICTOR COUSIN. This celebrated philosopher was born in 1791. He received his first instructions in philosophy, it is believed, from Royer-Collard, and was for some time his disciple. When, on the restoration of the Bourbons, Royer-Collard was made Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of France, Cousin was appointed adjunct Professor in the same department. At first he confined himself to commenting on the views of his master; but soon, extending his studies beyond the limits of the Scottish school, he pursued his investigations with indefatigable zeal, through the whole field of philosophical inquiry. The ancient Grecian systems,—the middle ages,—the modern philosophy commencing with Descartes,—and, finally, the vast mass of the more

recent German speculations, were explored. While engaged in these studies and in the duties of instruction, he was gradually forming the system to which his name is attached, and which has been subsequently developed in his lectures and writings. About this time he put out an edition of the unpublished works of Proclus, in six volumes, from the manuscripts preserved in the Royal Library at Paris.* He then commenced a translation of the works of Plato, which is still in progress. Of this work, we have received the first eight volumes, which we believe to be all that have yet come from the press. Though traces of his dependence upon his German predecessor, Schleiermacher, are visible, yet, still this work exhibits admirable original ability on the part of the French translator. We know of no individual who could have made the French language—the most insufficient of all dialects for the higher uses of philosophy—approach so nearly to an adequate representation of the infinite variety and delicacy of Plato's Greek. To each dialogue, Cousin has prefixed a philosophical argument; and the translation is to be followed by a volume containing the life of Plato, and a regular exposition of his system.—To M. Cousin we also owe the best, and, we believe, the first complete edition of the works of DESCARTES.†

During the reign of Jesuit ascendancy, under the ministry of M. de Villèle, Royer-Collard and Cousin—both obnoxious to the ultra-royalists—were prohibited from lecturing. This period was passed by Cousin principally in retirement and private studies. In 1826, he published his volume of *Philosophical Fragments*. About this time he travelled in Germany with the young duke of Montebello, the son of Marshall Lannes. Silenced in his own country by the ultra-royalists, his brilliant reputation alarmed the Prussian government, which sent police officers into Saxony, and arrested him at Dresden. By the interposition of the celebrated Hegel, Professor of Philosophy at Berlin, and the personal friend of Cousin, he obtained his release. This kindness Cousin acknow-

* PROCLI *Philosophi Platonici Opera e Codd. Mss. Biblioth. Reg. Parisiensis, tum primum edidit, lectionis varietate, et commentariis illustravit* VICTOR COUSIN &c., Tom. VI., Paris, 1820—1827.

† *Oeuvres complètes de Descartes, publiées par Victor Cousin*, 11 vols., 8vo., Paris, 1824—1826.

ledges with great warmth, in his beautiful and elegant dedication to Hegel, of the translation of the *Gorgias*.

At length, on the overthrow of the Villèle administration, Royer-Collard was chosen President of the Chamber of Deputies; and Cousin, after eight years of silence, was restored to the chair of philosophy.—In 1828, besides giving to the public a volume under the title of *New Philosophical Fragments*, containing many rich fruits of his studies in ancient philosophy, and exhibiting additional proof of his learning and ability,—he commenced a course of lectures, which were published under the title of *Introduction to the History of Philosophy*. This volume has been given to the American public, in the spirited and faithful translation of Mr. Linberg.

The next year, (1829,) Cousin published a translation from the German, of Tenneman's *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, (Sketch of the History of Philosophy,) and delivered a course of lectures, which were published in two volumes, under the title of *History of the Philosophy of the Eighteenth Century*. After the overthrow of the liberal ministry, and the accession of the ultra-royalists to power under Prince Polignac, Cousin appears again to have fallen under suspicion. A committee was appointed to inquire into the character and tendency of his lectures. Of the result of this investigation we have never heard, nor whether indeed it ever took place. The revolution of 1830, and the change of the French dynasty, probably left him to pursue his speculations and instructions, free from royalist annoyance. Since then, however, we know nothing of his philosophical labors, except three volumes of the translation of Plato. A new arrangement was made in his Professorship, by which M. Jouffroy received the department of the History of Modern Philosophy, while Cousin retained that of Ancient Philosophy.—Appointed under the new government to a place in the Royal Council of Public Instruction, he proceeded, in 1831, to Prussia to examine the state of education, and institutions for general instruction in that kingdom. His Report, published on his return, is, we believe, his last work. A translation of it has recently been published in England, and the work appears to have attracted much attention there as well as in France. M. Cousin is still in the vigor of life, and it is to be hoped that he may yet contribute much more to the cause of philosophy, and to the

interests of truth and science, to which his life has been devoted. Eminent ability and profound learning, when animated by the pure and noble spirit which has ever characterized and distinguished the labors of M. Cousin, cannot but promote the cause of truth in whatever department they are manifested. It is gratifying here to adduce the testimony of one of the ablest writers in the Edinburgh Review, who appears indeed in opposition to Cousin's system, yet concerning the author, remarks : "He has consecrated his life and labors to philosophy, and to philosophy alone ; nor has he approached the sanctuary with unwashed hands. The editor of Proclus and of Descartes, the translator and interpreter of Plato, and the promised expositor of Kant, will not be accused of partiality in the choice of his pursuits ; while his two works under the title of *Philosophical Fragments*, bear ample evidence to the learning, elegance, and distinguished ability of their author. Taking him all in all, in France, M. Cousin stands alone ; nor can we contemplate his character and accomplishments, without the sincerest admiration, even while we dissent from almost every principle of his philosophy."—The principles of philosophy here referred to by this writer, relate mainly to Cousin's solution of the problem concerning the positive knowledge of the infinite and absolute, by the human mind ; or, in other words, the possibility of philosophy, considered as the science of any thing beyond the phenomena of our own minds : this is affirmed by Cousin, and denied by this writer.

In regard to the peculiar system of philosophy embraced and taught by M. Cousin, the limits of this introduction will admit only a very brief and general statement. An extended exposition of this system, is not perhaps necessary to the comprehension of the portion of his lectures herewith presented to the public ; inasmuch as the work consists, almost entirely, of special analyses and critical discussions complete in themselves, which may be sufficiently judged of from the reader's general acquaintance with philosophical language and systems, and from so much of his system as is exhibited in them. Indeed, except in his oral instructions, M. Cousin has developed his philosophy rather in its applications, by history and criticism, than in a full and systematic exposition of its principles. Outlines of his system are given in the *Programs* of some of his courses of lectures published in the *Philosophical*

Fragments. They contain, however, barely the briefest indications. The reader will find a part of one of these programs printed at the end of this volume. A little fuller exposition of the fundamental principles of this system, may be found in the *Preface* to the *Fragments*, and also in the *Introduction to the History of Philosophy*, Lectures 4th, 5th, and 6th, to which the reader is referred.

The system of M. Cousin has received the appellation of *ECLECTICISM*. By this, however, the doctrines of *New Platonism* are not to be understood, as has been nevertheless very erroneously stated.* Neither is it a Syncretism, or gross mixture of all systems,—the impracticable project of conciliating all doctrines and opinions, which can only result in the confusion of inconsistent principles, without any scientific unity and connexion. On the contrary, it is a distinct scientific theory,—having its method, its principle, and its consequences. So far from being an arbitrary selecting and bringing together of doctrines and notions on the grounds of taste and preference, its processes are, throughout,

* North American Review for July, 1829, p. 70. The statement made by the Reviewer is contradicted by the whole tenor of M. Cousin's criticism of *New Platonism*, contained in the *Histoire de la Philos. au 18me Siecle*, (*Cours de Philosophie* for 1829,) Vol. I. p. 317—332.—Cousin there shows that the Alexandrine school, with the pretension and name of being a system of Eclecticism, was actually and distinctively a system of *MYSTICISM*, one of the four great systems under which he classes all the philosophical schools. As such, he proceeds to subject it to the criticism of his own principles, as distinct and different. He develops its essential traits, its principle and its consequences; shows that, as a system of *Mysticism*, its philosophy is distinctively religious; the heart of the system is its theodicy, or doctrine concerning the divine nature; there is its principle; its analysis, its psychology, and even its physics, are all made for and in the interest of its theology; that its principle "contains a fundamental error,"—involving a perversion of the true idea of God, and leading to all those mystical doctrines and practices of theurgy, incantation, magic, &c., which the Reviewer talks of Cousin's having "taken under his peculiar patronage."—It is but fair, however, to state, that the Reviewer could not have seen the work of Cousin which has just been referred to, as it had not probably then been published. Still, with the other writings of Cousin in his hands, it is scarcely less remarkable that he should have fallen into such an error. It is only another instance of the influence of casual associations. The writer had probably been always in the habit of connecting the word *Eclecticism* with the doctrines of the *Alexandrine* or *New Platonic* school.

strictly scientific and critical. Its *eclectic* character consists precisely in the pretension of applying its own distinctive principles to the criticism of all other systems,—discriminating in each its part of truth and its part of error,—and combining the part of truth found in every partial, exclusive, and therefore erroneous system, into a higher, comprehensive system.—The following brief sketch, selected from different places in the author's writings, and expressed nearly in his own language, may perhaps give the reader a general notion of this system.

In the psychological analysis of M. Cousin, all the facts of human consciousness are reduced to three classes,—sensible, voluntary, and rational. }

The first and the last have the characteristic of necessity ; those of the will alone are personal and imputable. Personality belongs solely to the will ; and self is the centre of the intellectual sphere. The will does not create the two classes of sensible and rational phenomena ; we find ourselves between these two orders of facts, which we perceive only by separating and distinguishing ourselves from them. Moreover, we perceive by a light which comes not from ourselves ; for our personality is our will, and nothing more. All light comes from the reason, and it is the reason that perceives both itself, and the sensibility which envelopes it, and the will also upon which it imposes obligation, though without constraining it. The element of cognition is, by its essence, rational ; and consciousness, though composed of three integrant and inseparable elements, has its most immediate foundation in reason, without which there would be no possible knowledge, and consequently no consciousness. The Sensibility is the external condition of consciousness : the Will is its centre ; and Reason its light.

In falling back upon our consciousness, we find that the relation of its three elements, the intelligence, the activity, and the sensibility, is so intimate, that when one of these elements is given, the two others enter into exercise, and this element is the activity. Without the free activity, or the self, there is no consciousness ; that is to say, the two other phenomena, whether they take place or not, are as though they were not in respect to the self, the *me*, which as yet is not. Now the *me* exists for itself, perceives and can perceive itself, only by distinguishing itself from sensation, which latter is likewise thereby alone perceived, and thereby be-

comes a part of the consciousness. But as the *me* cannot perceive itself and perceive the sensation, but by the reason or intelligence, the necessary principle of all perception, it follows, that the exercise of the reason is contemporaneous with the exercise of the personal activity and sensible impressions. The triplicity of consciousness, the three elements of which are distinct, and cannot be reduced to each other, reduces itself, therefore, to a single fact; while again, the unity of consciousness exists only under condition of this triplicity.

Passing over M. Cousin's analysis of the sensibility and of the activity, we come to that of the reason, or intelligence, in which, and in its consequences, the original pretensions and distinguishing peculiarity of his system are found.

In reason, or intelligence, considered as one of the three elements which meet in the unity of consciousness, analysis likewise discovers three integrant elements, or laws of thought, which are at once the reason itself, and which determine its manifestations. These three elements are inseparable, equally essential and primitive.—The *first* of these elements Cousin expresses indifferently as the idea of unity, identity, substance, absolute cause, the infinite, &c. All these expressions relate to an idea fundamentally one.—The *second*, he calls the idea of plurality, difference, phenomenon, relative cause, the finite, &c. These terms likewise express an idea essentially the same. These two elements are reciprocally correlatives. The one is the antithesis of the other, and they both necessarily co-exist in the reason.—The *third*, is the relation between the first and second terms, between the infinite and the finite. This relation is not simply that of inseparable co-existence; they are connected as cause and effect. The first term, though absolute, exists not absolutely in itself, but as an absolute cause, which must pass into action, and manifest itself in the second. The finite cannot exist without the infinite, and the infinite can only be realized by developing itself in the finite.

These three elements are found in the unity of reason. They are given inseparably in the primitive synthesis of thought. As inseparable, universal, and necessary, they are the integrant laws of intelligence, which constitute its nature, and preside over all its manifestations. The idea of the finite, of the infinite, and of their necessary connexion as cause and effect, meet in every act of

intelligence, nor is it possible to separate them from each other; though distinct, they are bound together, and constitute at once a triplicity and a unity.

Reason, which manifests itself in these three ideas, is not individual nor personal. What is personal to us, belongs to our will, to our free activity. But reason, constituted and governed by these necessary and absolute conceptions, is not an integrant part of our personality; it is not ours; it is not even human; it appears in, and governs humanity, and is human only in this relation. In its essence it is absolute, it is divine. The ideas which appear in, and govern the human intelligence, taken absolutely as they must be, are referable only to the absolute subject and substance of them, to the eternal reason. They are nothing else than the modes of the existence of the eternal reason. We therefore see by a light which is not our own. These ideas in the human intelligence, are a manifestation of the absolute intelligence, and a true revelation of the divine in the human.

The divine nature, therefore, as essentially intelligent, is essentially intelligible; for that which is true of reason as appearing in man, is true of reason taken absolutely. That which forms the foundation of our reason, forms the foundation of eternal reason: that is a triplicity which resolves itself into unity, and a unity which develops itself into triplicity.

Creation is therefore comprehensible and necessary; for creation is nothing else than the necessary developement of the infinite in the finite, of unity in variety, and that in virtue of the third element which binds the two other terms together, and in which both are realized. God, being substance and cause,—being substance as cause, and cause as substance, that is, being absolute cause as well as intelligence, cannot but manifest himself. This manifestation is creation, the developement of the infinite in the finite, of unity in plurality. Creation is necessarily implied in the idea of God, and the world, the universe, is the necessary effect of the divine existence and manifestation. God is thus everywhere, and in all. The universe is but a reflection of his being, a developement of his existence.

God is not, however, to be confounded with the universe, nor is God the mere anima mundi: God is the cause, the universe is the effect. In order to see the true relation between God and the

world, we must distinguish between the necessary manifestation of God in the world, and the subsistence of his divine essence in itself; for while, on the one hand, it is absurd to suppose that God, in manifesting himself, should not in some sort transfer himself into his manifestation, it is, on the other, equally absurd to suppose that the principle of that manifestation should not still retain all the superiority of a cause to its effect. While, therefore, the universe is a reflection, it is still an imperfect reflection of God; and the absolute divine subsistence still remains distinct from, and unexhausted by, the creation, which was the passing into activity, of that exhaustless power in which we perpetually *live, and move, and have our being*.

The world is also governed by the same principles which determined its creation. Two laws, and their connexion in perpetual reaction, govern and explain the material world. These two laws are expansion and attraction. The law of expansion is the evolution of unity to variety; the law of attraction, the resolution of variety into unity.

The same analogy is found in the human mind. As in nature two laws and their connexion govern and explain the material universe, so in consciousness, two ideas and their relation govern and explain the world of thought. In humanity, the constituent elements of all existence are brought under the eye of consciousness. The study of consciousness is the study of humanity. The study of consciousness is *PSYCHOLOGY*; and as man is the microcosm of existence, psychology envelopes all science. Psychology contains and reflects every thing,—both that which is of God and that which is of the world. As in nature, all the phenomena of the outward world may be reduced to one fundamental fact, composed of three elements, namely, two great laws and their necessary connexion, so in the internal world, all its phenomena may be reduced to one fundamental fact of consciousness, consisting of three elements, namely, two ideas and their connexion and correlation.

The fundamental fact of consciousness is a complex phenomenon, composed of three terms: first, the *me* and the *not me*, limited and finite; then, the idea of something different from these, the unlimited, the infinite; and third, the relation of the finite to the infinite which contains and unfolds it. These three terms universally and

necessarily meet in every act of consciousness. We find there the consciousness of self, as distinguished from the not-self, and of both as *finite*. But at the same instant, we are and must be conscious of something *infinite*, which contains and explains the finite; of something which is substantial as that is phenomenal; which comprehends both the me and the not-me; and finally, connecting the two terms, the infinite and the finite, under the principle of causality, we do and must regard the former as a cause, and consequently in its nature an infinite cause. This is God.—Thus consciousness has three momenta; and is like nature, of which it is the complement, and like the divine essence, which it manifests.

We now come to an important point—the fundamental peculiarity of M. Cousin's system: this is the two-fold developement of reason.—The three elements which constitute and govern the reason are all given in consciousness. But how are they given? In the *developed* state of human intelligence, reflection, falling back upon the consciousness, finds there the idea of the finite, of the infinite, and of their relation. The finite supposes the infinite, and the infinite supposes the finite; when one is given, the other is equally given; nor is their denial possible. Pronounce the name of the one, and that of the other is irresistibly suggested, because the idea which it represents enters irresistibly along with the former into the consciousness.—Such is the fact demonstrated by reflection, in the present developed state of the intelligence. But how were these elements *originally* given? Not by reflection. Reflection can only add *itself* to that which was; as a voluntary act, it falls back upon that which is, reviews, analyzes, distinguishes, throws light upon it; but it does not *create* the elements to which it applies itself. The human mind does not therefore commence by reflection; the first act of intelligence is not an act of reflection. Reflection itself supposes an operation anterior to itself; by which, moreover, must be given all the terms that form the basis of subsequent reflection. But what is the nature of this operation? As it is not of reflection, it is not of the will or voluntary activity. It is therefore an instinctive developement of thought: and as the intelligence does not commence by negation, this primitive, original act of intelligence is an instinctive perception of truth, an immediate intuition, and a pure affirmation.—Such is the result of logic applied to the fact of reflection; but a pro-

found and penetrating observation may verify the results of logical deduction, may in some sort detect immediately in the consciousness, the traces of this primitive act of intelligence anterior to all reflection.

Cousin thus asserts a two-fold developement of reason or intelligence : the first primitive, unreflective, instinctive ; the second ulterior, reflective, voluntary. The former he terms spontaneous reason, spontaneity of reason, or briefly, spontaneity ; the latter, reflective reason, reflection of reason, or briefly, reflection. By the spontaneity of reason, is meant " that developement of reason anterior to reflection, that power of reason to seize upon truth at first sight, to comprehend it, and to admit it, without asking or giving an account of its doing so."

In this distinction between spontaneous and reflective intelligence ; in the recognition of the former as anterior to, and supposed by, the latter—as containing the three great elements of thought—and immediately and positively cognizant of the infinite, no less than of the finite ;—it is here that we find the principle which, with its consequences, constitutes and determines the peculiar system of M. Cousin.—We will briefly explain.

All the elements of truth are given in every act of primitive, spontaneous consciousness. But as they are given anterior to all reflection, and without any negation, they are given blended obscurely, and without contrast, in the primary synthesis of thought. Yet still they are revealed in themselves and in their relations, in every act of original instinctive apperception. They are revealed : the first act of intelligence is an act of faith, of faith in the absolute reason by which they are revealed. The spontaneous reason is not individual nor personal ; it is not human, except as revealed in man ; in itself it is impersonal, divine. It is the Logos, the Word of St. John, which "lighteth every man that cometh into the world : " *"illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum."* In this sense it is, that reason is that which, developing itself in man, reveals to us from on high the truths which it imposes upon us immediately, and which, originally, we accept at once, without consulting reflection. It is this admirable and incontestible phenomenon which identifies reason and faith with the primitive, irresistible, spontaneous, and unreflective apperception of truth.

Subsequently comes reflection, which, applying itself to the elements given in spontaneity, analyzes and discriminates the facts contained in the primitive synthesis, recognizes their characteristics, and receives these fundamental elements of thought as ideas, laws, principles, or categories. These are the philosophical terms ; the element of philosophy is reflection. But what is the original source of these categories ? It is the spontaneous intuition ; the first form in which they appear is not that of reflection, but of spontaneity. But as reflection cannot apply itself to more than was given in spontaneity ; as analysis cannot give more than the primitive synthesis which it analyzes ; therefore the categories in their developed and scientific form, can contain nothing that was not given enveloped and unreflected in the spontaneous reason. But these categories, though they have their source and foundation in the primitive consciousness, receive their distinct recognition and form by analysis, that is, by reflection. But the constituent element of reflection is the will, the personality ; it is ourselves. The categories obtained by reflection, have consequently the appearance of being personal, as having truth and reality only relative to the mind. Here is found the secret of KANT'S mistake, and the vice of his system. Kant has distinguished the great constituent laws of thought—which he calls categories—from every thing derived from sensation, from every empiric element ; he has enumerated and classified them ; he has ascribed to them an irresistible force in the mind ;—yet, overlooking the spontaneous action of reason, and regarding reflection not merely as recognizing and giving form to, but also as the source of, these categories, he has, from the evident personality of reflection, been led to the conclusion that these laws, though irresistible, are merely personal ; true relative to the human mind, but not the ground of absolute certainty beyond the sphere of the human mind. In the view of Kant, as it is we ourselves that furnish the form of our consciousness, these laws are purely subjective ; that is, all that is conceived by us as necessary and universal, is so only relative to our personal reason, but without any objective reality ; the certainty of any corresponding objective reality is not grounded in these laws. If we think so, we arbitrarily make objective the subjective laws of our own thought ; but do not thereby legitimately arrive at any thing truly objective. Now if the laws of thought were purely

subjective, we should have no right to transfer them beyond the sphere of our own consciousness ; in their utmost reach they could engender only irresistible convictions, but never independent truth : Nature and God may be objects of our faith, but not objects of knowledge. Thus Kant comes out to absolute scepticism, in regard to ontology,—a scepticism against which he finds no refuge, except in the sublime inconsistency of giving to the laws of the practical reason, more of objective validity than to those of the speculative reason ;—an inconsistency which FICHTE demonstrated and demolished, by showing the practical reason to have no more objective validity than the speculative.* Thus Kant failed in his solution of the grand problem of philosophy.

* The following remarks on the use of the terms *objective* and *subjective*, are from the Edinburgh Review, October 1829, p. 196, *Note*. “ In the philosophy of mind, *subjective* denotes what is to be referred to the thinking subject, the Ego ; *objective*, what belongs to the object of thought, the Non Ego. It may be safe, perhaps, to say a few words in vindication of our employment of these terms. By the Greeks, the word *ὑποκειμενον* was equivocally employed to express either the *object of knowledge*, (the *materia circa quam*,) or the *subject of existence*, (the *materia in qua*.) The exact distinction of *subject* and *object* was first made by the schoolmen ; and to the schoolmen the vulgar languages are principally indebted for what precision and analytic subtilty they possess. These correlative terms correspond to the first and most important distinction in philosophy ; they embody the original antithesis in consciousness of self and not self,—a distinction which, in fact, involves the whole science of mind ; for psychology is nothing more than a determination of the subjective and objective in themselves, and in their reciprocal relations. Thus significant of the primary and most extensive analysis in philosophy, these terms, in their substantive and adjective forms, passed from the schools into the scientific language of Tilesius, Campanella, Berigard, Gassendi, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Wolf, &c. Deprived of these terms, the critical philosophy, indeed the whole philosophy of Germany, would be a blank. In this country, though familiarly employed in scientific language, even subsequently to the time of Locke, the adjective forms seem at length to have dropped out of the English tongue. That these words waxed obsolete, was perhaps caused by the ambiguity which had gradually crept into the signification of the substantives. *Object*, besides its proper signification, came to be abusively applied to denote *motive*, *end*, *final cause*, (a meaning not recognized by Johnson.) This innovation was probably borrowed from the French, in whose language the word had been similarly corrupted, after the commencement of the last century. (Dict. de Trevoux, voce *Objet*.) *Subject* in English, as *sujet* in French, had been also perverted into a synonyme for *object*, taken in its proper meaning, and

M. Cousin thinks he finds the true solution in the distinction between the spontaneous and reflective reason. In the intimacy of consciousness, at a depth to which Kant had not penetrated, and beneath the apparently relative and subjective character of the necessary principles of the intelligence, may be found, according to him, the instantaneous but real fact of a spontaneous apperception of truth, a cognition which, not instantly reflecting itself, takes place unnoticed in the depths of consciousness, but yet is there, and is the true basis of that which, subsequently, under a logical form, by reflection, becomes a necessary truth. The subjective, along with the reflective, altogether expires in the spontaneous apperception. Reason indeed becomes subjective in its relation to reflection, to the free and voluntary self, the seat and type of all personality; but in itself, and in spontaneity, it is impersonal, exempt from individuality; it does not even belong to humanity; consequently, its laws rest upon no basis but themselves; they appear in, preside over, and govern humanity, but belong not to it. Nothing is less personal than reason, particularly in spontaneous, pure affirmation; nothing therefore is less subjective; and the truths which are thus given us, are absolute truths.

The distinction between spontaneous and reflective reason, explains likewise the identity and diversity of humanity,—and the history of the world and of philosophy. Spontaneity is the element of agreement; reflection, of difference. Men agree in spontaneity; they differ only in reflection. In its instinctive and spontaneous form, reason is every where the same and equal to itself, in all generations of humanity, and in all the individuals that compose them. All thought necessarily includes a primitive synthesis of its three necessary and inseparable elements. Faith in

had thus returned to the original ambiguity of the corresponding term in Greek. It is probable that the logical application of the word (*subject of predication*) facilitated or occasioned this confusion. In using the terms, therefore, we think that an explanation, but no apology, is required. The distinction is of paramount importance, and of infinite application, not only in philosophy proper, but in grammar, rhetoric, criticism, ethics, politics, jurisprudence, theology. It is adequately expressed by no other terms; and if these did not already enjoy a prescriptive right, as denizens of the language, it cannot be denied, that, as strictly analogical, they would be well entitled to sue on their naturalization."

God is the necessary faith of the human race : Atheism, in strictness, has no existence. It is nothing but an individual madly opposing his will to his reason.—The identity of spontaneity, together with the identity of the truths it engenders, constitutes the identity of the human race. Spontaneity gives pure truth, and in all men the same truth. Reflection, as the element of difference, is the source of diversity and of error. Reflection, in analyzing the different elements of which the primitive synthesis of thought is composed, may attach itself to one or the other of these elements, exclusively, or with various degrees of partiality. Hence the errors, and the diversity of errors, that have prevailed in the world : hence the variety of individual opinions and characters. They arise from the partial, exclusive, and various development of reflection.—What reflection is to the individual, history is to the race. Hence the distinguishing character of different epochs in the history of mankind, is found in the predominance of some one element of intelligence. But as there are only three such elements, there are three, and only three, grand epochs in the history and development of mankind.—The principles already announced, likewise apply to the history of philosophy,—which discovers the successive development and predominance of the essential elements of intelligence ; and the diversity of their development, by reflection, in various systems. The vantage ground afforded by these principles, enables us to discover the part of error and the part of truth in each partial and exclusive system, which, as founded on an exclusive view of the elements of intelligence, is necessarily erroneous, and at the same time, as involving some one of those elements, necessarily has its part of truth.

Such, briefly, is the system of M. Cousin. It will be perceived, at once, that the grand peculiarity of it consists in the solution, and in the mode of solution, of the question concerning the objective and absolute in regard to human knowledge ; in other words, the possibility of philosophy, except as the science of the subjective and relative. This is indeed the great problem of philosophy ; and the distinctive character of every system is determined by its solution of this problem.

The SENSUAL system, deducing all thought and all knowledge from sensation, cannot of course find the infinite : it reduces it to the finite, confounds it with the finite, and by confounding destroys ;

and, according as it is more or less consequent, denies, or admits by an inconsistency. The true solution of the universe, by this system, is in the finite, and in one term of it, namely, matter. It cannot however rest even in this solution; in its last logical consequences it destroys itself, by going out into absolute nihilism.

The SCOTTISH school of REID and Stewart, distinguished and recognized the element of the intelligence, confounded by Sensualism; and vindicated for it a subjective reality, under the title of constituent laws of the human mind, or principles of common sense. Their enumeration is arbitrary, and their reduction incomplete. Their solution of the infinite is properly only subjective. The result of their principles gives it as a necessary conviction, an irresistible belief, which, however—though purely subjective, having a necessity relative only to the human mind in reflection—was postulated as justifying the assertion of a corresponding objective reality, although it cannot be made the object of immediate knowledge.—KANT completely enumerated the elements of the human intelligence; his reduction, however, is imperfect. But in regard to the absolute, the infinite, as has been seen, he made it merely a regulative principle of thought, denied explicitly the possibility of any knowledge beyond the science of the subjective; he denied also that the subjective, considered merely as intelligence, afforded any ground for the assertion of a corresponding objective reality. God is a necessary conception, an object of invincible faith; but the only legitimate ground for this faith is the moral interest of the practical reason. This, however, cannot be taken as a scientific basis: considered as such, it is equally subjective as the regulative principles of the speculative intelligence, and equally liable to the objections which he urges against the latter, when applied beyond the limits of consciousness.—Thus, that which was already subjective in the timid and inconsequent Idealism of the Scottish school, becomes more decisively subjective in the Idealism of Kant; and neither of them establish the infinite as an object of knowledge.

This CousIN attempts to do, in the manner already explained. He joins with Schelling, against Kant, in denying the personal and subjective nature of intelligence, and in asserting for philosophy a positive science of the infinite, immediately known by the intelligence as impersonal and divine. But while Schelling, if we do

not mistake him, denies this knowledge to the consciousness, and refers it to a capacity for knowledge above consciousness, which is the absolute identity of being and knowing, of the finite and the infinite—Cousin maintains that consciousness is necessarily implied in intelligence, and that the knowledge of the infinite is given in the spontaneous consciousness as above explained.

Concerning the success of M. Cousin's attempt to fix the infinite as a positive in knowledge, and concerning the possibility of any solution of this problem, different opinions may be entertained. But whatever may be thought in regard to these points, a high interest attaches to M. Cousin's labors, as an expounder of the history of philosophy. His profound and accurate acquaintance with the whole range of philosophical learning, his exact and just comprehension of philosophical doctrines and systems, and his lucid and faithful exposition of them, will certainly be appreciated by all competent judges. In general critical ability, and particularly in the talent for analysis, he has few equals.

We pass now to give some account of the course of lectures on the *History of Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century*, of which this volume contains a part. It must, however, be limited to the briefest indications.

Having, in his *Introduction to the History of Philosophy*, explained the scope and method, the system and general spirit of his instruction, M. Cousin proceeds, in the lectures on the philosophy of the 18th century, to elucidate, extend, and confirm the historical principles before developed, by applying them to the 18th century. It is his principle, that the philosophy of an age proceeds from all the elements of which the age is composed ; hence the necessity of studying the philosophy of the 18th century, first in the general history of that period.

The general character of the 18th century resembles that of the two preceding centuries, inasmuch as it continues the characteristic movement of that period ; it differs from it, only as it develops that movement on a larger scale. The Middle Ages was the reign of authority—every thing was fixed and controlled ; the 16th and 17th centuries commenced a new movement, in the spirit of independence ; it was the age of conflict and revolution. The 16th and 17th centuries undermined and shook the middle ages. The mission of the 18th century was to continue and complete

that movement,—to overthrow and put an end to the middle ages.

This mission determines the general spirit of the 18th century. This spirit is displayed in all the great manifestations of the age—political—moral—religious—literary—and scientific. In all these respects, there is a diminution of the powers and influences which predominated in the middle ages ; and, finally, the extension and predominance of new and unknown powers and influences. The spirit of the 18th century is a spirit of independence, of scrutiny, of analysis, in regard to all things. This movement began obscurely, and proceeded with a comparatively slow and latent progress at first, but with a constantly accelerating march towards the close of the period.

The general character of the philosophy of the 18th century is determined by the general character of the period. The philosophy of this epoch likewise continues, develops, and completes the philosophical movement of the former period. This movement was in the reaction against the spirit of authority in philosophy which predominated in the middle ages. This reaction—which began in the 16th century, by the springing up of the spirit of independence ; and which continued with increasing strength during the 17th—gains the victory in the 18th ; completes and puts an end to the middle ages in the matter of philosophy. The 16th century was, to this philosophical revolution, what the 15th was to the religious reformation ;—a period of necessary preparation, filled with struggles, and often with unsuccessful struggles, against the predominant spirit of authority ; and, like that, it had its martyrs. Bruno and Vanini were the Huss and Jerome of this philosophical revolution. The 16th century was a blind attack upon the principle of authority, as it existed in the Scholastic philosophy. The 17th century renewed the conflict, established the revolution, and destroyed Scholasticism.—The mission of the 18th century was to continue and consummate this revolution, by overthrowing the general spirit of authority in philosophy, and establishing the general spirit of independence. In fact, it generalized the conflict of the preceding period ; propagated the spirit of independence in every direction of thinking ; and, finally, established philosophy as a distinct and independent power.

Thus the general mission of the 18th century was to continue and complete the movement of independence, begun in the two preceding centuries ; and to put a final end to the middle ages in every thing,—politics, life, art, and science.

Analogous to this, the special mission of philosophy in the 18th century, was to complete the movement before begun therein, to put an end to the middle ages in regard to philosophy, by destroying, in this respect, the principle of authority, and circumscribing it within its proper limits, those of theology.

Now this was a complex and laborious task, mixed with results of good and of evil. The reaction against authority might go too far : freedom is liable to be pushed to licentiousness ; and while the object is to reduce religious authority within its legitimate sphere, namely, theology, theology itself may be attacked. Instances of this occur in the philosophy of the 18th century ; still, a large share of the most illustrious names are no less distinguished for a profound submission and respect to religion, than by the spirit of independence in regard to philosophy.

Next comes the consideration of the method of philosophy in the 18th century. The middle ages was the reign of Hypothesis. The 16th century was a sort of insurrection of the new spirit against the old, and could not organize itself and take the form and consistence of an established method. But in the 17th century, the true Method began to be formed under Bacon and Descartes ; though in the latter it ran out at last into hypothesis. In the 18th century, the question concerning method became the fundamental question. In this century was completed the triumph of the method of experiment over hypothesis ; its triumph, that is, in regard to its principle, namely, analysis. Analysis was generalized, extended every where, and established as an exclusive power in philosophy.—The triumph of analysis has likewise its part of good and its part of evil. Its good is found in the destruction of hypothesis, and of false synthesis, and in a vast collection of accurate experiments and observations. Its evil is found in the neglect of synthesis, which is, equally with analysis, an element of the true experimental method.

Then follows a view of the different systems of philosophy embraced in the 18th century. These systems are the same as those of the two preceding centuries ; neither more nor less. The only

difference is, that the philosophy of the 18th century develops these systems in grander proportions, and on a larger scale. They are the same systems, moreover, which are to be found in the 15th and 16th centuries,—in the middle ages,—in Greece,—in the East. The reason is, that all these systems have their root in human nature, independent of particular times and places. The human mind is the original, of which philosophy is the representation, more or less exact and complete. We are therefore to seek from the human mind the explanation of the different systems, which, born of philosophy, share all its changes, its progress, and its perfectionment ;—which, starting up in the east, in the cradle of humanity, after traversing the globe, and successively appearing in Greece, in the middle ages, in the modern philosophy commencing with the 16th century,—have met together in Europe in the 18th century.

The result of this examination gives, as a matter of fact in the history of philosophy, four great schools or systems of philosophy, which comprehend all the attempts of the philosophical spirit, and which are found in every great epoch of the world. These systems are Sensualism, Idealism, Scepticism, and Mysticism.

Sensualism takes sensation as the sole principle of knowledge. Its pretension is, that there is not a single element in the consciousness, which is not explicable by sensation. This exclusive pretension is its error. A part of our knowledge can be explained by sensation ; but another part, and that a very important part, cannot. Its necessary consequences are fatalism, materialism, and atheism.

On the other hand, Idealism, as an exclusive system, takes its point of departure from the reason or intelligence, from the ideas or laws which govern its activity ; but instead of contenting itself with denying the exclusive pretension of Sensualism, and asserting the origin of an important part of our knowledge in the reason, and thus vindicating the truths destroyed by sensualism,—it finds all reality in the mind alone, denies matter, absorbs all things, God and the universe, into individual consciousness, and that into thought ; just as, by a contrary error, Sensualism absorbs consciousness and all things into sensation. Sensualism and Idealism are two dogmatisms equally true in one view, equally false in another ; and both result in nearly equal extravagances.

Scepticism, in its first form, is the appearance of common sense on the scene of philosophy. Disgusted with the extravagances of the two exclusive systems, which mutually conflict and destroy each other, reflection proceeds to examine the bases, the processes and results of those systems; and it easily and undeniably demonstrates that, in all these respects, there is much error in both the systems. But in its weakness, it falls likewise into exclusiveness and exaggeration; and finally declares that every system is false, and that there is no such thing as truth and certainty within the grasp of the mind. Thus scepticism results in equal extravagance. Its distinctive position, that there is no truth, no certainty, is the absurd and suicidal dogmatism: It is certain that there is no certainty.

The fourth system is Mysticism. The word is not used vaguely, but in a precise sense; and designates the principle of a distinct philosophical system.—The human mind, indeed, when tossed about amidst conflicting systems, and distressed by the sense of inability to decide for itself, yet feeling the inward want of faith,—a spirit the reverse of the dogmatic and scornful scepticism, may despair of philosophy, renounce reflection, and take refuge within the circle of theology. This is doubtless often the fact, though there is, in the opinion of Cousin, an obvious inconsistency in it; for it takes for granted, that the objections which scepticism brings against every system, and which the mind cannot refute, are not as valid against a religious as a philosophical system.—The renunciation of reflection is not, however, what Cousin means by Mysticism. It is reflection itself, building its system on an element of consciousness overlooked by Sensualism, and by Idealism, and by Scepticism. This element is spontaneity, which is the basis of reflection. Spontaneity is the element of faith, of religion. Reflection effects a sort of philosophical compromise between religion and philosophy, by falling back and grounding itself upon that fact, anterior to itself, which is the point where religion and philosophy meet—the fact of spontaneity. This fact is primitive, unreflective, accompanied by a lively faith, and is exalting in its influence. It is reason, referred to its eternal principle, and speaking with his authority in the human intelligence. It is on this element of truth that Mysticism reposes. But this system, like the others, in the exaggeration of its principles and in its neglect

of the other elements of human nature, engenders multiplied extravagances; the delusions of the imagination, and nervous sensibility, taken for revelations, neglect of outward reality, visions, theurgy, &c.

These systems all have their utility; positively, in developing respectively some element of intelligence, and in cultivating some part of human nature and of science;—negatively, in limiting each other, in combatting each other's errors, and in repressing each other's extravagances.

As to their intrinsic merit, it is a favorite position with Cousin: They exist; therefore there is reason for their existence; therefore they are true, in whole or in part. Error is the law of our nature; but not absolute error. Absolute error is unintelligible, inadmissible, impossible. It is not the error that the human mind believes; it is only in virtue of the truths blended with it that error is admitted. These four systems are, respectively, partly true and partly false. The eclectic spirit is not absolutely to reject any one of them, nor to become the dupe of any one of them; but, by a discriminating criticism, to discern and accept the truth in each. This is the scope and attempt of M. Cousin's historical and critical labors.

These four systems are the fundamental elements of all philosophy, and consequently of the history of philosophy. They are not only found in the 18th century, but they exist, and re-appear successively in every great epoch of the history of man. Previously, therefore, to entering upon the examination of these systems as they exist in the 18th century, Cousin reviews their respective antecedents in the East, in Greece, in the middle age, and in the 16th and 17th centuries. He traces and develops the Sensual, the Ideal, the Sceptical, and the Mystical schools, in each of those periods. The principal portion of his first volume is occupied with this review. Our limits forbid us to follow him. It can only be remarked, that, along with the other schools, he finds also the Sensual school. He finds it with all its distinctive traits in the philosophy of India; he traces it through the twelve centuries filled by Grecian philosophy, from its commencement in the Ionian school, to Aristotle and the Peripatetics; thence to its re-appearance in the middle age, involved in the scholastic nominalism of Occam; thence to its more decided announcement in Pompona-

tius, Telesio, and Campanella, in the 15th and 16th centuries; and finally in modern philosophy, in Hobbes, Gassendi, and others, the immediate predecessors of Locke. He then comes to a detailed examination of Locke as the true father of the Sensual school, and of the various sensual systems included in it, in the 18th century. In this examination of the *Essay on the Understanding*, he signalizes its general spirit and its method; he exhibits its systematic principle, its applications, and all its consequences, explicit or involved. He carefully discriminates its part of truth from its part of error; and if his conclusions result in the overthrow of the exclusive and systematic principles and principal positions of Locke's work, it is because his analysis led him to this. Of the truth and exactness of this analysis, the reader will judge.

CRITICAL EXAMINATION
OF
LOCKE'S ESSAY
ON
THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

CHAPTER FIRST.

CONTENTS OF CHAPTER FIRST.

General spirit of the *Essay on the Human Understanding*.—Its Method. Study of the Human Understanding itself, as the necessary introduction to all true philosophy.—Study of the Human Understanding in its action, in its phenomena, or *ideas*.—Division of the inquiries relating to ideas, and determination of the order in which those investigations should be made. To postpone the logical and ontological question concerning the truth or falsity of ideas, and the legitimacy or illegitimacy of their application to their respective objects; and to concentrate our investigations upon the study of ideas in themselves,—and in that, to begin by describing ideas as they actually are, and then to proceed to the investigation of their origin.—Examination of the Method of Locke. Its merit: he postpones and places last the question of the truth or falsity of ideas. Its fault: he entirely neglects the question concerning the actual character of ideas, and begins with that of their origin. First mistake of Method; chances of error which it involves.—General tendency of the School of Locke. Recapitulation.

CHAPTER I.

THE first question which arises, in examining the *Essay on the Human Understanding*, respects the authority upon which it relies in the last analysis. Does the author seek for truth at his own risk, by the force of reason alone ; or does he recognize a foreign and superior authority to which he submits, and from which he borrows the grounds of his judgments ? This is indeed, as you know, the question which it is necessary to put at the outset to every philosophical work, in order to determine its most general character, and its place in the history of philosophy, and even of civilization. . A single glance is enough to show that Locke is a free seeker of truth. Every where he appeals to the reason. He starts from this authority, and from this alone ; and if he subsequently admits another, it is because he arrived at it by reason ; so that it is the reason which governs him, and, as it were, holds the reins of his mind. Locke belongs then to the great family of independent philosophers. The *Essay on the Human Understanding* is a fruit of the movement of independence in the eighteenth century, and it has sustained and redoubled that movement. This character passed from the master to his whole school, and was thus recommended to all the friends of human reason.—I should add that in Locke, independence is always united with a sincere and profound respect for every thing worthy of respect. Locke is a philosopher, and he is at the same time a christian. That is one of his titles of honor. But it must be said that if in the *Essay on the Human Understanding* there is a tincture of sound piety and true christianity, it is christianity in a sort reduced to its most general expression. Locke frequently quotes the sacred scriptures and pays homage to them ; but never enters into the interior of those doctrines and mysteries in which, nevertheless, the metaphysics of

christianity reside. Locke is a child of the reformation and of protestantism; he even inclines toward Socinianism, and though certainly within the bounds of christianity, is upon the very limit of it. Such is the chief. As to his school, you know what it has been. The master is independent, yet still christian; the disciples are independent, but their independence passed rapidly into indifference, and from indifference to hostility. I mention all this, because it is important that you should hold in your hand the thread of the movement and progress of the Sensual school.

I now pass to the question which comes next after that concerning the general spirit of every philosophical work, namely the question of Method. You know the importance of this question. It ought by this time to be very obvious to you, that as is the method of a philosopher, so will be his system, and that the adoption of a method decides the destinies of a philosophy. Hence our strict obligation to insist on the method of Locke with all the care of which we are capable. What then is that method which, in its germe, contains the whole system of Locke, the system that has produced the Sensual school of the eighteenth century? We will let Locke speak for himself. In his preface he expresses himself thus:

"Were it fit to trouble thee with the history of this Essay, I should tell thee, that five or six friends, meeting in my chamber, and discoursing on a subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by the difficulties that arose on every side. After we had awhile puzzled ourselves without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us, it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course; and that before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were, or were not, fitted to deal with. This I proposed to the company, who all readily assented; and thereupon it was agreed that this should be our first inquiry. Some hasty and undigested thoughts on a subject I had never before considered, which I set down against our next meeting, gave the first entrance into this discourse;

which having been thus begun by chance, was continued by intreaty ; written by incoherent parcels ; and after long intervals of neglect, resumed again, as my humour or occasions permitted ; and at last, in a retirement, where an attendance on my health gave me leisure, it was brought into that order thou now seest it."

He returns to the same thought in the Introduction which follows the preface.

B. I. Ch. I. § 2.—"I shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind, or trouble myself to examine wherein its essence consists, or by what motions of our spirits, or alterations of our bodies, we come to have any sensation by our organs, or any *ideas* in our understandings ; and whether those ideas do, in their formation, any or all of them, depend on matter or no. These are speculations, which, however curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my way, in the design I am now upon. It shall suffice to my present purpose, to consider the discerning faculties of a man, as they are employed about the objects which they have to do with."

Locke is persuaded that this is the only way to repress the rashness of philosophy, and at the same time to encourage useful investigations.

B. I. Ch. I. § 4.—"If, by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding, I can discover the powers thereof, how far they reach, to what things they are in any degree proportionate, and where they fail us, I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man, to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension ; to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether ; and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things, which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities. We should not then perhaps be so forward, out of an affectation of an universal knowledge, to raise questions and perplex ourselves and others about things to which our understandings are not suited, and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear and distinct perceptions, or whereof (as it has per-

haps too often happened) we have not any notions at all. If we can find out how far the understanding can extend its view, how far it has faculties to attain certainty, and in what cases it can only judge and guess, we may learn to content ourselves with what is attainable by us in this state."

§ 6. "When we know our own *strength*, we shall the better know what to undertake with hopes of success: and when we have well surveyed the *powers* of our own *minds*, and made some estimate what we may expect from them, we shall not be inclined either to sit still and not set our thoughts on work at all, in despair of knowing anything; or, on the other side, question every thing, and disclaim all knowledge, because some things are not to be understood."

And again in the same section:

"It is of great use to the sailor, to know the length of his line, though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the ocean. It is well he knows that it is long enough to reach the bottom, at such places as are necessary to direct his voyage, and caution him against running upon shoals that may ruin him."

I will add but one more quotation.

§ 7. "This was that which gave the first rise to this Essay concerning the understanding. For I thought that the first step towards satisfying several inquiries the mind of man was very apt to run into, was to take a survey of our own understandings, examine our own powers, and see to what things they were adapted. Till that was done, I suspected we began at the wrong end ———."

I have brought together all these citations on purpose to convince you that they contain not merely a fugitive view, but a fixed rule, a Method. Now this method, in my judgment, is precisely the true method, the same which at this day constitutes the power and the hope of science. Unquestionably it exists in Locke obscurely and indefinitely, not only in its application, but even in its annunciation. In order to make it more clear and definite, let me present it in somewhat more modern language.

Whatever be the object of knowledge or inquiry, God or the world, beings the most remote or near, you neither know nor can know them but under one condition, namely, that you have the faculty of knowledge in general; and you neither possess nor can attain a knowledge of them except in proportion to your general faculty of knowledge. Whatever you attain a knowledge of, the highest or the lowest thing, your knowledge in the last result rests, both in respect of its extent and of its legitimacy, upon the reach and the validity of that faculty, by whatever name you call it,—Spirit, Reason, Mind, Intelligence, Understanding. Locke calls it Understanding. It follows, then, that the sound philosopher, instead of beginning with a blind and random application of the Understanding, ought first to examine that faculty, to investigate its nature and its capacity; otherwise he will be liable to endless aberrations and mistakes. Now the Understanding forms a part of human nature; and the study of the Understanding implies a more extended study—the study of human nature itself. This, then, is pre-eminently the study which ought to precede and direct all others. There is no part of philosophy which does not presuppose it, and borrow its light from it. Take, for example, *Logic*, or the science of the rules which ought to direct the human mind,—what would it be without a knowledge of that which it is the object to direct, the human mind itself? So also of *Morals*, the science of the principles and rules of action,—what could that be without a knowledge of the *subject* of morality, the moral agent, man himself? *Politics*, the science or the art of the government of social man, rests equally on a knowledge of man, whom in his social nature, society may develope, but cannot constitute. *Esthetics*, the science of the Beautiful, and the theory of the Arts, has its root in the nature of a being made capable to recognize and reproduce the beautiful, to feel the particular emotions which attest its presence, and to awaken those emotions in other minds. So also if man were not a *religious* being, if none of his faculties reached beyond the finite and bounded sphere of this world, there would be for him no God.

God exists *for man*, only in proportion to his faculties ; and the examination of those faculties and of their capacity, is the indispensable condition of every sound Theodicy. In a word, the nature of man is implied in every science, however apparently foreign. The study of man is then the necessary introduction to every science ; and this study, call it Psychology, or by any other name, though it certainly is not the whole of Philosophy, must be allowed to be its foundation and its starting point.

But is a knowledge of human nature, is Psychology possible ? Without doubt it is ; for it is an undeniable fact, that nothing passes within us which we do not know, of which we have not a consciousness. Consciousness is a witness which gives us information of every thing which takes place in the interior of our minds.* It is not the principle of any of our faculties, but is a light to them all. It is not because we have the consciousness of it, that any thing goes on within us ; but that which does go on within us, would be to us as though it did not take place, if it were not attested by consciousness. It is not by consciousness that we feel, or will, or think ; but it is by it we know that we do all this. The authority of consciousness is the ultimate authority into which that of all the other faculties is resolvable, in this sense, namely, that if the former be overthrown, as it is thereby that the office and action of all the others, even that of the faculty of knowing itself, comes to be known, their authority, without being in itself destroyed, would yet be unknown to us, and consequently nothing for us. Thus it is impossible for any person not to rely fully upon his own consciousness. At this point, skepticism itself expires ; for, as Descartes says, let a man doubt of every thing else, he cannot doubt that he doubts. Consciousness, then, is an unquestionable authority ; its testimony is infallible, and no individual is destitute of it. Consciousness is indeed more or less distinct, more or less vivid, but it is in all men. No one is unknown to himself, although very few know themselves per-

* See Appendix, Note A.

fectly, because all or nearly all make use of consciousness without applying themselves to perfect, unfold, and understand it, by voluntary effort and attention. In all men, consciousness is a natural process ; some elevate this natural process to the degree of an art, a method, by reflection, which is a sort of second consciousness, a free reproduction of the first ; and as consciousness gives to all men a knowledge of what passes within them, so reflection gives the philosopher a certain knowledge of every thing which falls under the eye of consciousness.* It is to be observed that the question here is not concerning hypotheses or conjectures ; for it is not even a question concerning a process of reasoning. It is solely a question of facts, and of facts that are equally capable of being observed as those which come to pass on the scene of the outward world. The only difference is, the one are exterior, the other interior ; and as the natural action of our faculties carries us outward, it is more easy to observe the one than the other. But with a little attention, voluntary exertion, and practice, one may succeed in internal observation as well as in external. The talent for the latter is not more common than for the former. The number of Bacons is not greater than the number of Descartes. In fine, if Psychology were really more difficult than Physics, yet in its nature, the former is, equally with the latter, a science of observation, and consequently it has the same title and the same right to the rank of a positive science.

But we must understand its proper objects. The objects of Psychology are those of reflection, which again are those of consciousness. Now it is evident the objects of consciousness are neither the outward world, nor God, which are not given us in themselves ; nor is it even the soul itself as to its substance, for if we had a consciousness of the substance of the soul, there would be no more dispute concerning its nature, whether it be material or spiritual. The only direct object of consciousness is the soul in its manifestation, that is in its

* See Appendix, Note B.

faculties, that is to say again, its faculties in their exercise and action, in their application to their objects. But neither the objects of these faculties, nor their subject and substance, are objects of consciousness. The essence, the being in itself, whatever it be, whether of bodies, or of God, or of the soul, falls not under consciousness. It directly attains only to phenomena. If, then, phenomena are the sole objects of consciousness, and consequently of reflection, and consequently again of psychology, it follows that the proper characteristic of psychology is a complete separation of itself from every research relative to essences, that is from ontology. True philosophy does not destroy ontology, but it adjourns it. Psychology does not dethrone ontology, but precedes and clears it up. It does not employ itself in constructing a physical or metaphysical romance concerning the nature of the soul, but it studies the soul in the action of its faculties, in the phenomena which result therefrom, and which consciousness may attain, and does directly attain.

This may put in clear view the true character of the Essay on the Human Understanding. It is a work of psychology and not of ontology. Locke does not investigate the nature and principle of the understanding, but the action itself of this faculty, the phenomena by which it is developed and manifested. Now the phenomena of the understanding Locke calls *ideas*. This is the technical word which he every where employs to designate that by which the understanding manifests itself, and that to which it immediately applies itself.

Introduction, § 8. "I have used it," says he, "to express whatever is meant (we must here recollect the predecessors of Locke, the Schoolmen,) by *phantasm*, *notion*, *species*, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking. I presume it will be easily granted me that there are such ideas in men's minds; every one is conscious of them in himself; and men's words and actions will satisfy him that they are in others."

It is very obvious that by ideas are here meant the phenomena of the understanding, of thought, which the conscious-

ness of every one can perceive in himself when he thinks, and which are equally in the consciousness of other men, if we judge by their words and actions. Ideas are to the understanding what effects are to their causes. The understanding reveals itself by ideas, just as causes by their effects, which at once manifest and represent them. Hereafter we shall examine the advantages and disadvantages of this term, and the theory also which it involves. For the present it is enough to state it and to signalize it as the watchword of the philosophy of Locke. The study of the understanding is with Locke and with all his school, the study of ideas; and hence the celebrated word Ideology, recently formed to designate the science of the human understanding. The source of this expression already lay in the Essay on the Human Understanding, and the Ideological school is the natural daughter of Locke.*

Here, then, you perceive the study of the human understanding reduced to the study of ideas; now this study embraces several orders of researches which it is important definitely to determine. According to what has been said, ideas may be considered under two points of view: we may inquire if, in relation to their respective objects, they are true or false; or, neglecting the question of their truth and falsity, their legitimate or illegitimate application to their objects, we may investigate solely what they are in themselves as they are manifested by consciousness. Such are the two most general questions which may be proposed respecting ideas. The order in which they are to be treated cannot be doubtful. It is obvious enough, that to begin by considering ideas in relation to their objects, without having ascertained what they are in themselves, is to begin at the end; it is to begin by investigating the legitimacy of results, while remaining in ignorance of their principles. The correct procedure, then, is to begin by the investigation of ideas, *not* as true or false, properly or improperly applicable to such or such objects, and

* See Appendix, Note C.

consequently as being or not being sufficient grounds for such or such opinion or knowledge, *but* as simple phenomena of the understanding, marked by their respective characteristics. In this way unquestionably should the true method of observation proceed.

This is not all. Within these limits there is ground likewise for two distinct orders of investigation.

We may investigate by internal observation the ideas which are in the human understanding as it is now developed in the present state of things. The object, in this case, is to collect the phenomena of the understanding as they are given in consciousness, and to state accurately their differences and resemblances, so as to arrive at length at a good classification of all these phenomena. Hence the first maxim of the method of observation : to omit none of the phenomena attested by consciousness. Indeed you have no option ; they exist, and they must for that sole reason be recognized. They are in reality in the consciousness ; and they must find a place in the frame-work of your science, or your science is nothing but an illusion. The second rule is : to imagine none, or to take none upon mere supposition. As you are not to deny any thing which is ; so you are not to presume any thing which is not. You are to invent nothing and you are to suppress nothing. To omit nothing, to take nothing upon supposition ; these are the two maxims of observation, the two essential laws of the experimental method applied to the phenomena of the understanding, as to every other order of phenomena. And what I say of the phenomena of the understanding, I say also of their characteristics ; none must be omitted, none taken upon supposition. Thus having omitted nothing, and taken nothing upon supposition, having embraced all the actual phenomena and those only, with all their actual characteristics and those only ; you will have the best chance of arriving at a legitimate classification, which will comprehend the whole reality and nothing but the reality, the statistics of the phenomena of the understanding, that is of ideas, complete and exact.

This done, you will know the understanding as it is at present. But has it always been what it is at present? Since the day when its operations began, has it not undergone many changes? These phenomena, whose characters you have with so much penetration and fidelity analyzed and reproduced, have they always been what they are and what they now appear to you? May they not have had at their birth certain characters which have disappeared, or have wanted at the outset certain characters which they have since acquired? This is a point to be examined. Hence the important question of the origin of ideas or the primitive characters of the phenomena of the understanding. When this second question shall be resolved; when you shall know what in their birth-place have been the same phenomena which you have studied and learned in their actual form; when you shall know what they were, and what they have become; it will be easy for you to trace the route by which they have arrived from their primitive to their present state. You will easily trace their genesis, after having determined their actual present state, and penetrated their origin. It is then only that you will know perfectly what you are; for you will know both what you were, and what you now are, and how from what you were you have come to be what you are. Thus will be completely known to you, both in its actual and in its primitive state, and also in its changes, that faculty of knowledge, that intelligence, that reason, that spirit, that mind, that understanding, which is for you the foundation of all knowledge.

The question of the present state of our ideas, and that of their origin, are then two distinct questions, and both of them are necessary to constitute a complete psychology. In so far as psychology has not surveyed and exhausted these two orders of researches, it is unacquainted with the phenomena of the understanding; for it has not apprehended them under all their aspects. It remains to see with which we should commence. Shall we begin by investigating the actual characters of our ideas, or by investigating their origin? For as to the

process of their generation and the passage from their primitive to their present state, it is clear that we can know nothing of it, till after we have exactly recognized and determined both the one and the other state. But which of these two shall we study first?

Shall we begin, for example, with the question of the origin of ideas? It is without doubt a point extremely curious and extremely important. Man aspires to penetrate the origin of every thing, and particularly of the phenomena that pass within him. He cannot rest satisfied without having gained this. The question concerning the origin of ideas is undeniably in the human mind; it has then its place and its claim in science. It must come up at some time, but should it come up the first? In the first place it is full of obscurity. The mind is a river which we cannot easily ascend. Its source, like that of the Nile, is a mystery. How, indeed, shall we catch the fugitive phenomena, by which the birth and first springing up of thought is marked? Is it by memory? But you have forgotten what passed within you then; you did not even remark it. Life and thought then go on without our heeding the manner in which we think and live; and the memory yields not up the deposit that was never entrusted to it. Will you consult others? They are in the same perplexity with yourself. Will you make the infant mind your study? But who will unfold what passes beneath the veil of infant thought? The attempt to do it readily conducts to conjectures, to hypotheses. But is it thus you would begin an experimental science? It is evident that if you start with this question concerning the origin of ideas, you start with precisely the most difficult question. Now if a sound method ought to proceed from the better known to the less known, from the more easy to the less easy, I would ask whether it ought to commence with the origin of ideas? This is the first objection. Look at another. You begin by investigating the origin of ideas; you begin then by investigating the origin of that of which you are ignorant, of phenomena which you have not studied. What origin could you then find but a

hypothetical origin? And this hypothesis will be either true or false. Is it true? Very well then: you have happened to divine correctly; but as divination, even the divination of genius, is not a scientific process, so the truth itself thus discovered, cannot claim the rank of science: it is still but hypothesis. Is it false? Then instead of truth under the vicious form of an hypothesis, you have merely an hypothesis without truth. Accordingly you may see what will be the result. As this hypothesis, that is to say in this case this error, will have acquired a hold in your mind; when you come in accordance with it to explain the phenomena of the intelligence as it is at present, if they are not what they ought to be in order to establish your hypothesis, you will not on that account give up your hypothesis. You will sacrifice reality to it. You will do one of two things: you will boldly deny all ideas which are not explicable by your hypothetical origin; or you will arrange them arbitrarily and to the support of your hypothesis. Certainly it was not worth while to have made choice, with so much parade, of the experimental method, to falsify it afterwards by putting it upon a direction so perilous. Wisdom, then, good sense and logic demand, that omitting provisionally the question of the origin of ideas, we should be content first to observe the ideas as they now are, the characters which the phenomena of intelligence actually have at present in the consciousness.

This done, in order to complete our investigations, in order to go to the extent of our capacity and of the wants of the human mind, and of the demands of the experimental problems, we may interrogate ourselves as to what have been in their origin the ideas which we at present possess. Either we shall discover the truth, and experimental science, the science of observation and induction will be completely achieved; or we shall not discover it, and in that case nothing will be either lost or compromised. We shall not have attained all possible truth, but we shall have attained a great part of the truth. We shall know what *is*, if we do not know what *was*; and we shall always be prepared to try again the delicate question

of the origin of ideas, instead of having all our ulterior investigations impaired, and observation perverted beforehand, by the primary vice of our method in getting bewildered in a premature inquiry.

✓ The regular order then of psychological problems may be settled in the following manner :

1. To investigate without any systematic prejudice, by observation solely, in simplicity and good faith, the phenomena of the understanding in their *actual* state as they are at present given in consciousness, dividing and classifying them according to the known laws of scientific division and classification.

2. To investigate the *origin* of these same phenomena or ideas by all the means in our power, but with the firm resolution not to suffer what observation has given, to be wrested by any hypothesis, and with our eyes constantly fixed on the present reality and its unquestionable characters. To this question of the origin of ideas is joined that of their formation and genesis, which evidently depends upon and is involved in it.

Such in their methodical order are the different problems included in psychology. The slightest inversion of this order is full of danger and involves the gravest mistakes. Indeed you can easily conceive, that if you treat the question of the legitimacy of the application of our ideas to their external objects, before learning what these ideas exactly are, what are their present actual characters and what their primitive characters, what they are and from whence they spring, you must wander at hazard and without a torch in the unknown world of ontology. Again : you can conceive, that even within the limits of psychology, if you begin by wishing to carry by main force the question of the origin of ideas, before knowing what these ideas are, and before you have recognized them by observation, you seek for light in the darkness which will not yield it.

Now, how has Locke proceeded, and in what order has he taken up these problems of philosophy ?

Introduction, Sect. 3. "I shall pursue, says he, this following method :

First, I shall inquire into the *original* of those *ideas*, notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his mind ; and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them.

Secondly, I shall endeavor to show what *knowledge* the understanding hath by those ideas ; and the certainty, evidence, and extent of it.

Thirdly, I shall make some inquiry into the nature and grounds of *faith* or *opinion* ; whereby I mean that assent which we give to any proposition as true, of whose truth yet we have no certain knowledge : and here we shall have occasion to examine the reasons and degrees of assent."

It is evident that the two latter points here indicated, refer collectively to one and the same question, that is the general question of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the application of our ideas to their external objects ; and the question is here given as the last question of philosophy. It is nothing less than the adjournment of the whole logical and ontological inquiry until after psychology. Here is the fundamental characteristic of the method of Locke, and in this the originality of his Essay. We agree entirely with Locke in this respect, with this provision however, that the adjournment of ontology shall not be the destruction of it.

Now remains the first point, which is purely psychological, and which occupies the greatest part of Locke's work. He here declares that his first inquiry will be into the origin of ideas. Now here are two radical errors in point of method :—1. Locke treats of the origin of ideas before investigating what they are, before tracing the statistics and preparing the inventory of them. 2. He does still more : he not only puts the question of the origin of ideas before that of the inventory of ideas with their actual characters ; but he entirely neglects the latter question. It was already running a great hazard to put the one question before the other ; for it was seeking

an hypothesis at the very outset, even though afterwards the hypothesis should be confronted with the actual reality of consciousness. But how will it be when even this possibility of return to truth is interdicted, when the fundamental question, of the inventory of our ideas and their actual characters, is absolutely omitted ?

Such is the first aberration of Locke. Locke recognizes and proclaims the experimental method ; he proposes to apply it to the phenomena of the understanding, to ideas ; but not being profoundly enough acquainted with this method, which indeed was then in its infancy, he has not apprehended all the questions to which it gives rise ; he has not disposed these questions in their true relation to each other ; has misconceived and omitted the chief question, that which is eminently the experimental problem, namely, the observation of the actual characters of our ideas ; and he has fallen at the outset upon a question which he ought to have postponed, the obscure and difficult question of the origin of our ideas. What then must the result be ? *Either*, 1, Locke will hit upon the true origin of ideas by a sort of good luck and divination, which I should rejoice in ; but however true it may really be, it could never take a legitimate place in science except upon this condition, that Locke should subsequently demonstrate that the characters of our ideas are all in fact explicable and explained in all their extent by the origin which he supposes ; —or else, 2, Locke will deceive himself : now, if he deceives himself, the error will not be a particular error, confined to a single point, and without influence upon the rest. It will be a general error, an immense error, which will corrupt all psychology at its source, and thereby all metaphysics. For in faithfully adhering to his hypothesis, to the origin which he had beforehand assigned to all ideas without knowing precisely what they were, he will necessarily sacrifice all ideas which cannot be reduced to this origin ; and this origin, being not only an hypothesis, but an error, he will sacrifice unsparingly (for there is nothing more uncompromising than the spirit of systematic consistency) to an error every thing

which in his ulterior researches cannot be made to agree with it. The falsehood of the origin will spread out over the actual present state of the intelligence, and will hide even from the eyes of consciousness the actual characters of our ideas. Thus when observation shall come tardily in, if it comes at all, it will beforehand have been misled by the spirit of system and vitiated by false data. Hence it will result that from application to application of this hypothesis, that is from error to error, the human understanding and human nature will be more and more misconceived, reality destroyed and science perverted.

You see the rock ; it remains to learn if Locke has made shipwreck upon it. We do not know, for as yet we are ignorant what he has done, whether he has been so fortunate as to divine correctly ; or whether he has had the fate of most diviners, and of those who take at venture a road they have never measured. We suppose ourselves to be at present ignorant, and we shall hereafter examine. But here is a proper place to remark, that it is in great part from Locke, is derived in the eighteenth century, and in all his school, the habit and system of placing the question of the origin and genesis of ideas at the head of all philosophical inquiries. All the school start from this question ; that is to say, this school which eulogizes so much the experimental method, is the one which corrupts it and misleads it at the very starting-point. It takes up the question of origin in respect to everything. In metaphysics, it is pre-occupied with inquiring what are the first ideas which enter into the mind of man. In morals, neglecting the actual facts of man's moral nature, it searches for the first ideas of good and evil which rise in the mind of man considered in the savage state or in infancy, two states in which experience is not very sure, and may be very arbitrary. In politics, it seeks for the origin of society, of government, of laws. In general, it takes fact as the equivalent of right ; and all philosophy, for this school, is resolved into history, and history the most dim and shadowy, that of the first age of humanity. Hence the political theories of this school, so opposite

in their results, while at the same time so identical in their general spirit and character. Some, burying themselves in ante-historical or anti-historical conjectures, find as the origin of society force and conquerors; the first government which history presents to them is despotic; hence the idea of government is the idea of despotism; for according to them it is the origin which it concerns us to know, it is the origin which gives to everything its true character. Others, on the contrary, in the convenient obscurities of the primitive state, perceive a contract, reciprocal stipulations and titles of liberty, which subsequently were made to give way to despotism, and which the present times ought to restore. In both cases alike, the legitimate state of human society is always drawn from its supposed primitive form, from that form which it is almost impossible to trace; and the rights of humanity are left at the mercy of a doubtful and perilous erudition, at the mercy of conflicting hypotheses. In fine, from origin to origin, they have gone on even to investigate and settle the true nature of humanity, its end, and all its destiny, by geological hypothesis; and the last expression of this tendency is the celebrated *Telliamed* of Maillet.*

To recapitulate: the most general character of the philosophy of Locke is independence; and here I openly range myself under his banner, though with the necessary reservations, if not side by side with the chief, at least side by side with his school. In respect to method, that of Locke is psychological, or ideological, (the name is of little consequence;) and here again I declare myself of his school. But from not sufficiently comprehending the psychological method, and not distinguishing the different spheres of inquiry in which it may be employed, I accuse him of having commenced by an order of investigations which in the eye of strict reason is not the first; I accuse him of having commenced by an order of inquiries which necessarily puts psychology upon the road of hypothe-

* See Appendix, Note E.

sis, and which more or less destroys its experimental character; and it is here that I withdraw myself from him.*

Let us recollect where we are. We have seen Locke entering upon a hazardous route. But has he had the good fortune, in spite of his bad choice, to arrive at the truth, that is to say, at the true origin of ideas? What is, according to him, this origin? This is the very basis of the *Essay on the Human Understanding*, the system to which Locke has attached his name. This will be the subject of our future discussions.

* See Appendix, Note F.



CRITICAL EXAMINATION
OF
LOCKE'S ESSAY
ON
THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

CHAPTER SECOND.

CONTENTS OF CHAPTER SECOND.

First Book of the *Essay on the Human Understanding*. Of Innate Ideas.—Second Book. Experience, the source of all ideas. Sensation and Reflection.—Locke places the development of the sensibility before that of the operations of the mind. Operations of the Mind. According to Locke they are exercised only upon sensible data. Basis of Sensualism.—Examination of the doctrine of Locke concerning the idea of Space.—That the idea of Space, in the system of Locke, should and does resolve itself into the idea of Body.—This confusion contradicted by facts, and by Locke himself.—Distinction of the actual characters of the ideas of Body and of Space : 1, the one contingent, the other necessary ; 2, the one limited the other illimitable ; 3, the one a sensible representation, the other a rational conception. This distinction ruins the system of Locke. Examination of the origin of the idea of space. Distinction between the logical order and the chronological order of ideas.—Logical order. The idea of space is the logical condition of the idea of body, its foundation, its reason, its origin, taken logically.—The idea of body is the chronological condition of the idea of space, its origin, taken chronologically.—Of the Reason, and Experience, considered as in turn the reciprocal condition of their mutual development.—Merit of the system of Locke.—Its vices : 1, confounds the measure of space with space ; 2, the condition of the idea of space with the idea itself.

CHAPTER II.

LOCKE, it is true, is not the first who started the question concerning the origin of ideas ; but it is Locke who first made it the grand problem of philosophy ; and since the time of Locke it has maintained this rank in his school. For the rest, although this question is not the first which in strict method should be agitated, yet certainly, taken in its place, it is of the highest importance. Let us see how Locke resolves it.

In entering upon the investigation of the origin of ideas, Locke encounters an opinion, which if it be well founded, would cut short the question : I refer to the doctrine of *innate ideas*. In truth, if ideas are innate, that is to say, as the word seems to indicate, if ideas are already in the mind at the moment when its action begins, then it does not acquire them, it possesses them from the first day just as they will be at the last, and properly speaking, they have no points of progress, of generation and of origin. This doctrine then is opposed to the very design of Locke, to begin with the question of the origin of ideas. It is opposed also to the solution which he wished to give of this question, and to the system with which he was pre-occupied. It behoved him, then, first of all, to begin by removing this obstacle, by refuting the doctrine of innate ideas. Hence the polemic discussion which fills the first book of the *Essay on the Understanding*. It is my duty to give you some account of this controversy.

According to Locke there are philosophers who consider certain principles, certain maxims and propositions, pertaining to metaphysics and morals, as innate. Now on what grounds can they be called innate ? Two reasons may be and have been given : 1, that these propositions are universally admit-

ted ; 2, that they are primitive, that they are known from the moment the reason is exercised.

Now Locke in examining these two reasons finds, that even if they were sound and true in themselves, which he denies, they yet altogether fail to establish the doctrine of innate ideas.

In metaphysics, he takes the two following propositions, namely : "*what is, is,*" and, "*it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be,*"—and he examines if in fact, all men admit these two propositions. Passing by civilized men who have read the philosophers, and who would certainly admit these propositions, he has recourse to uncivilized nations, to savage people, and he inquires if a savage knows that "*what is, is,*" and "*the same is the same.*" He replies for the savage, that he knows nothing about these propositions, and cares nothing. He interrogates the infant, and finds that the infant is in the same case as the savage. Finally supposing that savages and infants, as well as civilized people, admit that what is, is, and that the same is the same ; Locke has in reserve an objection which he believes unanswerable, namely, that idiots do not admit these propositions, and this single exception suffices, according to Locke, to demonstrate that they are not universally admitted, and consequently that they are not innate, for certainly the soul of the idiot is a human soul.

Examining again if these propositions are primitive, if they are possessed at the first, and as soon as men come to the use of reason, Locke still takes a child for the subject of his experiment, and maintains that there are a crowd of ideas which precede them, the ideas of colours, of bodies, the idea of existence ; and thus the propositions in question are not the first which preside over the developement of intelligence.

So much for speculative propositions. It is the same with practical : Locke subjects moral propositions or maxims to the same test as metaphysical. Here he rests even more strongly on the manners of savages, on the recitals of travellers, and on the observation of infants. His conclusion is that there is no

moral maxim, universally and primitively admitted, and consequently, innate.

Such are the first two chapters of the first book of the *Essay on the Human Understanding*. The last goes still farther. If the propositions and maxims, metaphysical and moral, before examined, are neither universally nor primitively admitted, what must we think of the ideas which are contained in these propositions, and which are the elements of them? Locke selects two of them, upon which he founds an extended discussion, namely, the idea of God, and the idea of substance. He has recourse to his ordinary arguments to prove that the idea of God, and that of substance, are neither universal nor primitive. Here, as in respect to the metaphysical propositions and the principles of morality and justice, he appeals to the testimony of savage nations, who, according to him, have no idea of God; he appeals also to infants to know if they have the idea of substance: and he concludes that these ideas are not innate, and that no particular idea, nor any general proposition, speculative or moral, exists anterior to experience.

As ever since Locke, the question concerning the origin of ideas has become the fundamental question in the Sensual school, so also it is to be remarked that ever since Locke, the controversy against innate ideas has become the necessary introduction of this school. And not only the subject, but the manner of treating it, came from Locke. Ever since his time, the habit has prevailed of appealing to savages and to children, concerning whom observation is so difficult; for in regard to the former, it is necessary to recur to travellers who are often prejudiced, who are ignorant of the languages of the people they visit; and as to children, we are reduced to the observation of very equivocal signs. The controversy of Locke, both in its substance and its form, has become the basis of every subsequent controversy in his school, against innate ideas.

Now what is the real value of this controversy? Permit me to adjourn this question. For if we should give it merely

a general discussion, it would be insufficient, and if we should discuss it more profoundly, it would anticipate some particular discussions which the examination of the Essay on the Understanding will successively bring up. Reserving, then, for the present, my judgment on the conclusions of the first book, I enter now upon the second, which contains the special theory of Locke, on the question of the origin of ideas.

"Let us then suppose, says Locke, (B. II. chap. I. § 2,) the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any *ideas*; how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from *experience*; in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself.

Experience, then, this is the banner of Locke: it has become that of his whole school. Without adopting or rejecting it, let us accurately determine what it covers. Let us see what Locke understands by experience. I leave him to speak for himself:

B. II. ch. I. § 2. "Our observation, employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring."

§ 3. "*The objects of sensation one source of ideas.*"

FIRST, Our *senses*, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct *perceptions* of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them: and thus we come by those *ideas* we have of *yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet*, and all those things which we call sensible qualities; which, when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into the mind what produces

there those perceptions. This great source of most of the *ideas* we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call *Sensation*.

§ 4. "*The operations of our minds the other source of ideas.*"

SECONDLY, The other fountain from which experience furnisheth the understanding with *ideas*, is the *perception of the operations of our own mind* within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got; which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of *ideas*, which could not be had from things without; and such are *perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing*, and all the different actings of our own minds; which we being conscious of, and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understandings as distinct *ideas*, as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called *internal sense*. But as I call the other *Sensation*, so I call this *Reflection*, the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself. By *Reflection*, then, in the following part of this discourse, I would be understood to mean, that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them; by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the Understanding. These two, I say, namely, external material things, as the objects of *Sensation*, and the operations of our own minds within, as the objects of *Reflection*, are to me the only originals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings. The term *operations*, here I use in a large sense, as comprehending not barely the actions of the mind about its ideas, but some sort of passions arising sometimes from them; such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought.

§ 5. "*All our ideas are of the one or the other of these.*—
The understanding seems to me not to have the least glim-

mering of any ideas, which it doth not receive from one of these two. *External objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities*, which are all those different perceptions they produce in us : *and the mind furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations.*

These, when we have taken a full survey of them, and their several modes, combinations and relations, we shall find to contain all our whole stock of ideas ; and that we have nothing in our minds which did not come in one of these two ways."

Thus, then, we have two sources of ideas, sensation and reflection. From these two sources flow all the ideas which can enter the understanding. Such is the theory of the origin of ideas according to Locke.

At the outset, you will observe that Locke here evidently confounds reflection with consciousness. Reflection in strict language is undoubtedly a faculty analogous to consciousness,* but distinct from it, and pertains more particularly to the philosopher, while consciousness pertains to every man as an intellectual being. Still more Locke arbitrarily reduces the sphere of reflection or consciousness by limiting it to the "operations" of the soul. It is evident that consciousness or reflection has for its objects all the phenomena which pass within us, sensations or operations. Consciousness or reflection is a witness and not an actor in the intellectual life. The true powers, the special sources of ideas are sensations on the one hand, and the operations of the mind on the other, only under this general condition, that we have a consciousness of the one as well as the other, and that we can fall back upon ourselves and reflect upon them and their products. To these two sources of ideas, in strictness, the theory of Locke is reduced.

Now which of these two sources is developed the first ? Is it the sensibility ; or is it the operations of our soul, which enter first into exercise ? Locke does not hesitate to pronounce

* See the preceding chapter.

that our first ideas are furnished by the sensibility : and that those which we owe to reflection come later. He declares this in B. II. ch. I. § 8, and still more explicitly in § 20 : " I see no reason to believe that *the soul thinks before the senses have furnished it with ideas* to think on." And again, § 23 : " If it shall be demanded, then, *when a man begins to have any ideas*, I think the true answer is, when he first has any *sensation* ———." Thus Locke admits two distinct sources of ideas : he does not confound the operations of the soul with sensations, but he places the developement of the one before that of the other, the acquisitions of the senses before that of thought.—Now we might pause here, and demand if this order is real ; if it is possible to conceive, not perhaps a sensation, but the idea of a sensation, without the intervention and concurrence of some of the operations of the soul, and those the very operations which he arbitrarily postpones. But without entering into this objection, let it suffice to state the fact that Locke does not admit the operations of the mind to have place until after the sensations. It remains to see what these operations do, and what are their proper functions ; upon what, and in what sphere, they are carried on, what is their extent, and whether, supposing them not to enter into exercise till after the sensibility, they are, or are not condemned to act solely upon the primitive data furnished to them by the senses. In order to this, it is necessary to examine with care the nature and object of the operations of the mind, according to Locke.

Locke is the first who has given an analysis, or rather an attempt at an analysis of the sensibility, and of the different senses which compose it, of the ideas which we owe to each of them, and to the simultaneous action of several, (B. II. ch. II. § 2 : ch. III., IV. and V.) He likewise is the first who gave the example of what subsequently in the hands of his successors became the theory of the faculties of the mind. That of Locke, curious, and precious even, for the times, is in itself extremely feeble, vague and confused. Faithful, how-

ever, to the spirit of his philosophy, Locke attempts to present the faculties in the order of their probable developement.

The first of which he treats is *perception*, (B. II. ch. IX. § 2.) "What *perception* is, every one will know better by reflecting on what he does himself, what he sees, hears, feels, &c., or thinks, than by any discourse of mine. Whoever reflects on what passes in his own mind, cannot miss it : and if he does not reflect, all the words in the world cannot make him have any notion of it." § 3. "This is certain, that whatever alterations are made in the body, if they reach not the mind ; whatever impressions are made on the outward parts, if they are not taken notice of within ; there is no perception." § 4. "Wherever there is sense, or perception, there is some *idea* actually produced, and present to the understanding." And, § 15. "Perception is the first degree towards knowledge."—The perception of Locke is undeniably consciousness, the faculty of perceiving what actually passes within us.

After perception comes *retention*, (chap. X. § 1.) or the power of retaining actual perceptions, ideas, and of *contemplating* them when present, or of *recalling* them when they have vanished. In this latter case, retention is *memory*, the aids to which are *attention* and *repetition*.

Then comes the faculty of *distinguishing* ideas, (ch. XI.) and that of *comparing* them ; from whence spring all the ideas of relation, not to omit the faculty of *composition*, from whence spring all the complex ideas which come from the combination of several simple ideas. And finally, at a later period, the faculty of *abstraction* and *generalization* is developed. Locke reckons no other faculties. Thus in the last analysis, perception, retention or contemplation and memory, discernment and comparison, composition, abstraction ;—these are the faculties of the human understanding ; for the will, together with pleasure and pain, and the passions, which Locke gives as operations of the mind, form another order of phenomena.

Now what is the character and what is the office of these operations? About what, for example, is perception exercised, to what is it applied? To sensation. And what does it? It does nothing but perceive the sensation, nothing but have a consciousness of it. Add, according to Locke, (ch. ix. § 1.) that the perception is passive, forced, inevitable, it is still nothing but the effect of sensation. The first faculty of the mind, then, adds nothing to the sensation; it merely takes knowledge of it. In retention, contemplation continues this perception; when faded, the memory recalls it. Discernment separates, composition re-unites these perceptions; abstraction seizes their most general characters: but still, the materials are always, in the last analysis, ideas of sensation rendered up to perception. Our faculties connect themselves to these ideas, and draw from them every thing contained in them; but they do not go beyond them, they add nothing to the knowledge which they draw from them, but that of their existence and of their action.

Thus, on the one hand, sensation precedes; on the other, the understanding is, for Locke, only an instrument, whose whole power is exhausted upon sensation. Locke, to be sure, has not confounded sensation and the faculties of the mind; he has most explicitly distinguished them; but he makes our faculties sustain a secondary and insignificant part, and concentrates their action upon the data of the senses. From this, to the point of confounding them with the sensibility itself, it is but a step, and here is the germe, as yet feeble, of that subsequent theory of *sensation transformed*, of sensation as the sole and single principle of all operations of the mind.* It is Locke who, without knowing it, or wishing it, has opened the route to this exclusive doctrine, by adding to sensation only faculties whose sole office is to operate upon it without any proper and original power of their own. The Sensual school, properly speaking, is not completely formed till it has

* As maintained by Condillac and other successors of Locke, of the French Sensual School.—ED.

arrived at that point. In the meantime, while waiting till we are called to examine the labors of those by whom the system of Locke was urged onward to this point, let us take up this system at what it now is, or rather at what it holds out itself to be, namely, the pretension of explaining all the ideas that are or can be in the human understanding, by sensation, and by reflection, or the feeling of our own operations.

"If we trace the progress of our minds," says Locke, (ch. xii. § 8.) "and with attention observe how it repeats, adds together, and unites its simple ideas received from sensation or reflection, it will lead us farther than at first perhaps we should have imagined. And I believe we shall find, if we warily observe the originals of our notions, that even the *most abstruse* ideas, how remote soever they may seem from sense, or from any operations of our own minds, are yet only such as the understanding frames to itself, by repeating and joining together ideas, that it had either from objects of sense, or from its own operations about them : so that those even large and *abstract* ideas are *derived from sensation or reflection*, being no other than what the mind, by the ordinary use of its own faculties, employed about ideas received from objects of sense, or from the operations it observes in itself about them, may and does attain unto. This I shall endeavour to show in the ideas we have of *space*, *time*, and *infinity*, and some few others, that seem the most remote from those originals."

All in good time. This has a little the air of a challenge. Let us accept it, and let us see, for example, how Locke will deduce the idea of *space* from sensation and from reflection.

I am a little embarrassed, in attempting to expound to you the opinion of Locke concerning space, and I have need to recall to your minds here an observation I have already made. Locke is the chief of a school. We are not to expect, then, that Locke has drawn from his principles all the consequences which these principles contain ; nor even are we to expect that the inventor of a principle should establish it with the most perfect clearness and precision. This remark, which is true of the whole Essay on the Human Understanding, is

particularly true of the chapters where Locke treats of the idea of space. There reigns, under a clearness sometimes real, but oftener exterior and superficial, an extreme confusion ;—and contradictions direct and express, are met not only in different chapters, but even in different paragraphs of the same chapter.—Unquestionably it is the duty of the critical historian to relieve these contradictions, in order to characterize the era and the man, but history is not merely a monography ; it is not concerned solely with an individual, however great he may be ; it investigates particularly the order and progress of events, that is to say, in respect to the history of philosophy, of systems. It is the germe of the future which it seeks in the past. I shall attach myself, then, after having pointed out once for all, the innumerable inconsistencies of Locke, to the task of disengaging from the midst of these barren inconsistencies, whatever there is that is fruitful, whatever has borne his fruits, that which constitutes a system and the true system of Locke. This system, you know, consists in deducing all ideas from two sources, sensation and reflection. The idea of space, then, being given, it must necessarily be traced to one or the other of these two origins. The idea of space is certainly not acquired by reflection, by consciousness of the operations of the understanding. It remains, then, that it must come from sensation. According to Locke it is derived from sensation. Here you have his systematic principle. We shall allow Locke to start from this principle, and systematically deduce the idea of space from it. But Locke does not set up to reform the human understanding ; his office is to explain it. He is to show the origin of that which is, not of that which might be or ought to be.

The problem, then, for him, as for every other philosopher, is this : the principle of his system being given, to deduce from it that which now is, the idea of space, such as it is in the minds of all men. We shall therefore allow him to proceed according to his system ; then we shall take from the heads of this system, the idea of space as given by it, and we

shall confront it with the idea of space as we have it, such as all men have it, independently of any system whatever.

According to Locke, the idea of space comes from sensation. Now from what sense is it derived? It is not from the sense of smelling, nor of taste, nor of hearing. It must then be from sight and touch. So Locke says, B. II. ch. XIII. § 2. "We get the idea of space both by our sight and touch, which I think is so evident," &c. If the idea of space is an acquisition of the sight and touch, in order to know what it should be under this condition, we must recur to previous chapters, where Locke treats of the ideas we gain by the sight, and especially by the touch. Let us see what the touch can give according to Locke, and according to all the world. The touch, aided or not aided by sight, suggests the idea of something which resists;—and to resist is to be solid. "The idea of solidity, says Locke, (ch. IV. § 1,) we receive by our touch, and it arises from the resistance which we find ——." And what are the qualities of a solid, of that something which resists? Greater or less degree of solidity. The greater solidity is hardness; less is softness; from hence, also, perhaps, figure, with its dimensions. Take, then, your solid, your something which resists, with its different qualities, and you have every thing which the touch, whether aided or not aided by sight, can give you. This something which resists, which is solid, which is more or less so, which has such or such a figure, the three dimensions, is in a single word, body.

The touch, then, with the sight, does it suffice to give us that which resists, the solid with its qualities, body? I do not wish to examine any further. Analysis would perhaps force me to admit here a necessary intervention of something, altogether different, besides the sense of touch. But I now choose rather to suppose that, in reality, the touch, sensation, gives the idea of body, such as I have just determined it. That sensation may go thus far, I am willing to grant; that it goes farther, I deny, and Locke does not pretend. In that exact, ingenious, and unassailable chapter, in which, almost without anything of the spirit of system, he investigates the products

of sight and touch, Locke deduces nothing from them but the idea of solid, that is to say, of body. If afterwards, and in the spirit of system, he pretends, as we have seen he does, that the idea of space is given to us by sensation, that is, by the sight and touch, it follows that he reduces the idea of space to that of body, and that, for him, space can be nothing else but body itself,—body enlarged, indefinitely multiplied, the world, the universe, and not only the actual, but the possible universe. In fact, (ch. XIII. § 10,) Locke says: “the idea of *place* we have by the same means that we get the idea of space, (whereof this is but a particular and limited consideration) namely, by our sight and touch ——.” Same chapter, same section: “to say that the world is somewhere, means no more than that it does exist ——.” It is clear, that is to say, that the space of the universe is equivalent to neither more nor less than to the universe itself, and as the idea of the universe is, after all, nothing but the idea of body, it is to this idea, that the idea of space is reduced. Such is the necessary genesis of the idea of space in the system of Locke.

There are, it is true, in these chapters, many contradictory paragraphs, and the contradictions are sometimes of the most gross and obvious kind; but it is no less true, that the system of Locke being given, that is to say here, sensation being given as the sole principle of the idea of space, the result which necessarily follows, is the idea of space just such as Locke has made it. Look once more at the principle: the idea of space is given by the sight and touch; and then see the result: to inquire if the world exists somewhere, is to inquire if the world exists. Upon the road, it is true, Locke does not march with a very firm step; he makes more than one false step; however, he arrives at the result which I have stated, and which his system imposed upon him. Now is this result the reality? The idea of space, the offspring of sensation, the systematic daughter of touch and of sight, is it the idea of space such as it exists in your minds, and in the minds of all men? Let us see, if at present, such as we are

we confound the idea of body and the idea of space, if they are to us but one and the same idea.

But in bringing ourselves to the test of such an experiment, let us beware of two things which corrupt every experiment. Let us beware of having in view any particular systematic conclusion; and let us beware of thinking of any origin whatever, for, the pre-occupation of the mind by such or such an origin, would, unconsciously even to ourselves, engage us in a false course, make us attribute to ideas whose actual and present character it is our duty to observe, some specific character, too much in reference to the origin which we internally prefer. We will investigate afterwards the systematic conclusions which may be drawn from the experiment we wish to institute; hereafter we will also follow up the origin of the idea. But our present object and our only object, is to state, without any prejudice and without any foreign view, what this idea actually is.

Is the idea of space, then, reducible in the understanding to the idea of body? This is the question. And it is a question of fact. Let us take whatever body you please: take this book which is before our eyes and in our hands. It resists, it is solid, it is more or less hard, it has a certain figure, &c. Do you think of nothing more in regard to it? Do you not believe, for instance, that this body is somewhere, in a certain place? Be not surprised at the simplicity of my question; we must not be afraid of recalling philosophers to the simplest questions; for precisely because they are the simplest, philosophers often neglect them, and systematize before they have interrogated the most evident facts, which being omitted or falsified, precipitate them into absurd systems.

Is this body then any where? is it in some place? Yes, undoubtedly, all men will reply. Very well, then, let us take a larger body, let us take the world. Is the world somewhere also, is it in some place? Nobody doubts it. Let us take thousands, and ten thousands of worlds, and can we not, concerning these ten thousands of worlds, put the same question which I have just put concerning this book? Are they

somewhere,—are they in some place,—are they in space? We may ask the question concerning a world and millions of worlds, as well as the book; and to all these questions, you reply equally; the book, the world, the million of worlds, are somewhere, are in some place, are in space. There is not a human being, unless it may be a philosopher pre-occupied with his system, who can for a moment doubt what I have just said. Take the savage, to whom Locke appeals, take the child, and the idiot also, if he be not entirely one, take any human being who has an idea of any body whatever, a book, a world, a million of worlds; and he will believe, naturally, without being able to give an account of it, that the book, the world, the million of worlds, are somewhere, are in some place, are in space. And what is it to acknowledge this? It is to recognize, more or less implicitly, that the idea of a book, a world, a million of worlds, solid, resisting, situated in space, is *one thing*; and that the idea of space, in which the book, the world, the million of worlds, are situated, is *another thing*.

The idea of space, then, is one thing, and the idea of body is another thing.

This is so evident that Locke himself, when not under the yoke of his system, distinguishes perfectly the idea of body from that of space, and establishes the difference very clearly. Thus, for instance, B. II. chap. XIII. § 11:

“There are some that would persuade us that body and extension are the same thing: who either change the signification of words, which I would not suspect them of, they having so severely condemned the philosophy of others, because it hath been too much placed in the uncertain meaning, or deceitful obscurity of doubtful or insignificant terms. If therefore they mean by body and extension the same that other people do, viz. by *body*, something that is solid and extended, whose parts are separable and moveable different ways; and by extension, only the space that lies between the extremities of those solid coherent parts, and which is possessed by them: they confound very different ideas one with another. For I appeal to every man's own thoughts, wheth-

er the idea of space be not as distinct from that of solidity, as it is from the idea of scarlet colour? It is true, solidity cannot exist without extension, neither can scarlet colour exist without extension; but this hinders not, but that they are distinct ideas."

Various considerations are then added which develope at length the difference of body and space; considerations which occupy more than ten sections, and to which I must refer you, lest I multiply citations too much.

Thus, according to Locke himself, the idea of space, and the idea of body are totally distinct. To establish this distinction, and place it in clearer light, let us now notice the different characters which these two ideas present.

You have an idea of a body. You believe that it exists. But is it possible to suppose, and could you suppose, that such a body did not exist? I would ask you, can you not suppose this book to be destroyed? Undoubtedly. Can you not also suppose the whole world to be destroyed, and no body to be actually existing? Unquestionably you can.

For you, constituted as you are, the supposition of the non-existence of bodies involves no contradiction. And what do we term the idea of a thing which we conceive as possibly non-existent? It is termed *a contingent and relative idea*. But if you should suppose the book destroyed, the world destroyed, all matter destroyed, could you suppose *space* destroyed? Can you suppose that if there were no body existent, there would then no longer remain any space for the bodies which might come into existence? You are not able to make the supposition. Though it is in the power of the human mind, to suppose the non-existence of body, it is not in its power to suppose the non-existence of space. The idea of space is then *necessary and absolute*. You have, then, two characteristics perfectly distinct, by which the ideas of body and of space are separated.

Moreover, every body is evidently limited. You embrace its limits in every part. Magnify, extend, multiply the body by millions of similar bodies, you have removed, enlarged the

limits of the body, but you have not destroyed its limits ; you conceive them still. But in regard to space, it is not so. The idea of space is given to you as a continuous whole, in which you can very readily form useful and convenient divisions, but at the same time *artificial* divisions, under which subsists the idea of space without limit. For, beyond any determinate portion of space, there is space still ; and beyond that space, there is still space forever and forevermore. Thus while body has necessarily in all its dimensions something else which bounds it, namely the space which contains it,—there are, on the contrary, no limits to space.

The idea of body, moreover, is not complete without the idea of form and figure, which implies that you can always represent it under a determinate form : it is always an image. Far otherwise with space, which is a conception, and not an image ; and as soon as you conceive of space by *imagining* it, as soon, that is, as you represent it under any determinate form whatever, it is no longer *space*, of which you form a conception, but something *in* space, a body. The idea of space is a conception of the reason, distinct from all sensible representation.

I might pursue this opposition of the ideas of body and of space. But it is sufficient to have stated these three fundamental characteristics : 1. The idea of body is contingent and relative, while the idea of space is necessary and absolute ; 2. The idea of body implies the idea of limitation, the idea of space implies the absence of all limitation ; 3. And lastly, the idea of body is a sensible representation, while the idea of space is a pure and wholly rational conception.

If these characteristics are incontestably those of the idea of space and the idea of body, it follows that these two ideas are profoundly distinct, and that no philosophy which pretends to rest on the observation of the phenomena of the understanding should ever confound them. Nevertheless, the systematic result of Locke is precisely the confusion of the idea of space with that of body ; and this result necessarily follows from the very principle of Locke. In fact, the idea of

space condemned beforehand by the system to come from sensation, and not being deducible from the smell, the hearing, or the taste, was behoved to be derived from the sight and touch ; and coming from the sight and touch, it could be nothing else than the idea of body, more or less generalized. Now it has been demonstrated that the idea of space is not that of body ; it does not, then, come from sight and touch ; it does not, then, come from sensation ; and as it can still less be deduced from reflection, from the sentiment of our own operations : and as it nevertheless exists,—it follows that *all ideas are not derived from sensation and reflection*, and the system of Locke concerning the origin of ideas is defective and vicious, at least in regard to the idea of space.

But what ! does this vaunted system contain nothing but manifest and destructive contradictions to facts admitted by all men ? In order the better to penetrate the system of Locke, and bring out whatever is sound in it, as we have just recognized wherein it is vicious, we must ourselves take stand upon the ground of Locke, and investigate the question which is, with him, the great philosophical problem. After having determined the characteristics of the idea of space and the idea of body, as they now actually exist in the intelligence of all men, and shown that these characteristics establish a profound difference between these two ideas,—we must now inquire what their origin really is ; we must investigate the origin of the idea of space relatively to the idea of body. Every thing thus far, I trust, is simple and clear ; for we have not set foot out of the human intelligence as it now manifests itself. Let us advance onward ; but let us endeavor that the light which we have already gained from impartial observation, be not quenched in the darkness of any hypothesis.

There are two sorts of origin. There are, in the assemblage of human intellections, two orders of relations which it is important clearly to distinguish.

Two ideas being given, we may inquire whether the one does not *suppose* the other ; whether the one being admitted,

we must not admit the other likewise, or be guilty of a paralogism. This is the *logical* order of ideas.

If we regard the question of the origin of ideas under this point of view, let us see what result it will give in respect to the particular inquiry before us.

The idea of body and the idea of space being given, which supposes the other? Which is the logical condition of the admission of the other? Evidently the idea of space is the logical condition of the admission of the idea of body. In fact, take any body you please, and you cannot admit the idea of it but under the condition of admitting, at the same time, the idea of space; otherwise you would admit a body which was nowhere, which was in no place, and such a body is inconceivable. Take an aggregate of bodies; or take a single body, since every body is also an aggregate of particles, these particles are more or less distant from each other, and at the same time they co-exist together: these are the conditions of every body, even the smallest. But do you not perceive what is the condition of the idea of co-existence and of distance? Evidently the idea of space. For how could there be distance between bodies or the particles of a body, without space, and what possible co-existence is there, except in a continuous whole? It is the same with contiguity. Destroy, in thought, the continuity of space, and distance is no longer appreciable; neither co-existence nor contiguity are possible. Moreover, continuity is extension. We are not to believe (and Locke has very clearly established it, B. II. ch. XIII. § 11,) that the idea of extension is adequate to the idea of body. The fundamental attribute of body is resistance; from hence solidity; but solidity does not imply in itself that this solidity is extended.* There is no extension but under the condition of a continuity, that is, of space. The extension of a body, then, already supposes space; space is not the body or resistance; but that which resists does not resist ex-

* On this important point see the Essay of Dugald Stewart, on the Idealism of Berkely, in his Phil. Essays.

cept upon some real point.* Now every real point is extended, is in space. Take away, therefore, the idea of space and of extension, and no real body is supposable. Therefore as the last conclusion, in the *logical* order of human knowledge, the idea of body is not the logical condition of the admission of the idea of space; but on the contrary, it is the idea of space, of continuity, of extension, which is the logical condition of the admission of the slightest idea of body.

Unquestionably, then, when we regard the question of the origin of ideas under the logical point of view, this solution, which is incontestible, overwhelms the system of Locke. Now it is at this point that the Ideal school has in general taken up the question of the origin of ideas. By the origin of ideas, they commonly understand the logical filiation of ideas. Hence they have said, with their last and most illustrious interpreter, that so far is the idea of body from being the foundation [Kant should have added, the logical foundation] of the idea of space, that it is the idea of space which is the foundation (the logical condition) of the idea of body.† The idea of body is given to us by the touch and the sight, that is by experience of the senses. On the contrary, the idea of space is given to us, on occasion of the idea of body, by the understanding, the mind, the reason; in fine, by a faculty other than sensation. Hence the Kantian formula: the pure rational idea of space comes so little from experience, that it is the condition of all experience. This bold formula is incontestibly true in all its strictness, when taken in a certain reference, in reference to the logical order of human intellections.

But this is not the sole order of intellection; and the logical relation does not comprise all the relations which ideas mutually sustain. There is still another, that of anterior, or posterior, the order of the relative developement of ideas in time, their *chronological* order. And the question of the origin of ideas may be regarded under this point of view. Now the idea of space, we have just seen, is clearly the logi-

* See Appendix, Note G. † See Appendix, Note H.

cal condition of all sensible experience. Is it also the chronological condition of all experience, and of the idea of body? I believe no such thing. If we take ideas in the order in which they actually evolve themselves in the intelligence, if we investigate only their history and successive appearance, it is not true that the idea of space is antecedent to the idea of body. Indeed it is so little true, that the idea of space chronologically supposes the idea of body, that, in fact, if you had not the idea of body, you would never have the idea of space. Take away sensation, take away the sight and touch, and you have no longer any idea of body, and consequently none of space. Space is the place of bodies; he who has no idea of a body, will never have the idea of space which contains it. Rationally, logically, if you had not the idea of space, you could not have the idea of a body; but the converse is true chronologically, and in fact, the idea of space comes up only along with the idea of body: and as you have not the idea of body without immediately having the idea of space, it follows that these two ideas are contemporaneous. I will go farther. Not only may we say that the idea of body is contemporaneous with the idea of space, but we may say, and ought to say, that it is anterior to it. In fact the idea of space is contemporaneous with the idea of body in this sense, that as soon as the idea of body is given you, you cannot but have that of space; but in fine, it was necessary that you should have had at first that of a body, in order that upon the idea of a body being given you, the idea of space which contains it, should appear [or be evolved in your consciousness.] It is then by [occasion of] the idea of body, that you go to that of space. Take away the idea of body, and you would never have the idea of space which encloses it. The former, then, may be called the historical and chronological condition of the other.

Undoubtedly, and I cannot repeat it too much, for it is the knot of the difficulty, the secret of the problem, undoubtedly as soon as the idea of *body* is given, that instant the idea of *space* is evolved; but if this condition be not fulfilled, the

idea of space would never enter the human understanding. When it is awakened there, it remains fixed, independently of the idea of body which introduced it there, [occasioned its evolution ;] for we may suppose space without body, although we cannot suppose body without space. It is not possible for the reason, in its state of developement, to comprehend the idea of body, unless previously it has formed the idea of space ; but formerly, in the cradle of the human intelligence, if the idea of body had not been given, never would the idea of space have been evolved in the understanding. The former was the chronological condition of the latter, as the latter is the logical condition of the former.* These two orders are completely reciprocal, and, so to say, in a certain sense all the world are right, and all the world are wrong. *Logically*, Idealism and Kant are right, in maintaining that the pure idea of space is the condition of the idea of body, and of experience ; and *chronologically*, Empiricism and Locke are right in their turn, in holding up experience, that, is on this point, sensation, the sensation of sight and touch, as the condition of the idea of space, and of the developement of the reason.

In general, Idealism more or less neglects the question of the origin of ideas, and scarcely regards them but in their actual character. Taking its position, at the outset, amidst the facts of the understanding as at present developed, it does not investigate their successive acquisition and historical developement ; it does not investigate the chronological order of ideas. It confines itself to their logical validity ; it starts from reason, not from experience. Locke, on the contrary, pre-occupied with the question of the origin of ideas, neglects their actual characters, confounds their chronological condition with their logical ground, and the power of reason with that of experience, which indeed precedes and guides the former, but which does not constitute it. Experience, when put in its just place, is seen to be the condition, but not the ground of knowledge.

* See Appendix Note I.

Does it go farther, and pretend to constitute all knowledge? It then becomes nothing but a *système*, a system incomplete, exclusive, and vicious. It becomes Empiricism where it is opposed to Idealism, which latter is, in its turn, the exaggeration of the proper power of Reason, the usurpation of Reason over Experience, the destruction, or the forgetfulness of the chronological and experimental condition of knowledge, and which arises from its exclusive preoccupation with its logical and rational principles. Now it is Locke who has introduced and accredited Empiricism in the Philosophy of the eighteenth century.

Locke very clearly saw that we could have no idea of space, if we had not some idea of body. That it is not body, however, which *constitutes* space, I have proved; it is body which fills space. If it is body which fills space, it is body which measures it. If it is body which fills and measures space, it follows that if space is not body, we never know any thing concerning space, except what body teaches us. Locke saw this: that is his merit. His fault is, 1, in having confounded that which fills and measures space and reveals it to us, with the proper idea of space itself; 2, and this second fault is far more general and comprehensive than the first, in having confounded the chronological condition of ideas with their logical condition, the experimental data, external or internal, upon condition of which, the understanding conceives certain ideas, with the ideas themselves.

This is the most general critical point of view which predominates in all the metaphysics of Locke. I have drawn it from the examination I have just made of his theory and of the idea of space. I may apply it, and I shall apply it, in the succeeding discussions, to his theory of the idea of the infinite, of time, and of other ideas, which Locke has boasted, as you know, of deducing easily from experience, from sensation or from reflection.



CRITICAL EXAMINATION
OF
LOCKE'S ESSAY
ON
THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

CHAPTER THIRD.

CONTENTS OF CHAPTER THIRD.

Recapitulation of the preceding chapter.—Continuation of the examination of the second book of the *Essay on the Human Understanding*. Of the idea of Time.—Of the idea of the Infinite.—Of the idea of Personal Identity.—Of the idea of Substance.

CHAPTER III.

I SHALL begin at this time, by placing before you the results at which we arrived in the last lecture. The question was concerning Space.

A sound philosophy unquestionably ought not to suppress and destroy the ontological questions concerning the nature of space considered in itself;—whether it is material, or spiritual,—whether it is a substance, or an attribute,—whether it is independent of God, or is to be referred to God himself. For all these questions are undeniably in the human mind. But they should be postponed until psychological observations, correctly made and skilfully combined, shall put us in a condition to resolve them. Our first occupation, then, is with the purely psychological question concerning the idea of space.

If we interrogate the human understanding, as it is developed in all men, we shall recognize the idea of space with these three characteristics, noticeable among several others: 1. Space is given us as necessary, while body is given as that which may or may not exist; 2. Space is given us as without limits, while body is given as limited on every side; 3. The idea of space is altogether rational, while that of body is accompanied by a sensible representation.

The preliminary question concerning the actual characteristics of the idea of space being thus resolved, we may, without danger, advance to the far more difficult question concerning the origin of the idea. Now here we have carefully distinguished two points of view, which are intimately blended together, but which analysis should separate, namely, the logical order of ideas, and their chronological order. In the logical view, body pre-supposes space; for what is body? The juxta-position, the co-existence of resisting points, that is, of solids. But how could this juxta-position, this co-exist-

ence, happen but in a continuity, in space? But while, in the order of reason and of nature, body pre-supposes space; it is true, on the other hand, that in the chronological order, there is a contemporaneousness of the idea of body and that of space; we cannot have the idea of body without that of space, nor of space without that of body. And if, in this contemporaneous process, one of these ideas may be distinguished as the antecedent, in the order of time, of the other, it is not the idea of space which is anterior to that of body; it is the idea of body which is anterior to that of space. It is not from the idea of space that we start; and if the sensibility, if the touch, did not take the initiative, and give us, immediately, the idea of resistance, of solid, of body, we should never have the idea of space. This initiative, taken by the touch, marks the idea of solid, of body, with the character of an antecedent, relatively to that of space. Without doubt the idea of body could never be formed and completed in the mind, if we had not already there the idea of space; but still, the former idea springs up first in time; it precedes in some degree the idea of space, which [is awakened along with it and] immediately follows it.

Here then are the two orders perfectly distinct, and even opposed to each other. In the order of nature and of reason, body pre-supposes space. In the order of the acquisition of knowledge, on the contrary, it is the confused and obscure idea of solid, of body, which is the condition of the idea of space. Now the idea of body is acquired in the perception of touch, aided by the sight; it is, then, an acquisition of experience. It is, then, correct to say, that, in the chronological order of knowledge, experience and a certain developement of the senses, are the condition of the acquisition of the idea of space; and at the same time, as body pre-supposes space, and as the idea of space is given us by the reason, and not by the senses or experience, it is true also that, logically, the idea of space and a certain exertion of the reason, are pre-supposed in experience.

At this point of view, the true character, the merit and the defects of the system of Locke, are discovered. What has Locke done? Instead of being contented to postpone, he has, I apprehend, destroyed the ontological questions concerning the nature of space. True, indeed, he always has the sagacity to occupy himself, first of all, with the psychological question concerning the idea of space. But he ought to have tarried much longer in the inquiry into the actual characteristics of this idea; and it was a great fault in him, to throw himself at the outset upon the question of its origin. Now his general system of the origin of ideas being that all our ideas are derived from two sources, reflection, that is consciousness, and sensation; and as the idea of space could not come from consciousness, it clearly behoved to come from sensation; and in order to deduce the idea of space from sensation, it was necessary to resolve it into the idea of body. This, Locke has done in the systematic parts of his work, though at the same time contradicting himself more than once; for sometimes he speaks of space as altogether distinct from solidity. But when his system comes up, when he puts upon himself the necessity of deducing the idea of space from sensation, then he affirms that the idea of space is acquired by [not merely *occasioned* by the exercise of] the sight and by the touch. Now the touch, aided by the sight, gives us only body, and not space; and by this process alone, Locke, implicitly, reduces space to body. He does the same thing, explicitly, when he says that to ask if the world exists in any place, is simply to ask if the world exists. This identifying the existence of space with the existence of body, [for it is not merely saying that the existence of the one involves the idea of the existence of the other, which would be allowing two distinct ideas,] is [if Locke meant anything and understood himself, nothing less than] to identify the idea of space with that of body. This identity was necessary to render his system strict, at least in appearance.—But the universal belief of the human race declares that body is one thing, and space, which encloses it, another thing; the world and all possible worlds,

one thing ; the infinite and illimitable space which would enclose them, another thing. Bodies measure space, but do not constitute it. The idea of body is indeed in time the antecedent [and occasion] of the idea of space ; but it is not the idea itself.

So much for the idea of space. Let us now proceed farther to interrogate the second book of the *Essay on the Human Understanding*, concerning the most important ideas ; and we shall see that Locke constantly confounds the order of the acquisition of knowledge with the logical order, the necessary antecedent of an idea with the idea itself. I propose now to examine the system of Locke in relation to the idea of time, the idea of the infinite, of personal identity, and of substance. I begin, with Locke, with the idea of time.

Here the first rule, you know, is to neglect the question concerning the nature of time, and to inquire solely what is the idea of time in the human understanding ; whether it is there, and with what characteristics it is there. It is there. There is no one, who, directly he has before his eyes, or represents to his imagination, any event whatever, does not conceive that it has passed, or is passing, in a certain time. I ask whether it is possible to suppose an event, which you are not compelled to conceive as taking place some hour, some day, some week, some year, some century ? There is not an event, real or possible, which escapes the necessity of this conception of a time in which it must have taken place. You can even suppose the abolition, the non-existence of every event ; but you cannot suppose this of time. Standing before a time-piece, you may very easily make the supposition, that from one hour to another, no event has taken place ; you are however none the less convinced that time has passed away, even when no event has marked its course. The idea of time, then, like the idea of space, is marked with the characteristic of necessity. I add, that, like space, it is also illimitable. The divisions of time, like those of space, are purely artificial, and involve the supposition of a unity, an absolute continuity of time. Take millions of events, and do with them as you did with bodies,

multiply them indefinitely, and they will never equal the time which precedes and which succeeds them. Before all finite time, and beyond all finite time, there is still time, unlimited, infinite, inexhaustible. Finally, as with the idea of space necessary and illimitable, so is it with the idea of time necessary and illimitable ; it is a pure idea of the reason, which escapes all representation, all grasp of the imagination and the sensibility.

Now it is with respect to the origin of the idea of time as with the origin of the idea of space. Here again we are to distinguish the order of the acquisition of our ideas from their logical order. In the logical order of ideas, the idea of any succession of events pre-supposes that of time. There could not be any succession, but upon condition of a continuous duration, to the different points of which the several members of the succession may be attached. Take away the continuity of time, and you take away the possibility of the succession of events ; just as the continuity of space being taken away, the possibility of the juxta-position and co-existence of bodies is destroyed.

But in the chronological order, on the contrary, it is the idea of a succession of events, which precedes the idea of time as including them. I do not mean to say in regard to time, any more than in regard to space, that we have a clear, complete, and finished idea of a succession, and that then the idea of time, as including this series or succession, springs up. I merely say, that it is clearly necessary that we should have a perception of some events, in order to conceive that these events are in time, [and in order along with, and by occasion of, those events to have the idea of time awakened in the mind.] Time is the place of events, just as space is the place of bodies ; whoever had no idea of any event, [no perception of any succession] would have no idea of time. If, then, the logical condition of the idea of succession, lies in the idea of time, the chronological condition of the idea of time, is the idea of succession.

To this result, then, we are come : the idea of succession is the occasion, the chronological antecedent of the necessary conception of time. Now every idea of succession is undeniably an acquisition of experience. It remains to ascertain of what experience. Is it inward, or outward experience ? The first idea of succession,—is it given in the spectacle of outward events, or in the consciousness of the events that pass within us ?

Take a succession of outward events. In order that these events may be successive, it is necessary that there should be a first event, a second, a third, &c. But if, when you see the second event you do not remember the first, it would not be the second ; there could be for you no succession. You would always remain fixed at the first event, which would not even have the character of first to you, because there would be no second. The intervention of memory is necessary, then, in order to conceive of any succession whatever. Now memory has for its objects nothing external ; it relates not to things, but to ourselves ; we have no memory but of ourselves. When we say, we remember such a person, we remember such a place,—it means nothing more than that we remember to have been seeing such a place, or we remember to have been hearing or seeing such a person. There is no memory but of ourselves, because there is no memory but where there is consciousness. If consciousness then is the condition of memory, and memory the condition of time, it follows that the first succession is given us in ourselves, in consciousness, in the proper objects and phenomena of consciousness, in our thoughts, in our ideas. But if the first succession given us, is that of our ideas, as to all succession is necessarily attached the conception of time, it follows again, that the first idea we have of time, is that of the time in which we are ; and so the first succession for us, is the succession of our own ideas, the first duration for us is our own duration ; the succession of outward events, and the duration in which these events are accomplished, is not known to us till afterwards. I do not say, that the succession of out-

ward events is nothing but an induction from the succession of our own ideas ; neither do I say that outward duration is nothing but an induction from our own personal duration : but I say, that we cannot have an idea, either of external succession, or of duration, till after we have had the consciousness and the memory of some internal phenomena, and consequently of our own duration. Thus, then, summarily, the first duration given us, is our own ; because the first succession which is given, is the succession of our own ideas.

Important

A profound and penetrating analysis might carry us farther still. There is a crowd of ideas, of phenomena, under the eye of consciousness. To inquire what is the first succession given us, is to inquire what are the first ideas, the first phenomena, which fall under consciousness, and form the first succession. Now it is evident, in respect to our sensations, that they are not phenomena of consciousness except upon this condition : that we pay attention to them. Thousands and thousands of impressions may affect my sensibility, but if I do not give them my attention, I have no consciousness of them. It is the same with respect to many of my thoughts, which, if the attention is directed elsewhere, do not come to my consciousness, but vanish in reveries. The essential condition of consciousness is attention ; the internal phenomenon most intimately allied to consciousness is then attention ; and a series of acts of attention is, necessarily, the first succession which is given us. Now what is attention ? It is not a reaction of the organs against the impression received. It is nothing less than the *will* itself ; for nobody is attentive without willing to be so ; and attention at last resolves itself into the will. Thus, the first act of attention is a voluntary act, the first event of which we have a consciousness, is a volition, and the will is the foundation of consciousness. The first succession, then, is that of our voluntary acts ; the element of succession is volition. Now succession measures time, as body measures space ; from whence it follows, that the first succession being that of voluntary acts, the will is the primitive measure of time ; and as a measure, it has this ex-

cellence that it is equal to itself ; for every thing differs in the consciousness, sensations and thoughts, while acts of attention, being eminently simple, are essentially similar.

Such is the theory of the primitive and equal measure of time which we owe to *M. de Biran* ; and you may see it expressed with perfect originality of analysis and of style, in the Lectures of *M. Royer-Collard*.* *M. de Biran* continually repeated, that the element of duration is the will ; and in order to pass from our own duration to outward duration, from the succession of our own acts, to the succession of events, from the primitive and equal measure of time for us, to the ulterior and more or less uniform measure of time without us, *M. de Biran* had recourse to a two-fold phenomenon of the will, which has reference at once to the external and to the internal world. According to *de Biran*, the type of the sentiment of the will is the sentiment of effort. I make an effort to raise my arm, and I raise it. I make an effort to walk, and I walk. The effort is a relation with two terms ; the one is internal, namely, the will, the act of the will,—the other is external, namely, the movement of the arm, or the step that I take, which has its cause and its measure in the internal movement of the will. Now a moment is nothing else in itself but a most simple act of the will. It is at first altogether internal ; then it passes outward, in the external movement produced by the *nisus* or effort, a movement which reflects that of the will, and becomes the measure of all the subsequent external movements, as the will itself is the primitive and undecomposable measure of the first movement which it produces.

Without taking upon myself either the honor or the responsibility of all parts of this theory, I hasten to notice that of *Locke*. The merit of *Locke* consists in having proved that the idea of time, of duration, of eternity, is suggested to us by the idea of some succession of events ; and that this succession is taken, not from the external world, but from the

* See Appendix, Note K.

world of consciousness. See B. II. ch. XIV. XV. XVI. For example, ch. XIV. § 4: "men derive their ideas of duration from their reflection on the trains of the ideas they observe to succeed one another in their own understandings." And, § 6: "the idea of succession is not from motion." Also, § 12: "the constant and regular succession of ideas is the measure and standard of all other successions." The analysis of Locke undoubtedly does not go far enough; it does not determine in what particular succession of ideas, the first succession, the first duration, is given to us. And when it is said that Locke, in making the idea of duration to come from reflection, makes it to come from the sentiment of the operations of the mind, yet as according to Locke, the operations of the mind are not all active and voluntary, his theory is very far from being the same with that which I have just now stated. But it must be acknowledged that the one has opened the road for the other; and that it was doing much to have drawn the idea of time from the interior, from the phenomena of reflection. This is the merit of Locke's theory. The vice of it however, is more considerable; but still it is closely allied to the merit. Locke saw that the idea of time is given in succession, and that the first succession for us, is, necessarily, the succession of our own ideas. Thus far Locke deserves only praise, for he gives the succession of our ideas merely as the condition of the acquisition of the idea of time; but the condition of a thing is easily taken for the thing itself, and Locke, after having taken the idea of body, the mere condition [chronological antecedent, and occasion] of the idea of space, for the idea of space itself, here also takes the condition of the idea of time, for the idea itself. He confounds succession with time. He not only says that the succession of our ideas, is the condition of the conception of time; but he says that time is nothing else than the succession of our ideas. B. II. ch. XIV. § 4: "That we have our notion of succession *and* duration from this original, namely, from reflection on the train of ideas which we find to appear one after another in our minds, seems plain to me in that we have no perception of

duration, but by considering the train of ideas that take their turns in our understandings. When that succession of ideas ceases, our perception of duration ceases with it ; which every one clearly experiments in himself, while he sleeps soundly, whether an hour or a day, a month, or a year ; of which duration of things, whilst he sleeps or thinks not, he has no perception at all, but it is quite lost to him : and the moment wherein he leaves off to think, till the moment he begins to think again, seems to him to have no distance. And so, I doubt not, it would be to a waking man, if it were possible for him to keep only one idea in his mind, without variation and the succession of others."

In this whole passage there is: 1. A confusion of two ideas very distinct, duration and succession.

2. An obvious paralogism ; for duration is explained by succession, which, in its turn, is explicable only by duration. In truth, where do the elements of any succession follow each other, if not in some duration ? Or how could succession,—the distance, so to say, between ideas,—take place, unless in the space proper to ideas and to minds, that is, in time ?

3. Moreover, see to what results the theory of Locke leads. If succession is no longer merely the measure of time, but time itself ; if the succession of ideas is no longer the condition of the conception of time, but the conception itself, it follows that time is nothing else than the fact of there being a succession of our ideas. The succession of our ideas is more or less rapid ; and time then is more or less short, not in appearance, but in reality. In absolute sleep, in lethargy, all succession of ideas ceases ; and then we have no duration, and not only have we no duration, but there is no duration for any thing ; for not only our time, but time in itself is nothing but the succession of our ideas. Ideas exist but under the eye of consciousness ; but there is no consciousness in lethargy, in total sleep, consequently there was no time. The time-piece vainly moved on, the time-piece was wrong ; and the sun, like the time-piece, should have stopped.

These are the results, very extravagant indeed, and yet the necessary results of confounding the idea of succession with that of time; and the confusion itself is necessary in the general system of Locke, which deduces all our ideas from sensation and reflection. Sensation had according to him given space; reflection gives time: but reflection, that is, consciousness with memory, pertains only to the succession of our ideas, of our voluntary acts; a succession finite and contingent, and not time, necessary and unlimited, in which this succession takes place. Experience, whether external or internal, gives us only the measure of time, and not time itself. Now Locke, by his assumed theory, was forbidden any source of knowledge but sensation and reflection. It was necessary of course to make time explicable by the one or the other. He saw very clearly that it was not explicable by sensation, and it could not be by reflection, except upon condition of reducing it to the measure of time, that is to say, to succession. Locke has thus, it is true, destroyed time; but he has saved his system. It is at the same price he will save it again in respect to the idea of the infinite.

Time and space have for their characteristics, that they are illimitable and infinite. Without doubt the idea of the infinite is applicable to something else besides time and space; but since we have hitherto treated only of time and space, we will now refer the idea of the infinite merely to time and space, as Locke has set the example.

Space and time are infinite. Now the idea of the infinite may be detached from the ideas of time and space, and considered in itself, provided we always keep in mind the subject from which it is abstracted. The idea of the infinite unquestionably exists in the human understanding, since there is undeniably in it the idea of time, and the idea of space, which are infinite. The infinite is distinct from the finite, and consequently from the multiplication of the finite by itself, that is, from the indefinite. Zeroes of the infinite added as many times as you please to themselves, will never make up the infinite. You can no more deduce the infinite from

the finite, than you could deduce space from body, or time from succession.

In respect to the origin of the idea of the infinite, recollect that if you had not had the idea of any body, nor of any succession, you would never have had the idea of space, nor of time : but that at the same time, you cannot have the idea of a body or of a succession, without having [necessarily awakened along with it] the idea of space or of time. Now body and succession are the finite ; space and time are the infinite. Without the finite, there is for you no infinite ; but at the same time, immediately that you have the idea of the finite, you cannot help having the idea of the infinite. Here recollect again the distinction between the order of the acquisition of our intellections, and their logical order. In the logical order, the finite supposes the infinite as its necessary ground ; but in the chronological order, the idea of the finite is the necessary condition [occasion] of the acquisition of the idea of the infinite.

These facts are evident and undeniable ; but Locke had a system, and this system consisted in admitting no other origin of all our ideas but sensation and reflection. Now the idea of the finite, which resolves itself into that of body and of succession, comes easily from sensation or from reflection ; but the idea of the infinite, which resolves itself neither into the idea of body nor of succession, since time and space are neither the one nor the other of these two,—the idea of the infinite, can come neither from sensation nor from reflection. If the idea of the infinite subsist, the system of Locke must then be false. It was necessary then that the idea of the infinite should not subsist ; and Locke has accordingly repulsed and eluded it as much as possible. He begins by declaring that the idea of the infinite is very obscure, while that of the finite is very clear and comes easily into the mind, (B. II. ch. XVII. § 2.) But in the first place, whether obscure, or not obscure, is it in the intelligence ? That is the question, and whether obscure or not obscure, if it is real, it is your duty as a philosopher to admit it, whether you can render it clearer or not.

And then as to the obscure, let us understand ourselves. The senses have to do only with body ; consciousness or reflection, with succession. The objects of sense and of consciousness are then body and succession, that is to say, the finite. Thus truly nothing is clearer, for sense or for consciousness, than the finite ; while the infinite is and ought to be very obscure for sense and consciousness, for this very simple and sufficient ground, that the infinite is the object neither of sense nor of consciousness, but of the reason alone. If, then, you go about to apprehend the infinite by sense and consciousness, it is necessarily obscure and even inaccessible ; but if by reason, nothing is clearer, even to the degree that it is then precisely the finite which becomes obscure to your eyes and escapes you. Thus you may perceive how Empiricism, grounding itself exclusively upon experience, internal or external, is naturally led to the denial of the infinite ; while Idealism, grounding itself exclusively upon the reason, forms a very clear idea of the infinite, but scarcely admits the finite, which is not the appropriate object of the reason.

After having sported awhile with the idea of the infinite as obscure, Locke objects again that it is purely negative, that it has nothing positive in it. B. II. ch. XVII. § 13 : " We have no positive idea of infinity." § 16 : " We have no positive idea of an infinite duration." § 18 : " We have no positive idea of infinite space." Here we have the accusation, so often since repeated, against the conceptions of reason that they are not positive. But first, observe that there can no more be an idea of succession without the idea of time, than of time without the previous idea of succession ; and no more idea of body without the idea of space, than of space without the previous idea of body ; that is to say, there can no more be the idea of the finite without the idea of infinite, than of the infinite without the previous idea of the finite. From whence it follows in strictness, that these ideas suppose each other, and if any one pleases to say, reciprocally limit each other ; and consequently, the idea of the infinite is no more the negative of that of the finite, than the idea of the finite is the negative

of that of the infinite. They are both negatives on the same ground, or they are both positives; for they are two simultaneous affirmations, and every affirmation gives a positive idea.

Or does Locke understand by positive, that which falls under experience external or internal, and by negative, that which does not fall under experience? Then I grant that the idea of body and of succession, that is of the finite, does fall solely under experience, under sensation and consciousness; and that it alone is positive, while the idea of time and of space, that is, of the infinite, falling only under reason, is purely negative. But with this explanation, we should be driven in strict consistency, to maintain that all rational conceptions, for example those of Geometry and Morals, are also purely negative, and have nothing positive in them.

But if by positive be understood every thing which is not abstract, every thing that is real, every thing that falls within the immediate and direct grasp of some one of our faculties, it must be admitted that the idea of the infinite, of time and of space, is as positive as that of the finite, of succession and of body, since it falls under the reason, a faculty altogether as real and as positive as the senses and consciousness, although its proper objects are not those of experience.*

At last being obliged to explain himself categorically, after many contradictions, (for Locke often speaks elsewhere, and here also, of the infinity of God, B. II. ch. XVII. § 1, and even of the infinity of time and space, *ib.* § 4, 5,) he ends by resolving the infinite into number (*ib.* § 9:) "*Number affords us the clearest idea of infinity.*—But of all other ideas, it is number, as I have said, which I think furnishes us with the clearest and most distinct idea of infinity we are capable of. For even in space and duration, when the mind pursues the idea of infinity, it there makes use of the ideas and repetitions of numbers, as of millions of millions of miles, or years, which are so many distinct ideas, kept best by number from running into a confused heap, wherein the mind loses itself."

* See Appendix Note L.

But what is number? It is in the last analysis, such or such a number; for every number is a determinate number. It is then a finite number whatever it may be. Raise the figure as high as you please, the number, as such, is only a particular number, an element of succession, and consequently a finite element. Number is the parent of succession, not of duration; number and succession measure time, but are not adequate to it, and do not constitute it.

The reduction of the infinite to number is, then, the reduction of time infinite, to its measure indefinite, that is, to the finite; just as in regard to space, the reduction of space to body is the reduction of the infinite to the finite. Now to reduce the infinite to the finite is to destroy it; it is to destroy the belief of the human race; but, as before observed, it saves the system of Locke. In fact the infinite can be found neither in sense, nor consciousness, but the finite can be found there wonderfully well. It alone is found. There is, then, (for Locke) nothing else, neither in the mind nor in nature; and the idea of the infinite is nothing but a vague and obscure idea, altogether negative, which at last, when reduced to its just value, resolves itself into number and succession [as the only part of it actual and real.]

Let us now examine the theory of personal identity in Locke, as we have that of infinity, of time, and of space.

Is the idea of personal identity found, or not found in the human understanding? Every one can answer for himself. Is there any one who doubts his personal identity, who doubts that he is the same he was yesterday, and will be to-morrow? If no one doubts his personal identity; it remains solely to seek the origin of this idea.

I suppose if you did not think and were not conscious of thinking, you would not know that you existed. Reflect whether in the absence of all thought, all consciousness, you could have any idea of your own existence, and consequently of your existence as one and the same? On the other hand, can you have the consciousness of a single operation of your mind, without instantly having an irresistible conviction of

your existence? You cannot. In every act of consciousness there is the consciousness of some operation, some phenomenon, some thought, volition, or sensation; and at the same time the conception of our existence. And when memory, following consciousness, comes into exercise, the phenomena which just before were under the eye of consciousness, fall under that of memory, with this implicit conviction, that the same being, the same *I myself*, who was the subject of the phenomena of which I was conscious, still exists, and is the same whom my memory recalls to me. And you are carefully to observe that the sole direct objects of memory and of consciousness are phenomena present and past; but at the same time, consciousness and memory never take cognizance of these phenomena without the reason suggesting to me the irresistible conviction of my personal existence one and identical.

Now if you distinguish again the two orders I have repeatedly mentioned, the logical order and the chronological order of knowledge, it is evident that in the order of reason and nature, it is not the consciousness and memory with their acts, which are the foundation of personal identity; on the contrary, personal identity, the continued existence of the being, is the foundation of consciousness and of memory and of their continuity. Take away being, and there are no longer any phenomena; the phenomena no longer come to consciousness and memory. Thus in the order of nature and of reason, consciousness and memory involve the supposition of personal identity. But it is not so in the chronological order. In this order, though we cannot be conscious and remember without instantly having a rational conviction of our identical existence; nevertheless it is necessary in order to have this conviction of our identity, that there should have been some act of consciousness and of memory. Undoubtedly the act of memory and of consciousness is not consummated, until the conception of our personal identity is given us; but some act of memory and of consciousness must have taken place, in order that the conception of our identity should

take place in its turn. It is in this sense I say, that an exercise of memory, and of consciousness, of some sort, is the necessary chronological condition of the conception of our personal identity.

Analysis might bring up, concerning the phenomena of consciousness and of memory, which suggest to us the idea of our personal identity, the same problem that has already been brought up concerning those phenomena of consciousness which suggest the idea of time: it may examine what, among the numerous phenomena which we are conscious of and remember, are those by occasion of which we first acquire the conviction of our existence. This, in fact, is to inquire what are the conditions of memory and of consciousness. We have already seen that the condition of memory is consciousness. It remains, then, to see what is the condition of consciousness. But we have already seen also, that the condition of consciousness is attention,—and the condition of attention is the will. It is the will, then, attested by consciousness, which suggests to us the conviction of our own existence; and it is the continuity of the will attested by the memory, which suggests to us the conviction of our personal identity. It is M. de Biran to whom again I refer the honor and the responsibility of this theory.

Let us now notice the theory of Locke. It was very clearly seen by Locke (B. II. ch. XXVII. § 9) that where there is no consciousness, (and, as has been said, Locke should have added memory);—where there is neither consciousness nor memory, there can be for us no idea of our personal identity; and that the sign, the characteristic, and the measure of personality, is consciousness. I cannot attribute too much praise to this part of the theory of Locke. It apprehends and puts in clear light the true sign, the true characteristic, and measure of personality. But the sign is one thing, and the thing signified is another thing; the measure is one thing, the thing measured is another thing; the eminent and fundamental characteristic of *self*, and of personal identity, is one thing, the identity itself is another thing. Here, as in regard to the

infinite, to time, and to space, Locke has confounded the condition of an idea with the idea itself. He has confounded identity with consciousness and memory, which represent it, and which suggest the idea of it. B. II. ch. XXVII. § 9. "Since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls *self*, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking beings; in this alone consists personal identity, that is, the sameness of a rational being; and so far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same *self* now that it was then, and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done." *Ib.* § 10. "Consciousness makes personal identity;" and § 16, "Consciousness makes the same person;" § 17, "Self depends on consciousness;" § 23, "Consciousness alone makes self."

Now the confusion of consciousness and personal identity destroys personal identity, just as the confusion of number and infinity destroys infinity, as the confusion of succession and time destroys time, as the confusion of body and space destroys space. In truth, if personal identity consists wholly in consciousness, then when consciousness is impaired or lost, there must be a diminution or loss of personal identity. Deep sleep, lethargy, which is a species of sleep, revery, intoxication, or passion, which frequently destroys the consciousness, and of course the memory, must not only destroy the sense or feeling of existence, but existence itself. It is not necessary to follow all the consequences of this theory. It is evident that if memory and consciousness not merely measure existence for us, but constitute it, any one who has forgotten that he did an act, did not in reality do it; any one who has badly measured by memory the time of his existence, has really less existed. A man no longer recollects to have committed a crime; he cannot be put upon trial for it, for he has ceased to be the same person. The murderer must no longer suffer the punishment of his act, if by a fortunate chance he has lost the recollection of it.

To resume: no doubt personality has for its distinguishing sign, the will, and the operations of consciousness and memory; and that if we never had either consciousness or memory of any operation and of any voluntary act, we should never have the idea of our personal identity. But this idea once introduced by [occasion of] consciousness and memory into the intelligence, subsists there independently of the memory of the acts which occasioned it. No doubt that which attests and measures personality and the moral accountability of our actions, is the consciousness of the free-will which produced them; but when these actions are once performed by us with consciousness and free-will, though the recollection of them may have faded or vanished quite away, yet the responsibility of them, as well as our personality, remains complete. It is not, then, consciousness and memory which constitute our personal identity. Still more, not only do they not constitute it, but personal identity is not even an object of consciousness and of memory. None of us has a consciousness of his own nature; otherwise, the depths of existence would be easy to sound, and the mysteries of the soul would be perfectly known. We should perceive the soul as we perceive any phenomena of the consciousness, which we apprehend directly, sensation, volition, thinking. But such is not the fact. The personal existence, the *self* which we are, does not fall under the eyes of consciousness and memory; and nothing does, but the operations by which this self is manifested. These operations are the proper objects of consciousness and memory; personal identity is a conviction of the reason. But none of these distinctions could find a place in the theory of Locke. The pretension of this theory is to deduce all ideas from sensation and reflection. Now the idea of personal identity could not be made to come from sensation; it was necessary, therefore, to make it come from reflection, that is, to make it an object of memory and of consciousness, that is, again, to destroy the idea of personal existence, by confounding it with the phenomena which reveal it, and which, too, without it, would be impossible.

It only remains now to examine the theory of substance. And in the first place, do not be disturbed by the idea of substance, any more than by that of the infinite. Infinity is an attribute of time and space; so the idea and the word substance is a generalization from the fact which I have just been discussing. Consciousness, with memory, attests to you an operation, or many successive operations, and at the same time reason suggests the belief of your own personal existence. Now your personal existence, the *self* which you are, and which reason reveals to you,—what is it, relatively to the operations which consciousness and memory attest to you? It is the *subject* of these operations, of which the operations themselves are the characteristics, the signs, the attributes. These operations are perpetually changing and renewing; they are accidents. On the contrary, your personal existence subsists always the same; amidst the perpetual diversity of your acts, you are to-day the same that you were yesterday, and that you will be to-morrow. Personal identity is the unity of your being, your *self*, opposed to the plurality of consciousness and memory. Now being, one and identical, opposed to variable accidents, to transitory phenomena, is substance.

Here you have personal substance. And it is the same in relation to external substance, which I do not yet care to call material substance. The touch gives you the idea of resistance, of solid, the other senses give you the idea of other qualities, primary or secondary. But what! Is there nothing but these qualities? While the senses give you solidity, color, figure, softness, hardness, &c., do you believe that these qualities are merely in the air, or do you not believe that they are the qualities of something really existing, and which, because it really is, is solid, hard, soft, of a certain color, figure, &c.? You would not have had the idea of this something, if the senses had not first given you the idea of these qualities; but you cannot have the idea of these qualities without the idea of this something existent. This is the universal belief,

which implies the distinction between qualities and the subject of qualities, between accidents and substance.

Attributes, accidents, phenomena ;—being, substance, subject,—these are the generalizations drawn from the two incontestible facts of my belief in my own personal existence, and my belief in the existence of an external world.

Now every thing which has been said of body and space, of succession and time, of the finite and the infinite, of consciousness and personal identity, all this may be said of attribute and subject, of qualities and substance, of phenomena and being. When we inquire concerning the origin of the idea of phenomena, of quality, of attribute, if the question be concerning an attribute of an external substance, the idea is given by the senses ; if concerning an attribute of the mind, the idea is given by consciousness. But as to the substance itself, whether material or spiritual, it is not given either by sense or consciousness ; it is a revelation of the reason in the exercise of sense and consciousness ; just as space and time, infinity and personal identity, are revealed to us by the reason in the exercise of the sensibility, the consciousness and the memory. In fine, as body, succession, the finite, variety, logically involve the supposition of space, time, infinity and unity ; so in the order of reason and nature (the logical order) it is evident, that attribute and accident involve the supposition of subject and substance. But it is not less evident that in the order of the acquisition of our ideas, (the chronological order,) the idea of attribute and accident is the necessary condition of arriving at that of substance and subject ; just as in this same order, the idea of body, of succession, of number, of variety, is the condition of the idea of space, of time, of infinity, of identity.—It remains to see what place the idea of substance occupies in the system of Locke.

“I confess, says he, B. I. ch. IV. § 18, there is one idea which would be of general use for mankind to have, as it is of general talk, as if they had it : and that is the idea of substance, which we neither have nor can have by sensation or reflection.” Locke, then, systematically denies the idea of sub-

stance. Unquestionably many passages might be cited, in which he implicitly admits it ; but openly he repels it, in one place as "of little use in philosophy," B. II. ch. XIII. § 19 ;— in another, as obscure : "we have no clear idea of substance *in general*," B. II. ch. XXIII. § 4. But take away from substance this characteristic of abstraction and generality ; restore it to reality ; and then substance is self, or is body. What then ! can we say that the idea is of little use in philosophy ; that is, does the belief of my personal identity, and the belief of an external world, play but an insignificant part in my understanding and in human life ? Unquestionably to the senses, as well as to consciousness, all substance is obscure ; for no substance, material or spiritual, is in itself a proper object of sense or of consciousness. But to reason, we say again as before, it is not obscure. The idea of substance is the proper object of reason, which has its own objects, and reveals them to us with as much evidence as consciousness and the senses attest their objects.

Locke, however, every where repels the idea of substance, and when he officially explains it, he resolves it into a collection of simple ideas of sensation, or of reflection. B. II. ch. XXIII. § 3, 4, 6 : "—— no other idea of substances than what is framed by a collection of simple ideas."——It is by such combinations of simple ideas, and nothing else, that we represent particular sorts of substances to ourselves." § 37. "*Recapitulation.* All our ideas of the several sorts of substances, are nothing but collections of simple ideas, with a supposition of something to which they belong, and in which they subsist ; though of this supposed something we have no clear distinct idea at all." And he declares that we know nothing of matter but the aggregate of its qualities, and nothing of mind but the aggregate of its operations. Nothing can be more true than this in a certain respect. It is indubitable that we know nothing of mind but what its operations teach us concerning it, and nothing of matter but what its qualities teach us of it ; just as we have already granted that we know nothing of time save that which succession teaches

us of it, nor of space, save that which body teaches, nor of the infinite, save that which the finite teaches, nor of self, save that which consciousness teaches. Body is the sole measure of space, succession of time, the finite of the infinite, the operations of consciousness of our identity; and just so, attributes and qualities are the sole measures and the only signs of substances, whether material or spiritual. But because we do not know any thing of a thing except what another thing teaches us concerning it, it does not follow that the former thing is the latter. Because it is only by the aggregate of its qualities that substance manifests itself, it does not follow that substance is nothing but an aggregate of those qualities. It is evident that the aggregate of qualities into which Locke resolves substance, is altogether impossible without the supposition of substance. Royer-Collard has perfectly exposed the various aspects of this impossibility.* I shall bring forward but a single one. Among all conditions which are requisite to the possibility of this aggregate, look at one which is clearly unquestionable: it is that there should be some person, some mind, to make this collection, this combination. Numbers placed under each other do not make addition; arithmetic does not itself perform the whole, it demands an arithmetician. Now Locke, by denying substance, has destroyed the arithmetician necessary in order to make this addition. The human mind no longer exists as an integrating unity, capable of finding the sum of the different quantities of which the collection is to be composed. But pass over this radical difficulty, and suppose that a collection is possible without some person, some mind, to make it. Suppose it made and made of itself. What will it be? All that a mere collection can be: a class, a genus, an abstraction, that is to say, a word. See, then, to what you ultimately arrive. Without speaking of God, who is, however, the substance of substances, the being of beings; behold mind, behold matter reduced to words. The scholastic philosophy had converted many collections into substances, many

* See Appendix, Note M.

general words into entities ; but by a contrary extravagance, Locke has converted substance into collection, and made all things to be words. This I mean is the necessary consequence of his system. Admitting none but ideas explicable by sensation or reflection, and being unable to explain the — idea of substance either by the one or the other, he was necessarily led to deny it, to resolve it into a combination of the simple ideas of *qualities*, which are easily attained by sensation or reflection, and which his system admits and explains. Hence the systematic identification of substance and qualities, of being and phenomena, that is to say, the destruction of being, and consequently of beings. Nothing exists in itself, neither God, nor the world, neither you, nor myself. Every thing resolves itself into phenomena, into abstractions, into words ; and singular enough, it is the very fear of abstractions, and of verbal entities, the ill-understood taste for reality, that carries Locke into an absolute nominalism which ends in absolute nihilism.

I shall pursue the examination of the second book of the *Essay on the Human Understanding*, and shall take up the idea of cause, and the idea of good and evil.

CRITICAL EXAMINATION
OF
LOCKE'S ESSAY
ON
THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

CHAPTER FOURTH.

CONTENTS OF CHAPTER FOURTH.

General remarks on the foregoing results.—Continuation of the examination of the Second Book of the Essay on the Human Understanding. Of the idea of Cause.—Origin in sensation. Refutation.—Origin in reflection and the sentiment of the Will. Distinction between the idea of Cause, and the Principle of Causality.—That the principle of causality is inexplicable by the sentiment of will.—Of the true formation of the principle of Causality.

CHAPTER IV.

THE first fault of Locke in respect to the ideas of space, of time, of the infinite, of personal identity, and of substance, is a fault of method. Instead of investigating and ascertaining, at the outset, by impartial observation, the characteristics which these ideas *actually* display in the human understanding, Locke begins with the exceedingly obscure and difficult question concerning the *origin* of those ideas. Then he resolves this question in respect to those ideas, by his general system concerning the origin of ideas, which consists in admitting no idea that is not formed by sensation, or by reflection. Now the ideas of space, of time, of the infinite, of personal identity, and of substance, with the characteristics by which they are undeniably marked, are inexplicable by sensation and reflection, and by consequence, incompatible with the system of Locke. There remained, then, but one resource : to mutilate those ideas with their attributes, so as to reduce them to the measure of other ideas which really do come from sensation or reflection ; for example, the ideas of body, of succession, of number, of the direct phenomena of consciousness and memory, of the attributes of outward objects and of our own attributes.

But we believe we have shown that these latter ideas, while they are indeed the condition, [the necessary occasion,] of the acquisition of the former ideas, are nevertheless not the same as the former ;—they are the chronological antecedent, but not the logical reason of them, they precede, but do not engender nor explain them. Thus facts distorted and confused, save the system of Locke ; re-established and distinguished with clearness, they overthrow it.

These observations are equally and specially applicable to the theory of one of the most important ideas in the human

understanding, the idea which figures most in human life, and in the books of philosophers ; I mean the idea of Cause. It would have been wise in Locke to have begun by recognizing and describing this idea exactly as it is, and as it is manifested by our actions and speech. But far from this, Locke begins by investigating the origin of the idea of cause, and without hesitation refers it to sensation ; this will be seen by the following passage :

B. II. ch. XXVI. § 1.—*Of cause and effect. Whence their ideas got.* “In the notice that our senses take of the constant vicissitude of things, we cannot but observe, that several particular, both qualities and substances, begin to exist ; and that they receive this their existence from the due application and operation of some other being. From this observation we get our ideas of *cause* and *effect*. That which produces any simple or complex ideas, we denote by the general name, *cause* ; and that which is produced, *effect*. Thus finding that in that substance which we call wax, fluidity, which is a simple idea that was not in it before, is constantly produced by the application of a certain degree of heat ; we call the simple idea of heat, in relation to fluidity in wax, the cause of it, and fluidity, the effect. So also, finding that the substance wood, which is a certain collection of simple ideas so called, by the application of fire is turned into another substance called ashes, that is, another complex idea, consisting of a collection of simple ideas quite different from that complex idea which we call wood ; we consider fire, in relation to ashes, as the cause, and ashes as effect.” § 2 : “Having thus, from what our senses are able to discover in the operations of bodies on one another, got the notion of cause and effect ———.”

This is positive. The idea of cause has its origin in sensation. Such clearly is the theory of Locke ; it remains to examine it. And first of all, since the question is whether sensation gives us the idea of cause, we must guard against taking for granted the thing in question. We must abstract the sensation from every foreign element and interrogate that

alone, in order to discern what it can give relative to the idea of cause.

I suppose myself then limited exclusively to sensation. This done, I take the example of Locke, that of a piece of wax which melts and passes into a liquid state by contact with fire. Now what is there in this for the senses, to which alone I am confined? There is first two phenomena, the wax and the fire, in contact with each other. Of this the senses inform me; they inform, moreover, of a modification in the wax which was not there before. A moment before, they showed me the wax in one state; now they show me it in a different state; and this different state they show me at the same time that they show, or immediately after they have shown me the presence of another phenomenon, namely, the fire: or in other words, the senses show me the succession of one phenomenon to another. Do the senses show me any thing more? I do not see that they do, and Locke does not pretend that they do; for according to him, the senses give us the idea of cause in the observation of the constant vicissitude of things. Now the vicissitude of things is clearly the succession of phenomena to each other. Let this succession re-appear sometimes, or frequently, or even constantly; you will have a constant succession; but whether constant and perpetual, or limited to a very few cases, the nature of the succession is clearly not altered by the number. Succession is never any thing but succession. Thus the constant vicissitude of things at the bottom resolves itself into their vicissitude, which is nothing but their succession. I agree with Locke that the senses give me this succession, and Locke does not pretend that they give me any thing more. The only question between us then, is to ascertain whether the succession, rare or constant, of two phenomena, explains, exhausts the idea of cause. If it does, then the senses give us the idea of cause; otherwise not. This is the true and the only question.

I ask, then, whether if a phenomenon succeeds another, and succeeds it constantly, the latter is the cause? Is it all the

idea you form of cause? When you say, when you think, that the fire is the cause of the fluidity of the wax, I put it to you, whether you merely understand that the phenomenon of fluidity succeeds the phenomenon of the contact of fire? I put it to you whether you do not *believe*, whether the whole human race do not believe, that there is in the fire an incomprehensible something; an unknown something, which it is not our object here to determine, but to which you refer the production of the phenomenon of fluidity in the wax. I put it to you, whether the conception of a phenomenon appearing after another phenomenon, is not *one* thing, and the conception of a certain property in a phenomenon which produces the modification testified by the senses in the phenomenon that follows, *another* thing.

I will take an example often employed and which expresses perfectly well the difference between succession, and the relation of cause and effect. I will suppose that I wish at this moment to hear a melody, a succession of musical sounds, and scarcely is my volition complete, when that succession of sounds is heard from a neighbouring apartment and strikes my ear. There is nothing in this but a relation of succession. But suppose that I will to produce those sounds, and that I do produce them myself; do I in this case predicate nothing, between my volition and the sounds, but the relation of succession, which I predicated in the former case between my volition and the accidental sounds? Do I not in this case, besides the evident relation of succession, put another relation still, and one altogether different? Is it not evident that in the last case, I believe not only that the first phenomenon, the will, preceded the second, the sounds; but moreover, that the first phenomenon produced the second,—in short, that my will is the cause, and the sounds the effect? This is undeniable; it is undeniable, that in certain cases, we perceive between two phenomena only the relation of succession, and that in certain other cases, we predicate of them the relation of cause to the effect; and that these two relations are not identical. The conviction of every one, and the universal belief of the

human race, leave no doubt on this subject. Our acts are not only phenomena which appear in a sequence to the operation of volition ; they are judged by us, and recognized by others, as the direct effects of our volitions. From hence, moral imputation, and judicial imputation, and three quarters of human life and conduct. If there is nothing but a relation of succession, between the action of the murderer and the death of his victim, then the universal belief and the whole structure of civil society, is nothing. For civil life is founded upon the hypothesis, universally admitted, that man is a cause ; as the science of nature is also founded upon the hypothesis that external bodies are causes, that is, have properties which can and do produce effects. From the fact, then, that the senses give us the succession of phenomena, their succession more or less constant, it does not follow that they explain that connection of phenomena, far more intimate and profound, which we call the relation of cause and effect ; and consequently they do not explain the origin of the idea of cause. As to the rest, I refer you to Hume, who has perfectly distinguished vicissitude, that is succession, from causation, and completely demonstrated that the latter cannot come from sensation.* Enough has been shown to ruin the theory of Locke concerning the origin of the idea of cause from sensation.

But this is not all. Not only is there in the human mind the idea of cause ; not only do we believe ourselves to be the causes of our own acts, and that certain bodies are often the cause of the movement of other bodies ; but we judge in a general manner that no phenomenon can begin to exist, whether in space or in time, without having a cause. There is here something more than an idea, there is a principle ; and the principle is as incontrovertible as the idea. Imagine a movement, any change whatever, and the moment you conceive of this change, this movement, you cannot help supposing that it was made in virtue of some cause. It is not our

* See Appendix, Note N.

object to inquire what this cause is, what its nature, or how it produced such a change; the only question is whether the human mind can conceive of a change, a movement, without conceiving that it is produced by virtue of a cause. Here is the foundation of human curiosity, which seeks for a cause for every phenomenon, and of the judicial action of society, which intervenes as soon as any phenomenon appears in which society is concerned. An assassination, a murder, a theft, any phenomenon which falls within the scope of the Law, being given, an author of it is instantly presumed, a thief, a murderer, or an assassin, is presumed, and inquisition is made; nothing of which would be done, if it was not a decided impossibility for the human mind not to conceive of a cause wherever there is a phenomenon which begins to exist. Observe, I do not say there is no effect without a cause, for evidently this is a frivolous proposition, of which one term involves the other, and expresses the same idea in a different manner. The word effect being relative to the word cause, to say that the effect supposes the cause is to say nothing but that the effect is an effect. But we do not make an identical or frivolous proposition, when we say that every phenomenon which begins to exist necessarily has a cause. The two terms of this proposition: commencing phenomenon, and cause, do not reciprocally contain each other, they are not identical; and yet the human mind decides and puts a necessary connection between them. This is what we call the principle of causality.

This principle is real, certain, undeniable. What now are its attributes? First, then, it is universal. Is there a human being, a savage, a child, an idiot even, provided he is not entirely one, who, in the case of a phenomenon beginning to exist, does not instantly suppose a cause of it? True, indeed, if no phenomenon is given, if we have not the idea of some change, we do not suppose, we cannot suppose a cause; for where neither term is known, what relation can be apprehended? But it is a fact that in this case a single term being given, the supposition of the other, and of their relation is in-

volved, and that universally. There is not a single case in which we do not thus judge.

Still more: not only do we thus decide in all cases, naturally and in the instinctive exercise of our understanding; but to decide otherwise is impossible; a phenomenon being given, endeavor to suppose there is no cause of it. You cannot. The principle, then, is not only universal; it is also *necessary*. From whence I conclude it is not derived from the senses. For even if it should be granted that the senses might give the universal, it is evident that they cannot give the necessary. For the senses give that which appears, or even that which is, such as it is or appears, phenomena with their incidental characteristics; but it is repugnant to suppose that they can give that which *ought* to be, the reason of a phenomenon, still less its necessary reason.

It is so far from being true, that the senses and the external world give us the principle of causality, that were it not for the intervention of this principle, the external world from which Locke derives it, would have for us no existence. In fact, suppose that a phenomenon could begin to appear in time or in space without your being necessarily led to suppose a cause. When a phenomenon of sensation appeared under the eye of consciousness, not conceiving or supposing a cause for this phenomenon, you would not seek for any thing to which to refer it; you would rest in the phenomenon itself, that is, in a simple phenomenon of consciousness, that is, again, in a modification of yourselves; you would not go out of yourselves. You would never attain the external world. For what is it that is necessary in order for you to attain the external world and suspect its existence? It is necessary that, a sensation being given, you should be forced to ask yourselves, what is the cause of this new phenomenon, and also that under the two-fold impossibility of referring it to yourselves and of not referring it to some cause, you are forced to refer to a cause other than yourselves, to a foreign cause, to an external cause. The idea of an external cause of our sensations, is, then, the fundamental idea of a without, of outward

objects, of bodies, and of the world. I do not say that the world, bodies, external objects, are nothing more than a cause of certain sensations in us; but I say that at first they are given us as causes of our sensations, under this condition, and by this title. Afterwards, or, if you please, at the same time, we add to this property of objects other properties still. But it is upon this, that all the others which we subsequently learn, are founded. Take away the principle of causality, the sensation remains under the eye of consciousness, and reveals to us only its relation to the *self*, the *me*, which experiences it, without revealing to us that which produced it, the *not-self*, the *not-me*, external objects, the world. It is commonly said, and philosophers even join with the vulgar in saying, that the senses discover the world to us. This is right, if it is meant merely to say, that without the senses, without sensation, without the previous phenomenon, the principle of causality would lack the basis [the condition, the occasion] for attaining external causes, so that we should never conceive the world. But we are completely deceived, if we understand that it is the senses themselves, directly and by their own force, without the intervention of the reason, or any foreign principle, which make us acquainted with the external world. To know in general, to know whatever be the object, is beyond the reach of the senses. It is the reason, and the reason alone, which knows, and which knows the world; and it does not know the world at first but in the character of a cause. It is for us, primarily, nothing but the cause of the sensitive phenomena which we cannot refer to ourselves; and we should not search for this cause, and consequently should not find it, if our reason were not provided with the principle of causality, if we could suppose that a phenomenon might begin to appear on the theatre of consciousness, of time or of space, without having a cause. The principle of causality, then, I am not afraid to say, is the father of the external world, instead of its being possible to deduce it from the world and make it come from sensation. When we speak of external objects and of the world, without previously admitting the principle of causality,

either we know not what we affirm, or we are guilty of a paralogism.

The result of this whole discussion is : that if the question be about the idea of cause, we cannot find it in the succession of outward and sensible phenomena ; that succession is the condition, [the necessary occasion] of the conception of cause, its chronological antecedent, but not its principle and its logical reason : If the question be, not merely about the idea of cause, but concerning the principle of causality, this principle still more escapes from every attempt to explain it by succession and sensation.—In the first case, in regard to the idea of cause, Locke confounds the antecedent of an idea with the idea itself ; and in the second case, in regard to the principle of causality, he derives from the phenomena of the outward world precisely the principle without which there would be for us no outward, no world. He takes for granted the very thing in question. He no longer confounds the antecedent with the consequent, but the consequent with the antecedent, the consequence with its principle. For the principle of causality is the necessary foundation of even the slightest knowledge of the outward world, of the feeblest suspicion of its existence. To explain the principle of causality by the spectacle of the world, which can be given only by the principle of causality, is, as we have said, to explain the principle by the consequence. Now the idea of cause and the principle of causality, are undeniable facts in the human mind ; consequently the system of Locke, which obliges him to receive, in their stead, merely the idea of succession, of constant succession, does not account for facts, nor explain the human mind.

But is there nothing more in Locke on the great question of cause ? Has Locke never assigned to the idea of cause another origin than sensation ? You are not to expect from our philosopher perfect self-consistency ? I have already told you, and I shall have frequent occasion to repeat it, nothing is less consistent than Locke. Contradictions occur not only from book to book, in his Essay ; but from chapter to chapter, and almost from paragraph to paragraph. I have already

cited the positive passage, B. II. ch. XXVI. in which Locke derives the idea of cause from sensation. Well now, let us turn over a few pages, and we shall find him forgetting both his fundamental assertion, and the particular examples, all physical, produced to justify it ; and concluding, to the great astonishment of the attentive reader, that the idea of cause no longer comes from sensation solely, but from sensation, *or, from reflection*, ch. XXVI. § 2,——“ In which and all other cases, we may observe that the notion of cause and effect has its rise from sensation *or* reflection ; and that this relation, how comprehensive soever, terminates at last in them.” This *or* is now nothing less than a new theory. Hitherto Locke had not said a word about reflection. It is an evident contradiction with the passage I have before cited. But is this contradiction thrown in here at hazard, and afterward abandoned and lost ? In regard to the twenty-sixth chapter, the answer is, yes ; in regard to the entire work, no. Read another chapter of this same second Book, chapter XXI., *On Power*. At the bottom, a chapter on power is a chapter on cause. For what is power, but the power to produce something, that is, a cause ?* To treat of power, then, is to treat of cause. Now what is the origin of the idea of power, according to Locke, in the chapter expressly devoted to this inquiry ? It is, as in chapter twenty-sixth, at once sensation and reflection.

B. II. ch. XXI. *Of Power*. § 1. *This idea how got*. “ The mind being every day informed, by the senses, of the alteration of those simple ideas it observes in things without, and taking notice how one comes to an end, and ceases to be, and another begins to exist which was not before ; reflecting also on what passes within itself, and observing a constant change of its ideas, sometimes by the impression of outward objects on the senses, and sometimes by the determination of its own choice ; and concluding, from what it has so constant-

* The famous Essay of Hume on cause is entitled, *Of the Idea of Power*.

ly observed to have been, that the like changes will for the future be made in the same things by like agents, and by like ways ; considers in one thing the possibility of having any of its simple ideas changed, and in another the possibility of making that change ; and so comes by that idea which we call power."

Of these two origins, I have demonstrated that the first, namely sensation, is insufficient to account for the idea of cause, that is to say, of power. It remains, then, to examine the second origin. But this second origin, does it precede, or follow the first ? We derive, according to Locke, the idea of cause, both from sensation, and from reflection. But from which of these do we derive it first ? It is one of the eminent merits of Locke, as I have before noted, that he has shown in the question concerning time, that the first succession which reveals to us the idea of time, is not the succession of external events, but the succession of our own thoughts. Here Locke equally says that it is from the internal and not from the external, in reflection and not in sensation, that the idea of power is first given. It is a manifest contradiction, I grant, with his official chapter on cause ; but it is to the honor of Locke to have seen and established, even in contradiction to himself, that it is in reflection, in the consciousness of our own operations, the first and clear idea of cause is given. I wish to cite this passage entire ; for it evinces a true talent for observation, and a rare psychological sagacity.

B. II. ch. XXI. § 4. *The clearest idea of active power had from spirit.*——"If we will consider it attentively, bodies by our senses, do not afford us so clear and distinct an idea of active power, as we have from reflection on the operations of our own minds. For all power relating to action, and there being but two sorts of action whereof we have any idea, namely, thinking and motion ; let us consider whence we have the clearest ideas of the powers which produce these actions. 1. Of thinking, body affords us no idea at all, it is only from reflection that we have that. 2. Neither have we from body any idea of the beginning of motion. A body at

rest affords us no idea of any active power to move; and when it is set in motion itself, that motion is rather a passion, than an action in it. For when the ball obeys the stroke of a billiard stick, it is not any action of the ball, but bare passion; also when by impulse it sets another ball in motion that lay in its way, it only communicates the motion it had received from another, and loses in itself so much as the other received; which gives us but a very obscure idea of an active power moving in body, whilst we observe it only to transfer, but not to produce any motion. For it is but a very obscure idea of power which reaches not the production of the action, but the continuation of the passion. For so is motion, in a body impelled by another: the continuation of the alteration made in it from rest to motion, being little more an action, than the continuation of the alteration of its figure by the same blow, is an action. The idea of the beginning of motion, we have only from reflection on what passes in ourselves, where we find by experience, that barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the mind, we can move the parts of our bodies, which were before at rest. So that it seems to me, we have from the observation of the operation of bodies by our senses, but a very imperfect, obscure idea of active power, since they afford us not any idea of power in themselves to begin any action, either motion or thought."

Locke seems to have felt indeed that he contradicted himself; so he adds: "But if, from the impulse, bodies are observed to make one upon another, any one thinks he has a clear idea of power, it serves as well to my purpose, sensation being one of those ways whereby the mind comes by its ideas: only I thought it worth while to consider here, by the way, whether the mind doth not receive its idea of active power clearer from reflection on its own operations, than it doth from any external sensation."

Now this power of action, of which we have from reflection that distinct idea which sensation alone could not give us, what is it? It is that of the will.

B. II. ch. XXI. § 5. "This at least, I think evident, that we find in ourselves a power to begin or forbear, continue or end several actions of our minds, and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the mind ordering, or as it were, commanding the doing or not doing such or such a particular action. This power which the mind has thus to order the consideration of any idea, or the forbearing to consider it ; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and *vice versa* in any particular instance, is that which we call the *will*. The actual exercise of that power, by directing any particular action, or its forbearance, is that which we call willing, or *volition*. The forbearance of that action, consequent to such order or command of the mind, is called *voluntary* ; and whatsoever action is performed without such a thought of the mind, is called *involuntary*."

We have here, then, the will considered as an active power, as a productive energy, and consequently as a cause. This is the germe of the beautiful theory of M. de Biran, concerning the origin of the idea of cause. According to de Biran, as according to Locke, the idea of cause is not given us in the observation of external phenomena, which, regarded solely by the senses, do not manifest to us any causative energy, and appear only as successive ; but it is given from within, in reflection, in the consciousness of our operations, and of the power which produces them, namely, the will. I make an effort to move my arm ; and I move it. When we analyze attentively this phenomenon of effort, which M. de Biran considers as the type of the phenomena of the will, we have the following elements : 1. the consciousness of a voluntary act ; 2. the consciousness of a motion produced ; 3. a relation, a reference of the motion to the voluntary act. And what is this relation ? Evidently it is not a simple relation of succession. Repeat in yourselves the phenomena of effort, and you will find that you all with perfect conviction attribute the production of the motion of which you are conscious, to a previous voluntary operation of which you are also conscious. For you, the will is not merely a pure act, without efficiency ; it is

a productive energy, in such sort, that in it is given the idea of a cause.

Still more. This motion, of which you are conscious, which you all refer as an effect, to the previous operation of the will, as the producing operation, the cause,—do you, I ask, refer this motion to any other will than your own? Do you, or could you, consider this will as the will of another, as the will of your neighbour, of Alexander, or Cæsar, or of any superior or foreign power? Or, for you, is it not your own? Do you not always impute every voluntary act to yourselves? Is it not, in a word, from the consciousness of your will, as your own, that you derive the idea of your personality, the idea of yourselves. The distinguishing merit of M. de Biran is in having established that the will is the constituent characteristic of personality. He has gone farther,—too far perhaps. As Locke confounded consciousness and memory with personality and identity of self, M. de Biran has gone even so far as to confound the will with personality itself. It is certainly the eminent characteristic of it; and from hence it follows, that the idea of cause, which unquestionably is given in the consciousness of the producing will, is given by it in the consciousness of our own personality, and that we ourselves are the first cause of which we have any knowledge.

In short, this cause, which is ourselves, is implied in every fact of consciousness. The necessary condition of every phenomenon perceived by the consciousness, is that we pay attention to it. If we do not bestow our attention, the phenomenon may perhaps still exist, but the consciousness not connecting itself with it, and not taking knowledge of it, it is for us a non-existence. Attention then is the condition of every apperception of consciousness. Now attention, as I have more than once shown, is the will. The condition, then, of every phenomenon of consciousness, and of course of the first phenomenon, as of all others, is the will; and as the will is a causative power, it follows that in the first fact of consciousness, and in order that this fact may take place, there must necessarily be the apperception of our personal causality

in the will ; from whence it follows again that the idea of cause is the primary idea, that the apperception of ourselves is the first of all apperceptions, and the condition of all the others.

Such is the theory which M. de Biran has raised upon that of Locke.* I adopt it. I believe that it perfectly accounts for the origin of the idea of cause. But it remains to inquire whether the idea of cause springing from this origin and from the sentiment of voluntary and personal activity, suffices to explain the idea which all men have of external causes, and to explain the principle of causality. For Locke, who treats of the idea of cause, but never of the principle of causality, the problem did not even exist. M. de Biran, who scarcely proposes it, resolves it by far too rapidly, and arrives at once to a result which sound psychology and sound logic cannot accept.

According to M. de Biran, after we have derived the idea of cause from the sentiment of our own personal activity, in the phenomena of effort, of which we are conscious, we transfer this idea outwardly, we project it into the external world, by virtue of an operation which, with Royer-Collard, he has called *natural induction*.† Let us understand. If by this, M. de Biran means merely that before knowing external causes of any kind, we first derive the idea of cause from ourselves, I grant it. But I deny that the knowledge which we have of external causes is a transferral, a projection, an induction of ours. In fact this induction could not take place but under conditions which are in manifest contradiction with facts and with reason. I request here all your attention.

According to Locke and to M. de Biran, it is reflection, consciousness, which gives us the first idea of cause. But what idea of cause does it give us ? I answer, and wish it to be specially noticed, that it gives us, not the idea of cause in the abstract, in general, but the idea of a *self*, a *me*, which wills, and which, by willing, produces, and thereby is a cause. The idea of cause which consciousness gives us, is, then, an idea

* See Appendix Note O.

† See Appendix, Note P.

altogether particular, individual and determinate, since it is to us altogether personal. Every thing which we know of cause by consciousness, is concentrated in personality. It is this personality, and in this personality the will, and the will alone, which is the power, the cause revealed in consciousness. This being laid down, let us next see what are the conditions of induction. Induction is the supposition that in certain circumstances, a phenomenon, a law, having been given us, the same phenomenon, the same law, will take place in analogous cases. Induction then implies: 1. the supposition of analogous cases, that is, of cases more or less different; 2. the supposition of a phenomenon which is to continue to take place the same in both cases. Induction is the process of the mind which having hitherto observed a phenomenon only in certain cases, transfers this phenomenon; this phenomenon, observe, and not another, that is the same phenomenon, to different cases, cases necessarily different, since they are only analogous and similar, and cannot be absolutely identical. The character of induction then is precisely in the contrast of the identity of the phenomenon or law, and of the diversity of the circumstances from which it is first derived and then transferred. If, then, the knowledge of external causes is only an induction from our own personal cause, it is in strictness our causality, the voluntary and free cause which ourselves constitute, that should be transferred by induction into the external world; that is to say, whenever any motion or change begins to appear in time or in space, there we must suppose, not a cause in general, for bear in mind that we are not possessed of the general idea of cause, we have only the idea of our own personal causality. We can only suppose what we already have, otherwise it would no longer be the proper and legitimate process of induction. We shall be led to suppose, then, not the abstract and general idea of cause, but the particular and determinate idea of a particular and determinate cause, to wit, ourselves. From whence it follows that it is our own causality we should be obliged to suppose wherever a phenomenon begins to appear: that is to say, all causes subsequently conceived by us,

are and can be nothing but our own personality, the sole and only cause of all the effects, accidents, or events, which begin to appear. And bear in mind, that the belief in the external world and in external causes, is universal and necessary. All men have it; all men cannot but have it. As soon as any phenomenon begins to appear, all men believe, think, judge, that there are external causes present, and they cannot but so judge. If, then, induction explains our whole idea of external causes, this induction must be universal and necessary. It must be, that is, an universal and necessary fact, that we believe ourselves to be the cause of all the events, movements and changes which take place, or can take place.

Thus in strictness, the induction, the transfer of our own causality without ourselves, is nothing but the substitution of human liberty for destiny, and perhaps strictly the creation of the world by humanity. If we do not carry it this length, we misconceive the true nature and extent of induction; and I urge this consequence upon the system of M. de Biran as its legitimate and necessary consequence.

My excellent friend would undoubtedly resist this consequence as forced and exaggerated; but there is one which he would be forced to accept, and which he does almost accept. If external causes are nothing but an induction from our own causal power, and if nevertheless we are unwilling to allow that they are our very selves, it must at least be conceded that they are of the same kind as ourselves; if they are not our own, they are *as* our own; personal, conscious, voluntary, intentional, free, living, and living the same life with us, intellectual and moral. In fact, without pretending that this is our whole conception of external causes, M. de Biran maintains that such is the conception which we form of them at first. And he gives in proof of it that children, and savages, who are but grown children, conceive of all external causes after the model of their own causal power; that hence the child is angry at the stone which hurt him, as if it had the intention of hurting him; and the savage personifies and deifies the causes of external phenomena.

To this I reply : we are not to forget that the belief in the external world and in external causes, is universal and necessary ; and that the fact which explains it ought itself to be universal and necessary. Hence it follows, that if our belief in the outward world and in external causes resolves itself into the assimilation of these causes to ourselves, this assimilation ought likewise to be universal and necessary. Now at this point I have recourse to psychology ; I recur to it to determine whether all intellectual and moral beings conceive of external causes as animated and conscious. I look to psychology, and require it to prove that this opinion of children and of savages, is not only a frequent fact, but an universal fact ; that there is not a child nor a savage, who does not at first form this conception. And it must prove also that this is not only universal, but necessary. Now the character of a necessary fact is, that it continues without ceasing ; the necessity of an idea, of a law, implies the supremacy of that idea, that law, throughout the whole extent of duration, as long as the human mind subsists. Now, even if I should grant that all children and all savages believe at first that external causes are living, free, and personal, this would not be a necessary fact ; for it is not an opinion which continues, which subsists always. We do not now believe it. It is to our credit that we do not. That which [by the theory in question] should be a necessary truth, reproduced from age to age without exception or alteration, is for us simply an extravagance which exists for a short period, and then passes away never to return. From the fact that this supposed induction has languished for a single day, from this alone, we are forced to conclude that it is not an universal and necessary law of the human mind, and of course it does not explain the universal and necessary belief in the existence of the world and of external causes.

We all have, we cannot but have, a perfect conviction that the world exists, that there are external causes. These causes we believe to be neither personal, nor intentional and voluntary. This is the belief of the human race. It is the province of the philosopher to explain it, without destroying or impair-

ing it. Now if this belief is universal and necessary, the judgment which includes it and which gives it, ought to have a principle which is itself universal and necessary; and this principle is nothing else than the principle of causality, a principle now-a-days expressed in Logic under this form: every phenomenon, every change, which begins to appear, has a cause. This principle is universal and necessary, and because it is so, it imparts to our belief in the existence of the world and of external causes, the character of universality and necessity, by which it is marked. Take away this principle, and leave the mere consciousness of our personal causality, and never should we have the least idea of external causes and of the world. In fact, take away the principle of causality, and whenever a phenomenon appeared upon the theatre of consciousness, of which we were not the cause, there would no longer be a ground for our demanding a cause for the phenomenon. We should not seek for a cause. For observe, that even in order to the induction we have been speaking of, even in order for us to fall into the absurdity of assigning to the sensation as its cause, either ourselves, or something like ourselves, it is necessary to feel the need of assigning causes for every phenomenon; and in order to make this induction universal and necessary, this feeling of need must be universal and necessary; in short, we must have the principle of causality. Thus, without the principle of causality, every phenomenon is for us without cause, [and without the notion of cause,] so that we cannot even attribute it to an extravagant cause. But on the contrary, assume the principle of causality [as potentially existing in the mind], and as soon as a phenomenon of sensation begins to appear on the theatre of consciousness, at the same instant, the principle of causality [actually unfolded and put in exercise by the occasion of the phenomenon], marks it with this character: that it cannot but have a cause. Now, as consciousness attests that this cause is not ourselves, and yet it remains not less certain that it must have a cause, it follows that there is a cause other than ourselves, and which is neither personal nor voluntary,

and yet is a cause, that is to say, a cause simply efficient. Now this is precisely the idea which all men form of external causes. They consider them as capable of producing the motions which they refer to them, but not as intentional and personal causes. The universal and necessary principle of causality, is the only principle which can give us such causes; it is, then, the true and legitimate process of the human mind in the acquisition of the idea of the world and of external causes.

Having now demonstrated that our belief in external causes is not an induction from the consciousness of our own personal cause, but a legitimate application of the principle of causality, it remains to learn how we pass from the consciousness of our own particular causality to the conception of the general principle of causality.

I admit, I am decidedly of opinion, that the consciousness of our own proper causality precedes any conception of the principle of causality, and of course precedes any application of this principle, any knowledge of external causality. In my judgment, the process by which, in the depths of the mind, the passage is made from the primary fact of consciousness to the ulterior fact of the conception of the principle, is this. I wish to move my arm, and I move it. We have seen that this fact when analysed, gives three elements: 1. consciousness of a volition which is my own, which is personal; 2. a motion produced; 3. and finally, a reference of this motion to my will, a relation which, as we have seen, is a relation of production, of causation; a relation, too, which I no more call in question, than I do either of the two other terms; which is not given me without those two terms, and without which the terms are not given; so that the three terms are given in one single and even indivisible fact. Now what is the character of this fact? It is characterized by being particular, individual, determinate, and for this very simple reason, that the fact is altogether personal. This producing will is my own, and of course it is a will particular and determinate. Again, it is characteristic of every thing particular and determinate, to be sus-

ceptible of the degrees of more or less. I myself, a voluntary cause, have at such a moment more or less of energy, which makes the motion produced by me reflect it more or less, with more or less force. A little while ago, the causative power displayed, had such a degree of force, the motion produced had a corresponding degree; now again, the causative power has less energy, and the motion produced is more feeble; but does this last motion pertain less to me than the former? Is there between the cause, myself, and the effect, motion, any the less a relation in the one case than in the other? Not at all; the two terms may vary, and do vary perpetually, but the relation does not vary. Still farther: not only the individuality, the determinateness of the fact, if you will permit the expression, may vary, that is, the two particular terms may not only vary, but they may be altogether others, they may even not exist at all. It is supposable that I may not exist, that I am not a cause; that I have not produced a motion. The two terms, in so far as they are determinate, are susceptible of the attributes of more or less, and are purely accidental; but the relation between these two terms determinate, variable, and contingent, is itself neither variable nor contingent. It is the universal and necessary part of the fact. Now the moment the consciousness seizes these two terms, the reason seizes their relation, and by an abstraction which needs not the support of a great number of similar facts, it disengages the invariable and necessary element of the fact, from its variable and contingent elements. Make the attempt to call this relation in question. You cannot; no human intelligence can succeed in the attempt. Whence it follows, that this truth is an universal and necessary truth. Reason, then, is subjected to this truth. It is under an impossibility of not supposing a cause, whenever the senses or the consciousness reveal any motion, any phenomenon. Now this impossibility, to which reason is subjected, of not supposing a cause for every phenomenon revealed in sense and consciousness, is what we call the principle of causality; not, indeed, in its actual logical formula, but in its internal primitive energy. The impossibility for us of not

conceiving a cause, in every case in which we observe the appearance of a phenomenon, external or internal, beginning to exist, is what we call the principle of causality [subjectively]. If it be asked, how the universal and the necessary are found in the relative and the contingent, I reply that along with the Will and the Senses, there is also the faculty of the Reason, and that it is developed simultaneously with the former.

What has just been said of the principle of causality, may be said of all the other principles. It is a fact which should not be forgotten, though it very often is, that our judgments are all at first particular and determinate, and that under this form of a particular and determinate judgment, all universal and necessary truths, all universal and necessary principles, make their first appearance. Thus the senses attest to me the existence of a body, and at the instant I judge that this body is in space, not in space in general, not in pure space, but in a certain space; it is a certain body which my senses attest, and it is in a certain space that reason locates it. Then when we reflect upon the relation between this particular body and this particular space, we find that the relation itself is not particular, but universal and necessary; and when we attempt to conceive of a body without any space whatever, we find that we cannot. So also it is in regard to time. When our consciousness or our senses give us any succession of events or of thoughts, we instantly judge that this succession passes in a determinate time. Every thing in time and succession, as they are in the primitive facts of sensation or of consciousness, is determinate. The question is of such or such a particular succession, an hour, a day, a year, &c. But that which is not determinate and special, is the relation between this succession and this time. We may vary the two terms; we may vary the succession, and the time which embraces the succession; but the relation of succession to time does not vary.* Again, it is in the same way that the principle of substance is given us. When a phenomenon takes place on the theatre of my consciousness, it is a particular and

* See Appendix, Note Q.

determinate phenomenon; and accordingly I judge, that under this particular phenomenon, is a being which is the subject of it; not a being in the abstract and general, but actual and determinate, to wit, myself. All our primitive judgments are personal and determinate, and yet under the depths of these personal and determinate judgments, there are already relations, truths, principles, which are not personal and determinate, although they do determine and individualize themselves in the determination and individuality of their terms. Such is the first form of the truths of Geometry and Arithmetic. Take, for example, two objects, and two more objects. Here all is determinate; the quantities to be added are concrete, not discrete.* You judge that these two, and these two objects, make four objects. Now, what is to be noted in this judgment? Here again, as before, every thing is contingent and variable, except the relation. You can vary the objects, you can put pebbles in the place of these books, or hats in place of the pebbles, and the relation will remain unchanged and invariable. Still farther: why do you judge that these two determinate objects added to these two other determinate objects make four determinate objects? Reflect. It is in virtue of this truth, namely, that two and two make four. Now, this truth of relation is altogether independent of the nature of the two concrete terms, whatever they may be. It is an abstract truth, involved and hidden in the concrete, which leads you to pronounce concerning the concrete, that two concrete objects added to two concrete objects, make four concrete objects. The abstract is given in the concrete, the invariable and the necessary in the variable and contingent, the reason in sensation and consciousness. The senses attest the existence of concrete quantities and of bodies; consciousness, the internal sense, attests the presence of a succession of thoughts and of all the phenomena which pertain to personal identity. But at the same time, reason intervenes and pronounces that the relations of the quantities in question are abstract, universal,

* See Appendix, Note R.

and necessary. Reason pronounces that the relation of body to space is necessary; that the relation between succession and time is a necessary relation; that the relation between the phenomenal plurality formed by the thoughts in consciousness, and that substance, one and identical, which is at once the *self*, is a necessary relation. Thus in the birth-place of intelligence, the action of the senses and of consciousness is blended with that of reason. The senses and consciousness give the phenomena external and internal, the variable, the contingent; reason gives us the universal and necessary truths blended with the accidental and contingent truths which result directly from the apperception of the internal or external phenomena; and these universal and necessary truths constitute universal and necessary principles.—Now it is with the principle of causality as with other principles. Never would the human mind have conceived it in its universality and its necessity, if first there had not been given us a particular fact of causation. This primitive particular fact is that of our own proper and personal causality, manifested to the consciousness in an effort, in a voluntary act. But this does not suffice of itself wholly to explain the knowledge of external causes, because then we should have to regard external causes as only an induction from our own causality, that is to say, we should have to resolve the faith of the human race into an absurdity, and that a transient absurdity, which experience exposes, and which is now-a-days abandoned. This explanation, then, is inadmissible. It is necessary, then, to conceive that in the contingent and particular fact—I will to move my arm, and I move it—there is a relation of the motion as an effect to the volition as a cause, which relation, independent of the nature of the two terms, is seized immediately by the reason as an universal and necessary truth. From hence the principle of causality; and then with this principle, and only then, can we attain to external causes; because the principle is broader than the limits of consciousness, and with it we can judge universally and necessarily that every phenomenon, of whatever kind, has a cause. Thus armed, so to say, let a new

phenomenon present itself, and we refer it universally and necessarily to a cause ; and that cause not being ourselves, our consciousness bearing witness, we do not any the less necessarily and universally judge that a cause exists, we only judge that it is other than ourselves, that it is foreign, external ; and here, to go one step farther, is the idea of *exteriority*, and the basis of our conviction of the existence of external causes and of the world ; a conviction universal and necessary, because the principle of the judgment which gives us it, is itself universal and necessary.


At the same time that we conceive of external causes, foreign to ourselves, other than ourselves, not intentional, not voluntary, but pure causes, such as the rigorous application of the principle of causality affords,—it is unquestionably true, that the child, the savage, the human race in its infancy, sometimes, or even frequently, adds to this idea of exteriority and of cause purely efficient, the idea of a will, of a personality analogous to our own. But obviously, because this second fact sometimes accompanies the first, it does not follow that we are to confound it with the first. In order to apprehend the first as a universal and necessary fact, this other fact need not be held universal and necessary. This I have demonstrated. To do so, results in errors and temporary superstitions at the very encounter with the permanent and inviolable truth engendered by the principle of causality. But yet the fact of this confusion is real ; the errors which it involves, though local and temporary, are undeniable. And the explanation of them is very simple. The principle of causality, though universal and necessary, is given us at first in the contingent fact of the consciousness of our own causality. When, then, the principle is brought into exercise, and with its own proper characteristics, it at the same time retains, so to say, in its first applications, the marks of its origin, and the belief in the external world, may, for a while, be accompanied with some assimilation, more or less vague, of external causes to ourselves. Add here, as in all cases, that it is the truth which serves as the basis of the error ; for this arbitrary and superstitious per-

sonification of external causes takes upon supposition the existence of external causes, that is to say, an application of the principle of causality. Induction, then, misleads the principle of causality : but so far is induction from constituting the principle, that it presupposes the principle.

Thus it is that sound psychology, determined never to abandon the conceptions of the human mind, such as they are actually found in the mind, gradually ascends to their true origin : while the systematic psychology of Locke, burying itself at the outset in the question of the origin of our ideas and principles, before having marked with precision the undoubted characters with which they are actually marked ; and not admitting any other origin than sensation or reflection, believes that it has found the origin of the idea of cause in sensation, in the simple spectacle of the external world. But soon forced to abandon this origin, it has recourse to another, namely, the origin in reflection. But this origin, which can indeed give us the idea of a voluntary and personal cause, can give us nothing but that idea, and not the principle of causality ; and of course it cannot explain the origin of external purely efficient causes. If, however, we determine to rest in this narrow and insufficient origin, to what consequences are we driven ? We are obliged to confound two things : the necessary and universal result—that we conceive of causes external to ourselves, with another fact purely accidental and transitory—that it happened to us to conceive of these causes as personal ; and thus we are, indeed, enabled to explain the knowledge of external causes by a simple induction from our own proper causality, and of course to explain the principle of causality by reflection or consciousness, that is, by one of the two assumed origins of all knowledge. But as has been already shown, the conception of external causes as personal and endowed with consciousness, is nothing but an error found in the infancy of the human reason, and not a law of the reason, and by no means affords an explanation of the legitimate belief, the universal and necessary belief of the human race.

In concluding I should perhaps ask pardon for the length of this discussion ; but I owed it, imperfect as it still is, both to the importance of the subject, and to the memory of the great metaphysician whose very sagacity and profoundness led him astray in the path of Locke. Gifted with extraordinary psychological insight, M. de Biran penetrated so far into the intimacy of the fact of consciousness by which the first idea of cause is given, that he scarcely disengaged himself from that fact and that idea, and neglected too much the principle of causality ; thus confounding, as Locke had done, the antecedent of a principle with the principle itself. And when he attempted to explain the principle of causality, he explained it by a *natural induction* which transfers to the external world consciousness, the will, and all the peculiar attributes of his model ; confounding in this way a particular, transient, and erroneous application of the principle of causality, with the principle in itself, the true, universal and necessary principle,—that is to say, in fine, confounding by a singular error, not only the antecedent with the consequent, but also the consequent with the antecedent. The theory of M. de Biran is the developement of the theory of Locke. It reproduces that theory with more extent and profoundness, and exhausts at once both its merits and its defects.*

* See Appendix, Note S.



CRITICAL EXAMINATION
OF
LOCKE'S ESSAY
ON
THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

CHAPTER FIFTH.

CONTENTS OF CHAPTER FIFTH.

Examination of the second Book of the *Essay on the Human Understanding* continued. Of the idea of Good and Evil. Refutation. Conclusions of the second Book. Of the formation and of the mechanism of ideas in the understanding. Of simple and complex ideas.—Of the activity and passivity of the mind in the acquisition of ideas.—The most general attributes of ideas.—Of the Association of ideas.—Examination of the third Book of the *Essay on the Understanding*, concerning words. Credit due to Locke.—Examination of the following questions: 1. Do words derive their first origin from other words significant of sensible ideas? 2. Is the signification of words purely arbitrary? 3. Are general ideas nothing but words? Of Nominalism and Realism. 4. Are words the sole cause of error, and is all science only a well-constructed language?—Examination of the third Book concluded.

CHAPTER V.

It is an undeniable fact, that when we have done right or wrong, when we have obeyed the law of justice, or have broken it, we judge that we merit either reward or punishment. It is moreover a fact that we do indeed receive reward or punishment; 1. in the approbation of conscience or in the bitterness of remorse; 2. in the esteem or blame of our fellow-men, who, themselves moral beings, judge also of good and bad as we do, and like us judge that right and wrong merit reward and punishment, and who do punish and reward according to the nature of our actions, sometimes by the moral sentence of their esteem or blame, sometimes by physical punishments and rewards, which positive laws, the legitimate interpreters of the law of nature, hold ready for actions; 3. and finally, if we raise our thoughts beyond this world, if we conceive of God as we ought, not only as the author of the physical world, but as the Father of the moral world, as the very substance of good and of the moral law, we cannot but conceive that God ought also to hold ready rewards and punishments for those who have fulfilled or broken the law. But suppose that there is neither good nor evil, neither justice nor injustice in itself; suppose there is no law. There can then be no such thing as merit or demerit in having broken or obeyed it; there is no place for reward or punishment. There is no ground for peace of conscience, nor for the pains of remorse. There is no ground for the approbation or the disapprobation of our fellow-men, for their esteem or their contempt. There is no ground for the punishments inflicted by society in this life, nor in the other, for those appointed by the Supreme Legislator. The idea of reward and punishment rests, then, upon that of merit or demerit, which rests upon that of Law. Now what course does Locke take? He deduces the idea of right and wrong, of

the moral law, and all the rules of duty, from the fear and the hope of rewards and punishments, human or divine; that is to say, (without dwelling here upon any other consideration,) in the strict language of scientific method, he grounds the principle upon the consequence; he confounds, not as before the antecedent with the consequent, but the consequent with the antecedent. And from whence comes this confusion? From that same source of all the confusion we have so many times signalized, the premature inquiry after causes, before a sufficient study of effects, the inquiry after the *origin* of the idea of right and wrong, before carefully collecting the attributes, and all the attributes of this idea. Permit me to dwell a moment upon this important topic.

First, then, the most superficial observation, provided it be impartial, easily demonstrates, that in the human mind, in its present actual development, there is the idea of right and of wrong, altogether distinct the one from the other. It is a fact, that in the presence of certain actions, reason qualifies them as good or bad, just or unjust. And it is not merely in the select circle of the 'enlightened, that reason puts forth this judgment. There is not a man, ignorant or instructed, civilized or savage, provided he be a rational and moral being, who does not exercise the same judgment. As the principle of causality errs and rectifies itself in its application without ceasing to exist, so the distinction between right and wrong may be incorrectly applied, may vary in regard to particular objects, and may become clearer and more correct in time, without ceasing to be with all men the same thing at the bottom. It is an universal conception of reason, and hence it is found in all languages, those products and faithful images of the mind.—Not only is this distinction universal, but it is a necessary conception. In vain does the reason, after having once received, attempt to deny it, or to call in question its truth. It cannot. One cannot at will regard the same action as just and unjust. These two ideas baffle every attempt to commute them, the one for the other. Their objects may change, but never their nature.—Still farther: reason cannot conceive the distinction be-

tween right and wrong, just and unjust, without instantly conceiving that the one ought to be done, and the other ought not to be done. The conception of right and wrong instantly gives that of Duty, of Law ; and as the one is universal and necessary, the other is equally so. Now a law necessary for the reason in respect to action, is, for a rational but free agent, a simple obligation, but it is an absolute obligation. Duty obliges us, though without forcing us, but at the same time, if we can violate it, we cannot deny it. Accordingly, even when the feebleness of the liberty and the ascendancy of passion, make the action false to the law, yet reason, independent, asserts the violated law as an inviolable law, and imposes it still with supreme authority upon the wayward conduct as its imprescriptible rule. The sentiment of reason and of moral obligation which reason reveals and imposes, is consciousness in its highest degree and office, it is moral consciousness, or Conscience properly so called.

Observe distinctly, however, with what it is that obligation has to do. It refers to right doing. It bears upon no other point, but there it is absolute. It is, then, independent of every foreign consideration ; it has nothing to do with the facilities or difficulties which its fulfilment may encounter, nor with the consequences it may entail, with pleasure or pain, that is, with happiness or misery, that is again, with any motive of utility whatever. For pleasure and pain, happiness and misery, are nothing but objects of sensibility ; while moral good, and moral obligation, are conceptions of the reason. Utility is but an accident, which may or may not be ; Duty is a principle.

Now is not right-doing always useful to the agent and to others ? That is another question, to answer which, we no longer appeal to reason, but to experience. And does experience always answer in the affirmative ? Even if it does, and if the useful be always inseparable from the good, yet the good and the useful are none the less distinct in themselves, and it is not on the ground of utility that virtue becomes obligatory, and that it obtains universal veneration and admira-

tion. It is admired, and that alone proves it is not taken solely as useful. Admiration is a phenomenon which it is impossible to explain altogether by utility.

If the good were nothing but the useful, the admiration which virtue excites would always be on account of its utility. But such is not the fact. Human nature is wrong perhaps in being so formed ; but its admiration is not always the expression of its interest. The most useful virtuous act can never be so much so as many natural phenomena, which every where diffuse and maintain life. There is not an act of virtue, how salutary soever it be, which can be compared in this respect with the beneficent influence of the sun. And who ever admires the sun ? Who ever experiences for it the sentiment of moral admiration and respect which the most unproductive act of virtue inspires ? It is because the sun is nothing but useful ; while the virtuous act, whether useful or not, is the fulfilment of a law to which the agent, whom we denominate virtuous and whom we admire, is voluntarily conformed. We may derive advantage from an action without admiring it, as we may admire it without deriving advantage. The foundation of admiration, then, is not the utility which the admired object procures to others ; still less is it the utility of the action to him who performs it. The virtuous action would otherwise be nothing but a lucky calculation ; we might congratulate the author, but not the least in the world should we be tempted to admire him. Mankind demands of its heroes some other merit than that of a sagacious merchant ; and far from the utility of the agent and his personal interest being the ground or the measure of admiration, it is a fact that other things being equal, the phenomenon of admiration diminishes or increases in proportion to the sacrifices which the virtuous action cost. But if you wish for manifest proof that virtue is not founded upon the personal interest of him who practices it, take the example I have given on another occasion,* of a generous man whose virtue proves his ruin instead

* See Appendix, Note T.

of being an advantage to him. And to prevent all idea of calculation, suppose a man who sacrifices his life for the truth, who dies upon the scaffold, young and fresh in life, for the cause of justice. Here there is no future to be looked at, of course no chance of ulterior advantage; and of course no calculation, no possible self-interest.

This man, if virtue is nothing but utility, is a fool, and mankind who admire him are delirious. This delirium is nevertheless a fact, an undeniable fact. It demonstrates, then, unanswerably, that in the human mind in its actual state, the idea of right and wrong, of virtue and vice, is one thing, and the idea of utility, of pleasure and pain, of happiness and misery, is another thing.

I have now shown the essential and metaphysical difference of these ideas.* It remains to show their relation. It is certain that the idea of virtue in the human mind is distinct from that of happiness; but I ask, if when you meet a virtuous man, a moral agent who, free to obey or not to obey the moral law, obeys it at the sacrifice of his dearest affections,—I ask if this man, this moral agent, besides the admiration which attaches to the act, does not inspire you with a sentiment of good-will which attaches to his person? Is it not true that you are disposed, if happiness were in your hands, to dispense it to this virtuous man? Is it not true that he appears to you worthy to be happy, and that in respect to him, happiness does not appear to you solely as an arbitrary idea, but a right? At the same time, when the guilty man is rendered wretched, as the effect of his vices, do we not judge that he deserves it? In a word, do we not judge, in general, that it would be unjust for vice to be happy and virtue miserable? This is evidently the common opinion of all men; and this opinion is not only universal, it is also a necessary conception. In vain does reason endeavor to conceive vice as worthy of happiness; it cannot succeed in the attempt. It cannot help demanding an intimate harmony between happiness and vir-

* See Appendix, Note U.

tue. And in this conception, we are not sensitive beings who aspire after happiness, nor sympathetic beings who desire it for our fellow creatures ; but we are rational and moral beings, who, as with a superior authority, pass such a judgment in respect to others, as well as in respect to ourselves. And when facts do not accord with our judgments, we do not, on that account, reverse our judgments. We maintain them invincibly, in spite of facts at variance with them ; and such facts we do not hesitate to call disorders. The idea of merit and demerit is for the reason inseparable from that of the moral law fulfilled or violated.* Hence the idea of reward and punishment as universal and necessary as its principle.

Wherever virtue and vice receive their reward and punishment, there, in our conceptions, is a state of moral order ; and where vice and virtue are without punishment and reward, or where they are equally treated, there, on the other hand, is a state of disorder. Rewards and punishments are different according to the cases, and it is not necessary here to determine and classify them with perfect precision. When vicious actions do not pass beyond a certain sphere, the sphere of the person who commits them, men do not impose upon them any other punishment than their contempt or disesteem. We punish them by opinion. When they exceed that sphere, and affect the rights of others, then they fall under positive laws, and those laws penal. These two sorts of punishment, moral and material, have through all time and everywhere been inflicted upon vicious agents. Without any doubt it is useful to society to inflict contempt upon the violater of moral order ; without doubt it is useful to society to punish effectually the individual who attacks the foundations of social order. This consideration of utility is real ; it is weighty ; but I say that it is not the first, that it is only accessory, and that the immediate basis of all penalty is the idea of the essential merit and demerit of actions, the general idea of order, which imperiously demands that the merit and demerit of actions, which is a law

of reason and of order, should be realized in a society that pretends to be rational and well ordered. On this ground; and on this ground alone, of realizing this law of reason and of order, the two powers of society, opinion and government, appear faithful to their primary law. Then comes up utility, the immediate utility of repressing evil, and the indirect utility of preventing it, by example, that is, by fear. But this consideration has need of a basis superior to itself in order to render it legitimate. Suppose in fact that there is nothing good or evil in itself; and consequently neither essential merit or demerit, and consequently, again, no absolute right of blaming or punishing; by what right, then, I ask, do you blame or disgrace a man, or make him ascend the scaffold, or put him in irons for life, for the advantage of others, when the action of the man is neither good nor bad in itself, and merits in itself neither blame nor punishment? Suppose that it is not absolutely right, just in itself, to blame this man or to punish him, and the legitimacy and propriety of infamy and of glory, and of every species of reward and punishment are at an end. Still farther, I maintain if punishment has no other ground than utility, then even its utility is destroyed; for in order that a punishment may be useful, it is requisite: 1. that he upon whom it is inflicted, endowed as he is with the principle of merit and demerit, should regard himself as justly punished, and should accept his punishment with a suitable disposition; 2. that the spectators, equally endowed with the principle of merit and demerit, should regard the culprit as justly punished according to the measure of his crime, and should apply to themselves by anticipation the same justice in case of crime, and should be kept in harmony with the social order by the view of its legitimate penalties. Hence arises the utility of examples of punishment whether moral or physical.—But take away its foundation in justice, and you destroy the utility of punishment; you excite indignation and abhorrence, instead of awakening penitence in the victim, or teaching a salutary lesson to the public. You array courage, sympathy, everything noble and elevated in human nature, on the side

of the victim. You excite all energetic spirits against society and its artificial laws. Thus the utility of punishment is itself grounded in its justice, instead of its justice being grounded in its utility. Punishment is the sanction of the law and not its foundation. Moral order has its foundation not in punishment, but punishment has its foundation in moral order. The idea of right and wrong is grounded only on itself, on reason which reveals it. It is the condition of the idea of merit and demerit, which is the condition of the idea of reward and punishment ; and this latter idea is to the two former, but especially to the idea of right and wrong, in the relation of the consequence to the principle.*

This relation which embraces all moral order, subsists as inviolable as reason itself from which we receive it, even when we pass beyond the sphere of this life and of human society, to that of religion and of a world where God reigns without participation, where destiny gives place to the pure action of Providence, where fact and right are the same thing. There we cannot conceive of God but as at once the cause and substance of good, as the representative in some sort of the moral law ; that is to say, we cannot conceive of God without referring to him the moral law which by our reason is imposed upon us. Now at the same time that we conceive of God as imposing upon us a just law, we cannot help conceiving that God attaches a punishment to the violation of this law. The idea of merit and demerit, transferred as it were into the other world, is the basis of the conception of punishments and rewards in the future life. Suppose that God was not conceived by us as the representative of the moral law, it would appear to us impossible that he could punish or reward us for breaking or obeying the law. It is not in the caprice of a being superior to us in power, that we rest the legitimacy of the retributions of another life. Take away the justice of God, and his power, absolute as it is, would no longer appear to us a sufficient foundation for rewards and punishments.

* See Appendix, Note W.

Take away his justice, and what remains? A government, but no law; and instead of the sublime realization of the idea of merit and demerit, the future life is nothing but the threat of a superior force against a feeble being, fated to sustain the part of a sufferer and a victim.—In heaven, then, as upon the earth, in heaven much more than upon the earth, the sanction of law is not the foundation of it; reward and punishment are deduced from merit and demerit, from right and wrong; the former do not constitute the latter.*

Let us now apply to this subject the distinctions we have before established. We have distinguished the logical order of ideas, from the order of their acquisition. In the first case, one idea is the logical condition of another when it explains the other; in the second case, one idea is the chronological condition of another, when it arises in the human mind before the other. Now I say in respect to the question before us, that the idea of justice, the idea of the moral law obeyed or broken, is: 1. the logical condition of the idea of merit or demerit, which without it is incomprehensible and inadmissible; 2. the antecedent, the chronological condition of the acquisition of the idea of merit and demerit, which certainly never would have arisen in the mind, if previously it had not received the idea of justice and injustice, right and wrong, good and evil. Now, Locke, after having frequently confounded, as we have seen, the logical condition of an idea with its chronological condition, confounds at once in regard to this subject, both the logical and chronological condition of an idea with the idea itself, and even with a consequence of that idea; for the idea of reward and punishment is only a consequence of the idea of merit and demerit, which in its turn is only a consequence of the idea of right and wrong, which is here the supreme principle, beyond which it is impossible to ascend. Thus, instead of laying down first the idea of right and wrong, then that of merit and demerit, and then that of reward and punishment; it is the reward and punishment, that

* See Appendix, Note X.

is to say, the pleasure and the pain that result from right and wrong, which, according to Locke, is the foundation of moral good and evil, and of the moral rectitude of actions.

B. II. ch. XXVIII. § 5: "Good and evil, as hath been shown, B. II. ch. XX. § 2, and ch. XXI. § 42, are nothing but pleasure or pain, or that which occasions, or procures pleasure or pain to us. Moral good and evil, then, is only the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law, whereby good or evil is drawn on us by the will and power of the law-maker; which good and evil, pleasure or pain, attending our observance or breach of the law, by the decree of the law-maker, is what we call reward and punishment."

Locke then distinguishes three laws or rules, namely, the divine law, the civil law, and the law of opinion, or reputation.

Ibid. § 7: "By the relation they bear to the first of these, men judge whether their actions are sins or duties; by the second, whether they be criminal or innocent; and by the third, whether they be virtues or vices."

Ibid. § 8: "*Divine law the measure of sin and duty.* First, the divine law, whereby I mean that law which God has set to the actions of men, whether promulgated to them by the light of nature or the voice of revelation. That God has given a rule whereby men should govern themselves, I think there is nobody so brutish as to deny. He has a right to do it; we are his creatures: he has goodness and wisdom to direct our actions to that which is best; and he has power to enforce it by rewards and punishments, of infinite weight and duration in another life; for nobody can take us out of his hands. This is the only true touchstone of moral rectitude, and by comparing them to this law, it is that men judge of the most considerable moral good or evil of their actions; that is, whether as sins or duties, they are like to procure them happiness or misery, from the hands of the Almighty."

Here, then, the punishments and rewards of a future life are declared the sole touchstone, the sole measure of the recti-

tude of our actions. But suppose that the law which God has given us were not just in itself, independently of the rewards and punishments attached to it, the act which obeys or violates it would then be neither good nor bad in itself; and the divine will would then be seen in the strange aspect of attaching to a law indifferent in itself, and in its fulfilment or violation, rewards the most alluring, and punishments the most dreadful. These promises and these threatenings, moreover, being addressed merely to the sensibility, which is the subject of pleasure and pain, and not to the reason or conscience, might excite in us fear or hope, but never the emotion of reverence, nor the sentiment of duty. And it is of no avail to say, as Locke has, that God has the right to do so, to establish namely such a law, though it is in itself indifferent, because we are his creatures; for that is without meaning, unless it be that he is the most powerful and we the weakest, and that would be to appeal to the right of the strongest.* In general this theory tends to make God an arbitray king, to substitute the Divine Will and Power in place of Divine Reason and Wisdom. It is a doctrine concerning God for the senses, and not for the reason, made for slaves and brutes, not for intelligent and free beings.

Ibid. § 9: "*Civil law the measure of crimes and innocence.* Secondly, the civil law, the rule set by the commonwealth to the actions of those who belong to it, is another rule to which men refer their actions, to judge whether they be criminal or no. This law nobody overlooks; the rewards and punishments which enforce it being ready at hand, and suitable to the power that makes it; which is the force of the commonwealth, engaged to protect the lives, liberties, and possessions of those who live according to its laws, and has power to take away life, liberty, or goods, from him who disobeys, which is the punishment of offences committed against this law."

Unquestionably society has this right; this right is even a

* See Appendix, Note Y.

duty for it ; but it is so only upon one condition, the condition namely, that the laws which it passes should be just : for suppose that the law established by society be unjust, the violation of this law ceases to be unjust, and then the punishment of an act not unjust which transgresses an unjust law, is itself injustice. Take away, I repeat, the previous fitness and justness of the law, and you destroy the fitness and justice of the punishment. Punishment loses all its character of morality, and retains only that of mere physical force, which cannot, as Hobbes very well perceived, be too absolute or too formidable ; since it cannot subsist nor make itself regarded, except from the fear it inspires.

Ibid. § 10. "*Philosophical law the measure of virtue and vice.* Thirdly, the law of opinion or reputation. Virtue and vice are names pretended and supposed every where to stand for actions in their own nature right and wrong ; and so far as they really are so applied, they are coincident with the divine law above mentioned. But yet whatever is pretended, this is visible, that these names, virtue and vice, in the particular instances of their application, through the several nations and societies of men in the world, are constantly attributed only to such actions, as in each country and society are in reputation or discredit. Nor is it to be thought strange that men every where should give the name of *virtue* to those actions, which among them are judged praiseworthy ; and call that *vice*, which they account blameable : since otherwise they would condemn themselves, if they should think any thing right, to which they allowed not commendation, and any thing wrong, which they let pass without blame. Thus the measure of what is every where called and esteemed virtue and vice, is the approbation or dislike, praise or blame, which by a secret and tacit consent establishes itself in the several societies, tribes and clubs of men in the world ; whereby several actions come to find credit or disgrace amongst them according to the judgment, maxims, or fashions, of that place. For though men uniting to politic societies, have resigned up to the public the disposing of all their force, so that they cannot employ it

against any fellow citizen, any farther than the law of the country directs; yet they retain still the power of thinking well or ill; approving or disapproving the actions of those whom they live amongst and converse with; and by this approbation and dislike, they establish amongst themselves what they call virtue and vice."

Ibid. § 11: "That this is the common measure of virtue and vice, will appear to any one who considers, that though that passes for *vice* in one country which is counted *virtue*, or at least *not* vice in another, yet every where virtue and praise, vice and blame go together."

Upon which point Locke refers to all pagan antiquity, in which the incitement to virtue was the appeal to glory. He even cites a passage of St. Paul, which he forces aside from its natural sense, to get at the conclusion, that there is no other measure of virtue than good or bad fame. Read also his twelfth section, in which the "enforcements" of this law are stated to be "commendation and discredit."

But you will perceive that the same is true in regard to opinion, the pretended philosophical law, as in regard to public punishments under the civil law, and in regard to the punishments of another life under the divine law. Suppose that virtue is not virtue in itself, and that it is praise and approbation which make it, it is clear that morality is no longer any thing; there is no longer a law; there is nothing but arbitrary customs, local and changing; there is no longer any thing but fashion and opinion. Now, either opinion is nothing but a lying sound, or it is the echo of the public conscience, and then it is an effect, and not a cause; its legitimacy and its power reside in the sentiment of right and wrong. But to elevate the effect to the rank of a cause, to establish right and wrong upon opinion, is to destroy right and wrong; it is to confound and vitiate virtue, by making fear its only sanction; it is to make courtiers and not virtuous men. Popular applause is one of the sweetest things in the world, but only when it is the reflection of one's own conscience, and not the price of complaisance; when it is acquired by a series of actions truly

virtuous, by constancy to one's character, fidelity to one's principles and to one's friends in the common service of one's country. Glory is the crown, not the foundation of virtue. Duty does not measure itself by reward. Without doubt it is easier to perform it on a conspicuous theatre, and with the applauses of the crowd ; but it is not at all lessened in the shade, it perishes not in ignominy ; there, as every where, it is one and the same, inviolable and obligatory.

The conclusion to which we perpetually recur, is that here likewise Locke obviously takes the consequence for the principle, the effect for the cause. And you will observe that this confusion is a necessity of his system. This system admits no idea that is not derived from reflection or from sensation. Reflection being here out of the question, it is to sensation that Locke has recourse ; and as sensation cannot explain the idea which mankind have of good and evil, the object is to find an idea more or less resembling it, which can come from sensation, and take the place of the former. Now this idea is that of punishment and reward, which resolves itself into that of pleasure and pain, happiness and misery, or in general, into the idea of utility. This confusion, to repeat once more, was necessary to the system of Locke ; and it saves it : but dispel the confusion, re-establish the facts in their real value and true order, and the system of Locke is overthrown.

Let us see where we are. Locke has tried his system upon a number of particular ideas, to wit: the idea of space, the idea of time, the idea of the infinite, of personal identity, of substance, of cause, of good and evil ; imposing upon himself the task of explaining all these ideas by sensation and by reflection. We have followed Locke upon all these points chosen by himself ; and upon all these points, an attentive examination has demonstrated that not one of these ideas can be explained by sensation or reflection, except under the condition of entirely misconceiving the real characteristics with which these ideas are now marked in the understanding of all mankind, and of confounding, through the help of this misconception, these ideas with other ideas which are indeed more

or less intimately united with them, but which are not the same, which precede them, or which succeed them, but do not constitute them, as the ideas of body, of number, of the phenomena of consciousness and memory, of collection and totality, of reward and punishment, pleasure and pain. Now, without doubt sensation and reflection explain these latter ideas; but these are not the ideas which it is the problem to explain, and Locke is therefore convicted of being unable to explain all the ideas that are in the human mind.

The theories which we have brought forward and discussed, occupy three fourths of the second book of Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding. Locke had then only to gather his generalizations; he had nothing more to do but to show how, the ideas which we have gone over and all similar ideas being furnished by sensation or by reflection, the complete edifice of the human understanding may be erected on this basis. On our part, the most important portion of our task is accomplished. It was necessary to accompany the exposition of the grounds of Locke's system with a profound and thorough discussion. Now that these grounds are overthrown, we can proceed faster; it will be enough to give a rapid view of the last part of the second book, stating the principal positions, and elucidating them by a few reflections.

All those ideas which are derived immediately from these two sources, sensation and reflection, are by Locke denominated *simple ideas*. Simple ideas are the elements out of which we compose all other ideas. Compound or *complex ideas* are those which we form subsequently by the combination of simple and primitive ideas; so that the whole development and action of the human mind is resolved into the acquisition, immediately from the senses, of a certain number of simple ideas, which Locke believes he has determined;—then the formation from these materials of complex ideas by combination and association; then again, the formation from these complex ideas of ideas still more complex than the for-

mer ; and thus on continually, till we have exhausted all the ideas in the human mind.*

There is one error which it is necessary here to expose. It is not true that we begin by simple ideas, and then proceed to complex ideas. On the contrary, we begin with complex ideas, and from them proceed to more simple. The process of the mind in the acquisition of ideas is precisely the inverse of that which Locke assigns. All our first ideas are complex, and for the evident reason that all our faculties, or at least a great number of our faculties, enter into exercise at the same time ; and their simultaneous action gives us at the same time a number of ideas bound and blended together, which form a whole. For example : the idea of the external world which is given so quick and early in the order of acquisition, is a very complex idea, containing a multitude of ideas. There is the idea of the secondary qualities of external objects, the idea of their primary qualities, the idea of the permanent reality of something to which you refer these qualities, that is of body, of matter ; there is also the idea of space containing body, the idea of time in which its different motions and changes are accomplished, &c. And do you believe that you have at first, and by itself, the idea of the primary qualities, and of the secondary qualities ; then the idea of the subject of these qualities, then the idea of time, and then the idea of space ? By no means. It is simultaneously, or almost simultaneously, that you acquire all these ideas. Moreover you do not have them without knowing that you have them ; you have the conviction of having them. This conviction implies for you the exercise of consciousness ; and consciousness implies a certain degree of attention, that is, of will ; it implies also a belief in your own existence, in the real or substantial *I or self*, which you are. In a word, you have at once an assemblage of ideas which are given you the one with the other ; and all your primitive ideas are complex. They are complex besides for another reason ; because they are particu-

* Book II. chap. II. and chap. XII.

lar and concrete, as I have shown in the preceding lecture. Then comes abstraction, which, employing itself upon those primitive data, complex, concrete, and particular, separates what nature had given you united and simultaneous, and considers by itself each of these parts of the whole. That part which is separated from the whole, that idea detached from the body of the total picture of the primitive ideas, becomes an abstract and simple idea, until an abstraction, more sagacious and more profound, subjects that supposed simple idea to the same process to which the collection of preceding ideas had been subjected, namely, decomposes it, evolves from it many other ideas which it considers apart, abstracting one from the other ;—until in short, from decomposition to decomposition, abstraction and analysis, arrive at ideas so simple that they are supposed no longer capable of being decomposed. The more simple an idea is, the more general it is ; the more abstract, the greater the extension it has. We begin with the concrete, and we go to the abstract ; we begin with the definite and particular, in order to arrive at the simple and the general. The process of the mind, then, as I have said, is altogether the reverse of that assigned by Locke. I should, however, render this justice to the school of Locke, that it has not permitted so important an error to remain in the analysis of the mind, and that Condillac subsequently restored the true process.

This has not been done, however, in regard to another opinion of Locke, blended with the former, namely, that the mind is passive in the acquisition of simple ideas, and active in that of complex ideas.* Without doubt the mind is more active, its activity is more awake, in forming general ideas by abstraction (for this is what we must understand by the complex ideas of Locke ;) but it is also active in the acquisition of particular ideas (the simple ideas of Locke,) for in this there is still consciousness, and consciousness supposes attention, will, activity. The mind is always active when it thinks.

* B. II. ch. I. § 25 ; ch. XII. § 2.

It does not always think, as Locke has well remarked* ; but whenever it does think, and it certainly thinks in the acquisition of particular ideas, it is active. Locke has too much diminished the activity of the mind ; and the school of Locke, far from extending it, has limited it still more.

All our ideas are now obtained, or supposed to be obtained ; their mechanism has been described and explained. It remains only to investigate their most general characters. Locke has divided them into clear and distinct ideas, and ideas obscure and confused,† real and chimerical,‡ complete and incomplete,§ true and false.¶—In the last chapter, we find the remark since then so often reiterated, that in strictness all our ideas are true, and that error does not respect the idea considered in itself ; for even when you have an idea of a thing which does not exist, as the idea of a centaur, of a chimera, it is not the less true that you have the idea which you have ; it is only that the idea which you certainly have, which unquestionably is in the human mind, lacks a corresponding object, really existing in nature ; but the idea in itself is not the less true. The error, then, respects not the idea, but the affirmation sometimes added to it, namely, that this idea has an object really existing in nature. You are not in an error, because you have the idea of a centaur ; but you are in an error when to this idea of a centaur you join the affirmation, that the object of such an idea exists. It is not the idea taken by itself, it is the judgment connected with it, which contains the error. The school of Locke has developed and put in clear light this judicious observation.

The second book closes with an excellent chapter on the association of ideas.¶ Not only are ideas clear or obscure, distinct or confused, real or chimerical, complete or incomplete, true or false ; they have besides this undeniable peculiarity, that by occasion of one we conceive another, that they recal and bring up each other. There are associations natu-

* B. II. ch. I. § 18, 19. † B. II. ch. XXIX. ‡ *Ibid.* ch. XXX.

§ *Ibid.* ch. XXXI. ¶ *Ibid.* ch. XXXII. ¶ *Ibid.* ch. XXXIII.

ral, necessary, and rational ; there are also false, arbitrary, and vicious associations of ideas. Locke has clearly discerned and forcibly signalized the danger of the latter sort. He has shown by a multitude of examples how it frequently happens, that simply because we have seen two things by chance united, this purely accidental association subsists in the imagination and perverts the understanding. This is the source of a multitude of errors ; not only of false ideas, but of false sentiments, of arbitrary antipathies and sympathies, which not unfrequently degenerate into insanity. We find here in Locke the wisest counsels for the education of the soul and of the mind, on the art of breaking up in good season the false connections of ideas, and of restoring to their place those rational connections which are derived from the nature of ideas and of the human mind. I regret but one thing, it is that Locke did not push this analysis still farther, that he left still so much vagueness upon this important subject. It should not have been enough for him to lay it down that there are associations true, natural, and rational, and associations false, accidental, and irrational ; he should have shown in what consisted the true connections, determined the most important and the most ordinary of these legitimate connections, and attempted to ascend to the laws which govern them. A precise theory of these laws would have been an immense service done to philosophy ; for the laws of association of ideas rest upon the laws of the understanding itself. In fine, when Locke passed to perverted associations, he should have shown what is the root of these associations, and what is the relation of false connections to the true. We see the human mind only in its extravagance, until we ascend to the source, the reason of that extravagance. Thus, for example, Locke incessantly recommends, and very justly, to break up in the minds of children, the ordinary association of spectres with darkness. A more thorough analysis would have investigated the ground of this association of mysterious beings with night, darkness, obscurity. The idea of phantoms or spectres is never connected in the mind or in the imagination,

with the idea of the sun or a brilliant light. Here is certainly an extravagance of the mind, but it is an extravagance which has its ground, and it would be curious and useful to investigate it. Here is a false connection of ideas which analysis can completely explain only by referring it to another connection of ideas, natural and legitimate, but perverted in a particular case.—As to the rest, I repeat, this whole chapter shows the ingenious observer, and the true philosopher; and we shall see hereafter that the association of ideas became, in the hands of Locke's school, a rich subject of experiment and of instructive results, a fruitful topic of favorite study, and in respect to which the followers of Locke have rendered unquestionable service to the human reason.

Such is the exact and faithful analysis of the second book. Locke has made all our ideas to be derived from sensation or from reflection; he has exhibited their genesis, the play of their developement, the different general attributes by which they may be classed, and that most remarkable quality, which is at once the most useful or the most dangerous.—Ideology, psychology, at least that of Locke, is achieved.

It would now remain to pass to the applications of ideology, to the knowledge of objects and beings by the aid of ideas. This is the subject of the fourth book. But Locke, having clearly perceived what is the relation of words to ideas, and that words are a fruitful source of errors for the understanding, has previously devoted an entire book, his third, to the discussion of the great question concerning signs and language.

You know that this is again one of the points in which the school of Locke has been the most faithful to their master. It is the favorite subject with his school, and I cordially acknowledge that in regard to this question, together with that concerning the association of ideas, it has deserved best of philosophy. I acknowledge with great respect a multitude of sound, ingenious, and even original ideas, scattered through the whole of Locke's third book. Locke has admirably perceived the necessary intervention of signs, of words, in the

formation of abstract and general ideas ; the influence of signs and words in definitions, and consequently in a considerable part of logic. He has noticed and signalized the advantages of a good system of signs, the utility of a well constructed language, the danger of an ill one ; the verbal disputes to which a defective language too frequently reduces philosophy. Upon all these points he has opened the route which his school have entered and pursued. If he has not gone very far, he still has the credit of opening the way ; if he has suffered many profound observations to escape him which have been made by his successors, he has in requital avoided very many systematic errors into which they have fallen. Faithful still, however, to his method of inquiring more after the origin of things than their actual characters, Locke has not failed to investigate, though briefly, the origin of words, of signs, of language. He has recognized that the materials of language pre-exist in nature, in sounds, and in that of our organs, which is fitted to form them ; but he perfectly comprehended that if there were nothing else but sounds, even articulate sounds, there would indeed be the materials of signs, but there would yet be no signs. There are signs only on one condition, namely, that the understanding attaches a sense, a particular signification to the sound, in order that the sound should become a sign, the sign of an internal conception of the mind. "Parrots, and several other birds," says Locke, B. III. ch. I. § 1 and 2, "will be taught to make articulate sounds distinct enough, which yet by no means are capable of language. Besides articulate sounds, therefore, it was farther necessary that man should be able to *use these sounds as signs of internal conceptions* ; and to make them stand as marks for the ideas within his own mind." From whence it follows, 1. that language is not the product of sounds, that is to say, of the organs and the senses, but of the intelligence ; 2. that the intelligence is not the product of language, but on the contrary, language is the product of intelligence ; 3. that the greater part of words having, as Locke well remarked, an arbitrary signification, not only are languages the product of the

intelligence, but they are even in great part the product of the will ; while in the system which has prevailed, both in the school of Locke and in a school altogether opposed to his, intelligence is made to come from language, in the latter, without much inquiring whence language comes, in the former, by making it come from the sensation and the sound, without suspecting that there is a gulf between the sound considered as a sound, and the sound considered as a sign, and that what makes it a sign is the power to comprehend it, that is, the mind, the intelligence. Sounds, and the organs which perceive and produce them, are the conditions of language ; but its principle is intelligence. Here at least, we can give Locke the credit of not confounding the condition of a principle with the principle itself. His successors have not been as wise.*

I will now proceed to take up several important points of the third book, which appear to me doubtful or false. You will judge.

I. Locke maintains (B. III. ch. I. § 5,) that "words ultimately derive their origin from such [other words] as signify sensible things," that is to say, in the last analysis all words have for their roots elementary words, which are the signs of sensible ideas. In the first place, the absolute truth of this proposition may be denied. I will give you two words, and will ask you to reduce them to their primitive words expressive of sensible ideas. Take the word *I* or *myself*. This word, at least in all languages with which I am acquainted, is not susceptible of any reduction. It is undecomposable and primitive. It expresses no sensible idea ; it represents nothing but the meaning which the intelligence attaches to it ; it is a pure sign, without relation to any sensible sign. The word *being* is in precisely the same case ; it is primitive and altogether intellectual. I know no language where the word *to be* is expressed by a corresponding word representing a sensible idea. It is not then true, that all the roots of language are in the last analysis signs of sensible ideas. Farther,—even

* See Appendix, Note Z.

if it were true, and absolutely so, which is not the fact, let us see the only conclusion which could be justly drawn from it. Man is led at first by the action of all his faculties out of himself and towards the external world. The phenomena of the external world first strike his notice; these phenomena of course receive the first names; the first signs are drawn from sensible objects; and they are tinged in some sort with their colours. Then when man, subsequently, in falling back upon himself, apprehends more or less distinctly those intellectual phenomena, of which from the first he indeed had glimpses, but mixed and confused; and when he wishes to express these new phenomena of the mind and of thought, analogy leads him to connect the signs he is seeking for, with those he already possesses, for analogy is the law of all language forming or developed. Hence the metaphors into which analysis resolves the greater part of the signs of the most abstract moral ideas. But it does not follow at all, that the mind of man has hereby intended to mark the genesis of its ideas. Because the signs of certain ideas are analogous to the signs of certain other ideas, the conclusion does indeed follow that the former were formed after the others, and upon the others; but not in the least does it follow that the ideas of all these signs are in themselves identical or analogous. It is, however, by these analogies, purely verbal, and which, I repeat it, do not explain all the phenomena of language, that the school of Locke, taking advantage of the relations of words to each other, and of the sensible characteristics of the chief part of their roots, has pretended, that all signs in the last analysis are derived from sensible signs, and what is more, that all ideas are equally derived from sensible ideas. Here is the foundation of the great work of Horne Tooke, who, in respect to grammar, has developed with a hardy fidelity the system already clearly indicated in the *Essay on the Human Understanding*, (B. III. ch. I. § 5,) a system more or less in accordance with the necessary intervention of intelligence in the formation of language which Locke had himself set forth, and with the power of reflection as distinct from sensation in

the acquisition of knowledge. "It may also lead us a little towards the original of all our notions and knowledge, if we remark how great a dependance our words have on common sensible ideas; and how those, which are made use of to stand for actions and notions quite removed from sense, have their rise from thence, and from obvious sensible ideas are transferred to more abstruse significations, and made to stand for things that come not under the cognizance of our senses; e. g. to imagine, apprehend, comprehend, adhere, conceive, instil, disgust, disturbance, tranquillity, &c. are all words taken from the operations of sensible things, and applied to certain modes of thinking. *Spirit*, in its primary signification, is breath; *angel*, a messenger: and I doubt not, but if we could trace them to their sources, we should find, in all languages, the names which stand for things that fall not under the senses, to have had their first rise from sensible ideas. By which we may give some kind of guess, what kind of notions they were, and whence derived, which filled their minds who were the first beginners of languages; and how nature, even in the naming of things, unawares suggested to men the originals and principles of all their knowledge ——"

II. Another proposition of Locke: (B. III. ch. III. § 8,) "that the signification of words is perfectly arbitrary."—I have already acknowledged that the greater part of words are arbitrary, and come not only from the intelligence, but from the will. I am thoroughly persuaded that the greater part of words are conventional; but the question is, whether they are all so. The point to be investigated is, if there be absolutely not one root in language which carries of itself its own signification, which has a natural meaning, which is the foundation of subsequent convention, instead of coming from that convention. This is a great question which Locke has cut off with a single word, and which all his school have regarded as definitively settled; not even agitating it. And certainly even if I should grant, what I cannot grant without qualification, that all words are arbitrary, I should except the laws of the relation of words to each other. Language is not a simple collection of

isolated words ; it is a system of manifold relations of words to each other. These various relations are all referable to invariable relations, which constitute the foundation of every language, its grammar, the common and identical part of all languages, that is to say, universal grammar, which has its necessary laws derived from the very nature of the human mind. Now it is remarkable, that in the book on words, Locke has never touched upon the relations of words, never upon syntax, nor the true foundation of language. There are a multitude of special reflections and ingenious too, but no theory, no true grammar. It is by the school of Locke, that the isolated remarks of their master have been formed into a grammatical system true or false, which we shall not take up at present.

III. We come now to another proposition of great importance. Locke declares expressly, that what is called general and universal, is the work of the understanding, and that the real essence is nothing else than the nominal essence. B. III. ✓
 ch. III. § 11 : "*general and universal belong not to the real existence of things ; but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by it for its own use, and concern only signs, whether words or ideas.*" You see here the very foundation of nominalism. It is important to examine, though briefly, this proposition, which has become in the school of Locke an unquestionable principle, a prejudice placed above all discussion.

I perceive a book, and another book, and another book still ; I neglect, by abstraction, their differences of position, of form, of size, of color ; I attend solely to their relations of resemblance which it is needless to enumerate, and I arrive by well known processes, to the general idea of book ; and that general idea is expressed for me by the word, book. Now what is there under this word ? Neither more nor less than this : 1. the supposition that, besides the differences which distinguish the objects placed before my eyes, there are also in them resemblances, common qualities, without which no generalization would be possible ; 2. the supposition that there is a

mind capable of recognizing these common qualities ; and 3, the supposition that there are objects really existing, real books, subjects of the common qualities. The word book represents all this : different books existing in nature, qualities common to those different books, and a mind capable of uniting those common qualities and of raising them to their general idea. But independently of these different and real books, of their common qualities, and of the mind which conceives them, does the word book express, does it represent, any thing existing, which is neither such or such a book, but book in itself ? No, certainly not. The word book is, then, nothing but a word, a pure word, which has no special type, no real object existing in nature ; it is certain, then, that the general essence of book confounds itself with its nominal essence, that the essence of book is nothing but a word, and here I am altogether on the side of Locke and of nominalism.

But are there not other general ideas ? Let us examine. I perceive a body, and at the same instant my mind cannot but take for granted that the body is in a certain particular space, which is the place of this particular body. I perceive another body, and my mind cannot but believe that this other particular body is also in a particular space ; and thus I arrive, and I arrive very soon, as you have before seen, without need of passing through a long series of experiments, at the general idea of space. It remains to ascertain if this general idea of space is exactly the same as the general idea of book, that is, if the word space in itself signifies nothing more than the word book. Let us consult the human mind and the truth of internal facts. It is an unquestionable fact, that when you speak of book in general, you do not connect with the idea of book that of a real existence. On the contrary, I ask if, when you speak of space in general, you do not add to this idea a belief in the reality of space ? I ask if it is with space as with book ; if you believe, for instance, that there are, without you, nothing but particular spaces, that there is not an universal space, capable of embracing all possible bodies, a space one and the same with itself, of which different particular spaces are

nothing but arbitrary portions and measures? It is certain, that when you speak of space, you have the conviction that out of yourself there is something which is space; as also when you speak of time, you have the conviction, that there is out of yourself something which is time, although you know neither the nature of time nor of space. Different times and different spaces, are not the constituent elements of space and time; time and space are not solely for you the collection of different times and different spaces. But you believe that time and space are in themselves, that it is not two or three spaces, two or three ages, which constitute space and time; for, every thing derived from experience, whether in respect to space or to time, is finite, and the characteristic of space and of time for you is to be infinite, without beginning and without end; time resolves itself into eternity, and space into immensity. In a word, an invincible belief in the reality of time and of space, is attached by you to the general idea of time and space. This is what the human mind believes; this is what consciousness testifies. Here the phenomenon is precisely the reverse of that which I just before signalized; and while the general idea of a book does not suppose in the mind the conviction of the existence of any thing which is book in itself, here on the contrary, to the general idea of time and of space, is united the invincible conviction of the reality of something which is space and time. Without doubt, the word space is a pure word, as well as that of book; but the former word carries with it the supposition of something real in itself. Here is the root and ground of realism.

Nominalism thinks that general ideas are nothing but words; realism, that general ideas suppose something real. On both sides there is equal truth, and equal error. Without doubt, there are a great number of general ideas, which are purely collective, which represent nothing else than the common qualities of objects, without implying any existence [any general existence, any essence separate from those common qualities, and the particular objects in which they reside]; and in this sense nominalism is in the right. But it is certain,

also, that there are general ideas, which imply the supposition of the real existence of their object: realism rests upon this basis, which is unquestionable.—Now, observe the error of nominalism and of realism. The force of realism lies in general ideas, which invincibly imply the external existence of their objects; these are, as you know, universal and necessary general ideas. It starts from thence; but into the circle of these superior ideas, it attracts and envelopes ideas which are purely collective and relative, born of abstraction and language. What it had the right to affirm of the former, it affirms also of the latter. It was right on one point; it would extend it to an absolute and exclusive right: that is its error. Nominalism, on its part, because it had demonstrated clearly that there are many general ideas which are only collective ideas, relative and of mere words, concluded from this that all general ideas are nothing but general ideas, collective and relative, mere signs. The one converted things into words, the other converted words into things. Both are right in their starting-point, both go astray in their conclusion, through their excessive and absolute pretensions. In general, the Sensual school is nominalist, and the Ideal school is realist; and on both sides, as is always the case with the incomplete and exclusive, half right, and half wrong.

IV. I conclude with pointing out a proposition of Locke, or rather a tendency of the third book, which it is important to reduce within just limits. Every where Locke attributes to words the greatest part of our errors; and if you expound the master by his disciples, you will find in all the writers of the school of Locke, that all disputes are disputes about words; that science is nothing but a language, (which is indeed true, if general ideas are nothing but words,) and of course, a language well formed, is a science well constructed. I wish to point out the exaggeration of these assertions. No doubt words have a great influence; no doubt they have a very large share in our errors, and we should endeavor to make language as perfect as possible. Who questions it? But the question is, whether *all* error is derived from language, and

whether science is *merely* a well-formed language? And I answer, no. The causes of error are very different; they are both more extended and more profound. Levity, presumption, indolence, precipitation, pride, thousands of moral causes, influence our judgments, independently of their external signs. Apart from all these moral causes, the human understanding is only a limited power; it is capable of truth, it is also capable of error. The vices of language may connect themselves with these moral causes and aggravate them, but do not constitute them. If you look more closely, you will see that the greater part of disputes, which seem at first to be disputes about words, are, at the bottom, disputes about things. Humanity is too serious to be excited, and often to shed its best blood for verbal quarrels. Wars do not turn on disputes about words; and I say the same of other conflicts, theological and scientific controversies, whose depth and importance is altogether misconceived, when they are resolved into pure logomachies. Certainly every science should seek for a well constructed language; but it were to take the effect for the cause, to suppose that there are well established sciences, because there are well formed languages. The contrary is true. Sciences have well formed languages, when they themselves are well formed. Mathematics, physics, chemistry, are sciences well established, and they have very well constructed languages. It is because in mathematics the ideas have been perfectly determined, that the simplicity, strictness and precision of the ideas have produced, and necessarily do produce, strictness, precision and simplicity of signs. Otherwise it would be implied that precise ideas express themselves in confused language; and even if it were so for a while, in the infancy of a language, yet soon, the precision, strictness, and fixedness of the ideas would reform the vagueness and obscurity of language. The excellence of the chemical and physical sciences comes obviously from well made experiments. Facts having been observed with precision, and described with fidelity, reasoning could apply itself to these facts with certainty, and deduce from them legitimate consequences and applications. From hence arose,

and from hence should arise, a good system of signs. Make the contrary supposition; suppose the experiments badly made, then the more strict the reasoning, founded upon these false data, should be, the more errors it would deduce, and the more length and breadth it would give to the errors. Suppose that the theories resulting from these imperfect and vicious experiments should be represented by signs the most simple, the most analogous, the best determined; of what importance would the goodness of the signs be, while under this excellent language was concealed a chimera or an error? Take the science of medicine. It is a complaint that this science has made so little advancement. What do you think should be done to bring it up from the regions of hypothesis, and elevate it to the rank of a science? Do you believe that at the outset you could, by a language well constructed, reform physiology and medicine? Or do you not believe that the true remedy is experiment, and along with experiment the strict employment of reason? A good system of signs will then come of itself; it could not come before, or it would come to no purpose. It is the same with respect to philosophy. It has been incessantly repeated, that the structure of the human mind is entire in that of language, and that philosophy would be completed the day that a philosophical language should be achieved. And starting from this point, some have endeavoured to arrange a certain philosophical language more or less clear, easy and elegant; and they have believed that philosophy was completed. But it did not answer; it was very far from answering the purpose. This prejudice has even retarded its progress, by taking off the mind from experiment. Philosophical science, like every science of observation and of reasoning, lives by observations accurately made and deductions rigorously strict. It is there, and not elsewhere, we are to look for all the future progress of philosophy.

CRITICAL EXAMINATION
OF
LOCKE'S ESSAY
ON
THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

CHAPTER SIXTH.

CONTENTS OF CHAPTER SIXTH.

Examination of the fourth Book of the Essay on the Human Understanding, on Knowledge.—That knowledge, according to Locke, depends: 1. upon Ideas; 2. upon Ideas, in so far as they are conformed to their objects.—That the conformity or non-conformity of ideas with their objects, as the foundation of truth or falsehood in regard to knowledge, is not with Locke merely a metaphor, but a real theory.—Examination of this theory of ideas, 1. in relation to the external world, to secondary qualities, to primary qualities, to the *substratum* of these qualities, to space, to time, &c.; 2. in relation to the spiritual world.—Appeal to Revelation. Paralogism of Locke.

CHAPTER VI.

HAVING found all the ideas which are in the human understanding, their origin, their genesis, their mechanism and characters; the signs also by which we express, exhibit and unfold them;—the next thing is to inquire what man does with these ideas, what knowledge he derives from them, what is the extent of this knowledge, and what its limits. This is the subject of the fourth book of the *Essay on the Human Understanding*. It treats of Knowledge, that is, not merely of ideas taken in themselves, but in relation to their objects, in relation to essences. For knowledge in its humblest degree, as well as in its highest flight, reaches to that; it evidently attains to God, to bodies, and to ourselves. Now here at the outset a previous question comes up. Knowledge extends to beings; the fact is unquestionable: but how does this take place? Departing from ideas which are within it, how does the understanding arrive at beings which are without it? What bridge is there, between the faculty of knowing, which is within us, and the objects of knowledge which are without us? When we shall have arrived on the other side, we will take counsel what course we ought to follow, and where we can go; but first it is necessary to know how to make the passage. Before entering upon ontology, we must know how to pass from psychology to ontology, what is the foundation, and the legitimate foundation of knowledge. It is this preliminary question which we shall first impose upon Locke.

The fourth book of the *Essay on the Human Understanding* begins by recognizing that all knowledge depends upon ideas:

B. IV. *Of Knowledge*; ch. I. *Of Knowledge in general*. § 1: "Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it

alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them."

Now you have seen that Locke recognizes, and rightly, that ideas in themselves considered are always true. It is always true that we have the idea which we have, which is actually under the eye of consciousness. Be this idea a chimera, a fairy, a centaur, yet, as an idea, it is always what we have it, and in this respect the idea cannot be false, it cannot but be true ; or rather, in strictness, it is neither false nor true. Where, then, can error begin, and where does truth reside ? Both the one and the other evidently reside, and can reside, only in the supposition of the mind that the idea does, or does not refer to an object, to such or such an object really existing in nature. It is in this reference or relation that truth or error lies for the human mind. If this relation can be found out and fastened upon, human knowledge is possible ; if this relation cannot be apprehended, human knowledge is impossible. Now supposing that this relation is possible, what is it, and in what does it consist ? On this point it is our task to interrogate Locke with precision and severity ; for here should be the foundation of the theory of the true or false in regard to human knowledge, that is, the foundation of the fourth book which we have to examine.

Throughout the whole of the fourth book, as at the close of the second, Locke expressly declares that the true or false in ideas, about which all knowledge is conversant, consists in the supposition of a relation between these ideas and their object ; and every where also he expressly declares that this relation is and can be nothing but a relation of agreement or disagreement. The idea is conformed to its object, or it is not conformed. If conformed, knowledge is not only possible but it is true, for it rests upon a true idea, an idea conformed to its object ; if the idea is not conformed to its object, the idea is false, and the knowledge derived from it is equally false. This in substance is what we find from one end to the other of the fourth book of the *Essay on the Human Understanding*, concerning knowledge. The same also we find at eve-

ry step in the last six chapters of the second book, where Locke treats of true and false ideas.

B. II. ch. XXXII. § 4: "Whenever the mind refers any of its ideas to any thing extraneous to them, they are then capable to be called true or false. Because the mind in such a reference makes a tacit supposition of their conformity to that thing."

B. IV. ch. IV. § 3: "It is evident, the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our *knowledge* therefore is *real*, only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things."

These two passages are positive; they clearly reduce the question of truth or falsehood in respect to knowledge, to that of the conformity or non-conformity of ideas with their objects.

But this necessity of the conformity of an idea with its object in order to its truth, is it in Locke a real theory, or is it merely a mode of speaking, simply a metaphor, more or less happy? In the first place, if it is a metaphor, I would ask what then is the theory couched under this metaphor, and in what place in Locke we are to find that theory once expressly declared. No where can I find any thing but the metaphor itself. Again, if in the entire absence of any other theory, the two passages which I have just cited do not suffice to prove that the necessity of the conformity of an idea with its object in order to constitute its truth, is not a metaphor, but an express theory, I can adduce here a multitude of other passages which leave no doubt in this respect. Thus when near the end of the second book, Locke treats of ideas as real or chimerical, as complete or incomplete, he rests upon his theory of the conformity or non-conformity of ideas with their objects.

B. II. ch. XXX. § 1: "*Real ideas are conformable to their archetypes.* First, by *real* ideas, I mean such as have a foundation in nature; such as have a conformity with the real being and existence of things, or with their archetypes. *Fantastical or chimerical*, I call such as have no foundation

in nature, nor have any conformity to that reality of being to which they are tacitly referred as to their archetypes."

Now what is an adequate or inadequate idea? An adequate idea will be that which shall be completely conformed to its archetype; an inadequate idea, that which shall be conformed only in part.

Ibid. ch. XXXI. § 1: "Those I call *adequate*, which perfectly represent those archetypes which the mind supposes them taken from, which it intends them to stand for, and to which it refers them. *Inadequate* ideas are such, which are but a partial or incomplete representation of those archetypes to which they are referred."

Thus the theory of complete or incomplete ideas rests upon the theory of real and chimerical ideas, which also rests upon that of true or false ideas, and that consists altogether in the theory of the conformity of the idea to the object. This is a point of so much importance, that to take away all uncertainty, I will adduce a passage where Locke lays down the problem by itself, and the precise form in which he lays it down, excludes all ambiguity in the solution which he gives.

B. IV. ch. IV. § 3: "But what shall be here the criterion? How shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that they agree with things themselves? This, though it seems not to want difficulty, yet I think there be two sorts of ideas that we may be assured agree with things."

§ 4. "Simple ideas carry with them all the conformity which is intended, or which our state requires; for they represent things to us under those appearances which they are fitted to produce in us." And a little further on: "this conformity between our simple ideas and the existence of things, is sufficient for real knowledge."

It is impossible to explain any thing more distinctly and directly. It is not, then, a mere way of speaking, a metaphor thrown off in passing; it is altogether a theory, a system. Let us examine it seriously.

See, then, by it, truth and error, reality and chimera, resolved into the representation or non-representation of the object by

the idea, into the conformity or non-conformity of the idea to its object. There is knowledge upon this condition, and upon this alone, that the idea represents its object, is conformed to it. But upon what condition does an idea represent its object, and be conformed to it? Upon this condition, that the idea resemble its object, that the idea have to its object the relation of a copy to its original. Weigh the force of the words : the conformity of an idea to its object can signify nothing else but the resemblance of that idea, taken as a copy, to its object, taken as the original. This is exactly what Locke expresses by the word *archetypes*, which he uses to designate the objects of ideas. Now if the conformity of the idea to its object is nothing but the resemblance of the copy to its original, to its archetype, I say that in such a case, the idea is taken solely as an image. The idea must evidently be an image in order positively to resemble any thing, in order to be able to represent any thing. See then the representative idea reduced to an image. Now reflect closely, and you will see that every image implies something material. Can an image of any thing immaterial be conceived? Every image is necessarily sensible and material, or it is nothing but a metaphor, a supposition which we have put away. Thus in the last analysis, to say that there is knowledge where the idea is conformed to its object, and that no knowledge is possible but upon this condition, is to pretend that there is no knowledge but upon the condition that the idea of a thing is the image of that thing, that is to say, its material image. All knowledge, then, is involved in the following question : Have we, in respect to beings, the ideas which represent them, which resemble them, which are the images, and the material images of them ; or have we not such images? If we have, knowledge is possible ; if not, it is impossible. Now in point of fact, human knowledge embraces both the external world, and the soul, and God. If, then, knowledge of these objects is possible and real, it is only upon the condition just laid down, namely, that we have of these beings, ideas which represent them, which resemble them, which are images of them, and once again, material images. Have we, then, or have we not

idea-images, material images, of God, of the soul, of the external world? This is the question. Let us first apply it to the external world. It is there, above all, that the theory of Locke would appear most admissible. Let us see what is the soundness and value of it even upon this ground.

The idea of the external world is the idea of body. Bodies are known to us only by their qualities. These qualities are primary or secondary. By the secondary qualities of bodies is understood, you know, those which might not exist, and yet the body itself not cease to exist; for instance, the qualities of which we acquire the idea by the sense of smelling, of hearing, and of taste, by all the senses, in short, except unquestionably that of touch, and perhaps also that of sight. The primary qualities of bodies are those which are given to us, as the fundamental attributes of bodies, without which bodies could not for us exist. The eminently primary quality is solidity, which implies more or less extension, which directly implies form. We have the conviction that every body is solid, extended, has form. We are moreover convinced that bodies have the property of causing in us those particular modifications which are called savor, sound, odour, perhaps also the modification called color. Locke agrees to all this, it is he who chiefly contributed to extend in science the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of bodies. It is not our object to go any farther in this distinction. Let us now see how Locke explains the acquisition of ideas of the primary and of secondary qualities.

B. II. ch. VIII. § 11: *How primary qualities produce their ideas.* "The next thing to be considered is, how bodies produce ideas in us; and that is manifestly by impulse, the only way which we can conceive bodies to operate in."

§ 12. "If, then, external objects be not united to our minds, when they produce ideas therein, and yet we perceive these original qualities in such of them as singly fall under our senses, it is evident, that some motion must be thence continued by our nerves or animal spirits, by some parts of our bodies to the brain or the seat of sensation, there to produce in our minds the particular ideas we have of them. And since the exten-

sion, figure, number, and motion of bodies of an observable bigness, may be perceived at a distance by the sight, it is evident that some singly imperceptible bodies must come from them to the eyes, and thereby convey to the brain some motion, which produces these ideas which we have of them in us."

§ 13. *How secondary qualities produce their ideas.*

"After the same manner that the ideas of these original qualities are produced in us, we may conceive that the ideas of secondary qualities are also produced, namely, by the operations of insensible particles on our senses. For it being manifest, that there are bodies, and good store of bodies, each whereof are so small, that we cannot by any of our senses discover either their bulk, figure, or motion, as is evident in the particles of the air and water, and others extremely smaller than those, perhaps as much smaller than the particles of air and water, as the particles of air and water are smaller than peas or hailstones: let us suppose at present, that the different motions and figures, bulk and number, of such particles, affecting the several organs of our senses, produce in us those different sensations, which we have from the colors and smells of bodies; *e. g.* that a violet, by the impulse of such insensible particles of matter of peculiar figures and bulks, and in different degrees and modifications of their motions, causes the ideas of the blue color and sweet scent of that flower to be produced in our minds; it being no more impossible to conceive that God should annex such ideas to such motions, with which they have no similitude, than that he should annex the idea of pain to the motion of a piece of steel dividing our flesh, with which that idea hath no resemblance."

§ 14. "What I have said concerning colors and smells, may be understood also of tastes, and sounds, and other the like sensible qualities ———."

If you follow up this whole theory to its principle, so imperfectly discerned and unfolded, you will find that it rests in the last analysis upon the supposition that, as bodies act upon each other only by contact, and consequently by impulsions, so in the

same way the mind likewise cannot be brought into connection with corporeal things but upon the same condition, that there should be contact between the mind and body, and of course impulse of the one upon the other. Now in sensible ideas, which are involuntary, and in which, according to Locke, the mind is passive, the impulse ought to come from the body upon the mind, and not from the mind upon the body, and the contact cannot take place directly, but indirectly by means of particles. Thus the necessity of contact involves that of particles, which emitted by bodies, obtain admittance by the organs into the brain, and there introduce into the mind what are called sensible ideas. The starting point of the whole theory is the necessity of contact, and in its result it comes out to depend upon intermediate particles and their action. These particles are, in other terms, the sensible species of the Peripatetic Scholasticism, to which modern physics has done justice. There is at the present day no more talk about sonorous, visible, tangible species; nor can there of course be any more question about their emission, nor consequently about the principle by which they were engendered, namely, the necessity of contact and impulse as the condition of acquiring sensible ideas. All this at the present day is only an obsolete hypothesis, which it would be superfluous to stop to refute. Supposing sensible ideas, however, to be thus formed, once obtained under this condition, which is yet a chimera, let us see in what these ideas differ from each other.

According to Locke, the ideas which we have of the primary qualities of matter have this peculiarity, that they resemble their object; while the ideas we have of secondary qualities have this as their peculiarity that they do not resemble their objects.

B. II. ch. VIII. § 15: "The ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves; but the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities, have no resemblance of them at all."

The ideas of secondary qualities do not then resemble those qualities. Very well; I am, therefore, according to the theory of Locke, to conclude of course, that the ideas of secondary qualities are mere chimera, and that we have no knowledge of these qualities. In fact, recollect that according to Locke, all knowledge depends upon ideas, and that there is no knowledge except as far as the idea resembles its object. Now by the acknowledgment of Locke himself, the ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble these qualities; therefore these ideas do not contain any knowledge. It cannot be said that we have indeed a knowledge, though incomplete, of the secondary qualities of bodies. If Locke had intended to say this, he should have said, according to his general theory, that the ideas of secondary qualities do represent, though incompletely, their objects. But he says they do not represent them at all, in any degree. They do not therefore involve any, even the most imperfect knowledge; they contain no knowledge; they are pure chimeras, like the ideas of fairies, of centaurs, &c. This consequence is necessitated by the theory of Locke. But is it in accordance with facts; which it is our business to explain, and not to destroy? Is it in fact true, that we have no knowledge of the secondary qualities of bodies? Far otherwise. The secondary qualities of bodies, smell, sound, taste and color, are for us decidedly real properties in bodies, to which we attribute the power of exciting in us certain modifications or sensations. We are not only conscious of these sensations, but we believe that they have causes, and that these causes are in the bodies. As we could conceive of bodies independently of these causes or powers, properties or qualities, we call these qualities secondary. We know them, I grant, only as causes of our sensations, while we are ignorant of their intimate essence; but still we know them in this character and degree, and it is a real knowledge undeniably found in all mankind. Now do not forget that according to the theory of Locke, knowledge is always subject to this condition, that the idea upon which knowledge depends shall represent its object. You have undeniably the idea of the secondary qualities of bodies, so far forth

as causes of your sensations. Now observe that according to the theory of Locke, this idea, which you all have, and upon which is founded almost all your conduct, and of human life at large,—this idea cannot be true, cannot be the foundation of any legitimate knowledge, except upon condition that it shall be conformed to its object, to the causes of your sensations, to the secondary qualities of bodies. And when I say conformed to them, recollect distinctly that the condition of conformity is nothing less than that of resemblance, and that the condition of resemblance is nothing less than that of being an image, a sensible and material image ; for there is no immaterial image. The question, then, resolves itself to this : whether you have, or have not a material image of the secondary qualities of bodies, that is to say, of those properties of bodies which cause in you the sensations of color, sound, taste and smell. Let us see, then, what the material image of a cause can be. A cause, in so far forth as a cause, (and the secondary properties or qualities of bodies are nothing else,) has no form, no color ; what material image then can be made of it ? A cause, whatever it be, whether you place it in the mind, or in what we call matter, is always a cause, it is never any thing but a cause ; and so far forth as it is a cause, it falls neither under the hand, nor the eye ; it falls under none of our senses. It is then something of which in strictness you can have no sensible idea, no idea-image, no material image. Then, since you have not, and cannot have the image of a cause, and since secondary qualities of bodies are given you only as causes, it follows that you cannot have any true idea, any legitimate knowledge of the secondary qualities of bodies. It follows in strictness that you cannot have any knowledge of them, legitimate or illegitimate, and that these qualities ought to be to you as though they had never been ; since according to the theory of Locke, you could not have attained them except by images more or less faithful which you had formed of them, images however which in this case are altogether and absolutely wanting.

The denial of the secondary qualities of bodies is, then, the inevitable result of the theory, that every idea, to be true, must represent its object. This result is unavoidable; experience however gives the lie to it, and in so doing, refutes the principle. The ideas of the secondary qualities do not resemble their objects in any way, and nevertheless they contain a certain knowledge; it is not therefore true that all knowledge supposes the resemblance of the idea to its object.

The theory of Locke breaks to pieces upon the secondary qualities of bodies; let us see if it will be more fortunate in respect to primary qualities.

Solidity is by eminence the primary quality. Solidity with its degrees, hardness or softness, penetrability or impenetrability, envelopes extension, which contains size and form; these are chiefly the primary qualities of bodies. Locke declares expressly that the ideas of primary qualities resemble those qualities; this is their title of legitimacy in his view. This theory at first sight, might *seem* to be true in regard to one point, that which respects form. In fact, the form of objects which pertains to extension, which also pertains to solidity, paints itself upon the retina. Experience attests this, and the conformity of these images to their objects, seems indeed the foundation of the truth of the ideas which we have of the form of objects. But even here it is only a false semblance.

If the resemblance of the image on the retina to the form of the external object, is the foundation of our knowledge of the form of that object, it follows that this knowledge cannot be acquired, and never could have been acquired, but upon the following conditions:

1. That we should know there is some image upon the retina.

2. That, by some process, comparing the image upon the retina to the external object, we should find the image upon the retina, in fact, similar to the object, as to form; then, and only then, by the theory of Locke, should we be certain that the idea which we have of the form of this object is true, and our knowledge in regard to it certain.

All these conditions are necessary ; but are they fulfilled in the fact of our knowledge of the forms of external objects ? By no means. In the first place, the knowledge of the image upon the retina is altogether a subsequent acquisition of experience and of psychology. The first men who believed that they had before their eyes figured bodies, knew nothing in the world about the images upon the retina. Still farther were they from inquiring whether these images, of which they knew nothing, were conformed to the forms of the bodies which they knew ; and consequently the condition imposed upon the human mind of knowing first the image upon the retina, and then verifying the conformity of this image with its object, is not the process which the mind, left to itself and without any system, naturally employs, in order to know the forms of bodies.—Again, observe that if the accurate painting of the form of the object upon the retina, explains the secret of the perception of that form, it is necessary that this picture, this image, should pass from the retina to the optic nerve, from the optic nerve to the brain, which Locke calls the audience chamber of the soul, and from this audience chamber it must gain admittance to the mind itself. But this process is arrested at every step. From the retina, the image must pass to the brain by the optic nerve. Now, who does not know that the optic nerve is situated in an obscure region impenetrable to the light ? The optic nerve is in the dark, no image can be painted on it, and our image is already lost. Farther, the brain, that audience chamber of the soul, is also in the dark ; the soul which, according to the theory of Locke, must observe the retina, in order there to meet with the image of the form of a body, which must discern this image and its conformity to the original, can make this observation neither upon the optic nerve nor the brain.

We have, so to say, shut up all the avenues of the soul against the hypothesis of the idea-image ; the idea-image is, then, nothing but a chimera in the mind. In the perception of the form of objects there are not, 1. figured objects ; 2. a mind capable of perceiving the figure of these objects ; 3. an inter-

mediate image between the real form of the objects and the mind. There are nothing but figured objects, and a mind endowed with the faculty of perceiving them with their forms. The existence of the image of the figure of objects upon the retina is a real fact, which is indeed the previous condition of the perception of visible appearances, but not the foundation of this perception ; which precedes, but does not in any way constitute nor explain it. The existence of the figure of objects upon the retina, which is simply an external condition of the phenomena of vision, being transformed into a complete explanation of these phenomena, is the source of the hypothesis of the idea-image, so far as respects the perception of the forms of objects. It has also still another source. Not only is the mind endowed with the faculty of perceiving the forms of present objects, whenever certain organic conditions are fulfilled ; but also when these objects are absent, it is endowed with the faculty of recalling them, not only of knowing what they were, but of representing them to itself as they were, and with the forms which they had been perceived to have while they were present. The memory actually has this imaginative power ; we may imagine objects altogether as we perceived them ; the fact is unquestionable. But in the imagination of the forms of absent objects, as in the perception of the forms of present objects, there are only two terms, the absent objects, and the mind which is able to represent them though absent ; or rather in this case, there is really nothing but the mind which, in the absence of the objects, recalls them with their forms, as if they were present before it. Now in the mind which represents past objects to itself, poetry can indeed detach the representation from the objects, and consider it apart as a proper element subsisting by itself. This is a right of poetry, but not of philosophical analysis, which can never lawfully convert abstractions into realities. Abstraction taken for reality, the participle or adjective converted into a substantive, is, then, the second source of the hypothesis of the idea-image ; not to refer again to the vicious analogies, of the con-

ditions of communication between bodies, applied to the mind.

But to go further. Our discussion has thus far respected only the form of external objects ; but how will it be if we come to the other primary qualities of bodies ; for instance, the primary quality *par excellence*, namely, solidity ? Would you dare revive the scholastic hypothesis of the *tangible species*, in order to provide a companion to the visual image upon the retina ? Would you put this tangible species upon the mysterious paths of the nerves and brain which the image of forms could not traverse ? Be it so. Suppose a tangible species ; suppose this idea-image of solidity arrived at the mind, and there let us see if it satisfies the fundamental condition of the theory of Locke. Let us see whether it is conformed, or not conformed to its model, to solidity itself. What is solidity ? We have shown that it is resistance. Where there is no resistance, there is to us nothing but ourselves. Where resistance begins, there begins for us something besides ourselves, the outward, the external, nature, the world. Now if solidity is something which resists, it is a resisting cause ; and we are here, again, in respect to the primary quality of bodies, as before in respect to their secondary qualities, led back to the idea of cause. Here, then, also, in order that we may have a legitimate knowledge of the resisting cause, of solidity, it is necessary that we should have an idea of it, which is conformed to it, which is similar to it, an image, a material image of the resisting cause. Such, according to Locke, is the systematic condition of the primary quality of body. But I have shown that there cannot be a material image of any cause, and of course not of a resisting cause, of solidity, the fundamental quality of body.

Thus we have no longer a legitimate idea of the primary qualities of bodies, any more than of their secondary qualities, if we are to have it only upon the condition of the idea being a material image of its object. But we are not yet done. We are yet only at the threshold of the external world. Not only has body primary and secondary qualities, which I have

just shown to be incompatible with the theory of Locke ; but moreover, we believe that under these qualities, there is something which is the subject of them, something which has not only a real, but a permanent existence, while these qualities are in perpetual motion and alteration. We all believe in the existence of a subject, of a substance for these qualities. Now in the theory of Locke, the idea of this substance is not legitimate, unless it be conformed to its object, that is, to the substance of bodies ; and the idea, to be conformed to its object, must be a material image. But I ask if it is possible to have a material image of substance ? It is obviously impossible. Then you have no idea of substance, and of the reality of bodies.

Not only are you convinced of the real and substantial existence of bodies, but you all believe that these bodies, of which the fundamental attribute is solidity, resistance, are somewhere, in place, in space. You all have the idea of space. Now you cannot have it except on one condition, (according to Locke,) that the idea you have of it represents it, is its material image. But it is, we have seen, one of the characteristics of space, that it cannot be confounded with bodies which fill and measure it, but not constitute it. It is, then, *a fortiori*, impossible that you should have a material image of that which has no material existence, when you cannot have one of bodies, and of their fundamental and accessory attributes.

It is the same in regard to time. You believe that the motions of bodies, and the succession of these different motions, take place in time, and you do not confound the succession of the motions of bodies with time itself, which is indeed measured but not constituted by this succession, any more than the aggregate of bodies constitutes space. You have the idea of time as distinct from all succession. If you have it, by the theory of Locke, it is under the condition of having an idea conformed to it, an idea-image. But you cannot have an idea-image of time, since time is distinct from the motion of bodies and does not fall under any of the senses ;—you cannot therefore have a legitimate idea of time.

I might pursue this criticism still farther, but I believe I have gone sufficiently far to demonstrate that if, relatively to the external world, our ideas are not true except upon condition that they are representative ideas, conformed to their objects, material images of their objects, we should have no legitimate idea of the external world, neither of the secondary nor primary qualities of matter, nor of their subject, nor of space, nor of time. The theory of a material image results in nothing less than the destruction of all legitimate knowledge of matter and of the external world.

The objections which I have just presented are so natural and so simple, that Locke could not even lay down the problem as he has done, without partially suspecting them, and they sufficiently pressed upon him to shake his conviction of the existence of the external world. He does not precisely call it in question, but he acknowledges that upon the foundation of the representative idea, (the only one which he conceived,) the knowledge of bodies has not perfect certainty; he thinks however that it goes beyond simple probability. "But yet, if after all," says Locke, "any one will question the existence of all things, or our knowledge of any thing, I must desire him to consider that we have such an assurance of the existence of things without us, as is sufficient to direct us in the attaining the good, and avoiding the evil, which is caused by them; which is the important concernment we have of being made acquainted with them." B. IV. ch. 10, § 8. This is almost the language of scepticism. Locke, however, is not sceptical in regard to the existence of bodies. He belongs to the great family of peripatetics and sensualists, in which the theory of *sensible species* had the authority of a dogma, and the office of giving and explaining the external world. Out of the sensible species, the seventeenth century, and Locke in particular, have made sensible ideas, provided with all the qualities of those species, representatives of their objects, and emanating from them. There is then no idealistic tendency in the theory of Locke. On the contrary, Locke is persuaded that these ideas, so far forth as they are represent-

ative, are the only solid foundation from which the knowledge of external objects can be derived. Only he finds, and half acknowledges, that contrary to his wish, the peripatetic hypothesis of species, transformed into the modern theory of sensible ideas, turns out against his design, and that although this hypothesis has evidently a material character, since his ideas are necessarily material images, yet it is convicted of inability legitimately to give us matter. Judge, then, how it must be in regard to the spiritual world, the soul, and God. I shall be brief. Recollect the general principle of Locke. We have no legitimate knowledge of any thing, but upon condition that the ideas we have of it, be conformed to their object. Now all the world believe in the existence of the soul, that is to say, in the existence of something in us which feels, which wills, which thinks. Even those who do not believe in the spiritual existence of this subject, have never called in question the existence of its faculties, the existence of the sensibility, for example, or that of will, or of thought. Reflect then : you have no legitimate knowledge of thought, of volition, of sensibility, but upon the condition that the ideas you have of them are representative, and that these ideas are images, and of course material images. See then into what an abyss of absurdities we are thrown. In order to know thought and volition, which are immaterial, it is necessary that we should have a material image which resembles them. But what is a material image of thought, and of volition ? It is an absurdity even in regard to the sensibility. But the absurdity is, if possible, still greater, in regard to the substance of these faculties, in regard to the soul, and then in regard to the unity and identity of this soul, and then in regard to the time in which the operations of these mental faculties take place, sensations, volitions, and thoughts.

See, then, the spiritual world fallen away and lost, as well as the material. Simply from the condition that we have no legitimate ideas of our faculties and of their subject, unless these ideas be material images of them, it evidently results that we have no legitimate knowledge of our soul, and of its

faculties, of our whole internal being, intellectual and moral. Here the difficulty seems even much greater than in regard to the material world, or at least the successor of Bacon and of Hobbes is more startled by it. In respect to the material world, he had acknowledged that his theory was liable to some objections, but these objections did not seem to him insurmountable, nor to go far enough to deprive us of a certain knowledge of the material world, sufficient for our wants. Hereby he pretended to open the door only to a semi-scepticism. It was without doubt a weakness; for the idea of Locke, a material image, not in any manner representing bodies, neither complete nor incomplete, he ought not to have admitted any idea of bodies; he ought to have gone on to absolute scepticism. Locke, however, stops short, both from the good sense and from the evidence which, in his school, surrounds the senses and the physical world. But when he comes to the spiritual world, to which the sensual school is much less attached, the arguments which naturally rise up against him from his own theory, strike him more forcibly, and he declares (B. IV. ch. XI. § 12,) that "we can no more know, that there are finite spirits really existing, by the idea we have of such beings in our minds, than by the ideas any one has of fairies, or centaurs, he can come to know that things answering those ideas do really exist. Here it would seem is absolute scepticism; you may think, perhaps, that the final conclusion of Locke will be, that there is no knowledge of finite spirits, nor consequently of our soul, nor of any of its faculties; for the objection is as valid against the phenomena of the soul as against its substance. This is, indeed, the result to which he should have gone on; but he did not dare to do it, for there is no philosopher at once wiser and more inconsistent than Locke. What then does he do?

In the peril into which his philosophy has driven him, he abandons his philosophy, and all philosophy, and appeals to Christianity, to revelation, to faith. By faith, however, and by revelation, he does not understand a philosophical faith and revelation. This interpretation did not exist in the age of

Locke. He understands faith and revelation in the proper orthodox theological sense. His conclusion is this: (section before cited,) "Therefore, concerning the existence of finite spirits, as well as several other things, we must content ourselves with the evidence of faith." Thus Locke here himself acknowledges and accepts the inevitable consequences of his theory, to which I wished to conduct him. Speaking as a philosopher, and not as a theologian, in the name of the human mind, and not in the name of a creed, I said that if we had no other reason to believe in the existence of spirit than the hypothesis of the representative idea, we had no good reason to believe at all. Locke admits it, he proclaims it himself, and he throws himself into the arms of faith. I shall not leave him there.

The world of faith is as much shut up against him, as the world of mind and of matter. He could never have penetrated it, but by the grossest paralogism. Locke has no more right, nay, he has even less right, to believe in faith, in revelation, in Christianity, than in finite spirits such as we are, and in matter which is before us.

Revelation supposes two things: 1. doctrines emanating from God; 2. a book in which these doctrines are deposited and preserved. This book, though its contents may be divine and sacred, is itself necessarily material, it is a body; and here I refer Locke to the objections already brought forward against the legitimate knowledge of bodies, if we have no other ground for believing in them than the idea-image which represents them. Thus there is no legitimate knowledge of the book, in which are contained the sacred doctrines revealed by God. What, then, becomes of the doctrines it contained? Besides, these doctrines come from God.

And what is God? A spirit, an infinite spirit, as we judge. Now, Locke has not yet been able, by his theory, to admit the legitimate existence of finite spirits; and, incredible to tell, in order to make me admit the existence of finite spirits, he proposes that I should begin by admitting the existence

of an infinite spirit. But is not this to explain *obscurum per obscurius*, [to solve the lesser difficulty by presenting a greater]? See the human mind deprived of the knowledge of finite spirits, because it can have no ideas conformed to them, and yet, from its greater facility, having an idea of the infinite spirit, perfectly representing its object! But if a finite spirit cannot be represented, much less can the infinite spirit be represented; evidently it cannot be, under the condition of Locke, that is, under the condition of forming an image, and a material image of it. There is, then, no infinite spirit, no God, [that is, we have no knowledge of him, no right to believe]; therefore, no revelation is possible. Every where, at every step, in the theory of Locke, we are plunged from depth to depth in the abyss of paralogism.

If it is true that we have no legitimate knowledge, no true idea, but under the condition that this idea represents its object, and is conformed to it, is an image, and (as I have proved to be in strictness the necessary result of the hypothesis,) a *material* image of it,—then it follows, that we have no legitimate idea of the external world, nor of the world of spirits, souls, ourselves, and still less of God, to whom Locke appeals. Consequently it follows, in the last analysis, that we have no true idea of beings, and that we have no other legitimate knowledge than that of our own ideas; none of their object, whatever it be, even of our own personal being itself. This consequence overwhelms this theory of ideas, and it is a consequence which invincibly follows from this theory.*

* See Appendix, Note AA.



CRITICAL EXAMINATION
OF
LOCKE'S ESSAY
ON
THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

CHAPTER SEVENTH.

CONTENTS OF CHAPTER SEVENTH.

Resumption and continuation of the preceding chapter.—Of the idea, not now considered in relation to the object which it should represent, but in relation to the mind which perceives it, and in which it is found.—The idea-image, idea taken materially, implies a material subject ; from hence materialism.—Taken spiritually, it can give neither bodies, nor spirit.—That the representative-idea, laid down as the sole primitive *datum* of the mind, in the inquiry after reality, condemns us to a paralogism ; since no representative idea can be decided to represent correctly or incorrectly, except by comparing it with its original, with the reality itself, to which, however, by the hypothesis, we cannot arrive but by the idea.—That knowledge is direct, and without an intermediate.—Of judgments, of propositions and ideas.—Return to the question of innate ideas.

CHAPTER VII.

I NOW resume and complete the last lecture. According to Locke, knowledge consists entirely in the relation of the idea to its object ; and this knowledge is true or false, according as the relation of the idea to the object is a relation of conformity or of non-conformity. An idea, to be true, to be the foundation of real knowledge, must be similar to its object, must represent it, be an image of it. Now what is the condition of an image ? There is no image without figure, without something of extension, without something sensible and material. The idea-image then implies something material ; and if the truth of knowledge resolves itself into the conformity of the idea to its object, it resolves itself into the conformity of an image, taken materially, to its object, of whatever sort the object be.

Observe that the representative idea, as the basis of knowledge, is in Locke a universal theory, without limit, without exception. It should then explain all knowledge ; it should go as far as human knowledge can go ; it should then embrace God, spirits, and bodies, for all this falls more or less under knowledge. If then we can know nothing, neither God, nor spirits, nor bodies, except by the ideas which represent them, and which represent them by being material images of them, the question is : whether we have ideas of these objects, these beings, which are faithful images of them, taken materially.

The problem thus reduced to its most simple expression, has been easily solved. I think it has been clearly demonstrated that the external world itself, which the idea-image would seem most easily to give us, entirely escapes us, if it can be got at only by the idea-image ; for there is no sensible idea

which can be an image of the world, of external objects, of bodies.

In regard to bodies, we have considered first their secondary qualities so called, which you know are properties in their nature out of our reach, and appreciable only by their effects, that is to say, are pure causes, the causes of our sensations. Now it is evident there is, and can be no material image of a cause.—In respect to the primary qualities of bodies, there is one among them, namely, figure, which would seem proper to be represented by the idea-image; and in fact it is certain that the visible appearance, the figure of external bodies placed before the organ of vision, is painted upon the retina. But, 1. the person who first knew the visible figure of a body was entirely ignorant that this visible figure was painted upon his retina; it is not, then, to the knowledge of this picture upon the retina and of the conformity of this picture to its object, that the knowledge of the reality of the external figure is owing: 2. then this picture stops at the retina; in order to go to the brain, which, as Locke says, is the audience chamber of the mind, it is necessary that it should traverse the optic nerve which is in an obscure region; and even if the optic nerve were in a luminous position, the image, after having traversed it, and arrived at the brain, would perish in the darkness of that organ, before arriving at the mind. Thus it is indeed the condition of the phenomena of vision that there should be an image of the object upon the retina, but is only a condition, and not the foundation and explanation. Besides, if the idea-image plays a certain part in the phenomena of vision, it does not apply at all to other phenomena, to those of touch, for example, from which we derive the knowledge of the primary quality of body, *par excellence*, namely, of solidity, resistance. We have demonstrated that there can be no idea-image of resistance, of solidity; for the idea of solidity resolves itself into the idea of a cause, a resisting cause, and it has been demonstrated that there can be no idea-image of cause.

So much for the primary and secondary qualities of bodies. If the idea-image represents no quality of bodies, still less can

it represent the subject of these qualities, that *substratum* which escapes the grasp of the senses, and which of course can fall under no image borrowed from the senses. Space also, which must not be confounded with bodies enclosed by it, cannot be given by an idea-image. It is the same in respect to time ; it is the same in respect to every sort of knowledge involved in the general knowledge of the external world. Since, then, the idea-image can represent only forms, and plays no part except in the phenomena of vision, and even there is only the external condition of those phenomena, it follows that if the external world has no other way of arriving at the intelligence, than that of the representative idea, it does not and cannot arrive there at all.

The difficulties of the hypothesis of a representative idea are greatly increased when we come to consider the spiritual world. Locke acknowledges these difficulties. He allows that, since in fact the idea-image cannot represent the qualities of spirits, because there is no image of that which has no figure, either we must renounce the knowledge of spirit, or to obtain it, we must have recourse to faith, to revelation. But revelation is for us a book which contains doctrines revealed by God. Here there are, then, two things, a book, and God. As to the book, we refer it to the external world : no representative idea being able to give certain knowledge of a sensible object, consequently giving none of a book, this book, sacred or not, can never be certainly known, nor be the foundation of certain knowledge of spiritual existence.—God remains ; but to have recourse to God in order to legitimate the knowledge of spirit, is to have recourse to spirit, in order to legitimate the knowledge of spirit ; it is to take for granted the thing in question. The only difference there is between the spirit of God, and our own, is that the spirit of God is infinite, while our spirit is finite, which, far from diminishing the difficulty, increases it. Thus the representative idea, turned every way, can give no real knowledge, neither of bodies, nor of spirits, and still less the knowledge of the infinite spirit to whom Locke gratuitously appeals.

Absolute scepticism, then, is the inevitable consequence of the theory of the representative idea ; and absolute scepticism is nothing less than absolute nihilism. In fact you have legitimately by this theory, neither the secondary qualities of bodies, nor their primary qualities, nor the subject of these qualities, nor space in which the bodies are located, nor time in which their motions are accomplished. Still less legitimately have you the qualities of your mind, or your mind itself, or that of your fellow beings, the finite mind ; and still less God, the infinite mind. You have then nothing, absolutely nothing, but the idea itself, that idea which ought to represent every thing, and which represents nothing, and suffers no real knowledge to come to you.

You see then where we are ; but our difficulties are far from being exhausted. We have hitherto considered the idea-image in its relation to external objects which it should represent, namely, to bodies, to our spirits, and to God. Let us now consider it in another view, in its relation to the mind which must perceive it, and in which it must be found.

The idea represents neither body, nor spirit, nor God ; it can then give no object. This we have demonstrated. But it necessarily is in a subject. How is it there ? What is the relation of the idea, not now to its object, but to its subject ?

Recollect the condition to which we have condemned the representative idea. If it represents, it must have in itself something of figure, something material ; it is, then, something material. Look, then, at the representative idea which is something material in the subject where it is found. But it is clear that the subject of the idea, the subject which perceives, contains and possesses the idea, can be of no other nature than the idea itself. The representative idea is something figured, like the shadows which paint themselves in a magic lantern ; it can then exist only in something of an analogous kind, in a subject of the same nature, figured as the idea is, having parts, being extended and material, as it is. Hence, the destruction of the simplicity and spirituality of the subject

of the idea, that is to say, of the soul, or in a word, materialism is the consequence of the theory of the representative idea, considered in relation to its subject.

This result was already in the principle ; this consequence does nothing but expose the vice of the origin of the representative idea. In fact, the origin of this theory, as you know, is in the hypothesis that the mind does not know bodies, does not communicate with bodies, except in the same way that bodies communicate with one another. Now bodies communicate, either by immediate impulse one upon the other, or indirectly by the intermediation of one or more bodies receiving and communicating the impulse, so that is always impulse which forms the communication between bodies. If mind, then, may know bodies, it must be by impulse. But we see no immediate and direct impulse of bodies upon the mind, nor of the mind upon bodies ; the impulse must then be from a distance, that is by something intermediate. This intermediate is the idea. The idea emanates from the body, and through the senses arrives at the mind. The idea emanates from bodies, that is its first characteristic, the second is, that it represents them. Representation is here founded upon the emission. Now emission, which is the first root of the representative idea, necessarily makes it material. This shows already a strong inclination towards materialism ; look now at something which shows this tendency much more strikingly. Not only does the mind gain no knowledge of bodies, except as bodies communicate with one another ; but the mind knows minds only as it knows bodies, by the intermediation of the representative idea. A theory material in its origin, is first applied to the knowledge of bodies, then transferred to the knowledge of spirit. It is then altogether natural that the last expression of this theory should be materialism. And I do not impose upon this theory merely its logically necessary consequences, but consequences which have been deduced from it. History is charged with the office of developing these consequences in the school of Locke. Upon this theory of the representative idea, the school of Locke in part, grounds

its positive denial of the spirituality of the soul. According to that school, many ideas in the mind, taken materially, suppose something extended in the mind ; and even a single idea, being an image, is already something figured, which supposes a corresponding subject. The vulgar expression that ideas make an impression on the mind, is not in this school, a metaphor, it is the actual reality. I refer you to Hartley, to Darwin, to Priestly, and to their English and other successors. We shall take them up in due time, and order.

This consequence of the theory of the representative idea in relation to its subject is irresistible. But does any one wish to save the spirituality of the soul, and still preserve the theory of the representative idea ? Then on the one side, there are material ideas, material images, and on the other, a simple soul, and consequently between the modification and its subject an abyss. How to bridge over this abyss ? What relation is there between the material image and the subject of this image, if this subject is held to be simple, unextended, spiritual ? It is clearly necessary to find some intermediates between the idea-images and their subject, the soul. The images were before regarded as the media between bodies and the soul ; but now media are necessary between those first media or the idea-images and the soul. New media must be found, that is to say, new ideas. But these new ideas, in order to serve as media between the first ideas and the soul, must represent those ideas ; and in order to represent images they must themselves be images, and if images, then material. The difficulty constantly returns ; either the idea-images do not enter the soul, or they make the soul material. The attempt has been made to subtilize these ideas, to refine the intermediate ; but either these refinements still leave it material, and of course the materiality of the image invincibly involves the materiality of its subject ; or, the idea-image, as material, must be given up, and retaining the theory of the representative idea, the idea must be considered as spiritual.

This has been done. The idea, as a material image, has been abandoned for a spiritual idea. But what is the result

of this new modification of the representative theory under examination? I grant that if the idea is spiritual, it permits a spiritual subject; it gives room for believing in the simplicity and spirituality of the soul. But then the hypothesis of emission is evidently destroyed, and along with it, the theory of representation. Indeed, I ask what is this spiritual idea as the image of a material object? The mind has none of the fundamental properties which constitute what we call matter; it has then neither solidity nor extension nor figure. But how can that which is neither solid, nor extended, nor figured, represent that which is solid, extended, figured? What can the spiritual idea of a solid be? What the spiritual idea of extension, of form? It is evident that the spiritual idea cannot represent body. And can it any better represent spirit; Still less. For what is that which represents, what is that which is endowed with a representative power? Once again, there is no representation where there is no resemblance, and there is no resemblance except between figures or forms. That which is figured can resemble that which is figured; but where there is no figure, there is no possible matter for resemblance, nor consequently for representation. Spirit cannot represent spirit. A spiritual idea cannot in any way represent any spiritual quality, nor any spiritual subject; and the spiritual idea-image which destroys the possible knowledge of body, destroys no less, nay even more decidedly destroys the possible knowledge of spirit, of finite spirits such as we are, and of the infinite spirit, God. From the bosom of sensualism there proceeds a kind of idealism which along with matter, does away also with mind and with God himself. And do not think, I beseech you, that it is merely reasoning which derives these new consequences from the theory of ideas. As Hartley and Priestley prove that I have not gratuitously derived materialism from the theory of ideas, taken as material images; so here also facts and the history of another branch of the school of Locke prove that it is not I who condemn the theory of the spiritual idea-image to the necessity of destroying both body and spirit. That it destroys body, seek in Berkeley, who armed himself

with this theory, in order to deny all material existence. That it destroys spirit, seek in Hume, who taking from the hands of Berkeley the arms he had used for the destruction of the material world, and turning them against the spiritual world, has destroyed both the finite spirit which we are, and the infinite spirit, both the human soul and God.

We must go to the extent of these principles. The representative idea considered relatively to its subject and as a *material* image, conducts directly to materialism ; taken *spiritually*, it leads to the destruction of body and of spirit, to absolute scepticism, and absolute nihilism. Now it is an unquestionable fact that we have the knowledge of bodies, that we have the knowledge of our mind. We have this knowledge, and yet we could not have obtained it by the theory of the representative idea. This theory therefore does not exhibit the true process of the human mind. According to Locke, the representative idea is the only way of real knowledge ; then, this way failing us, we are in the absolute impossibility of ever arriving at knowledge. We do arrive at it, however ; consequently we arrive at it in some other way than by the representative idea, and consequently, again, the theory of the representative idea is a chimera.

I will now go further. I will change the ground altogether. I will admit that the idea has a representative office ; I will admit the reality of this representation ; I will believe with Locke and all his partizans, that we know only through representative ideas, and that in fact ideas have the wonderful property of representing their objects. Let all this be so. But on what condition do ideas represent things ? On the condition, you know, of being conformed to them. I take for granted that if we did not know that the idea was conformed to its object, we should not know that it represented it ; we should have no true knowledge of this object. And again, upon what condition can we know that an idea is conformed to its object, is a faithful copy of the original which it represents ? Nothing more simple. The condition is that we should have known the original. It is necessary that we should

have before our eyes both the original and the copy, in order to compare the copy with the original, and to pronounce that the copy is in fact, a faithful copy of the original. But suppose we had not the original, what could we say of the copy? Could you say, in the absence of the original, that the copy which alone is before your eyes, is a faithful copy of the original which you do not see, which you have never seen? Certainly not. You could neither be sure that the copy is a faithful, nor an unfaithful copy; you could not even affirm that it is a copy. If we know things only through ideas, and if we know them only on the condition that the ideas faithfully represent them, we can know that the ideas do faithfully represent them, only by seeing on the one hand the things themselves, and on the other the ideas of them. Then only could we pronounce that the ideas are conformed to their objects. Thus, to know if you have a true idea of God, of the soul, of bodies, you must have, on the one hand, God, the soul, and bodies, and on the other, the idea of God, the soul, and bodies, in order that by comparing the idea with its object, you may be able to decide whether it is or is not conformed to its object. Let us choose an example.

I wish to know, if the idea which I have of body is true. It is necessary that I should have both the idea which I form of body, and the body itself; then that I should compare them, confront them, and decide.

I take then from Locke the idea of body, just as Locke has himself furnished me with it. To know if it is true, I must compare it, I must confront it with body itself. This supposes that I know body; for if I do not know it, with what shall I compare the idea of body in order to know if it is true or false? We must then suppose that I know body. But how could I have come to know it? By the theory of Locke; you know and you can know nothing but by ideas which represent things to you. Now I know this body; then by the theory of Locke, I know it only by the ideas which represent it to me; therefore I do not know this body itself, the body which it is necessary for me to know in order to compare it

with the idea that I have of it ; I know only its idea, and it is its idea alone that I can compare with its idea, that is to say I have compared an idea with an idea, a copy with a copy. Here is still no original. The comparison, then, the verification is impossible. That the verification may conduct me to a result, it is necessary that this second idea which I have of body, should be a true idea, should be conformed to its object. But I cannot know that this second idea is true, except on the condition that I compare it ; and with what ? With the body, with the original. It is therefore necessary that I should know the body in some other way, in order to decide whether this second idea is conformed to it. Let us see then. I know the body ; but how do I know it. By the theory of Locke, again, I know it only by the idea I have of it ; there is here, then, nothing but an idea with which I can compare the second idea I had of body. I cannot pass beyond the idea ; go on in this way, as long as you please, you incessantly go round in a circle of ideas from which you cannot break forth, and which never allow you to get at the real object, nor lay the foundation of a legitimate comparison ; since such a comparison supposes that you have on the one hand the copy, and on the other the original ; while in fact you have nothing but an idea, and then a second idea, and thus on, and of course can compare nothing but the ideas, the copies. And again, even to decide that they are copies, it is necessary that you should have had the original itself, which yet escapes, and forever will escape your grasp, in every theory of knowledge which subjects the mind to the necessity of knowing only through the intermediation of representative ideas.

Thus in the last analysis, the object, the original, forever escapes the *immediate* grasp of the human mind, can never be brought under its regard, nor consequently be the basis of a comparison with the copy, the idea. You can never know then that the idea which you have of body is conformed or not conformed, faithful or unfaithful, true or false. You will have it without knowing even whether it has an object or not.

It is impossible to remain in this predicament ; and to assist Locke, I will now make a supposition. I will suppose, that in fact we have before our eyes not only the idea of the original, but the original itself. I will suppose, that we know the original *directly* ; the comparison is then possible. Let us go on to make it. Previously, however, I will remark, that the supposition I have made,—of an original directly known, which is the necessary basis of all comparison, but which comparison is the necessary basis of the theory of Locke,—this supposition just destroys entirely the theory. For, if we suppose that we have an original which we know directly, we suppose that we can know in some other way than by representative ideas.

But I will proceed with the supposition ; and I ask whether this original, which we know *directly*, and without the medium of representative ideas, is a chimera ? No ; if it were, to compare an idea with a chimerical object would lead you to nothing. You suppose, then, that it is indeed the original, the true original, the object, the body ; and you suppose that the knowledge you have of it is certain knowledge, knowledge which leaves nothing to be desired. See, then, what is your position. You have, on the one hand, the certain knowledge of body, and on the other you have an idea of this body, and you wish to know whether it is faithful or not. On these terms, the comparison is very easy ; it is made of itself ; having the copy and the original, you can easily tell if the one represents the other. But this comparison, necessary by the theory, and now (by supposition) possible and easy, is also perfectly useless. What, indeed, was the object of this comparison ? It was to assist the theory of Locke ; it was to deduce from the comparison the certain knowledge of body. That is what you were seeking after. In order to get at it, you place the original beside the copy. But if you take for granted that you have the original, that is to say, certain knowledge of the body, the whole thing is done. There is nothing more to do. Let alone your comparison, your verification. Do not give yourself the trouble to investigate whether the idea is con-

formed or not to the original. You possess the original ; that is enough, you possess the very knowledge you were seeking to gain. Thus, without having the certain knowledge of the original, you could never know whether the idea you have is faithful or not, and all comparison would be impossible ; and as soon as you have the original, it is undoubtedly very easy to compare the idea with the reality ; but since you have the reality, it is altogether useless to compare the idea with it ; you have what you were in search of, and the very condition of the theory, the comparison namely which it requires, is precisely the taking for granted the knowledge which you are seeking from the theory : that is, a paralogism, [a begging of the question.]

Such is the criticism, a little subtle, perhaps, but exact, which, pursuing in all its turnings the theory of the representative idea, destroys and confounds it on every hand. Either, the representative does not represent and cannot represent, and consequently, if we have no other means of knowing things, we are condemned never to know them ; we are condemned to a scepticism, more or less extensive, according as we are more or less consistent, and if we will be perfectly consistent, to absolute scepticism both in respect to matter and mind, that is to say, to absolute nihilism. Or else, the idea does represent its object ; and in this case we can know that it faithfully represents its object only so far as we have the original, that is, so far only as we know matter and mind, things themselves, in some other way ; and then the intervention of the representative idea is possible, but it is useless. Its truth, the conformity of the idea to its object, can be demonstrated only by a supposition, which overthrows the very theory it was designed to sustain.

Let us now deduce from this criticism the consequences it gives.

First consequence : we know matter and mind, the world, the soul and God, otherwise than by representative ideas. Second and more general consequence : in order to know beings we have no need of an intermediate. We know things

directly and without the medium of ideas, or of any other medium. The mind is a faculty of knowing, which is indeed subject to certain conditions, but which, when these conditions are once supplied, enters into exercise, develops itself, and knows, for the sole reason that it is endowed with ability of knowing.

The history of the true developement of the understanding confirms this important result, and serves to put the theory of ideas in its true light.

Primitively nothing is abstract, nothing is general; every thing is particular, is concrete. The understanding, as I have proved, does not begin with these formulas: that there is no modification without its subject, that there is no body without space, &c. But a modification being given, it conceives a particular subject of this modification; a body being given, it conceives that this body is in a space; a particular succession being given, it conceives that this particular succession is in a determinate time, &c. It is so with all our primitive conceptions; they are all particular, determined, concrete. Moreover, as I have also shown, they are blended together, all our faculties entering into exercise simultaneously, or nearly so. There is no consciousness of the slightest sensation without an act of attention, that is to say, without some developement of the will; there is no volition without the sentiment of an internal causative power; no sensation perceived without reference to an external cause and to the world, which we then conceive as in a space and in a time, &c. In short, not to repeat here what I have said so many times, all our primitive conceptions are not only concrete, particular and determinate, but simultaneous; and as the understanding does not commence by abstraction, but by particularity, so it does not commence by analysis, but by synthesis. Our primitive conceptions, moreover, present two distinct characteristics; some are contingent, others are necessary. Under the eye of consciousness there may be a sensation of pleasure or of pain, which I perceive as actually existing; but this sensation may vary, change, disappear. From hence very soon may arise the con-

viction that this sensible phenomenon which I notice, is indeed real, but that it may exist or may not exist, and therefore I may feel it or may not feel it. This is a characteristic which philosophers have designated as contingent. But when I conceive that a body is in space, if I endeavor to conceive the contrary, that a body may be without space, I cannot succeed. This conception of space is a conception which philosophers have designated by the term necessary. But from whence do all our conceptions, contingent or necessary, come? From the faculty of conceiving, which is in us, by whatever name you call this faculty of which we are all conscious, mind, reason, thought, understanding, intelligence. The operations of this faculty, our conceptions, are essentially affirmative, if not orally, yet mentally. To deny even, is to affirm; for it is to affirm the contrary of what had been first affirmed. To doubt also, is to affirm; for it is to affirm uncertainty. Besides, we evidently do not commence by doubt or negation, but by affirmation. Now, to affirm in any way, is to judge. If, then, every intellectual operation resolves itself into an operation of judgment, all our conceptions, whether contingent or necessary, resolve themselves into judgments contingent or necessary; and all our primitive operations being concrete and synthetic, it follows that all the primitive judgments, supposed by these operations, are also exercised under this form.

Such is the primitive scene of the intelligence. Gradually it unfolds itself. In the progress of this developement language supervenes, which reflects the understanding, and brings it, so to say, out of itself. If you open the grammars, you will find that they all begin with the elements and go to propositions, that is, they begin by analysis and go to synthesis. But in reality the process is not so. When the mind translates itself into language, the primary expressions of its judgments are, like the judgments themselves, concrete and synthetic. Faithful images of the developement of the mind, languages begin not by words, but by phrases, by propositions very complex. A primitive proposition is a whole, corresponding to the natural synthesis by which the mind begins. These primitive

propositions are by no means abstract propositions such as these: there is no quality without a subject, there is no body without space containing it, and the like; but they are all particular, such as: I exist, this body exists, such a body is in that space, God exists, &c. These propositions are such as refer to a particular and determinate object, which is either self, or body, or God. But after having expressed its primitive, concrete and synthetic judgments, by concrete and synthetic propositions, the mind operates upon these judgments by abstraction; it neglects that which is concrete in them to consider only the form of them, for example, the character of necessity with which many of them are invested, and which, when disengaged and developed, give instead of the concrete propositions: I exist, these bodies are in such a space, &c., the abstract propositions: there can be no body without space, there can be no modification without a subject, there can be no succession without time, &c. The general was at first enveloped in the particular; then from the complexity of the primitive fact, you disengage the general from the particular, and you express it by itself. But I have elsewhere sufficiently explained the formation of general propositions.*

Language is the sign of the mind, of its operations and of their development. It expresses at first primitive, concrete and synthetic judgments, by primitive propositions themselves concrete and synthetic. The judgments are gradually generalized by abstraction, and in their turn the propositions become general and abstract; and this process continues to go on. Abstract propositions, the signs of abstract judgments, are themselves complex, and contain several elements. From the propositions we abstract these elements, and consider them separately. These elements are called ideas. It is a great error to suppose that we have first these elements, without having the whole of which they are a part. We do not begin by propositions, but by judgments; the judgments do not come from the propositions, but the propositions come from the judg-

ments, which themselves come from the faculty of judging, which is grounded in the original capacity of the mind. *A fortiori*, then, we do not begin by ideas; for ideas are given us in the propositions. Take, for example, the idea of space. It is not given us by itself, but in this complete proposition: there is no body without space, which proposition is only the form of a judgment. Take away the proposition, which would not be made without the judgment, and you have not the ideas; but as soon as language permits you to translate your judgments into propositions, then you can consider separately the different elements of these propositions, that is to say, ideas separately from each other. To speak strictly, there are in nature no propositions, neither concrete nor abstract, particular nor general, and still less are there ideas in nature. If by ideas be understood something real, which exists independently of language, and which is an intermediate between beings and the mind, I say that there are absolutely no ideas. There is nothing real except things, and the mind with its operations, that is its judgments. Then come languages, which in some sort create a new world, at once spiritual and material, those symbolic beings which are called signs, words, by the help of which they give a kind of external and independent existence to the results of mental operations. Thus, in expressing judgments or propositions, they have the appearance of giving reality to those propositions. The same is the case in respect to ideas. Ideas are no more real than propositions, they have the same reality, the reality of abstractions to which language attaches a nominal and conventional existence. Every language is at once an analyst and a poet; it makes abstractions and it realizes them. This is the condition of every language. We must be resigned to it, and speak in figures, provided we know what we are doing. Thus all the world talk of having an idea of a thing, of having a clear or obscure idea, &c.; but by this nobody intends to say, that we have no knowledge of things, except by means of certain intermediate things called ideas; it is merely intended to mark the operation of the mind in reference to such a thing, the

operation by which the mind knows the thing, knows it more or less, &c. We talk also of representing a thing, and frequently a thing which falls not under the senses; this is merely saying that we know it, comprehend it, saying it, that is, by using a metaphor borrowed from the phenomena of the senses, and from the sense whose use is the most frequent, that of sight. Good taste is ordinarily the sole judge of the employment of these figures. This metaphorical style may be carried and is frequently carried very far without obscurity or error. I absolve, then, the ordinary language of the bulk of mankind, and I believe that we may also absolve that of most philosophers, who commonly have spoken as the people, without being more absurd than the people. It is impossible, in fact, to forbid the philosopher all metaphors; the only law which it is necessary to impose upon him, is not to insist upon metaphors, and not to convert them into theories. Perhaps the Scotch school, which has taken up in the eighteenth century the old controversy against the representative idea, in the name of the common sense of the human race, has not been sufficiently aware that philosophers also make a part of the human race; perhaps it has imputed too much to the schools, and been too willing to see every where the theory which it had undertaken to combat. But it has certainly rendered an eminent service to philosophy, in demonstrating that the idea-image is at the bottom nothing but a metaphor, and in doing justice to this metaphor, if seriously taken as endowed with a representative power. This latter is the vice into which Locke has fallen, and I have thought proper to signalize it with some care, as one of the most perilous rocks of the Sensual school.

From the point at which we have now arrived, we can easily judge of the doctrine of *innate ideas*, the refutation of which occupies the whole of Locke's first book.* The time has now come to explain ourselves concerning this doctrine, and concerning the refutation of Locke.—Locke divides the gene-

ral doctrine of innate ideas into two points, general propositions or maxims, and ideas. Now, we likewise reject the doctrine of innate propositions and ideas, and for a very simple reason : because there are in nature neither propositions nor ideas. What is there in nature ? Besides bodies there is nothing except minds, and among these, that which is ourselves, which conceives, and knows directly things, minds and bodies. And in the order of minds, what is there innate ? Nothing but the mind itself, the understanding, the faculty of knowing. The understanding, as Leibnitz has profoundly said, is innate to itself; the developement of the understanding is equally innate, in this sense, that it cannot but take place, when the understanding is once given, with the power which is proper to it, [and the conditions of its developement supplied.] And, as you have seen, the developement of the understanding is the judgments which it passes, and the knowledge implied in those judgments. Undoubtedly, these judgments have conditions, which belong to the domain of experience. Take away experience, and there is nothing in the senses, nothing in the consciousness, and consequently nothing in the understanding. But is this condition the absolute law of the understanding ? Might it not still judge, and develope itself without the aid of experience, without an organic impression, without a sensation ? I neither affirm nor deny it ; *hypotheses non fingo*, as Newton said, I am not framing hypotheses. I state what is, without knowing what might be, what will be, or what may have been. I say, that in the limits of the present state, it is an undeniable fact, that unless certain experimental conditions are supplied, the mind does not enter into operation, does not judge ; but I say at the same time, that as soon as these conditions are fulfilled, the mind, in virtue of its own capacity and force, developes itself, thinks, conceives, judges, and knows a multitude of things, which fall neither under consciousness, nor under the senses, as time, space, external causes, existences, and its own existence. There are no innate ideas, any more than innate propositions ; but there is a capacity, faculty or power innate in the understanding, that acts and projects it-

self in primitive judgments, which, when language comes in, express themselves in propositions, and these propositions decomposed by abstraction and analysis, engender distinct ideas. As the mind is equal to itself in all men, the primitive judgments which it passes are the same in all men, and consequently, the propositions in which language expresses these judgments, and the fundamental ideas of which they are composed, are at once and universally admitted. One condition is however, necessary, namely; that they should be apprehended. When Locke pretends that these propositions: "*whatsoever is, is,*" and "*it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be,*" are propositions which are not universally nor primitively admitted, he is both right and wrong. Certainly, the first comer, the peasant to whom you should say: whatever is, is, and it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, would not admit these propositions, for he would not comprehend them, because you speak a language which is not his own, the language of abstraction and of analysis. But that which the peasant does not admit and does not comprehend under its abstract form, he admits immediately and necessarily under the concrete and synthetic form. Ask this same man who does not comprehend your metaphysical language, whether under the different actions or sensations of which he is conscious, there is not something real and subsistent, which is himself; and whether he is not himself the same to-day that he was yesterday; in a word, instead of abstract formulas, propose to him particular, determinate and concrete questions, and then human nature will give you an answer, because human nature, the human understanding, is in the peasant as really as in Leibnitz.—What I have just said concerning abstract and general propositions, I say concerning the simple ideas which analysis finds in these propositions. For example, ask a savage if he has the idea of God; you ask him what he cannot reply to, for he does not understand it. But if you know how to interrogate this poor savage, you will see proceed from his intelligence a synthetic and confused idea, which, if you know how to read it, contains already every thing which

the most refined analysis could ever give you ; you will see that under the confusion of their natural judgments, which they neither know how to separate nor to express, the savage, the child, the idiot even, if he is not entirely one, admit originally and universally all the ideas which subsequent analysis developes without producing, or of which it produces only the scientific form.

There are, then, indeed, no innate ideas, nor innate propositions, because there are no ideas nor propositions really existing. Again, there are no general ideas and propositions universally and primitively admitted under the form of general ideas and propositions. But it is certain, that the understanding of all men teems, so to say, with natural judgments, which may be called innate in this sense, that they are the primitive, universal and necessary developement of the human mind, which finally is innate to itself, and equal to itself, in all men.*

* See Appendix, Note BB.

CRITICAL EXAMINATION
OF
LOCKE'S ESSAY
ON
THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

CHAPTER EIGHTH.

CONTENTS OF CHAPTER EIGHTH.

Examination of the fourth Book of the Essay on the Understanding continued. Of Knowledge. Its modes. Omission of inductive knowledge.—Its degrees. False distinction of Locke between knowing and judging.—That the theory of knowledge and of judgment in Locke resolves itself into that of a perception of agreement or disagreement between ideas. Detailed examination of this theory.—That it applies to judgments abstract and not primitive, but by no means to primitive judgments which imply existence.—Analysis of the judgment: *I exist*. Three objections: 1. the impossibility of arriving at real existence by the abstraction of existence; 2. that to begin by abstraction is contrary to the true process of the human mind; 3. that the theory of Locke involves a paralogism.—Analysis of the judgments: *I think, this body exists, this body is colored, God exists, &c.*—Analysis of the judgments upon which Arithmetic and Geometry rest.

CHAPTER EIGHTH.

WE have stopped some time at the entrance of the fourth Book of the Essay on the Understanding ; let us now pass within. This book treats of knowledge in general, of its different modes, of its different degrees, of its extent and limits, with some applications. It is therefore, properly speaking, Logic with something of Ontology. The principle of this Logic rests upon the theory we have examined, that of the representative idea. We have seen that, with Locke, the condition of all legitimate knowledge is the conformity of the idea to the object ; and we have every way proved that this conformity is nothing but a chimera. We have then already overthrown the general theory of knowledge, but we have overthrown it only in its principle. It is necessary now to examine it in itself, independent of the principle of the representative idea, and to follow it in its appropriate developement and consequences.

Whether the idea is representative or not, it is a settled point in the system of Locke that the understanding does not commence by things but by ideas ; that ideas are the sole objects of the understanding, and consequently the sole foundations of knowledge. Now if all knowledge necessarily depends upon ideas, then where there is no idea there is no knowledge, and every where that there is knowledge, there has necessarily been an idea. But the converse is not true, there is not necessarily knowledge, wherever there is an idea. For instance, in order that you may be able to have a correct knowledge of God, it is necessary that you should first have some idea of God ; but from your having some idea of God, it does not follow that you have a correct knowledge of him. Thus knowledge is limited by ideas, but it does not necessarily go along with and as far as ideas.

B. IV. ch. 3. § 1. "*We can have knowledge no farther than we have ideas.*" *Ibid*, § 6. "*Our knowledge is narrower than our ideas.*" If knowledge never surpasses the ideas and sometimes falls short of them, and if all knowledge depends upon ideas, it is clear that knowledge can never be any thing but the relation of one idea to another ; and that the process of the human mind in knowledge is nothing else than the perception of a relation of some sort between ideas.

B. IV. ch. 1, § 1. "Since the mind in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them." § 2. "Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. In this alone it consists. Where this perception is, there is knowledge ; and where it is not, there though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of knowledge."

Thence follow the different modes and degrees of knowledge in the system of Locke. We know only when we perceive a relation of agreement or disagreement between two ideas. Now we may perceive this relation in two ways : we may either perceive it immediately, and then the knowledge is intuitive ; or we may not be able to perceive it immediately, we may be obliged to have recourse to another idea, or to several other ideas, which we put between the two ideas whose relation cannot be directly perceived, so that thereby we may seize and apprehend the relation which escapes us. Knowledge is then called demonstrative. (B. IV. ch. 2, § 1,—2.) Locke there makes an excellent remark which ought not to be omitted, and for which it is just to give him credit. No doubt we are often compelled to resort to demonstration, to the interposition of one or more ideas, in order to perceive the latent relation of two ideas ; but this new idea which we interpose between the two others, it is necessary that we should perceive its relation to each of the others. Now if the perception of this relation between that idea and the two others, is

not intuitive, if it is demonstrative, it would be necessary to have recourse again to a new idea, and thus on *ad infinitum*. The perception of the relation between the middle term and the extremes must therefore be intuitive ; and it must be so in all the degrees of deduction, so that demonstrative evidence is grounded upon intuitive, and always supposes it.

B. IV. ch. 2, § 7. "*Each step must have intuitive evidence.* Now in every step reason makes in demonstrative knowledge, there is an intuitive knowledge of that agreement or disagreement it seeks with the next intermediate idea, which it uses as a proof ; for if it were not so, that yet would need a proof ; since without the perception of such agreement or disagreement, there is no knowledge produced. If it be perceived by itself, it is intuitive knowledge ; if it cannot be perceived by itself, there is need of some intervening idea, as a common measure to show their agreement or disagreement. By which it is plain that every step in reasoning that produces knowledge, has intuitive certainty ; which when the mind perceives, there is no more required but to remember it, to make the agreement or disagreement of the ideas, concerning which we inquire, visible and certain. So that to make any thing a demonstration, it is necessary to perceive the immediate agreement of the intervening ideas, whereby the agreement or disagreement of the two ideas under examination, (whereof the one is always the first, and the other the last in the account) is found. This intuitive perception of the agreement or disagreement of the intermediate ideas, in each step and progression of the demonstration, must also be carried exactly in the mind, and a man must be sure that no part is left out."

Thus intuition and demonstration are the different modes of knowledge according to Locke. But are there no others ? Have we not knowledge which we acquired neither by intuition nor demonstration ? How do we acquire a knowledge of the laws of external nature ? Take which you please, gravitation, for instance. Certainly there is no simple intuition and immediate evidence here ; for experiments multiplied and

combined, are necessary to give the slightest law, and even this will not suffice, since the slightest law surpasses the number, whatever it be, of experiments from which it is drawn. There is therefore need of an intervention of some other operation of the mind besides intuition. Is it demonstration? Impossible; for demonstration is the perception of a relation between two ideas by means of a third, but it is upon this condition, that the latter should be more general than the two others, in order to embrace and connect them. To demonstrate is, in the last analysis, to deduce the particular from the general. Now what is the more general physical law from which gravitation can be deduced? We have not deduced the knowledge of gravitation from any other knowledge anterior to it, and which involves it in the germe. How, then, have we acquired this knowledge, which we certainly have; and in general, how have we acquired the knowledge of physical laws? A phenomenon having been presented a number of times, with a particular character and in particular circumstances, we have judged that if this same phenomena should appear again in similar circumstances, it would have the same character; that is to say, we have generalized the particular character of this phenomenon. Instead of descending from the general to the particular, we have ascended from the particular to the general. This general character is what we call a law; this law we have not deduced from a more general law or character; we have derived it from particular experiments in order to transfer it beyond them. It is not a simple resumption, nor a logical deduction; it is neither simple intuition nor demonstration. It is what we call *induction*. It is to induction that we owe all our conquests over nature, all our discoveries of the laws of the world. For a long time natural philosophers contented themselves with very limited observations which furnished no great results, or with speculations which resulted in nothing but hypotheses. Induction for a long time was only a natural process of the human mind, of which men made use for acquiring the knowledge they needed in respect to the external world, without explaining it, and

without its passing from practice into science. It is to Bacon, chiefly, we owe, not the invention, but the discovery and scientific exposition of this process. It is strange that Locke, a countryman of Bacon, and who belongs to his school, should in his classification of the modes of knowledge, have permitted precisely that one to escape him to which the school of Bacon has given the greatest celebrity, and placed in the clearest light. It is strange that the whole Sensual school, which pretends to be the legitimate offspring of Bacon, should, after the example of Locke, have almost forgotten the evidence of induction among the different species of evidence, and that at its first entrance upon what an experimental school should have done, it has neglected induction to bury itself in demonstration. This is the reason of the singular but undeniable phenomenon, that in the eighteenth century, the logic of the Sensual school was scarcely any thing but a reflection of the peripatetic scholasticism of the middle age, of that scholasticism which admitted no other processes in knowledge than intuition and demonstration.*

Let us now see what, according to Locke, are the different degrees of knowledge.

Sometimes we know with certainty, without the least blending of doubt with our knowledge. Sometimes also, instead of absolute knowledge, we have only probable knowledge. Probability also has its degrees, and its particular grounds. Locke treats them at large. I advise you to read with care the chapters, not indeed very profound, but sufficiently exact, in which he discusses the different degrees of knowledge. I cannot go into all these details, but will content myself with pointing out to you the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth chapters of the fourth book. I shall particularly notice a distinction to which Locke attaches great importance, and which, in my opinion, is without foundation.

We either know in a certain and absolute manner, or we know merely in a manner more or less probable. Locke chooses to employ the term knowledge exclusively to signify abso-

* See Appendix, Note CC.

lute knowledge, that which is raised above all probability. The knowledge which is wanting in certainty, simple conjecture, or presumption more or less probable, he calls judgment.

B. IV. ch. 14. § 4: "The mind has two faculties, conversant about truth and falsehood. *First, knowledge*, whereby it certainly perceives and is undoubtedly satisfied of the agreement, or disagreement of any ideas. *Secondly, judgment*, which is the putting ideas together, or separating them from one another in the mind, when their certain agreement or disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so; which is as the word imports, taken to be so, before it certainly appears."

But the general usage of all languages is contrary to so limited a sense of the word knowledge, a certain knowledge, or a probable knowledge is always spoken of as knowledge in its different degrees. It is so in regard to judgment. As languages have not confined the term knowledge to absolute knowledge, so they have not limited the term judgment to knowledge merely probable. In some cases we pass certain and decisive judgments; in others we pass judgments which are only probable, or even purely conjectural. In a word, judgments are infallible, or doubtful in various degrees; but doubtful or infallible, they are always judgments, and this distinction between knowledge as exclusively infallible, and judgment as being exclusively probable, is verbal distinction altogether arbitrary and barren. Time has done justice to it by rejecting it; but it seems to have spared the theory on which the distinction is founded, the theory which makes both knowledge and judgment consist in the perception of a relation of agreement or disagreement between two ideas. All verbal distinction laid aside, to know or to judge, is with Locke nothing but to perceive, intuitively or demonstratively, a relation of agreement or disagreement, whether certain or probable, between two ideas. This is the theory of knowledge and of judgment according to Locke, reduced to its simplest expression. From Locke it passed into the Sensual school, where it enjoys an undisputed authority, and forms the acknow-

ledged theory of judgment. It requires, then, and deserves a scrupulous examination.

In the first place, let us accurately state the extent of this theory. It pretends not merely that there are judgments which are nothing else than perceptions of the relation of agreement or disagreement of ideas; but it pretends that every judgment is subject to this condition. The question is concerning the truth of this universal assertion.

Locke distinguishes four relations which the understanding may perceive between ideas, (B. IV. ch. I. § 3.) Ideas are either identical or diverse, a relation called by Locke identity or diversity; they have also simply a relation of some sort undetermined and called by Locke relation; they have a relation either of simple co-existence or of necessary connection; and finally, they express a relation of real existence. Thus there can be only these four sorts of relations: 1. general relation; 2. identity or diversity; 3. co-existence or necessary connexion; 4. real existence. The whole question now before us is, whether these embrace every thing, whether there is not some knowledge, some judgment which escapes these categories. Let us see then. Let us go from knowledge to knowledge, from judgment to judgment; if we can find no knowledge, no judgment, which is not the perception of one of these relations, then the theory of Locke is absolute. If, on the contrary, we find a single judgment which escapes this condition, the theory of Locke, so far as it is set up for an unlimited and universal theory, is destroyed.

Let us take some knowledge or judgment. I propose the following judgment: two and three are five. This is not a chimera, it is a knowledge, a judgment, and it is certain. How do we acquire this knowledge, what are the conditions of this judgment?

The theory of Locke supposes three: 1. that there are two ideas present to the understanding, known anterior to the perception of relation; 2. that there is a comparison of these two ideas; 3. that at the end of this comparison there is a perception of some relation between the two ideas. Two ideas, a compari-

son of them, a perception of a relation derived from the comparison : such are the conditions of the theory of Locke.

Let us reflect : two and three make five. Where are the two ideas ? Two and three, and five. Suppose I had not these two ideas, these two terms, on the one hand, two and three, and on the other, five. Could I ever perceive that there was a relation between them of equality or inequality, identity or diversity ? No. And having these two terms, if I did not compare them, should I ever perceive their relation. Certainly not. And if in comparing them, their relation, spite of all my exertions, should escape my understanding, should I ever arrive at the result, that two and three make five ? By no means. And suppose these three conditions to be supplied, is the result infallibly obtained ? I see nothing wanting to it. Thus far, then, the theory of Locke seems to work well. I will take another arithmetical example. But arithmetical examples have this peculiarity, that they are all alike. What in fact are arithmetical truths but relations of numbers ? They are nothing else. Arithmetical knowledge then falls under the theory of Locke concerning knowledge ; and an arithmetical judgment, if the expression may be used, is nothing else than the perception of a relation of numbers. Thus far, then, the theory of Locke is perfectly sound.

Shall we take Geometry ? But if geometrical truths are nothing but relations of magnitude, it is clear that no geometrical truth can be obtained, except under the condition of having previously two ideas of magnitude, then of comparing them, and then of deducing a relation of agreement or disagreement. And as all mathematics, as Newton has said, is only a universal arithmetic, it seems true that mathematical judgment in general is nothing but a perception of relations.

Let us take other examples a little at hazard. I wish to know if Alexander is a truly great man. It is a question frequently agitated. It is evident that unless I have on the one hand the idea of Alexander, and on the other an idea of a truly great man, and unless I compare these two ideas, and perceive between them a relation of agreement or disagreement, I can-

not decide whether Alexander is a great man or not. Here again we must necessarily have two ideas, a particular idea, that of Alexander, and a general idea, that of a great man, and we compare these two ideas to know if they agree or disagree with each other, if the predicate can be affirmed of the subject, if the subject falls under the predicate, &c.

I wish to know if God is good. At first it is necessary that I should have the idea of the existence of God, of God so far forth as existing ; then it is necessary that I should have the idea of goodness, an idea more or less extensive, more or less complete of it, so as to be able after a comparison of the one with the other, to affirm that these two ideas have a relation of agreement.

Such are, indeed, the conditions of knowledge, of judgment in these different cases. But let us explain the nature of these different cases. In the first place, let us examine the mathematical truths which lend themselves so readily to the theory of Locke. Arithmetical truths, for example, do they exist in nature ? No. And why not ? Because these relations which are called arithmetical truths, have for their terms not concrete quantities, that is to say, real quantities, but discrete, that is, abstract quantities. One, two, three, four, five,—all this has no existence in nature. Consequently, the relations between abstract and not real quantities no more have a real existence than their terms. Arithmetical truths are pure abstractions.—Again, does numeration and calculation begin, as in arithmetic, upon discrete and abstract quantities ? Does the human mind begin by abstract arithmetic ? By no means. It operates first upon concrete quantities, and it is only subsequently that it rises from the concrete to the conception of those general relations which constitute arithmetical truths properly so called. They have two characteristics : 1. they are abstract ; 2. they are not primitive ; they suppose previous concrete judgments, in the bosom of which they reside until deduced by abstraction and raised to the height of universal truths.—The same may be said of the truths of geometry. The magnitudes with which geometry has to do, are not con-

crete magnitudes; they are abstract, having no existence in nature. For there are in nature only imperfect figures, and the operations of geometry are conditioned by perfect figures, the perfect triangle, the perfect circle, &c., that is to say, by figures which have no real existence, but are pure conceptions of the mind. The relations of abstractions can then be nothing but abstractions.—Still farther, the human mind no more begins by conceiving perfect figures, than it begins by conceiving the abstract relations of numbers. It first conceives the concrete, the imperfect triangle, the imperfect circle, from which it subsequently deduces by abstraction the perfect triangle and circle of geometry. The truths of geometry are not then primitive truths in the human understanding.—The other examples which we have taken, the judgments upon which we have tried the theory of Locke, namely, that Alexander is a great man, and that God is good, have the same character. They are problems instituted by later reflection and intelligent curiosity, in the progress of the ulterior development of the understanding. And in a word, hitherto we have verified the theory of Locke only in respect to abstract judgments, and which are not primitive. Let us now take judgments marked with other characteristics, and pursue the course of our experiments.

Look at another knowledge, another judgment, which I propose for your examination: I exist. You no more doubt the certainty of this knowledge than of that which I first cited, that two and three make five. You would sooner doubt the first than this. Well, then, let us submit this certain knowledge, this certain judgment: I exist, to the conditions of Locke's general theory concerning knowledge.

I will recall the conditions of this theory: 1. two ideas; 2. a comparison of the two ideas; 3. perception of some relation of agreement or disagreement.

Now, what are the two ideas which should be the two terms of this relation and the basis of the comparison? It is the idea of I, or myself, and the idea of existence, between which it is the object to find a relation of agreement or disagreement.

Let us take good heed what we do. It is not the idea of our existence that is to be one of the two ideas which are to be the objects of comparison. For what are we seeking after? Our own existence. If we have it, we should not seek after it. We must not take the thing in question, our own existence, for granted. The idea of existence which is to be here one of the terms of comparison, is therefore the idea of existence in general, and not the particular idea of our own existence. Such is the rigorous condition of the problem.—And what is the other idea, the second term of the comparison? It is the idea of myself, the I. But what are we seeking after? I or self, as existing. We are not, then, to take it for granted; for that would be to take for granted the thing in question. It is not, then, the I, the myself, as existing, which should be the second term of the comparison; but an I, a self, which must necessarily be conceived as distinct from the idea with which it is intended to compare it, in order to know if it agrees or not, namely the idea of existence. It is a self, then, which must be conceived as not possessing existence, that is to say, an I, a myself, abstract and general.

An abstract idea of myself, and an abstract idea of existence,—see the two ideas of which a comparison is to be made, in order to bring out the judgment in question! Reflect, I pray you; what are you in search of? Your own personal existence. Do not, then, take it for granted, since it is what you are seeking to find. Do not involve it in either of the two terms, from the comparison of which you are to get it. Since it should be only the product of the relation of these two terms, it should not be taken for granted in either of them, for then the comparison would be useless, and the truth would then be anterior to the comparison, and not (as the theory demands) the result of it. Such are the imperious conditions of the theory of Locke: two abstract ideas, the abstract idea of self, and the abstract idea of existence. We are now to compare these two ideas, to see if they agree or disagree with each other, to perceive the relation of agreement or disagreement which binds or separates them. In the first place I might re-

mark, in passing, upon the expression of agreement or disagreement, and show how much it is wanting in precision and distinctness; but I will not do so. I take the words as Locke gives them. I allow his theory to unfold itself freely; I shall not repress it, I merely wish to see where it will arrive. It starts from two abstract terms; it compares them, and seeks a relation of agreement or disagreement between them, between the idea of existence and the idea of self. It compares them, then; so be it. And what is the result? A relation, a relation of agreement. So be it again. I wish to make here but one remark. It is that this relation, whatever it is, must necessarily be of the same nature as the two terms, which are its foundation. The two terms are abstract; the relation must then necessarily be abstract. What will be the result, then, of the perception of the relation, which I am very willing to suppose, of agreement between the general and abstract idea of existence, and the general and abstract idea of self? A truth of relation of the same nature as the two terms on which it is founded, namely an abstract knowledge, a logical knowledge of the non-contradiction found between the idea of existence and the idea of self, of the *Ego*, that is to say, the knowledge of the pure possibility of the existence of a self, of an *Ego*. But when you think, when you believe, judge, that you exist, do you, I ask, merely pass the judgment that there is no contradiction between the general idea of self, and that of existence? Not at all. The object of thought is not a possible self, but a real self, that quite determinate self which nobody confounds with a logical abstraction. The question is not about existence in general, but about your own, your own altogether personal and individual existence. On the contrary, the result of the judgment derived from the perception of a relation of agreement between the general and abstract idea of existence and the general and abstract idea of self, does not imply real existence. It gives, if you please, possible existence, but it gives nothing more.

See, then, to what we come; there is no contradiction between the idea of self, and the idea of existence. Now this

result is not equivalent to that which is implied in the natural judgment passed by you when you say: I exist. The one is not the other. The theory of Locke gives the former only, but not the latter. This is the first vice of his theory. Look now at another.

The judgment: I exist, is eminently a primitive judgment. It is the starting point of knowledge. Obviously you can know nothing before yourselves. Now in the theory of Locke. the two ideas upon which the judgment acts, and between which it is the object to discern the relation of agreement, are necessarily two abstract ideas. The radical supposition then of the theory of Locke is that the human mind, in regard to knowledge, commences by abstraction, a supposition gratuitous and falsified by facts. In fact we commence by the concrete and not by the abstract, and even if it were possible, (what I deny, and what I have demonstrated to be impossible,) to derive reality from abstraction, it would remain no less true that the process which Locke imputes to the human mind, is not that which the mind employs.

The theory of Locke can give only an abstract judgment and not a judgment which reaches to real existence; and his theory, moreover, is not the true process of the human mind. Still farther: this theory involves a paralogism.

In fact Locke proposes to arrive at the knowledge of real and personal existence by a comparison of the idea of existence and the idea of self, by bringing them together in order to discern their relation. But in general, and to finish the question at a single stroke, the abstract being given us only in the concrete, to derive the concrete from the abstract is to take as a principle what could have been had only as a consequence; it is to ask what we are in search of, from precisely that which we could never have known but by means of that which we are in search of. And in regard to this particular case, under what condition have you the general and abstract idea of existence, and the general and abstract idea of self, which you compare in order to derive from them the knowledge of your own existence? Under this condition:

that you have already had the idea of your own existence. It is impossible that you should have ascended to the generalization of existence without having passed from the knowledge of some particular existence; and as neither the knowledge of the existence of God, nor that of the existence of the external world can precede that of your own, it follows that the knowledge of your own existence cannot but have been one of the bases of the abstract and general idea of existence: consequently to set out to derive the knowledge of your own existence from the general idea of existence, is to fall into an evident paralogism. If Locke had not known that he existed, if he had not already acquired the knowledge of his own self, real and existent, he could never have had the general and abstract idea either of a self, nor of existence, those very ideas from which he seeks to obtain the knowledge of his personal self and existence.*

Thus we have three radical objections against the theory of Locke:

1. It starts from abstractions; consequently, it gives only an abstract result, and not the one you are seeking.

2. It starts from abstractions, and consequently it does not start from the true starting-point of the human intelligence.

3. It starts from abstractions, which it could never have obtained but by the help of concrete knowledge, the very concrete knowledge that it pretends to derive from the abstractions wherein they are taken upon supposition; consequently, it takes for granted the thing in question.

The theory of Locke breaks down under these three objections. It is impossible to derive the real existing self from the forced and artificial bringing together of the abstraction, existence, and the abstraction, self. But even if this were possible, it is not the process of the human mind, which it is our business to retrace and reproduce. And again, the process which the theory arbitrarily puts in its stead, is possible only under the condition of taking for granted the thing in question.—

* See Appendix, Note CC, for proof that this charge cannot be brought against the *cogito ergo sum*.

The judgment : I exist, escapes, therefore, in every way from the conditions of the theory of Locke.

This judgment has two characteristics : 1. It is not abstract : it implies existence ; 2. It is a primitive judgment : all others take it for granted, involve the supposition of it, while in it no other is involved.

Now observe, it was in regard to abstract, and if you will allow the expression, ulterior judgments that the theory of Locke was before seen to hold true. But in this latter instance, the judgment implies existence, and is primitive ; and the theory can no longer be verified. It remains, therefore, to choose between the theory, and the certainty of personal knowledge ; for the former is absolutely unable to give the latter.

So much for personal existence. It is the same in regard to all the modes of this existence, to our faculties, our operations, whether sensation, or will, or thought.

Take whatever phenomenon you please : I feel, I will, I think. Take for instance : I think. This is commonly called a fact of consciousness ; but to be conscious is still to know, (*conscire sibi*,) it is to believe, to affirm, to judge. When you say : I think, it is a judgment which you exercise and express ; when you are conscious of thinking, and do not say so, it is still a judgment which you exercise without expressing it. Now this judgment, whether expressed or not, implies existence ; it implies that you, a real being, actually exercise the real operation of thinking. Moreover, it is a primitive judgment, at least contemporaneous with the judgment that you exist.

Let us test the theory of Locke in regard to this judgment, as we have tested it in regard to that other primitive and concrete judgment : I exist.

Three conditions are necessary by the theory of Locke, in order to explain and legitimate the judgment : I think ; namely, two ideas, their comparison, a perception of relation between them. What in this case are the two ideas ? Obviously the idea of thinking on the one hand, and of I or myself, on the

other. But if it is the idea of thinking distinct from self, it is thinking considered apart from the subject, the I, from that subjective I, which is, you will not forget, the basis of all existence: it is, then, thinking abstracted from all existence, that is abstract thought, that is to say, the simple power of thinking, and nothing else. On the other hand, the self, which is the other necessary term of the comparison, cannot be a self which thinks, for you have just separated it from thought; it is, therefore, a self, which you are to consider abstracted from thinking. For if, in fact, you should suppose it thinking, you would have what you are in search of, and there would be no need of your making a laborious comparison. You might stop at one of the terms, which would give you the other, the self as thinking, or I think. But to avoid paralogism, you must suppose it as not thinking; and as your first legitimate term is thought separated from self, your second legitimate term must be self separated from thought, a self not thinking. And you wish to know if this self, taken independently of thinking, and this thinking taken independently of self, have a relation to each other of agreement or disagreement. Such is the question. It is then two abstractions you are going to compare. But once again, two abstract terms can engender only an abstract relation, and an abstract relation can engender only an abstract judgment, namely, the abstract judgment, that thinking and self are two ideas which imply no contradiction. Thus the theory of Locke applied to this judgment: I think, as to the other judgment: I exist, gives nothing but an abstract result, [the possibility of the truth of the proposition: I think, but not its actual truth, its reality,] an abstract truth which in no respect represents what passes in your mind when you judge that you think, and when you say: I think.

Then, too, the theory of Locke makes the human mind begin by abstraction; but this is not the process by which it actually commences.

Finally, it not only makes the mind to begin by abstraction, but also to derive the concrete from the abstract, while in point

of fact you could never have had the abstract, if you had not previously had the concrete. You passed first, and naturally, this determinate, concrete, and synthetic judgment : *I think* ; and then afterwards as you began to exercise the faculty of abstraction, you made a division in the primitive synthesis ; you considered separately, on the one hand, the thinking, that is to say, thought without the subject, without the *I*, the self, that is, possible thinking,—and then, on the other hand, the *you*, the *I*, without the real attribute of thinking, that is to say, self by itself, the simple possibility of being : and now you are pleased artificially and too late, to reunite, by a pretended relation of agreement, two terms which originally you did not have given you separate and disjoined, but united and confused in the synthesis of reality and of life.

Thus the three preceding objections return here with the same force, and the theory of Locke can legitimately give you neither the knowledge of your own existence, nor the knowledge of any of your faculties, or operations ; for what has been shown concerning the judgment : *I think*, may be shown likewise of the judgment : *I will*, *I feel*, and of all the attributes and modes of personal existence.

Nor is it any more possible for the theory of Locke to give external existence. Take for instance the judgment : *this body exists*. The theory decides that you cannot have this knowledge but upon the condition of having perceived a relation of agreement between two ideas compared with each other. What are these two ideas ? Certainly not the idea of a body really existing ; for you would then have what you are seeking ; nor is it any more the idea of actual existence. It is then the idea of a possible body, and the idea of a possible existence, two abstractions, which you are to compare. But you can deduce from them only this other abstraction : there is no logical incompatibility between the idea of existence and the idea of body.—Again, you commence by abstraction, which is contrary to the natural order.—And finally, you begin by an abstraction which you would never have had, if you had not previously obtained the concrete know-

ledge, the very knowledge which you wish to derive from the comparison of your abstractions.

What has been shown concerning the existence of body, may be equally shown concerning the attributes by which body is known to us, solidity, form, color, &c. Take for example, the quality of color, commonly classed among the secondary qualities, but which is perhaps more inherent in body than is commonly believed. Be this however, as it may, whether color be a simple secondary quality or a primary quality of matter, let us see on what conditions, by the theory of Locke, we acquire the knowledge of it. In order to pass this judgment : *this body is colored*, is it true that we must have two ideas, compare them, and perceive their relation ? The two ideas would be that of body and that of color. But the idea of body must not here be the idea of a colored body, for then the single term would imply the other; would render the comparison useless, and would take for granted the thing in question. It must then be the idea of a body as not being colored. The idea of color also must not be the idea of a color really existing ; for a color is real, exists, only in a body, and the very condition of the operation which you wish to make, is the separation of color from body. The question here, then, is not concerning a real color, having such or such a determinate shade, but of color abstracted from all that determines it, makes it special and real. The question is only concerning the abstract and general idea of color. From whence it results that the two ideas you have are general and abstract ideas, and from abstractions you can derive only abstractions.—And again, you commence by abstraction : you go contrary to the true natural process.—And finally, which is the most crushing objection, it is obvious that you could never have gained the general idea of color except in the idea of some particular and positive color, which you could not have gained except in that of a body figured and colored. It is not by the help of the general idea of color, and the general idea of body, that you learn that bodies are colored ; but on the contrary, it is because you have previously known that

such a body was colored, that afterwards separating what was united in the primitive synthesis, you were able to consider on the one hand, the idea of body, and on the other the idea of color, abstracting one from the other : and it is then only that you could have instituted a comparison in order to explain what you already knew.

In general : judgments are of two sorts, either, those in which we acquire what we were before ignorant of ; or, those reflex judgments in which we only explain to ourselves what we already knew. The theory of Locke can to a certain extent, explain the second, but the first entirely escape it.

For instance, if we wish now to give account to ourselves of the idea of God, whom we already know, we take or we can take, on the one hand, the idea of God, and on the other, the idea of existence, and inquire if these two ideas agree or disagree. But to give account of the knowledge we have already acquired, is one thing ; to acquire that knowledge, is another thing. Now certainly we did not at first acquire the idea of the existence of God, by placing the idea of God on one side and the idea of existence on the other, and then seeking their relation ; for (to spare you superfluous repetitions, and not go over the whole circle of the three foregoing objections, but to fasten only upon the last of them) that would be to take for granted the thing in question. It is very evident that when we consider on the one hand the idea of God, and on the other the idea of existence, and when we seek the knowledge of the existence of God by comparing the two ideas, we do nothing but turn over and over what we already had, and what too we never could have had, if we had been reduced to gain it by the theory of Locke. It is perfectly easy to see that it is the same in regard to the attributes of God as in regard to his existence. Every where, then, and continually, we encounter the same objections, the same paralogism.

The theory of Locke then can give neither God, nor body, nor self, nor their attributes : it gives every thing else, I allow, if any body wishes the concession.

It gives mathematics, you will say. True, I have myself said so, and I repeat it. It gives mathematics, geometry, and arithmetic, in so far as they are sciences of the relations of magnitude and numbers. It gives them however, on one condition : that you are to consider these numbers and these magnitudes, as abstract, not implying existence. Now without doubt the science of geometry is an abstract science ; but it has its bases in concrete ideas, and real existences. One of these bases is the idea of space, which, as you know,* is given in this judgment : every body is in a space. This is the proposition, the judgment, which gives us space, a judgment accompanied with perfect certainty of the reality of its object. We have but one single idea as the starting-point, namely, the idea of body ; then the mind by its own power, as soon as the idea of body is given it, conceives the idea of space and its necessary connexion with body. A body being known, we cannot but judge that it is in a space which contains it. From this judgment abstract the idea of space, and you have the abstract and general idea of space. But it was not anterior to the conception of the necessary relation of space to body, any more than the relation was anterior to it ; nor was it posterior to the relation, nor the relation posterior to it. They both reciprocally imply each other, and are given us in the same judgment as soon as body is known. To lay down first the idea of space, and the idea of body, and then to seek by comparing them to deduce the relation which connects them, is to overthrow the order of intellectual development ; for the idea of space alone, supposes already this total judgment, that every body is necessarily in space. The judgment therefore cannot come from the idea, on the contrary the idea comes from the judgment. It is not difficult to deduce the judgment from the idea, which supposes it, but it would require to be explained from whence comes the idea anterior to the judgment. There is no difficulty in finding a relation between body and space, when we know body and space ; but it would

* See ch. II.

be difficult for Locke to show how he obtained that idea of space, just as we have seen in regard to the idea of body, of God, of color, of existence, &c. To suppose that the necessary idea is given us by the comparison of two ideas, one of which is already the idea of space, is a vicious reasoning in a circle, and a ridiculous paralogism. This is the rock on which the theory of Locke perpetually breaks.

The other idea upon which geometry rests is the idea of magnitude which contains the idea of point, the idea of line, &c. Magnitude, point, line, are ulterior and abstract conceptions, which evidently suppose that the idea of some real body, of a solid existing in nature. Now the idea of solidity, like every idea, is given us in a judgment; and it is necessary that we should judge that such a solid exists in order to conceive the idea of solidity by itself. How, then, do we judge that such a solid exists? According to the theory of Locke, there must be two ideas, a comparison of those two ideas, and a perception of their agreement. And what are the two ideas which are to serve as the terms of the judgment: *this solid exists*? I acknowledge I do not see. Compelled by the hypothesis to find them, I can discover no others than the idea of solidity and that of existence, which we are to compare in order to see if they agree or disagree. The theory requires all this scaffolding. But is there any need of destroying it piece by piece, in order to overthrow it? Is it not enough to recollect that the solid in question, being deprived of existence, since it is separated from the idea of existence, is nothing but the abstraction of solidity, and that this abstraction, to which it is the object give reality, in order to deduce the existence of the solid, could never have been formed without the previous conception of a real solid, and really existing? The abstraction, line, point, &c. supposes such or such a real solid, a primitive and concrete knowledge, which we can never deduce from ulterior abstractions without falling into a vicious circle, and taking away from all geometrical conceptions their natural and real basis.

Thus, then, the two bases, the two fundamental ideas of Geometry, namely the idea of space, and the idea of solidity, can never be explained by Locke's theory of knowledge and judgment.

The same is true in regard to the fundamental basis of Arithmetic. This basis is evidently unity, not a collective unity, for example: *four* representing *two* and *two*, *five* representing *two* and *three*, but a unity which is found in all collective unities, measures them and values them. This unity Arithmetic conceives in an abstract manner; but abstraction not being the starting point in the human mind, the abstract unity must have been given to us at first in some concrete unity, really existing. What is then this concrete, really existing unity, the source of the abstract idea of unity? It is not body; that is indefinitely divisible. It is the *I*, the *self*, identical, and consequently one under all the variety of its acts, its thoughts, its sensations. And how, by the theory of Locke, could this knowledge be acquired, the concrete knowledge of the unity of self which is the basis of the abstract idea of unity, which is the basis of Arithmetic? It is necessary that we should have had, on the one hand, the idea of self, not as being one, that is, without reality, (the identity and unity of self being implied in its existence from the very first moment of memory,) and on the other hand, the idea of a unity distinct from self, without subject, and consequently without reality; and then comparing these, that we should have perceived their relation of agreement. Now here all my objections come up again, and I will briefly recapitulate them:

1. It is an abstract unity and an abstract *I* or *self*, from which you start; but the abstract unity and the abstract *I*, brought together and compared, will give you nothing but an abstract relation, and not a real relation, an abstract unity, and not the real and integrant unity of the *I*. You will not therefore have that concrete idea of unity, which is the necessary basis of the abstract idea of unity, which again is the basis of Arithmetic, the measure of all numbers;

2. You start from abstraction without having passed through the concrete ; which is contrary to the natural order of the understanding.

3. Finally, you are guilty of a paralogism, since you wish to obtain the integrant unity of the I, self, from the comparison of two abstractions which involve the supposition of precisely what you are seeking.

The theory of Locke therefore cannot give the basis of Geometry and Arithmetic, that is, of the abstract sciences. It works well in the field of Geometry and Arithmetic, in as far as they are abstract sciences ; but these abstract sciences, and all mathematics, depend in the last analysis upon primitive intellections which imply existence ; and those primitive intellections which imply existence cannot be brought any where within the theory of Locke. Now we have seen that the theory fails equally and on the same grounds, in respect to the knowledge of personal existence, that of bodies, and that of God. It follows, then, in general, and in the last result, that the theory of Locke is valid only in respect to pure abstraction, and that it breaks to pieces as soon as it is brought into contact with any reality to be known of whatever sort.

The general and unlimited pretension of Locke, therefore, that all knowledge, every judgment, is nothing but the perception of a relation of agreement or disagreement between two ideas, this pretension is convicted in every way of error, and even of absurdity.

I am afraid this discussion of Locke's theory of knowledge may appear somewhat subtle ; but when one wishes to follow error in all its windings, and to untie, methodically, by analysis and dialectics, the knot of sophistical theories, instead of cutting them at once by simple good sense, one is obliged to engage in apparent subtleties in following the track of those we wish to combat. At this price alone can we seize and confound them.

I am afraid, too, that this discussion seems to you very prolonged ; and yet it is not finished, for it is not yet penetrated to the true root of the theory of Locke. This theory,—that

every judgment, all knowledge, is nothing but the perception of a relation between two ideas,—supposes and contains another theory, which is the principle of the former. The examination of the one is indispensable to complete that of the other, and to determine the judgment we ought to pass definitively upon it.

CRITICAL EXAMINATION
OF
LOCKE'S ESSAY
ON
THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

CHAPTER NINTH.

CONTENTS OF CHAPTER NINTH.

Continuation of the preceding chapter. That the theory of judgment, as the perception of a relation of agreement or disagreement between ideas, supposes that every judgment is founded upon a comparison. Refutation of the theory of comparative judgment.—Of axioms.—Of identical propositions.—Of Reason and of Faith.—Of Syllogism. Of Enthusiasm.—Of the causes of Error.—Division of the Sciences.—Conclusion of the examination of the Fourth Book of Locke's Essay.

CHAPTER IX.

I BELIEVE I have sufficiently refuted, by its results, the theory of Locke, which makes knowledge or judgment to consist in a perception of the relation of agreement or disagreement between ideas. I have demonstrated, I believe, that this theory cannot give reality, existences ; that it starts from abstraction and results in abstraction.—I now come to examine this same theory under another aspect, not any longer in its results, but in its principles, in its essential principle, in its very condition.

It is evident that judgment can be the perception of a relation of agreement or disagreement of ideas, only on condition that a comparison be made between the ideas. Every judgment of relation is comparative. This is the first and the last principle of the theory of Locke ; a principle which the infallible analysis of time has successively disengaged and placed at the head of the Sensual school. In its germe, at least, it is found in the fourth Book of Locke, and there we will take it up and examine it.

We observe then that the theory of comparative judgment, like that which it involves and governs, is an unlimited and absolute theory. It pretends to explain all our knowledge, all our judgments ; so that if the theory is correct, there ought not to be a single judgment which is not a comparative judgment. I might then, I ought even, in this, as in the preceding lecture, to go from judgment to judgment, examining if they are in fact the fruit of a comparison. But this would lead me to a great length, and the space I have yet to go over admonishes me to hasten my progress. I will say then all at once, that if there are many judgments which are undeniably comparative, there are also very many which are not, and that here again every judgment which implies reality of existence,

excludes all comparison. Let us begin by accurately recognizing the conditions of a comparative judgment, then we will test these conditions in regard to judgments which imply existence. We shall without doubt get again somewhat into our former reasonings; but it will be requisite, in order to pursue and force the theory of Locke into its last hold.

In order to make a comparison, there must be two terms to be compared. That these terms may be abstractions or realities, is a point not any longer to our purpose to examine; there must always be two terms, or the comparison is impossible. And it is necessary that these terms should be known previously to the comparison which one wishes to make, that they should be present to the mind, before the mind can compare them and judge. All this is very simple; yet it is sufficient to overthrow the theory of comparative judgment, in respect to reality and existence. For there, in fact, I maintain that judgment does not depend and cannot depend upon two terms.

Let us take, for example, personal existence, and see what are the two terms which are to be compared in order to derive from them this judgment: *I exist*. We will, for this time, have nothing to say about the abstraction of self, and the abstraction of existence, which as we have seen can give only an abstract judgment. Let us take an hypothesis more favorable; let us come nearer to reality. It is indubitable, that if we had never thought, if we had never acted, never felt, we should never have known that we exist. Sensation, action, thinking, some phenomenon appearing on the theatre of consciousness, is absolutely necessary, in order that the understanding may be able to refer this phenomenon to the subject who experiences, to that subject which is ourselves. If, then, knowledge is here the fruit of a comparative judgment, the two terms of this judgment must be, on the one hand, action, sensation, thought, and in general every phenomenon of consciousness; and on the other hand, the subject *self*, or *I*. I do not see any other possible terms of comparison.

Now what is the nature of these two terms? And first what is that of the phenomenon of consciousness. The phenomenon of consciousness is given by an immediate apperception which attains it and knows it directly; and it is because this knowledge is direct that it is entire and adequate to the reality itself. See, then, already a knowledge; I say a knowledge, for it is either a mere dispute about words, or else an apperception of consciousness is knowledge or it is nothing. Now if there is knowledge, there has been judgment: for apparently there has been a belief of knowledge, an affirmation of the truth of this knowledge, tacit or express; the affirmation has taken place solely in the depths of the intelligence, or it has been pronounced on the lips in words; at all events it has taken place. And to affirm is to judge. There has then been a judgment. Now there is here again only a single term, namely, the sensation, or action, or thought, in a word a phenomenon of consciousness; there cannot then have been a comparison. According to Locke, then, there cannot have been a judgment, if every judgment is comparative. All our knowledge is resolvable in the last analysis into affirmations of true or false, into judgments; and it is contradictory to say that the judgment which gives the first knowledge we have, the knowledge of consciousness, is a comparative judgment, since this knowledge has but a single term, and there must be two terms for every comparison. This single term, however, is a knowledge, and consequently it supposes a judgment, but a judgment which does not fall under the conditions which Locke assigns for every judgment.

Thus of the two necessary terms of the comparison from which should result the judgment: *I exist*, the first by itself alone comprehends a knowledge, a judgment, which is not and cannot be comparative. It is just so in regard to the second term. If every phenomenon of consciousness, in so far as known, implies already a judgment, it is evident that the *I*, the *self*, which ought to be known also in order to be the second term of the comparison, implies, likewise, from the very fact of its being known, a judgment, and that a judgment which

cannot have been comparative. . In fact, if the comparison of a sensation, a volition, or a thought, with the personal self, the *me*, is the foundation of the judgment: *I exist*, it follows that the phenomenon, of consciousness, and the being, *me*, which are to be the terms of the comparison, ought not and cannot, either of them, come from the comparison which has not yet taken place. These two terms nevertheless constitute intellections (*connaissances*, knowledges;) the second particularly is an important and fundamental knowledge, which evidently implies a judgment. The theory of comparative judgment falls to pieces, then, in respect to the second term as well as the first; and the two terms necessary, according to Locke, in order that a judgment may take place, contain each a judgment, and a judgment without any comparison.

But there is a second and still greater difficulty. The special characteristic of all knowledge of consciousness, is directness and immediateness. There is an immediate and direct apperception of a sensation or a volition or a thought; hence it is that you know them perfectly, you can observe and describe them with certainty, in all their modes and shades, in all their characteristics, relative or particular, fugitive or permanent. Here the judgment has no other principle than the faculty of judging, and the consciousness itself. There is no principle, general or particular, on which consciousness is obliged to depend in order to perceive its own objects. Undoubtedly an act of attention is necessary, or a phenomenon, sensitive, active, or intellectual, may take place and we shall not perceive it. An act of attention is the condition of all consciousness; but when this condition is fulfilled, the phenomena of consciousness are perceived and known directly. But it is not with being, essence, as with a phenomenon; it is not with the self, as with the sensation, volition, or thought. Suppose, when any phenomenon of consciousness is directly perceived, that the understanding is not provided with the principle: that every phenomenon supposes a being, every quality supposes a subject, the understanding in that case

would never be able to form the judgment, that under the sensation, thought or volition, there is being, the subject I. And bear in mind I do not mean to say that the understanding must know this principle in its general and abstract form ; I have shown in another place that such is not the primitive form of principles.* I merely say that the understanding [by the ultimate law of its action] must, consciously or unconsciously, be directed by this principle, in order to affirm and judge, or even to suspect (which is still judging) that there is some being under the phenomena which consciousness perceives. This principle, properly speaking, is the principle of being ; the principle by which self or personality is revealed ; I say *revealed*, for self does not fall under the immediate apprehension of consciousness ; the understanding conceives and believes it, without the consciousness attaining and seeing it. Sensation, volition, thought, are believed because they are in some sort seen by the internal intuition [immediate vision and perception] of consciousness ; the *subject* (I, self,) of the sensation, volition, thought, is believed without being seen either by the external senses nor by the consciousness ; it is believed [by a law of the mind] because it is conceived. The phenomenon alone is visible to the consciousness, the being is invisible, but the one is a sign of the other. The visible phenomenon reveals the invisible being, on the faith of the principle in question, without which the understanding would never come forth from the consciousness, [would never project itself] from the visible, the phenomenal, would never attain the the invisible, the substance, the self. Hence the opposite nature of the knowledge of self, and of the knowledge of the phenomena of consciousness : the one entirely manifest, because it is direct, the other equally certain, but less manifest, because it is indirect. Again, do not forget this distinguishing characteristic of these two sorts of knowledge : the one is a truth without doubt, but a contingent truth, the truth, namely, that at some particular moment there is some particular phe-

*See Chap. IV.

nomenon under the eye of consciousness ; while the other, when once its condition is supplied, is a necessary truth, for as soon as an apperception of consciousness is given we cannot help judging that the subject of it, the *self*, I, exists. Thus in regard to the second term, the subject, the *me*, there is not only knowledge and consequently judgment, as is the case in regard to the first term ; but there is also a knowledge and judgment marked with characteristics altogether peculiar.

It is, then, entirely absurd to derive the judgment of personal existence from the comparison of two terms, of which the second, in order to be known, supposes already a judgment of a character so remarkable. And it is very evident that this judgment is not comparative ; for from what comparison could the self proceed ? Invisible, it cannot be brought under the eye of consciousness along with the visible phenomenon, in order that they may be compared together. It is not then from a comparison of the two terms that the certainty of the existence of the second is derived ; for this second term is known all at once, with a certainty which neither increases or decreases, which has no degrees. Far from the knowledge of self and personal existence coming from a comparison between a phenomenon and self, taken as correlative terms, it is enough to have one single term, namely, a phenomenon of consciousness ; and then, on the instant, and without the second term, *self*, being previously known, the understanding, by its own innate efficacy and by the principle which in such a case directs it, conceives and in some sort divines, but divines infallibly, this second term, as the necessary subject of the first. After having thus conceived the second term, the understanding can, if it pleases, place it beside the second, and compare the subject *self*, with the phenomena of sensation, volition, thought ; but this comparison teaches it only what it already knew ; and comparison can do this only because the understanding already had the two terms which contain all the knowledge sought from a comparison, and which were acquired anterior to all comparison, by two different

judgments, whose only point of resemblance is that they are not comparative.

Thus the judgment of personal existence does not depend upon the comparison of two terms, but upon a single term, the phenomenon of consciousness. The latter is given immediately, and with it the understanding conceives the other, that is, self and personal existence, hitherto unknown and consequently incapable of serving as the second term of a comparison.—Now what is true of personal existence, is true of all other existences and of the judgments which reveal them; these judgments rest originally upon a single datum.

How do we know the external world, bodies and their qualities, according to the theory of Locke? To begin with the qualities of bodies. If we know them, it is only by a judgment founded upon a comparison, that is, upon two terms previously known. Such is the theory: but it is altogether falsified by facts.

I experience a sensation, painful or agreeable, which is perceived by consciousness: this is all that is directly given me, and nothing more; for we must not take for granted the thing in question, the qualities of bodies. It is our business to arrive at the knowledge of them, not to take for granted that they are already known. And you understand in what way we come at the knowledge of them, in what way we pass from the sensation, the apperception of a phenomenon of consciousness to the knowledge of the qualities of external objects.* It is by virtue of the principle of causality, which, the instant any phenomenon begins to appear, leads us irresistibly to seek for a cause of it. In our inability to refer to ourselves the cause of the involuntary sensation actually under the eye of consciousness, we refer it to a cause other than ourselves, foreign to us, that is external. We make as many causes as there are distinct classes of sensations, and these different classes are the powers, the properties, the qualities of bodies.

* See Chap. IV.

It is not therefore by a comparison that we come to know the qualities of bodies ; for the sensation alone is given us at first, and it is, so to say, upon the basis of this sensation alone, that the mind rests the judgment, that it is impossible this sensation should be self-produced, that it therefore refers it to a cause, to an external cause, which is some particular quality of bodies.

The theory of comparison cannot then give the qualities of body : still less does it give the *substratum*, the subject of these qualities. You do not believe that there is merely extension, resistance, solidity, hardness, softness, savor, color, &c., before you ; but you believe that there is something which is colored, extended, resistant, solid, hard, &c. Now it will not do to begin by supposing this something at the same time with its qualities, so as to have these two terms : the external qualities, hardness, softness, &c., *and* some thing really solid, hard, soft &c., two terms which you are then to compare in order to decide whether they agree or disagree. This is not the actual process ; but at first you have solely the qualities which are given you by the application of the principle of causality to your sensations ; then, and from this datum alone, you judge that these qualities cannot but belong to some subject of the same nature, and this subject is body.* It is not therefore to the comparison of two terms of which the one, namely, the subject of sensible qualities, is at first entirely unknown, that you owe the knowledge of body.

It is just so in regard to space. There again, you have but a single term, a single datum, namely, bodies ; and upon that alone, without having any other term, you judge and cannot help judging that bodies are given in space. The knowledge of space is the fruit of this judgment which has nothing to do with any comparison ; for you knew nothing of space anterior to the judgment ; but the body being given, you judge that space exists, and it is then only, that the idea of space comes up, that is to say, the second term.†

* See Chap. III.

† See Chap. III.

The same analysis applies to time. In order to judge that the succession of events is in time, you do not have, on the one hand, the idea of succession, and on the other, the idea of time; you have but one term, namely, the succession of events, whether external events, or internal events, our sensations, thoughts, or acts; and this single term being given, you judge, without comparing it with time which is as yet profoundly unknown to you, that the succession of events is in time: from hence the idea, the knowledge of time. Thus this knowledge, so far from being the fruit of a comparison, becomes the possible basis of an ulterior comparison, only on the condition that it is first given you in a judgment not dependent upon two terms, but upon a single term, namely, the succession of events.*

This is still more evident in regard to the infinite. If we know the infinite, we must by the theory of Locke, know it through a judgment, and that a comparative judgment. Now the two terms of this judgment cannot be two finite terms; for the finite could never give the infinite; it must be the finite and the infinite between which the mind discovers the relation of agreement or disagreement. But I have, I think, demonstrated, and I need here only refer to it,† that it is enough for us to have the idea of the finite given us, and we are instantly led to the judgment that the infinite exists: or, to keep within the limits of the topics there discussed,‡ the infinite is an attribute of time and of space, which we necessarily conceive, by *occasion* of the finite and contingent attributes of body and of succession. The mind is so constituted, that, on occasion of the idea of the finite, it cannot help conceiving the idea of the infinite. The finite is previously known, it is known directly, by the senses or by consciousness; the infinite is invisible and escapes our grasp; it is only conceivable and comprehensible; it escapes the senses or the consciousness, and falls only under the reason; it is neither one of the previous terms of a comparison, nor the fruit

* See Chap. III.

† See Chap. III.

‡ See Chap. III.

of it; it is given us in a judgment depending only on a single basis, the idea of the finite.—So much for judgments pertaining to existence in general.

There are also many other judgments, not relating to existence, which present the same character. I shall content myself with referring to the judgments of good and evil, of the beautiful and the opposite. In both cases the judgment depends upon a single term, and it is the judgment itself which constitutes the other term, instead of resulting from the prior comparison of two terms.

According to the theory of Locke, in order to judge whether an action is right or wrong, good or bad, it is requisite to have, first, the idea of action, and then, the idea of right and wrong, and then, to compare the one with the other. But in order to compare an action with the idea of right and wrong, it is necessary to have that idea, that knowledge, and that knowledge supposes a judgment. The question then is: whence comes this judgment, and how is it formed. Now we have seen,* that in view of particular actions, which to the eyes of the senses are destitute of any moral character, the understanding is so constituted, that it takes the initiative, and attributes to these actions, though indifferent to the sensibility, the quality of right or wrong, good or bad. From this primitive judgment, which undoubtedly has its law, analysis at a later period derives the idea of right and wrong, which thenceforward serves as the explicit rule of our subsequent judgments.

The forms of objects are to the sense, whether external or internal, neither beautiful nor ugly. Take away the intelligence, and there is for us no longer any beauty in external forms and things. What in fact, do the senses teach you concerning forms? Nothing, except that they are round or square, colored, &c. What does consciousness teach you? Nothing, but that they give you agreeable or disagreeable sensations. But to be agreeable or disagreeable, square or round,

* Chap. V.

green or yellow, &c., is one thing ; to be beautiful or ugly, is another thing. There is an immense abyss between the two ideas. While the senses and the consciousness perceive such or such a form, such or such a feeling more or less agreeable ; the understanding, on the other hand, conceives the beautiful, as it does the good and the true, by a primitive and spontaneous judgment, whose whole force and validity resides in that of the understanding and its laws, and of which the sole datum and condition is an external perception.

I have then demonstrated, as it seems to me, that the theory of Locke, which makes knowledge to rest upon comparison, that is, upon two terms previously known, does not explain the true process of the mind in the acquisition of a great amount and variety of its knowledge.—And in general, I here bring forward again the criticism, I have so many times made upon Locke, that he always confounds: *either*, the antecedents of a knowledge with the knowledge itself, as when he confounded body with space, succession with time, the finite with the infinite, effect with cause, qualities and their aggregate with substance ; *or*, which is a mistake not less grave, the consequences of a knowledge with the knowledge itself. Here, for example, the comparative judgments which pertain to existence, (and even in other cases) are ulterior judgments, requiring two terms which again require a previous foundation in a single term, and consequently not comparative. Locke then, you perceive, here confounds the class of ulterior, comparative judgments, with that of the primitive, and not comparative judgments, which he entirely neglects ; and yet it is precisely the latter, which precede, ground, and give validity to the former. Comparative judgments presuppose judgments not comparative. Comparative judgments are abstract, and suppose real judgments ; they teach us scarcely any thing but what the others had already taught ; they mark explicitly what the others had taught implicitly, but yet decisively ; they are arbitrary, at least in their form ; while the others are universal and necessary ; they need the aid of language ; the others are, strictly speaking, above language, above all conven-

tional signs, and suppose necessarily nothing but the understanding and its laws. Comparative judgments pertain to reflection and to artificial logic; primitive and not comparative judgments constitute the natural and spontaneous logic of the human race. To confound these two classes of judgments, is to vitiate at once all psychology and all logic; and yet such a confusion fills a large portion of the fourth book of the Essay on the Understanding.

I shall now briefly take up the different fundamental points to which this book is devoted, and you will see that, for the most part, we shall find continually this same error, the results of judgments confounded with the judgments themselves, applies directly to the seventh chapter, concerning *Axioms*.

If I made myself fully understood in the last lecture, it must be very evident that axioms, principles, general truths, are the product and expression of propositions, which are the expression of primitive judgments. There are no axioms in the primary developement of the understanding. There is an understanding which, when certain external or internal conditions are fulfilled, by virtue of its own laws, passes certain judgments, sometimes local and contingent, sometimes universal and necessary. These latter judgments, when we operate upon them by analysis and language, resolve themselves, like the others, into propositions; and these propositions being universal and necessary, like the judgments which they express, are what we call axioms. But it is clear that the form of the primitive judgments is one thing, and the form of these same judgments when reduced to propositions and axioms, is another thing. At first concrete, particular, and determinate, whatever be the universality and necessity naturally and potentially in them, it is language and analysis that raise them to the abstract form which is the actual form of axioms. Thus, in the primitive action of the mind, a particular phenomenon being under the eye of consciousness, you instinctively referred it to a subject, that is yourself. But at present on the contrary, instead of abandoning the mind to its laws, you recall them to it, you submit it to the axiom: every phe-

nomenon implies a subject to which it is referred ; and so of the other axioms : all succession supposes time, every body supposes space, the finite supposes the infinite, &c. Do not fail to notice that these axioms have no force but what they borrow from the primitive judgments from which they are deduced. It is to primitive judgments we owe all real and fundamental knowledge, the knowledge of ourselves, of the world, of time, of space, and even, as I have shown in the last lecture, the knowledge of magnitude and of unity. But in respect to axioms it is not so. You acquire no real knowledge, for instance, by the application of the axiom : every effect supposes a cause. It is the philosopher, and not the man, that makes use of this axiom. The savage, the peasant, the uneducated, know nothing of it ; but they all, as well as the philosopher, are provided with an understanding which makes them pass certain judgments, concrete, positive and determinate, and at the same time, necessary, and therefore universal, the result of which is, the knowledge of such or such a particular cause. The judgments and their laws, I repeat, are what produce all knowledge ; axioms are only the analytic expression of those judgments and laws, the ultimate elements of which they express under their most abstract form. Locke, however, instead of stopping within these limits, pretends that axioms are of no use, that they are not the principles of the sciences ; and he demands somewhat contemptuously, to be shown a science founded upon axioms : “ it has been my ill luck” says he (§ 11,) “ never to meet with any such sciences ; much less any one built upon these two maxims, *what is, is* ; and, *it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*. And I would be glad to be shown where any such science, erected upon these or any other general axioms, is to be found ; and should be obliged to any one who would lay before me the frame and system of any science so built on these or any such like maxims, that could not be shown to stand as firm without any consideration of them.” Now, it is indeed true beyond all doubt, that axioms, in their actual form of axioms, never engendered any science ; but it

is no less true that, in their source and under their primitive form, that is, in the laws of the natural judgments from which they are deduced, they have served as the basis of all the sciences. Moreover, although in their actual form, they never have made and cannot make any science, and although they give no particular truth. yet it must be recognized that, without them, no science, no truth general or particular, subsists. Endeavor to deny the axioms; to suppose, for instance, that there can be a quality without a subject, a body without space, succession without time, &c.; set yourselves to making abstractions of the axioms with which Locke has chosen to amuse himself, namely, *what is, is*; and *it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*; that is to say, make an abstraction of the idea of being, and of identity; and there is an end of all science; it can neither advance nor sustain itself.

Locke pretends also (ch. VII, § 9,) that the axioms are not the truths which we know first. True, again, without doubt, the axioms, under their actual form, are not primitive intellections; but, under their real form, as laws governing the exercise of the understanding, and implied in our judgments, they are so truly primitive, that without them no knowledge could be acquired. They are not indeed primitive as being the first truths which we know, but as those without which no others would be known. Here returns again the perpetual confusion in Locke of the historical and logical order of human knowledge. In the chronological order, we do not begin by knowing the axiom, the laws of our understanding; but, logically, without the axioms, no truth is admissible; without the operation, unnoticed, indeed, but real operation, of the laws of thought, no thought, no judgment is either legitimate or possible.

At last, Locke combats the axioms by a celebrated argument, since his time frequently renewed, namely, that the axioms are nothing but frivolous propositions, because they are identical propositions (ch. VII, § 11.) It is Locke, I believe, who introduced the expression, identical proposition, into the

language of philosophy. It signifies a judgment, a proposition, wherein an idea is affirmed of itself, wherein we affirm of a thing what was already known concerning it. Elsewhere, (ch. VIII, of *trifling Propositions*; § 3, of *identical Propositions*,) Locke shows that identical propositions are merely verbal propositions. "Let any one repeat, as often as he pleases, that *the will is the will*; ——— *a law is a law*, and *obligation is obligation*; *right is right*; *wrong is wrong* ——— what is this more than trifling with words?" "It is, says he, but like a monkey shifting his oyster from one hand to the other; and had he words, might, no doubt, have said: oyster in right hand is subject, and oyster in left hand is predicate; and so might have made a self-evident proposition of oyster, that is: *oyster is oyster*." Hence the condemnation of the axiom: *that which is, is*, &c. But it is not exact, it is not fair, to concentrate all the axioms, all the principles, the primitive and necessary truths into the axiom: *what is, is*; *the same is the same*; and to the trifling and ridiculous examples of Locke, I oppose, as examples, the following axioms, which have already been brought forward: the quality supposes a subject; succession supposes time; body supposes space; the finite supposes the infinite; variety supposes unity; phenomenon supposes substance and being,—in short all the necessary truths which our foregoing discussion must have fixed in your minds. The question is, whether these are identical propositions. In order to show that they are, Locke must maintain that time is reducible to succession, or succession to time; space to body, or body to space; the infinite to the finite, or the finite to the infinite; phenomenon to being, or being to phenomenon, &c. Locke does, and by his system should thus maintain. But it ought by this time to be sufficiently evident to you, that this position, and the system on which it rests, are alike destitute of truth.

This proscription of axioms as identical, Locke extends to propositions which are not axioms; and in general, he perceives very many more identical propositions than there are. For instance, gold is heavy, gold is fusible, are to Locke

(ch. VIII, § 5 and 13,) identical. Nothing is farther from the truth, however; we do not in these propositions affirm the same thing of the same. A proposition is called identical, whenever the attribute is contained in the subject in such sort that the subject cannot be conceived as not containing it. Thus, when you say that body is solid, I say that you make an identical proposition, because I defy you to have the idea of body without having that of solidity. The idea of body is perhaps more extended than that of solidity, but it is primarily and essentially the same. The idea of solidity being, then, for you the essential quality of body, to say that body is solid, is to say nothing else than that body is body. But when you say that gold is fusible, you affirm, of gold, a quality which might, or might not belong to it. It involves a contradiction to say a body is not solid; but it involves no contradiction to suppose that gold might not be fusible. Gold might for a long time be known solely as a solid, as hard, yellow, &c.; if the experiment had not been made, it would not be known that it is fusible. When then you affirm, of gold, that it is fusible, you recognize in it a quality which you may not have known before; certainly you do not affirm the same of the same, at least when you first make the assertion. At the present day, it is true, in the laboratory of modern chemistry, where the fusibility of gold is a quality universally recognized, to say that gold is fusible, is to repeat what is already known; it is to affirm of the word gold what is already comprized in the received signification. But, originally, the first one who affirmed that gold is fusible, far from making a tautology, expressed the result of discovery, and a discovery not without difficulty and importance. I may ask whether Locke in his time would have mocked at the proposition, that the atmosphere has weight, as an identical and frivolous proposition? Certainly not; and why? Because at that time, weight was a quality of the air which had hardly come to be demonstrated by the experiments of Pascal, and the still more complete experiments of Toricelli. The only difference, however, is, that those who established the fusibility and weight

of gold were earlier by some thousands of years ; but at the bottom, if the gravity of the atmosphere is not an identical proposition, neither, on the same ground, is the weight or the fusibility of gold ; since the first who affirmed these qualities did not affirm in one term what had already been affirmed in the other.

As to the rest, it is worth while to note the fate of identical truths. Locke saw a great many more than there are, and ridiculed them. The school of Locke has perceived still more of them ; but far from condemning them on that score, it treats them with respect ; it even goes so far as to lay it down as the condition of every true proposition that it must be identical. Thus, by a strange progress, what Locke had branded with ridicule, as frivolous, became in the hands of his successors a mark of legitimacy and truth. The identity ridiculed by Locke was nothing but a fictitious identity ; and now, we see this pretended identity, so much scouted by him, and so unreasonably, because it is not real, celebrated in his school, with still less reason, as the triumph of truth and the last conquest of science and analysis. Now, if all true propositions are identical, as every identical proposition, whether according to Locke, it be frivolous, or according to his disciples not, is, according to both, only a verbal proposition, it follows that the knowledge of all possible truths is only a verbal knowledge ; and thus, when we think that we have learned science or systems of truth, we have really done nothing but translate one word into another ; we only learn words, and a language. Hence the famous principle, that all science is only a language, dictionaries well or ill formed. Hence the reduction of the human mind to grammar.

I pass now to other theories which remain to be examined in the fourth book of the Essay.

Ch. XVII. *Of Reason*—I have scarcely any thing but praise to bestow upon this chapter. Locke there shows, (§ 4,) what indeed was not then shown for the first time, but what at that period it was still necessary and useful to demonstrate, that the syllogism is not the principal instrument of reasoning.

You have indeed seen* that the evidence of demonstration is not the only evidence : that there is, besides, the evidence of intuition, upon which Locke himself allows the evidence of demonstration to be founded, and, also, a third kind of evidence which Locke misconceived, namely, the evidence of induction. Now, the syllogism is of no service in regard to the evidence of induction ; for the syllogism proceeds from the general to the particular, while induction proceeds from the particular to the general. The syllogism, too, serves no purpose in regard to intuition, which is knowledge direct and without an intermediate. It is of no use, then, but in respect to demonstrative evidence ; it is therefore neither the sole, nor the principal instrument of reasoning. But Locke does not stop here ; he goes even so far (§ 6,) as to pretend that the syllogism adds nothing to our knowledge, and that it is only a means of disputing. I here recognize the language of a man who wrote near the end of the seventeenth century, and who was still in the movement of reaction against the Scholastic philosophy. The Scholastic philosophy admitted, as Locke did, the evidence of intuition and demonstration ; it forgot, in theory, like Locke, only the evidence of induction. But, in point of fact, being forbidden the examination of its principles, it scarcely employed any other evidence than the demonstrative ; and consequently it used the syllogism as its principal or exclusive instrument. A reaction therefore against the Scholastic philosophy was necessary. But every reaction always goes too far. Hence the proscription of the syllogism was a blind and unjust proscription ; for deductive knowledge is still real knowledge. There are two things in the syllogism, the form and the substance. The substance is the real and special process by which the human mind goes from the general to the particular ; and certainly it is a process, of which account should be made, in a faithful and complete description of the human mind. As to the form, so well described and so well developed by Aristotle, it is undoubtedly

* See ch. VIII.

liable to abuse ; but still it has a very useful office. In general, all reasoning which cannot be put into this form, is vague reasoning, without strictness and without precision ; while every true demonstration readily submits itself to this form. The syllogistic process, common to the ignorant as well as the learned, and inherent in the human mind itself, is an original principle, fruitful in knowledge and truths, since it is that which gives us all consequences. The syllogistic form, it is true, is often nothing but a test applied to a deduction already drawn, but as a test, it is not without great value. It is not right to say that the syllogism lends itself as readily to the demonstration of the false as of the true ; for let any error whatever be taken in the order of deduction, and I defy it to be put into a regular syllogism. The only remark which holds true, is that the human mind is not to be found entire in the syllogism, neither in the process which constitutes it, nor in the form which expresses it ; because reason is not entire in reasoning, nor is all evidence reducible to that of demonstration. On the contrary, as Locke himself very clearly saw, the evidence of demonstration would not exist, if there were not previously the evidence of intuition. So much for the limitations of Locke's criticism of the syllogism.

This chapter contains several passages (at § 7, and seq.) on the necessity of seeking for discoveries by some other instrument than the syllogism. But, unfortunately with more of promise than performance, these passages give no definite indication. In order to find this new instrument, Locke had nothing to do but to open Bacon's *Novum Organum*, and *De Augmentis* ; and he would have there found perfectly described, both intuition sensible and rational, and induction. But we are compelled to suspect that he had very little acquaintance with Bacon, when we see him darkly groping after, and unable to find, the new route opened a half century before, and already rendered so clear by his immortal countryman.

One of the best chapters of Locke is that on *Faith and Reason*, (ch. XVIII.) You there recognize one of the inter-

preters of the great moral and religious revolution, which at that period had taken place. Locke assigns the exact province of reason and of faith. He indicates their relative office and their distinct limits. He had already said, (ch. XVII, § 24,) that faith in general is so little contrary to reason, that it is nothing else than the assent of reason to itself. "I think it may not be amiss to take notice, that however faith be opposed to reason, faith is nothing but a firm assent of the mind ; which if it be regulated, as is our duty, cannot be afforded to any thing but upon good reason, and so cannot be opposite to it."

And when he comes to treat of positive faith, that is, of revelation, in spite of his respect, or rather by reason of his profound respect for christianity, even while admitting (ch. XVIII, § 7,) the celebrated distinction, and perhaps more specious than profound, between things according to reason, contrary to reason, and above reason, he declares that no revelation, whether immediate or traditional, can be admitted contrary to reason, and that the measure of the admissibility of every revelation, is in the proportion of its comprehensibility, that is its relation more or less intimate to the reason. I will adduce the words of Locke, § 5 :

"But yet nothing, I think, can, under that title, [of a revelation,] shake or overrule plain knowledge ; or rationally prevail with any man to admit it for true, in a direct contradiction to the clear evidence of his own understanding. For since no evidence of our faculties, by which we receive such *revelations*, can exceed, if equal, the certainty of our intuitive knowledge, we can never receive for a truth any thing that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct knowledge ; *v. g.* the ideas of one body, and one place, do so clearly agree, and the mind has so evident a perception of their agreement, that we can never assent to a proposition, that affirms the same body to be in two distant places at once, however it should pretend to the authority of a divine *revelation* : since the evidence, *first*, that we deceive not ourselves in ascribing it to God ; *secondly*, that we understand it right ; can never be so great as the evidence of our own intuitive knowledge,

whereby we discern it impossible for the same body to be in two places at once. And therefore *no proposition can be received for divine revelation*, or obtain the assent due to all such, *if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive knowledge*. Because this would be to subvert the principles and foundations of all knowledge, evidence and assent whatsoever; and there would be left no difference between truth and falsehood, no measures of credible and incredible in the world, if doubtful propositions shall take place before self-evident; and what we certainly know, give way to what we may possibly be mistaken in. In propositions, therefore, contrary to the clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, it will be in vain to urge them as matters of *faith*.*

I am not equally satisfied with the next chapter (the XIX) *On Enthusiasm*. Locke, it seems to me, has not profoundly apprehended his subject; he has made a satire rather than given an impartial description of enthusiasm.

What in fact is enthusiasm according to Locke? It is: 1. the pretension of referring to a positive, privileged, and personal revelation, to a divine illumination made in our particular favor, our own peculiar sentiments, which often are nothing but extravagances; 2. the pretension, still more absurd, of imposing upon others these imaginations, as superior orders clothed with divine authority. (See § 5 and 6.) These are indeed the follies of enthusiasm. But is enthusiasm nothing but this? I do not believe it.

Locke has elsewhere perfectly seen that the evidence of demonstration is founded upon that of intuition. He has even said that of these two kinds of evidence, the evidence of intuition is not only anterior to the other, but is superior to it, and is the highest degree of knowledge, (ch. XVII, § 14.) It is even curious to see Locke express himself on this point with as much strength as could a philosopher of a totally opposite school. "Intuitive knowledge is certain, beyond all doubt, and needs no probation, nor can have any, this being the

* Appendix, Note DD.

highest of all human certainty. In this consists the evidence of all those maxims, which nobody has any doubt about, but every man (does not, as is said, only assent to, but) knows to be true as soon as ever they are proposed to his understanding. In the discovery of, and assent to these truths, there is no use of the discursive faculty, no need of reasoning, but they are known by a superior and higher degree of evidence ; and such, if I may guess at things unknown, I am apt to think that angels have now, and the spirits of just men made perfect shall have in a future state, of thousands of things, which now either wholly escape our apprehensions, or which, our short-sighted reason having got some faint glimpse of, we, in the dark, grope after." I accept this statement, let it be consistent or not with the general system of Locke. I hold likewise that the highest degree of knowledge is intuitive knowledge. This knowledge, in many cases, for example, in regard to time, space, personal identity, the infinite, all substantial existences, as also, the good and the beautiful, has, you know, this peculiarity, that it is not grounded upon the senses nor consciousness but upon the reason, which, without the intermediation of any reasoning, attains its objects and conceives them with certainty. Now, it is an attribute inherent in the reason to believe in itself, and from hence comes faith. If, then, intuitive reason is above inductive and demonstrative reason, the faith of reason in itself is, in intuition, purer and more elevated than in induction and demonstration. Recollect likewise that the truths intuitively discovered by reason are not arbitrary, but necessary ; that they are not relative, but absolute. The authority of reason is absolute ; it is then a characteristic of the faith attached to reason to be, like that, absolute. These are the admirable characteristics of reason, and of the faith of reason in itself.

This is not all. When we come to interrogate reason about itself, to inquire into its own principle, and the source of that absolute authority which characterizes it, we are forced to recognize that this reason is not ours, not constituted by us. It is not in our power ; it is not in the power of

our will to cause the reason to give us such or such a truth, or not to give us them. Independent of our will, reason intervenes, and, when certain conditions are fulfilled, gives us, I might say, imposes upon us, these truths. The reason makes its appearance in us, though it is not ourselves, and in no way can it be confounded with our personality. Reason is impersonal. Whence then comes this wonderful guest within us, and what is the principle of this reason which enlightens us, without belonging to us? This principle is God, the first and the last principle of every thing. Now, when the faith of reason in itself is attached to its principle, when it knows that it comes from God, it increases not merely in degree, but in nature, by as much, so to say, as the eternal substance is superior to the finite substance in which it makes its appearance. Thus comes a redoubled faith in the truths revealed by the supreme reason in the shades of time and in the limitation of our weakness.*

See, then, reason become, to its own eyes divine, in its principle. Now this mode or state of reason which hears itself and takes itself as the echo of God on the earth, with the particular and extraordinary characteristics connected with it, is what is called Enthusiasm. The word sufficiently explains the thing : enthusiasm [*ἔνθεος* or *ἐκστασις*] is the spirit of God within us ; it is immediate intuition, opposed to induction and demonstration ; it is the primitive spontaneity opposed to the ulterior developement of reflection ; it is the apperception of the highest truths by reason in its greatest independence both of the senses and of our personality. Enthusiasm in its highest degree, in its crisis, so to say, belongs only to particular individuals, and to them only in particular circumstances ; but in its lowest degree, enthusiasm is as much a fact as any thing else, a fact sufficiently common, pertaining not to any particular theory or individual, or epoch, but to human nature, in all men, in all conditions, and almost at every hour. It is enthusiasm which produces spontaneous convictions and resolutions, in lit-

* See Appendix, Note EE.

tle as in great, in the hero and in the feeblest woman. Enthusiasm is the poetic spirit in any thing ; and the poetic *spirit*, thanks to God, does not belong exclusively to poets. It has been given to all men in some degree more or less pure, more or less elevated ; it appears above all in particular men, and in particular moments of the life of such men, who are the poets by eminence. It is enthusiasm likewise which makes religions, for every religion supposes two things : 1. that the truths which it proclaims are absolute truths ; 2. that it proclaims them in the name of God himself who reveals them to it.

Thus far all is well : we are still within the conditions of humanity and of reason, for it is reason which is the foundation of faith and of enthusiasm, of heroism, of poetry and of religion. And when the poet, when the priest repel reason in the name and behalf of enthusiasm and faith, they do nothing else, whether they are aware or ignorant of it, (and it is the affair neither of poets, nor of priests, to know what they do,) they do nothing else, I say, than put one mode of reason above other modes of the same reason ; for, if immediate intuition is above ratiocination, yet it none the less pertains to reason. Enthusiasm is then a rational fact, which has its place in the order of natural facts, and in the history of the human mind ; only this fact is extremely delicate, and enthusiasm may easily turn into folly. We are here upon the doubtful border between reason and extravagance. See the universal principle, the necessary and legitimate principle of religious philosophy, of religions and mysticism, a principle which must not be confounded with the mistakes and delusions by which it may be corrupted. Thus disengaged and enlightened by analysis, philosophy ought to recognize it, if she wishes to recognize all the essential facts, all the elements of reason and of humanity.

See now where error begins. Enthusiasm is, I repeat, that spontaneous intuition of truth by reason, as independent as possible of the personality and of the senses, of induction and of demonstration, a state which has been found true, legiti-

mate, and founded upon the nature of the human reason. But sometimes it happens that the senses and the personality which inspiration ought to surmount and reduce to silence, introduce themselves into the inspiration itself, and mingle with it material, arbitrary, false and ridiculous details. It happens likewise, that those who share in a superior degree, this revelation of God made in some measure to all men, imagine it to be peculiar to themselves, and denied to others, not only in this degree, but totally and absolutely. They set up in their minds, a sort of privilege of inspiration; and as in inspiration we feel the duty of submitting ourselves to the truths which inspiration reveals, and the sacred mission of proclaiming and spreading them, we frequently go to the extent of supposing that it is also a duty for us, while submitting ourselves to these truths, to subject others likewise to them, and to impose them upon others, not in virtue of our own power and personal illumination, but in virtue of the superior power from which all inspiration emanates.

On our knees ourselves, before the principle of our enthusiasm and our faith, we wish also to make others bend their knees to the same principle, to make them adore and serve what we adore and serve.* From hence religious authority; and then very soon tyranny. Men begin by believing in special revelations made in their favor, they end by regarding themselves as delegates of God and providence, commissioned not only to enlighten and save teachable souls, but to enlighten and save, spite of themselves, those who resist the truth and God. The folly of enthusiasm conducts very rapidly to the tyranny of enthusiasm.

But the folly and the tyranny, which, I grant, sometimes spring from the principle of inspiration, because we are feeble, and consequently exclusive, and therefore intolerant, are essentially distinct from the principle. We can, and we ought to acquit, and even to put honor upon the principle, while at the same time we condemn the errors connected with it. But in-

stead of this, Locke confounds the abuse of the principle, that is to say, extravagant enthusiasm, peculiar to some men, with the true enthusiasm which has been given in some degree to all men. In enthusiasm throughout he sees nothing but a disordered movement of the imagination, and every where he sets himself to putting up barriers to all passing beyond the circle of authentic and properly interpreted passages of the holy scriptures. I approve his prudence ; I allow it at all times, and I think still more of it, when I recollect the extravagances of sectarian enthusiasm about the times of Locke, and the sad spectacle presented to his eyes. But prudence should never degenerate into injustice. What would the Sensual school say, if, from prudence likewise idealism should wish to suppress the senses on account of the excesses to which the senses may and often do conduct, or reasoning, on account of the sophisms which it engenders ? We must be wise within bounds, *sobrie sapere* ; we must be wise within the limitations and conditions of humanity and nature ; and Locke was wrong in regarding enthusiasm so much less in itself, than in its consequences, and in its foolish and pernicious consequences.

Next follows ch. XX. *On the causes of Error.* Nearly all those signalized by Locke had been recognized before him. They are : 1. want of proofs ; 2. want of ability to use them ; 3. want of will to use them : 4. wrong measures of probability, which are reduced by Locke to the four following : 1. propositions that are not in themselves certain and evident, but doubtful and false, taken up for principles ; 2. received hypotheses ; 3. predominant passions or inclinations ; 4. authority. This whole chapter may be read with profit ; but I shall dwell only upon the last section (the 18th,) entitled : *Men not in so many errors as is imagined.* I avow that I was singularly pleased, from the optimism which you know I cherish, with the title of this paragraph. I hoped to find in the good and wise Locke these two propositions which are so dear to me ; first, that men do not so much believe in any error as in the truth, and secondly, that there is no error in which there is not some share, however small, of truth. So far from

this, however, I perceive that Locke in respect to error, makes an apology for human nature that is but little creditable to it. If men are not the fools which they appear to be, it is, according to Locke, because they really have no faith at all in the foolish opinions with which they have the air of being so persuaded, but follow them merely from habit, excitement or interest. "They are resolved to stick to a party, that education or interest has engaged them in ; and there, like the common soldiers of an army, show their courage and warmth as their leaders direct, without ever so much as examining or knowing the cause they contend for. ——— It is enough for a man to obey his leaders, to have his hand and his tongue ready for the support of the common cause, and thereby approve himself to those who can give him credit, preferment, or protection in that society." Let it be so, in regard to some men ; but is this true of all ? Here, again, Locke suffered himself to be disturbed by the spectacles presented by his own times, when, amidst so many follies, there might very likely be some dissembled ; but all were not so, and could not be. I allow that in times of agitation and revolution, ambition frequently takes the standard of extravagancies which it despises, in order to lead the crowd ; but it is not right to calumniate ambition. Every thing is entire in humanity ; and a man may be at the same time both very ambitious and very sincere. Cromwell, for instance, was, in my opinion, a sincere puritan even to fanaticism ; and likewise greedy of power even to hypocrisy ; and still his hypocrisy is more obscure and more doubtful than his fanaticism. Probably it only led him to exaggerate the opinions which were really in his heart, and to caress and excite the passions, which he himself shared. His tyranny is not a proof that his republican ardor was assumed. There are times when the popular cause needs a master to govern and represent it, and when the good sense, which perceives this necessity, or the genius, which feels its own strength, easily impels an ardent mind to arbitrary power, without implying excessive egotism. Pericles, Cæsar, Cromwell, and another still, might

very sincerely have loved equality in the midst of a dictatorship. There is perhaps now in the world a man, whose ambition is the last hope of the country which he has twice saved, and which he alone can save again by applying a firm hand. But let us leave great men, who, to expiate their superiority and their glory, are often condemned not be comprehended; let us leave the chiefs, and come to the multitude. Here the explanation of Locke fails. We can, indeed, explain to a certain extent the foolish opinions of some men by the interest they have in simulating those of the mass upon whom they wish to support themselves; but it is implied that the mass of men hold false opinions by imposture; for apparently they would not be willing to deceive themselves. But no; this is not the way to justify the errors of humanity. Their true apology is that which I have so many times given, and which I shall never cease to repeat: that there is no total error in an intelligent and rational being. Men, individuals and nations, men of genius and ordinary men, unquestionably give in to many errors, and attach themselves to them; but not to that which makes them errors, but to the part of truth which is in them. Examine to the bottom all the celebrated errors, political, religious, philosophical; there is not one which has not a considerable portion of truth in it, and it is to this it owes its credence in the minds of great men, who introduced it upon the scene of the world, and in the minds of the multitude, who have followed the great men. It is the truth joined to the error, which gives to the error all its force, which gives it birth, sustains it, spreads it, explains and excuses it. Errors gain success and footing in the world, no otherwise than by carrying along with them, and offering, as it were, for their ransom, so much of truth, as, piercing through the mists which envelope it, enlighten and carry forward the human race. I approve entirely, then, the title of Locke's paragraph; but I reject his developement of it.*


The *twenty first* Chapter contains a division of the sciences into physics, practics, and logic or grammar. By physics,

* See Appendix, Note GG.

Locke understands the nature of things, not only of bodies, but of spirits, God and the soul ; it is the ancient physics and the modern ontology. I have nothing to say of this division but that it is very ancient,* obviously arbitrary and superficial, and very much inferior to the celebrated division of Bacon, reproduced by D'Alembert. I find it indeed very difficult to believe that the author of this division could have known this division of Bacon. I see rather, in this, as also in the third book concerning signs and language, marks of the reading and recollection of Hobbes.

We have at length come to the end of this long analysis of the *fourth book* of the Essay of Locke. I have followed, step by step, all the important propositions contained in it, as I have done in regard to the preceding books. I should not, however, give a complete view of the Essay on the Human Understanding, if I should stop without still exhibiting some theories of great importance, which are not thrown in episodically in the work of Locke, but pertain closely to the general spirit of his system, and have acquired in the Sensual school an immense authority. It has appeared to me proper to reserve these theories for a special examination.

* See Appendix, Note HH.



CRITICAL EXAMINATION
OF
LOCKE'S ESSAY
ON
THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

CHAPTER TENTH.

CONTENTS OF CHAPTER TENTH.

Examination of three important Theories found in the Essay on the Human Understanding: 1. Theory of Freedom; which inclines to Fatalism. 2. Theory of the Nature of the Soul; which inclines to Materialism. 3. Theory of the Existence of God which rests itself almost exclusively upon external proofs, drawn from the sensible world.—Recapitulation of the whole Examination of the Essay of Locke; the Merits and the Faults which have been pointed out.—Of the spirit which has governed this Examination.—Conclusion.

CHAPTER X.

THE theories which I wish to discuss, are those concerning Liberty, the Soul, and God. I wish to explain these three theories in the order in which they occur in the Essay on the Understanding.

In order to enable you to comprehend the true character of Locke's theory of Liberty, some preliminary explanations are indispensable.

All the facts which can fall under the consciousness of man, and consequently under the reflection of the philosopher, resolve themselves into three fundamental facts, which contain all the others ; three facts which, beyond doubt, are never, in reality, solitary and separate from each other, but which are essentially not the less distinct, and which a careful analysis ought to distinguish, without dividing, in the complex phenomenon of intellectual life. These three facts are expressed in the words : *to feel, to think, to act.*

I open a book and read ; let us decompose this fact, and we shall find in it three elements.

Suppose I do not see the letters of which each page is composed, the figure and order of the letters ; it is obvious I shall not comprehend the meaning which usage has attached to those letters, and so I shall not read. To see, then, is the condition of reading. But, on the other hand, to see is still not to read ; for, the letters being seen, nothing would be done if the intellect was not superadded to the sense of sight, in order to comprehend the signification of the letters placed before my eyes.

Here, then, are two facts, which the most superficial analysis immediately discerns in the fact of reading. Let us recognize the characteristics of these two facts.

Am I the cause of the vision, and in general terms, of the sensation? Am I conscious of being the cause of this phenomenon; of commencing, continuing, interrupting, increasing, diminishing, maintaining and abolishing it, at my pleasure? I will refer to other examples more striking. Suppose I press upon a sharp cutting instrument; and a painful sensation results. I put a rose to my nose; and an agreeable sensation results. Is it I who produce these two phenomena? Can I make them cease? Does the pain or pleasure come or go at my wish? No: I am subject to the pleasure as well as to the pain; both come, subsist, and depart, without regard to my will. In a word, sensation is a phenomenon, marked in the eye of my consciousness, with the characteristic of necessity.

Let us now examine the character of the other fact, which sensation indeed precedes, but does not constitute. When the sensation is accomplished, the intellect applies itself to the sensation; and first it pronounces that the sensation has a cause, the cutting instrument, the rose, and, to return to our first example, the letters placed before the eyes: this is the first judgment passed by the intellect. Farther: as soon as the sensation is referred by the intellect to an external cause, namely, to the letters and the words which they form, this same intellect conceives the meaning of those letters and words, and judges of the truth or falseness of the proposition formed by them. The intellect, then, judges that the sensation has a cause; but I wish to ask, if it could judge the contrary? No: the intellect can no more judge that this is without a cause, than it can judge that it was possible there might or might not be the sensation, when the cutting instrument was in the wound, the rose at the organ of smelling, or the book before the eyes.—And not only does the intellect of necessity judge that the sensation refers to a cause, but it also of necessity judges that the propositions contained in the lines perceived by the eye are true or false; for instance, that two and two make four, and not five, &c. This is undeniable. I ask again, if it is in the power of the intellect, to judge, at pleasure, con-

cerning any particular action of which the book speaks, that it is good or bad ; or concerning any particular form which the book describes, that it is beautiful or ugly ? By no means. Undoubtedly different intellects, or the same intellect at different periods of its exercise, may sometimes pass different judgments in regard to the same thing. Sometimes it may be deceived ; it will judge that which is false to be true, the good to be bad, the beautiful to be ugly, and the reverse ; but, at the moment when it judges that a proposition is true or false, an action good or bad, a form beautiful or ugly, at that moment, it is not in the power of the intellect to pass any other judgment than that it passes. It obeys laws which it did not make. It yields to motives which determine it independent of the will. In a word, the phenomenon of intelligence, comprehending, judging, knowing, thinking, whatever name be given to it, is marked with the same characteristic of necessity as the phenomenon of sensibility. If then the sensibility and the intellect are under the dominion of necessity, it is not in them, assuredly, that we are to seek for liberty.

Where, then, are we to seek for it ? It remains only to look for it in the third fact blended with the two others, and which we have not yet analyzed. It must be found there, or it is to be found no where, and liberty is a chimera.

To see and feel, to apprehend and judge, do not exhaust the complex fact submitted to our analysis. If I do not look at the letters of this book, shall I see them, or at least shall I see them distinctly ? If, seeing the letters, I do not give my attention to them, shall I comprehend them ? If instead of holding the book open, I shut it, will the perception of the words and the understanding of their meaning, take place, and the complex fact of reading be accomplished ? Certainly not. Now what is it, to open this book, to look, to give attention ? It is neither to feel nor to comprehend ; for to look is not to perceive, if the organ of vision is wanting, or is untrue ; to give attention, is still not to comprehend ; it is an indispensable condition of comprehending, but not always a sufficient reason ; it is not enough to be attentive to the state-

ment of a problem, in order to solve it ; in a word, as has been said by one of my honoured colleagues, whom you no longer have the pleasure of hearing, but whom you can always read,—attention no more includes the understanding, than it is included in the sensibility.* To be attentive is to act, it is to make a movement, internal or external, a new phenomenon, which it is impossible to confound with the two first, although it is perpetually blended with them, and along with them makes up the total and complete fact which we were to analyze and explain.

Let us examine the character of this third fact, the phenomenon of activity. Let us first distinguish the different sorts of action. There are actions, sometimes so called, which a man does not refer to himself, although he may be the theatre of them. Others may tell us that we performed these actions, but as to ourselves, we know nothing of them ; they are done in us, but we do them not. In lethargy, in sleep, in delirium we execute a multitude of motions which resemble actions, which are actions even, if you please, but which present the following characteristics :

We have no consciousness of them at the time when we appear to be performing them ;

We have no recollection of having performed them ;

Consequently we do not refer them to ourselves, neither while we were performing them, nor afterwards ;

Consequently, again, they do not belong to us, and we do not impute them to ourselves, any more than to our neighbor, or to an inhabitant of another world.

But are there not other actions besides such ? I open this book ; I look at the letters ; I give my attention to them ; these are certainly actions ; do they resemble the preceding ?

I open this book : am I conscious of doing it ? Yes.

This action being done, do I remember it ? Yes.

Do I refer this action to myself as having done it ? Yes.

* See Appendix, Note II.

Am I convinced that it belongs to me? Could I impute it to such or such another person, as well as to myself, or am I myself solely and exclusively responsible in my own eyes? Here likewise I answer yes to myself.

And in fine, at the moment when I do this action, along with the consciousness of doing it, am I not conscious likewise of power not to do it? When I open this book, am I not conscious of opening it, and conscious also of power not to open it? When I look, do I not know at once that I look, and that I am able not to look? When I give my attention, do I not know that I give it, and that I am able also not to give it? Is not this a fact which each of us can repeat, as many times as he pleases, in himself, and on a thousand occasions? Is it not an undeniable experiment? And is it not also, the universal belief of the human race?—Let us, then, generalize, and say, that there are motions and actions which we perform with the two-fold consciousness of doing them, and of being able not to do them.

Now, an action performed with the consciousness of power not to do it, is what men have called a free action; for there is no longer in it the characteristic of necessity. In the phenomenon of sensation, I could not help feeling it, when the agreeable sensation fell under my consciousness; I could not but suffer, when the pain was present; I was conscious of feeling it, with the consciousness of not being able not to feel it. In the phenomenon of intelligence, I could not help judging that two and two make four; I am conscious of thinking this or that, with the consciousness of not being able not to think it.—In certain motions, likewise, I am so little conscious of power not to make them, that I make them without any consciousness of doing so, even at the very moment I am making them. But in a great number of cases, I perform certain actions with the consciousness of doing them, and of being able not to do them, of ability to suspend or to continue them, to complete or cut them short. This is a class of facts of undoubted reality; they are, I believe, very numerous; but if there were but a single one, *sui*

generis, it would be enough to establish in man a power, that of liberty. Liberty, then, is the attribute, neither of the sensibility nor of the intelligence ; it belongs to the activity, and not to all the facts which are referable to that, but merely to a certain number, marked by peculiar characteristics, namely, acts which we perform with the consciousness of doing them, and of being able not to do them.

After having stated a free act, it is important to analyze it more attentively.

A free act is a phenomenon which includes many different elements blended together. To act freely, is to do an act with the consciousness of being able not to do it ; now, to do an act with the consciousness of being able not to do it, supposes that one prefers doing it to not doing it ; to commence an action, with ability not to have commenced it, is to have preferred to commence it ; and so of continuing or suspending, completing or breaking off. Now, to prefer, supposes that we have motives of preference, motives to perform the action, and motives not to perform it, that we know these motives, and that we prefer the one to the other ; in a word, preference supposes the knowledge of motives for, and against. What these motives are, whether passions or ideas, errors or truths, this or that, is of little moment ; what is important, is to know what is the faculty here in operation, that is to say, what the faculty is which knows these motives, which prefers one to the other, which judges that the one is preferable to the other, for that is the meaning of the word prefer. Now, what is it that knows, and judges, but the intellect ? The intellect, then, is the faculty which prefers. But to prefer one motive to another, to judge that the one is preferable to the other, it is not enough to know the different motives, it is necessary likewise to have compared and weighed them ; it is necessary to have deliberated on them in order to conclude ; in fact to prefer, is to judge definitively, to conclude. What is it then to deliberate ? It is nothing else than to examine with doubt, to appreciate the relative value of those different motives which present themselves, but not at first with that evidence which decides the

judgment, the preference. Now what is that which examines, doubts, and finally decides? Evidently the intellect, which, subsequently, after having passed many provisional judgments, will abrogate them all, in order to pass its final judgment, will conclude and prefer after having deliberated. It is in the intellect, that the phenomenon of preference, and the other phenomena included in it, take place. Thus far then we are still within the sphere of the intelligence, and not in that of action. The intellect, to be sure, has its conditions; no one examines who does not wish to examine, and the will intervenes in deliberation; but it is simply as a condition, and not as the ground of the phenomenon; for, although it is true, that without the faculty of willing, all examination and deliberation would be impossible, it is also true, that the faculty which examines and deliberates, the faculty whose proper office is examination, deliberation, and all judgment, whether suspensive or decisive, is the intellect. Deliberation, and conclusion or preference, are, then, facts purely intellectual.* Let us pursue our analysis.

We have conceived the different motives for doing or not doing an action; we have deliberated on these motives, and we have preferred the one to the other; we have concluded that we should do it, rather than not do it; but to conclude that it ought to be done, and to do it, are not the same thing. When the intellect has judged that this or that is to be done, from such or such motives, it remains to pass on to action, and at once to resolve, to take sides, to say to ourselves no longer: I ought to do, but: I will do. Now the faculty, which says: I ought to do it, is not and cannot be the faculty which says: I will do it, I take the resolution to do it. Here the action of the intelligence completely ceases. I ought to do it, is a judgment; I will do it, is not a judgment, nor consequently an intellectual phenomenon. In fact, the moment we take the resolution to do an action, we take it with a consciousness of being able to take a contrary resolution. See, then, a new ele-

* See Appendix, Note JJ.

ment, which must not be confounded with the former. This element is the will ; one moment before we were in a state of judgment and knowledge ; now we are in a state of willing. I say willing, and not doing ; for, as to judge that a thing should be done, is not to will to do it, so likewise to will to do it, is yet not to do it. To will is an act, and not a judgment ; but it is an act altogether internal. It is evident that this act is not an action properly so called ; in order to arrive at action, it is necessary to pass from the internal sphere of the will, to the sphere of the external world, wherein the action is definitively accomplished which you first conceived, deliberated and preferred, and then willed that it should be executed. If there were no external world, there would be no completed action ; and not only is it necessary that there should be an external world, but also that the power of willing should be connected with another power, a physical power, which serves as an instrument, and by which it can attain the external world. Suppose that the will was not united with an organization, there would no longer be any bridge between the will and the external world ; and no external action would be possible. The physical power, necessary to action, is the organization ; it is admitted that the muscular system is the special instrument of the will. Take away the muscular system, and there is no more effort possible, consequently no more locomotion and movement possible, and therefore no more external action possible. Thus, to resume what has been said, the total action, which we were to analyze, resolves itself into three elements perfectly distinct : 1. the intellectual element, which is composed of the knowledge of the motives for and against, of deliberation, of preference, of choice ; 2. the voluntary element, which consists in an internal act, namely the resolution, the determination to do it ; 3. the physical element, or external action.

If these three elements exhaust the action, that is to say, the phenomenon in which we have recognized the character of liberty in opposition to the phenomena of intelligence and sensation,—the question now to be decided is, precisely in

which of these three elements liberty is to be found, that is, the power of doing with the consciousness of being able not to do. Does this power of doing, while conscious of the power not to do, belong to the first element, the intellectual element of the free action? It does not, for it is not at the will of a man to judge that such or such a motive is preferable to another; we are not master of our preferences, we judge in this respect according to our intellectual nature, which has its necessary laws, without having the consciousness of being able to judge otherwise, and even with the consciousness of not being able to judge otherwise than we do. It is not then in this element that we are to look for liberty; still less is it in the third element, in the physical action; for this action supposes an external world, an organization corresponding to it, and, in this organization, a muscular system, sound and suitable, without which the physical action is impossible. When we accomplish it, we are conscious of acting, but under the condition of a theatre of which we have not the disposal, and of instruments, of which we have but an imperfect disposal, which we can neither replace, if they escape us, and they may do so every moment, nor repair, if they are out of order and unfaithful, as is often the case, and which are subject to laws peculiar to themselves over which we have no power and which we scarcely even know: whence it follows, that we do not act here with the consciousness of being able to do the contrary of what we do. Liberty, then, is no more to be found in the third, than in the first element. It can then only be in the second, and there in fact we find it.

Neglect the first and the third element, the judgment and the physical action, and let the second element, the willing, subsist by itself; analysis discovers in this single element two terms, namely, a special act of willing, and the power of willing, which is within us, and to which we refer the special act. That act is an effect in relation to the power of willing which is its cause; and this cause, in order to produce its effect, has need of no other theatre and no other instrument, than itself. It produces it directly, without intermediate, and without con-

dition, continues and consummates, or suspends and modifies, creates it entire, or annihilates it; and at the moment it exerts itself in any special act, we are conscious that it might exert itself in a special act totally contrary, without any obstacle, without being thereby exhausted; so that after having changed its acts a hundred times, the faculty remains integrally the same, inexhaustible and identical, amidst the perpetual variety of its applications, being always able to do what it does not do, and able not to do what it does. Here, then, in all its plenitude, is the characteristic of liberty.

If the whole outward world were wanting to the will, yet if the organization and the muscular system existed, the will could still produce muscular effort, and consequently a sensible fact, even though this fact would not pass beyond the limits of the organization. This M. de Biran has perfectly established.* He regarded the phenomenon of muscular effort as the type of causality, of the will and of freedom. But while I readily agree with him, in regarding the muscular effort and the consciousness of this effort and the sensation which accompanies it, as the most eminent and most easily appreciable type of our causative power, voluntary and free, I say still, that it is but an external and derivative type, and not the primitive and essential type; otherwise, M. de Biran would be obliged to carry his theory to the extreme of asserting that where there is absence or paralysis of the muscles, there can be no causation, volition, or active and free phenomenon. Now, I maintain to the contrary; I maintain that if the external world be removed, and the muscular and locomotive system taken away, and if there remained to man, along with an organization purely nervous, an intelligence capable of conceiving motives, of deliberating, of preferring and choosing, there would remain to him the power of willing, which might still exert itself in special acts, by volitions, in which the proper causality and the liberty of the will would still manifest itself, although these effects, these free volitions, would

* See ch. IV.

never pass beyond the internal world of the will, and would have no reaction on the organization through a muscular system, and would produce no phenomena of muscular effort ; phenomena, which without doubt, are internal in reference to the external world, but which are themselves external in reference to the will. Thus, suppose I will to move my arm, without being able to do it, through defect of the muscles ; there is still in this fact : 1. the act of willing to move my arm, a special volition ; 2. the general power of willing, which is the direct cause of this volition ;—there would, then, in such a case, be an effect and a cause ; there would be consciousness of this effect and cause, of a causal act, of an internal causative force, supreme in its own world, in the world of willing ; even though it might be absolutely unable to pass to the external action, because the muscular system was defective.

The theory of M. de Biran, then, takes the free act only in its external manifestation and not in its foundation, in a remarkable fact undoubtedly, but which itself supposes an antecedent, namely the profound and intimate fact of willing with its immediate and proper effect. Here, in my judgment, is the primitive type of freedom,—and this the conclusion of this analysis, too long, perhaps for its place, and too brief in itself not to be still very gross. When, in an action, we are seeking for that which constitutes its freedom, we may be deceived in two ways :

Either it may be sought in what I have called the intellectual element of the action, the knowledge of motives, deliberation, preference, choice,—and then it cannot be found ; for it is evident that the different motives for or against, apply to and govern the intellect, which is not free to judge indifferently this or the opposite. They who seek for it thus, do not find liberty in the intellectual part of action, they decide therefore that there is no liberty. Undoubtedly it is not where they seek it, but it may be elsewhere : such is the first way of falling into error.

Or, they seek for liberty in the physical element of action ; and they do not find it there, at least not constantly, for every

action is not the reflection of a volition ; and they are tempted to conclude that liberty is but an accident, which sometimes exists, but three quarters of the time has no existence, and which is dependent on physical conditions, either external or internal. They see there no token of the proper and fundamental power of human nature.

Now if we wish to refer to their most general causes these two sorts of errors, that is, if we wish to consider them in reference to scientific method, we may say that they consist, the first, in looking for the phenomenon of liberty in the antecedent of it, namely, in the intellectual fact which always precedes the free act of the will, but which does not engender and contain it as the cause engenders and contains the effect ; the second, in looking for the phenomenon of liberty, not in the antecedent, but in the consequent, so to say, of the phenomenon, in the sensible fact which sometimes (but not always) follows willing, but which does not include it, except as borrowed from another source.—This brings us back to the general source of all the errors of Locke : the confusion of an idea with that which precedes or that which follows it. You have seen this in regard to space, to time, the infinite, substance, cause, good and evil ; and you may now see it in regard to the theory of Liberty.

Locke begins (Book II. ch. XXI. *Of Power*, § 5) by dividing all the phenomena of consciousness, not into three classes, but into two, the understanding and the will, a division radically false and contrary to facts.

Then follows a classification of actions.

“ All the actions that we have any idea of, reduce themselves to two, namely, thinking and motion.” *Ibid.* § 8. Sometimes, in Locke, the will includes both these actions, sometimes it applies only to motion.

“ This power which the mind has to order the consideration of any idea or the forbearing to consider it ; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and *vice versa* in any particular instance, is that which we call will. The actual exercise of that power, by directing any particu-

lar action, or its forbearance, is that which we call volition or willing." *Ibid.* § 5.

Here, you perceive, the will is made to apply to acts of the understanding as well as to motions of the body. In the following passage, on the contrary, it is applied only to the latter: "Volition, it is plain, is an act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or withholding it from, any particular action." *Ibid.* § 15.

The theory of the will, in Locke, appears, then, as fluctuating and inconsistent as the other theories which have been exhibited. As to the rest, on both hands there is equal error. Does Locke seek for the will in the understanding? It is clear he cannot find it there; for liberty is not and cannot be found in the operations of thought: and Locke is here deceived by confounding a phenomenon with that which precedes it, and does not include it.—Again: does Locke wish to understand, by will, merely the faculty of moving his body? It is clear likewise that he will not find freedom in that faculty; for, as you know, our physical power is limited on all hands, and we have not always the control of it with the consciousness of power to do the contrary of what we actually do; and here Locke is deceived by confounding the internal phenomenon of volition with the external phenomenon of motion which sometimes follows the volition, but which is not the volition itself. This, however, mixed up with many inconsistencies, is the predominant theory of Locke, a theory, which, like that of M. de Biran, but with less profoundness, concentrates the will into one of its applications, visible external action. If the will is only the power of motion, it is not always and essentially free. This is the positive conclusion of Locke:

Ibid. § 14. "*Liberty belongs not to the will.*—If this be so (as I imagine it is) I leave it to be considered, whether it may not help to put an end to that long agitated, and I think unreasonable, because unintelligible question, namely: *whether man's will be free or no.*——The question itself

is altogether improper ; and it is as insignificant to ask whether man's *will* be free, as to ask, whether his sleep be swift, or his virtue square ——— ”

‡ 10. “ Our idea of liberty reaches as far as that power [of doing or forbearing to do], and no farther. For wherever restraint comes in to check that power, or compulsion takes away that indifferency of ability on either side to act, or to forbear acting ; there, liberty, and our notion of it, presently cease.”

Now, as it is unquestionable that a thousand obstacles oppose, or may perpetually oppose, our power of acting (evidently here by him meant physical), it follows that there is sometimes liberty and sometimes not ; and even when it exists, it exists only by the concurrence of external circumstances which might have prevented it. To explain liberty in this way, is to destroy it. Liberty is not and cannot be, neither in the faculty of thinking, nor in that of [outward] action, since they are subject to necessary laws and conditions. But Liberty exists in the pure power of Willing, which is always accompanied by the consciousness of the power to will (I do not say power to think, or power to act, but power to *will*) the *contrary* of what it wills. Locke has then destroyed liberty by denying it to the will, and seeking for it either in the thinking faculty, or in the power of outward motion. He destroys it, and he thinks he has even destroyed the question concerning liberty. But the belief of the human race protests against the annihilation of liberty, and the whole history of philosophy protests against the annihilation of the question concerning it.*

I now pass to another point, the theory of the nature of the soul.

It has been shown (ch. III.) that it is impossible to know any phenomenon of consciousness, the phenomena of sensation, or volition, or intelligence, without instantly referring

* See Appendix, Note KK, for some remarks on the foregoing discussion, and also for some general observations on the question concerning the Will and Freedom.—Tr.

these phenomena to a subject one and identical, which is self, the I : and likewise, that we cannot know the external phenomena of resistance, solidity, figure, color, smell, taste, &c., without judging that they are not phenomena in the air, but phenomena which pertain to something real, which is solid, figured, colored, &c. On the other hand, if you did not know any of the phenomena of consciousness, you would never have the least idea of the subject of these phenomena ; and if you did not know the external phenomena of resistance, figure, color, &c., you would never have any idea of a subject of these phenomena. These characteristics or attributes, are, then, for you, the only signs or tokens of the nature of the subjects of these phenomena, whether they are phenomena of consciousness, or external phenomena. In examining the phenomena which fall under the senses, we find important differences between them, which it is useless to insist upon here, and which establish the distinction of primary and secondary qualities. Among the primary qualities, and in the first rank, is solidity, which is given in the sensation of resistance, and inevitably accompanied by that of form, &c. On the contrary, when you examine the phenomena of consciousness, you do not find in them this characteristic of resistance, of solidity, form, &c. ; and you could no more speak of the phenomena of your consciousness as having figure, solidity, resistance, than as having secondary qualities equally foreign to them, color, taste, sound, smell, &c. Now, as the subject is for us, nothing but the aggregate of the phenomena which reveal it to us with the *addition* of the idea of its own existence, so far forth as the subject of the inherence of these qualities, it follows that, under phenomena marked with dissimilar characteristics, and altogether foreign to each other, the human mind conceives their subjects dissimilar and of different kind. Thus, as solidity and figure have nothing in common with the phenomena of sensation, of thought and of will, as every solid is for us extended and necessarily located by us in space, while our thoughts, our volitions, and our sensations, are for us

unextended and cannot be conceived and located in space, but only in time,—the human mind concludes with perfect strictness that the *subject* of the external phenomena has the character of the former, and that the *subject* of the phenomena of consciousness has the same character with the latter, that the one is solid and extended, the other neither solid nor extended. In fine, as that which is solid and extended is divisible, and as that which is not solid nor extended, is indivisible, divisibility is therefore attributed to the solid and extended subject, and indivisibility, that is, simplicity, is attributed to the subject which is not solid nor extended. Who of us, in fact, does not believe himself a being indivisible and simple, one and identical, the same yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow? Now, then, the word, *Body*, *Matter*, signifies nothing else than the subject of those external phenomena, of which the most remarkable are form, extension, solidity, divisibility. The word *Spirit*, *Soul*, signifies nothing else than the subject of those phenomena of consciousness, thought, volition, sensation, phenomena simple, unextended, not solid, &c. See the whole idea of spirit, and the whole idea of matter. There is nothing more under the idea of matter, than that of an aggregate of sensible qualities, with the addition of a subject of the inherence of those qualities; there is nothing more under the idea of spirit, than that of an aggregate of the phenomena of consciousness, with the addition of that of the existence of a subject in which those phenomena co-exist. You see, then, the whole of what is requisite in order to identify matter with mind, or mind with matter; it is necessary to pretend that sensation, thought, volition, are reducible, in the last analysis, to solidity, extension, figure, divisibility, &c.; or that solidity, extension, figure, &c., are reducible to sensation, thought, will. [And according to the starting-point of the reduction, and its direction, are the two opposite systematic results.] In the view of Spiritualism, there will be but one substance, namely, *Spirit*, because there is but one single general phenomenon, namely, consciousness. In the view of Materialism, there will be but

one substance, namely, *Matter*, because there is but one single fundamental phenomenon, namely, solidity or extension. These are the two great systems ; they have each their part of truth and their part of error, which it is not my purpose now to determine. I wish only to state the fact, that Locke inclines more to the one than the other, and that he is almost led to derive thought from extension, and consequently to make the mind a modification of matter. It is true, Locke is far from explaining himself clearly or decisively on this point ; but he advances the notion that it might not be impossible that matter, besides the phenomenon of extension, by a certain disposition and arrangement of its particles, should produce also the phenomenon of thought. He does not say that the soul is material, but that it might very well be so.

See this important passage, B. IV. ch. III. § 6 : “ We have the ideas of *matter* and of *thinking*, but possibly shall never be able to know, whether any mere material being thinks, or no ; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas without relation, to discover, whether omnipotency has not given to some systems of matter fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think, or else joined and fitted to matter so disposed, a thinking immaterial substance. ——— What certainty of knowledge can any one have that some perceptions, such as pleasure and pain, should not be in some bodies themselves, after a certain manner modified, as well as that they should be in an immaterial substance, upon the motion of the parts of the body ? ”

Locke therefore declares that, apart from revelation, and within the limits of reason alone, he is not certain that the soul may not be material. Now you conceive that if the soul is not immaterial, it runs some risk of not being immortal ; for, if the phenomena of thought and consciousness are nothing but the result of the combination of material particles, extended and divisible, the dissolution of this organization may well involve that of thought and the soul. Locke replies that this consequence is not to be feared ; for, material or not, revelation guaranties the immortality of the soul. “ And

therefore, says he, (*ibid.*) it is not of such mighty necessity to determine one way or the other, as some over-zealous for or against the immateriality of the soul, have been forward to make the world believe." And when his adversaries insist, when Bishop Stillingfleet objects, that "it takes off very much from the evidence of immortality, to make it depend wholly upon God's giving that of which it is not capable in its own nature," Locke is ready to cry out upon him as a blasphemer; "that is to say, says he, it is not as credible upon divine revelation, that a material substance should be immortal, as an immaterial; or which is all one, God is not equally to be believed when he declared it, because the immortality of a material substance cannot be demonstrated from natural reason." Again: "any one's not being able to demonstrate the soul to be immortal, takes not off from the evidence of its immortality, if God has revealed it; because the veracity of God is a demonstration of the truth of what he has revealed, and the want of another demonstration of a proposition, that is demonstratively true, takes not off from the evidence of it." And he goes on to say that his system is the only Christian system. Certainly I believe no such thing: but without descending to this ground, which is not ours, notice the consequence involved in such a system. If the immateriality of the soul is very doubtful and indifferent, and if the immortality of the soul, in itself equally doubtful as its immateriality, is grounded solely upon the promise of God, who is to be believed upon his word, the Christian revelation; it follows that whoever has not the happiness to be enlightened, as Locke was, by the rays of the Christian Revelation, and who has no other resource than that of his own reason, can legitimately believe neither in the immateriality nor the immortality of the soul; and this is to condemn the entire human race to materialism, previous to Christianity, and more than half of humanity, since then. But facts repel this sad consequence; facts attest that reason, so feeble according to Locke, has sufficed to establish, and still suffices to establish the two-fold conviction of the immateriality and im-

mortality of the soul. The universal and perpetual revelation of Reason, (*the light of the word which lighteth every man that cometh into the world,*) more or less vivid, more or less pure, has every where preceded, prepared for, or supplied the place of that [special revelation] which in the designs of Providence, and in the progress of humanity, has come to establish, extend, and complete the former.—Finally I wish you to notice that it is the father of the Sensual school of the eighteenth century, who here announces himself in opposition to reason, and substitutes theology in place of philosophy, and, as to the rest, with perfect loyalty, for he firmly believed in revelation and in Christianity which establish and save the immateriality, or at least the immortality of the soul. Hereafter* we shall see what became of these two great truths in the hands of the successors of Locke, who, after his example, declare reason in respect to these subjects feeble and incompetent, and like him refer them to faith, to revelation, to theology, some believing and some disbelieving the authority they invoke.†

I have proved, I think, that Locke, in seeking for liberty where it could not be found, in the power of motion, has, in the midst of many contradictions put philosophy upon the route to fatalism.—I have shown likewise that, without affirming the soul to be material and perishable, he at least says that revelation alone can give us any certainty of it; and he has consequently put philosophy, properly speaking, upon the road to materialism.—Now I am happy to declare that Locke has not the least in the world put philosophy upon the road to atheism. Locke, not only as a christian, but as a philosopher, admits and proclaims the existence of God, and has given excellent natural proofs of it; but it is important to put you fully in possession of the particular character of these proofs, which are likewise in keeping with the general system of Locke.

* Alluding to future lectures which it was the intention of Cousin to have given, but which have never been given, designed to exhibit the history and progress of the Sensual school, with a critical examination of the principal successors of Locke.—*Tr.*

† See Appendix, Note LL.

There are various and different proofs of the existence of God. The gratifying result of my studies in this respect, is, that these various proofs have different degrees of strictness in their form, but that they all have a foundation of truth, which needs simply to be disengaged and put in clear light in order to give them an incontrovertible authority. Every thing leads us to God ; there is no bad way of arriving thither ; we may go in different ways. In general, all the proofs of every sort of the existence of God, are comprehended under two great classes, namely : proofs *a posteriori*, and proofs *a priori*. Either I give myself, aided by my senses and consciousness, to the observation and study of the external world and of my own existence ; and simply by a knowledge, more or less profound and extended, of nature and myself, after sufficient observations, and inductions founded upon them, I arrive at the knowledge of God who made man and the world. This is called the demonstration *a posteriori*, of the existence of God.— Or, I may neglect the external world, and fall back upon myself, in the entirely interior world of consciousness ; and even there, without engaging in the study of its numerous phenomena, I may derive at once from reason an idea, a single idea, which, without the aid of experience, in the hands of that same reason, becomes the basis of a demonstration of the existence of God. This is called the demonstration *a priori*.

Look, for example, at the most celebrated proof *a priori*, and which includes nearly all the others of this kind. When we fall back upon ourselves, the first glance which we bestow upon the phenomena of consciousness discovers to us this striking and incontestable characteristic, that they begin, and pause, renew themselves, and cease, have their different degrees of intensity and energy, are marked with the qualities of more and less ; in a word they are imperfect, limited, finite. Now this characteristic of finite cannot, as we have seen (ch. III,) be given us, without the reason entering into exercise, and passing instantly this judgment : that there is something infinite, if there is any thing finite. If you are unacquainted with the external world, consciousness would suffice

to give you the idea of the finite, and consequently the reason would have a sufficient basis for developing itself and suggesting the idea of the infinite. The idea of the infinite opposed to the idea of the finite, is nothing less than the idea of perfection opposed to the idea of imperfection. What in fact is consciousness for us, but the sentiment of our imperfection and our weakness ? I do not dispose of my sensations ; they come and go at their will ; they appear and disappear, often without my being able to retain or repel them. Nor do I control my judgments, they are subject to laws I have never made. I have the direction of my will, it is true, but frequently it results only in internal acts, without being able to pass into external actions ; and sleep, and lethargy, and delirium, suspend it. On every hand, the finite and imperfect appear in me. But I cannot have the idea of the finite and imperfect, without having the idea of the perfect and infinite. These two ideas are logical correlatives ; and in the order of their acquisition, that of finite and imperfect precedes the other, but it scarcely precedes it. It is not possible for the reason, as soon as consciousness furnishes the mind with the idea of the finite and imperfect, not to conceive the idea of the infinite and perfect.

Now, the infinite and the perfect, is God himself. It is enough therefore for you to have the idea of the imperfect and finite, in order to have the idea of the perfect and the infinite, that is to say, of God, whether you do or do not call it by that name, whether you know how to express in words the convictions of your intelligence, or whether, through defect of language and analysis, they remain obscure and indistinct in the depths of your soul. Once more, then, I say : do not go to consult the savage, the child, the idiot, to know whether they have the idea of God ; ask them, or rather, without asking them any thing, ascertain if they have the idea of the imperfect and the finite ; and if they have it, and they cannot but have it, if they have the least apperception, be sure that they have an obscure and confused idea of something infinite and perfect ; be sure that what they discern of themselves and of the world, does not suffice them, and that they at once

humble and exalt themselves in an intimate faith in the existence of something infinite and perfect, that is to say, of God. The word may be wanting among them, because the idea is not yet clear and distinct; but no less does it exist within the folds of the opening intelligence, and the philosophic observer easily discovers it there.

The infinite and the perfect are given you along with the imperfect and the finite, and the finite and the imperfect are given you immediately by your consciousness, as soon as there are, under the eye of consciousness, any phenomena. The idea of the finite and imperfect, being, then, primitive, the correlative idea of the infinite and perfect, and consequently, of God, is also primitive.

The idea of God is a primitive idea; but from whence comes this idea? Is it a creature of your imagination, an illusion, a chimera? You can imagine a gorgon, a centaur, and you can imagine them not to exist; but is it in your power, when the finite and the imperfect are given, to conceive or not to conceive, the infinite and perfect? No: the one being given, the other is also given and necessarily. It is not then a chimera; it is the necessary product of reason; therefore it is a legitimate product. Either, you must renounce your reason; and then we will talk no more neither of reason, nor of truth, nor of knowledge, nor of Philosophy; or, you must admit the authority of reason, and admit it in regard to this subject, as well as in regard to other subjects.

You are a finite being, and you have the necessary idea of an infinite being. But how could a finite and imperfect being have the idea of one perfect and infinite, and have it necessarily, if such a being did not exist? Take away God, the infinite and the perfect, and let there be only man, the finite and imperfect, and I shall never deduce, from the finite, the idea of the infinite, from the imperfect, the idea of the perfect, from humanity, the idea of God; but if God, if the perfect, if the infinite exist, then my reason will be able to conceive them. In fine, you see where I wish to come: the simple fact, of the conception of God by the reason, the sim-

ple idea of God, the simple possibility of the existence of God, implies the certainty and necessity of the existence of God.

Such, nearly, is the celebrated demonstration *a priori*, of the existence of God, that is, the proof independently of experience. Now look at the proof *a posteriori*; a few words will be enough to put you in possession of it; it explains itself.

This proof consists in arriving at God solely by an induction founded on experience, and on observation more or less extended. Instead of closing your senses, and opening only your consciousness, you open your senses, and close up more or less your consciousness, in order to survey every where nature and the vast world which surrounds you; and by a contemplation, more or less profound, by studies, more or less intelligent, you become penetrated with the beauty, the order, the intelligence, the skill, the perfection diffused through the universe; and as the cause must, at least, be equal to the effect, you reason from Nature to its Author; from the existence and perfection of the one, you conclude the existence and perfection of the other.

These two proofs, I repeat are good; and instead of choosing between them, we ought to do as the human mind does, employ them both. In fact, they are so little exclusive of each other, that they each contain something of the other. The argument *a priori*, for example, supposes an element *a posteriori*, a datum of observation and experience, for, although the idea of the infinite, of the perfect, of unity, of the absolute, conducts directly to God, and although this idea is given *by* reason, and not by experience, yet it is not given independently of all experience, [is not given *without* experience, as its occasion and condition,] since reason would never give us this idea without the simultaneous, or anterior idea of the finite, the imperfect, of variety, of the contingent, which is derived from experience; only in this case, the experimental datum is rather internal than external, it is borrowed from the consciousness, and not from the senses; though it is still true, that every phenomenon of consciousness supposes a *sensitive* phenomenon, simultaneous or anterior. An element *a pos-*

teriori intervenes, then, as the condition of the demonstration *a priori*.

So likewise, a little reflection shows, that the proof from experience *a posteriori* implies an element purely rational and *a priori*. In fact, on what condition do you conclude from nature to God? On condition that you admit, or at least, that you employ, the principle of causality: for, if you are destitute of this principle, you might contemplate and study the world forever, you might forever admire its perfection, the order and wisdom which shine in it, without ever rising to the supposition that all this is only an effect, that it all must have a cause. Take away the principle of causality, and there are for us no longer any causes, there would no longer be, neither the need nor the possibility of seeking for them, nor of finding them, and induction would no longer go from the world and physical order to its cause, to God. Now, the principle of causality has indeed an experimental condition; but it is not itself derived from experience; it supposes experience, and it is applied to experience, but it governs it and decides upon it. It properly belongs to the reason. (See ch. IV.)—See then an element *a priori*, in the proof *a posteriori*. The basis of this argument is certainly experimental, but its instrument is rational.—Farther: this world is full of harmony; I believe it; and the more we look at it, especially if we place ourselves in a certain point of view which observation may indeed establish but which it does not give, the more we are struck with the order of the world; but we can also, by consulting only the senses, find appearances, of confusion and disorder; we cannot comprehend the reason of volcanoes which overwhelm flourishing cities, of earthquakes and tempests, &c., in a word, observation employed alone, in its weakness and limitations, and when not directed by a superior principle, may easily find disorder and evil in the world. Now, if to this deceptive experience, you connect the rational principle, that every thing which is true of the effect is true of the cause, you will be forced to admit in the cause what there is in the effect, that is to say, not only intelligence, wisdom, and power, but also degrading

imperfections, as has indeed been done by more than one distinguished mind, when under the exclusive direction of experience, and by more than one people in the infancy of humanity. In fine, so many diverse effects, of which experience does not always show the connection, might easily conduct not to God as one sole cause, but to divers causes, and to a plurality of Gods : and history is at hand to justify this apprehension.— You see then clearly, that the proof *a posteriori*, which, in the first place, essentially requires the rational principle of causality, has need also of other principles still to direct the application of causality to experience, principles, which, in order to govern experience, should not come from it, but must come from reason. The argument *a posteriori* supposes, then, more than one element *a priori*. Thus completed, it has its use and its excellence, as well as the argument *a priori*, when well regulated and recalled to its true principles.

These two arguments are not in themselves exclusive of each other ; but one or the other is more striking, according to the turn of mind, and moral and religious condition of individuals and nations. The Christian religion, rational and idealistic, which rests on the mind and not on the senses, employs chiefly proofs *a priori*. Neglecting Nature, or regarding it under an ideal point of view, it is in the depths of the soul, through Reason and the Word, that it rises to God. The argument *a priori*, is eminently the Christian argument. It belongs particularly to the reign of christianity, to the middle age, to the Scholastic philosophy which represents it. There it is, that developed, cleared up, spread abroad and almost popularized in Europe, by the great doctors of the Church, it passed from Christian theology, into the Ideal school of modern philosophy, through Descartes,* Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Wolf, and their most recent successors. On the contrary, the religions of the first age of humanity, which are not yet religious in spirit and in truth, and which are almost solely founded upon the senses and appearance, employ more espe-

* See Appendix, Note MM.

cially the proof *a posteriori*; and while religion, founded on the ideal ground, tends too much to the separation of God from nature, because the proof upon which it rests separates too much reason and consciousness from the senses and from experience; so, in their turn, the religions of Nature make God in the image of nature, and reflect all the imperfections of the argument *a posteriori*. Hence, one of two things results: either, the sensual Theology receives the rational *a priori* principle of causality, contrary to the spirit of the philosophical school to which that theology pertains, and thus arrives at God by an inconsistency; or, it rejects the principle of causality, and then it does not and cannot arrive at God at all; and besides, as Sensualism confounds substance with the aggregate of qualities, (see ch. III.) it could recognize no other God than the aggregate of the phenomena of Nature, the assemblage of things in the universe. From hence, Pantheism, the necessary theology of paganism, and of the Sensual philosophy.* Let us apply all this to Locke.

Locke believes in the existence of God, and he has given an excellent demonstration of it. But he comes from the Sensual school, he therefore repels arguments *a priori*, and admits scarcely any thing but arguments *a posteriori*. He does not wish to employ the argument of Descartes, which proves the existence of God from the idea of him, from the idea of infinity and perfection. B. IV. ch. X. § 7: "This I think, I may say, that it is an ill way of establishing this truth, and silencing Atheists, to lay the whole stress of so important a point as this, upon that sole foundation; and take some men's having that idea of God in their minds, (for it is evident that some men have none, and some worse than none, and the most very different) for the only proof of a Deity; and out of an over-fondness of that darling invention, cashier, or at least endeavour to invalidate all other arguments, and forbid us to hearken to those proofs, as being weak or fallacious, which our own existence and the sensible parts of the universe offer

* See Appendix, Note NN.

so cogently to our thoughts, that I deem it impossible for a considering man to withstand them. For I judge it as certain and clear a truth as can any where be delivered that 'the invisible things of God are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead.' " He then goes on more particularly to develop this kind of proofs. If Locke had wished simply to establish that the argument *a priori* is not the *only* valid argument, and that the proof *a posteriori* is not to be slighted, I would very willingly join with him; but he goes much farther, and strays into assertions which I cannot too strongly repel. I deny that there are persons who have no idea of God; and here the Cartesian philosophy and all ideal philosophy comes well in, and proves, beyond reply, that the idea of God, being at the bottom, that of the infinite, of perfection, of unity, of absolute existence, cannot but be found, in every man whose reason is at all developed. I deny also the sentiment which Locke has lent to Bayle,—Sensualism to Scepticism,—that some men have such an idea of God, that they had better have none at all. I deny that it is better to have no idea of God than to have an imperfect idea, as if we were not imperfect beings, subjected to blend the false with the true. If we will have nothing but unmixed truth, very little belief would be left to humanity, and very few theories to science. There is not a man at all familiar with the history of philosophy, who would reject the truth, because it should be blended with some errors, or even with many errors.—And in fine, Locke allows that the greatest part of men have an idea of God of some sort. Now, this is sufficient for Descartes, who, this sole idea, such as it is, being given, would found upon it his proof of the existence of God from the idea of God. I remark, finally, that even in developing his preference for the argument *a posteriori*, Locke employs frequently, and without hesitation, arguments *a priori*, ideal, and even somewhat scholastic: § 8. "Something must be from eternity." § 3. "Nothing cannot produce a being, therefore something eternal." Although he especially seeks God in

the external world, he also, (§ 2 and 3,) with Descartes, goes from man to God. He no where accepts and unfolds, but everywhere employs the principle of causality, without which, indeed, he could never take a single step beyond nature and man. As to the rest, the sole conclusion, which I wish to deduce from these observations, is that the theology of Locke, in repelling the argument *a priori*, and in employing in preference the argument *a posteriori*, still retains and manifests the fundamental characteristic of the philosophy of Locke, which grounds itself specially, and often even exclusively, upon sensible and external experience.

Here ends this long analysis of the Essay on the Human Understanding. It only remains to generalize and resume the partial results we have obtained.

1. Considered in a most important point of view, in regard to method, the Essay on the Human Understanding has this excellence, that psychology is given as the basis of all sound philosophy. Locke commences by the study of man, of his faculties, and of the phenomena observable in consciousness. Thereby he attaches himself to the great Cartesian movement and to the genius of modern philosophy. This is the good side of the Method of Locke. The bad side is, that instead of observing man, his faculties and the phenomena which result from the developement of his faculties, in their present state, and with the characteristics which these phenomena actually present, he buries himself at once in the obscure and perilous question concerning the primitive state of these phenomena, the first developements of the faculties, the origin of ideas.

2. This vice of Method, the question concerning the origin of ideas, which ought to come after that of their actual characteristics, being prematurely taken up, without a sufficient knowledge of the facts to be explained, throws Locke into a system which sees no other origin to all knowledge and all ideas, than sensation and reflection.

3. And again, it is to be recollected, that Locke does not hold the balance true between these two origins, and that he lets it incline in favor of sensation.

4. This position being taken, to derive all ideas from sensation and from reflection, and particularly from sensation, imposes upon Locke the necessity of confounding certain ideas with certain others, for example, the seven following ideas: the idea of space, of time, of the infinite, of personal identity, of substance, of cause, of good and evil,—ideas which, as we have demonstrated, cannot come into the human mind from sensation, nor from reflection. Locke is therefore forced, in order to make them enter the human mind, to confound them with the ideas of body, of succession, of the finite or number, of consciousness, of the aggregate of qualities, the succession of phenomena, of reward and punishment or pleasure and pain, which are in fact explicable by sensation or by reflection; that is to say, he is forced to confound either the antecedents or the consequents of the ideas of space, time, infinity, substance, cause, good and evil, with the ideas themselves.

5. This is the most general vice which governs the philosophy of Locke; and this vice fully displays itself in the theory of knowledge and judgment. Locke founds knowledge and judgment upon the perception of a relation between two ideas, that is to say, upon comparison; while in many cases, these relations and the ideas of relation, so far from being the foundation of our judgments and our intellections, are, on the contrary, the results of primitive intellections and judgments referable to the natural power of the mind, which judges and knows in its own proper virtue, basing itself frequently upon a single term, and consequently without comparing two together in order to deduce the ideas of relation.

6. The same is true in regard to the theory of Language. Locke attributes very much to language: and with reason. ✓ But we are not to believe that every dispute is a dispute about words, every error an error purely verbal, every general idea the sole product of language, and that a science is nothing

but a language well framed;—we are not, I say, to believe all this merely because that words really play a great part in our disputes and errors, because there are no general ideas without language, and because a language well framed is the condition, or the consequence rather, of a true science.

7. In fine, in regard to the great theories, by which all philosophies in their last result, are judged, the theories of God, of the soul, and of liberty; you have seen Locke confounding the Will with the power of moving, with the power of producing external action, and seeking for freedom in the will thus extended, and consequently seeking it where it is not, denying it, and giving it as a simple accident, whereas it is a proper and essential characteristic.—You have seen him led by the habit of investigating in every thing the point of view most external, most visible, the most tangible, to advance the suspicion that the spiritual substance, impenetrable in its nature, might be reduced to material substance, and that thought may be nothing but a mode of matter, just as extension.—You have seen him, finally, in theology, always faithful to the spirit of his system, depending more upon the senses than upon consciousness, interrogating nature rather than reason, repelling the proof *a priori* of Descartes, and adopting scarcely anything than the proof *a posteriori*.

Such is my definitive judgment on the work of Locke. I trust the length of this examination will not be met with disapprobation, when the importance of the work and everything of which it is a summary and a preparation, is considered. The Essay on the Human Understanding sums up for the eighteenth century, all the traditional philosophy in which it has an interest, that is to say, that of the seventeenth century. In general modern philosophy, and I except no school, is, to say the least, ignorant and careless of the past. It thinks only of the coming; it is unacquainted with its own history. As the Ideal school of the eighteenth century ascends no farther than Descartes, so the Sensual school scarcely goes back farther than Locke. It has scarcely regarded Bacon; it is a

little occupied with Hobbes and Gassendi; but its official point of departure is Locke. It is Locke who is always cited and imitated and developed. And in fact, now that you are acquainted with the Essay on the Human Understanding in its foundation, and as a whole, and in its details, you must see that it really contains the most marked traits of all the great anterior sensual theories, whether of modern philosophy, or of the Middle age, of Greece, or of the East.

The essential characteristic of Sensualism, as we have seen, is the denial of all the great general truths which escape the senses, and which reason alone discovers, the negation of infinite time and space, of good and evil, of human liberty, of the immateriality of the soul, and of Divine Providence; and according to the times, or the greater or less zeal of its partisans, it openly announces these results, or veils them by the distinction, sometimes sincere, and sometimes pretended, between philosophy and religion. This is the sole difference which, in the *seventeenth* century, separates Gassendi, the Catholic priest, from Hobbes, the enemy of the Church. At the bottom their system is the same; they renew in their persons, the one, Epicurus, the other, Democritus; they give an almost exclusive share to sensation in knowledge; they nearly maintain that all being is material, (*substantia nobis datur sub ratione materiæ*); in spiritual beliefs they see nothing but metaphors; and, beyond the senses, they attribute everything to signs and to language: after all this, Gassendi invokes revelation, and Hobbes invokes it not.—In the *sixteenth* century, the appeal to revelation was indispensable; it characterizes, and it hardly saves the Peripatetic Sensualism of Pomponatius and his school.—Previous to that time, during the absolute reign of Christianity, this precaution was still more necessary; it illy protected the involved Sensualism,

* Reference is here had to a rapid view of the history of philosophy down to the time of Locke, exhibited in the preceding portion of the course of Lectures, of which this work is a part. For some account of them, and particularly in justification of the remark of Cousin, see the Introductory Essay.—Tr.

and the avowed Nominalism of Occam ; and Sensualism dared scarcely show itself in Duns Scotus, except by the negation of all absolute truth in itself, that is by denying right and wrong, the beautiful and ugly, the true and false, in so far as founded in the nature of things, and by explaining them by the sole will and arbitrary power of God. Now, all these traits of Sensualism, manifest or concealed, of the middle age, and of the sixteenth and seventeenth century, are reproduced in Locke. Who cannot see, likewise, in the bosom of paganism, the precursors of Gassendi and Hobbes, and consequently of Locke, in Epicurus, in Strato, in Democritus, and in the Ionian school ? In fine, in certain Oriental systems, and particularly the *Sankhya* of Capila,* in the midst of inconsistencies apparent or real, and of mysticism true or false, similar, perhaps, to much of the modern invocation of revelation, who does not trace the lineaments of that theory which, increasing and clearing up, and sharing in all the progress of humanity, came, towards the commencement of the *eighteenth* century, to receive its expression, not indeed full and decisive, but already elevated and truly scientific expression, in the *Essay on the Human Understanding* ?

And not only does the *Essay on the Human Understanding* include and sum up the past, but it also contained the future. All those theories, the discussion of which has so long occupied us, and which, as they appear in Locke, may have perplexed you by their equivocal character, will be seen, as we proceed,† in less than half a century, to become enlarged, extended, and regularly unfolded by the hardy successors of Locke, into firm and precise theories, which will obtain, in more than one great country of Europe, an almost absolute

* See Appendix, Note OO.

† It was the intention of Cousin, as has been observed in a former note, to pursue the progress of the system of Locke, to its legitimate results and last expression, in his successors, such as Condillac, Helvetius, La Mettrie and Holbach.—The reader will of course understand that the anticipated results of that examination, spoken of in the future tense, are facts which have long been matter of history in philosophy.—Tr.

authority, and be there regarded as the last expression of the human mind. Thus the theory of Locke concerning Freedom tended to Fatalism ; this theory will come forth fully developed.—Locke seems not to have had much dread of Materialism ; his disciples will admit and proclaim it.—Soon, the principle of causality, being no longer merely overlooked and neglected, but repelled and destroyed, the argument *a posteriori* for the existence of God, will lose its basis, and the indecisive physical Theism of Locke's Sensualism, will end in avowed Pantheism, that is to say, in Atheism.—The two sources of knowledge, sensation and reflection, will be resolved into one ; reflection will be merged in sensation ; there will remain only sensation to explain the whole human mind.—Signs, whose influence Locke had already exaggerated, will become, next after sensation, the source of all ideas.—In a word, you may expect hereafter to see, how important it was for us to throw at the outset a strong and abundant light upon all those questions and theories, which, gradually rising up, will become the battle-ground of our future discussions. It was necessary to reconnoitre beforehand, and familiarize you with the field, on which we shall have so often to engage.

I have [in former discussions] divided the schools of the *eighteenth* century into four fundamental schools, which have appeared to me to contain them all. I have loved to tell you, that each of these schools has existed ; therefore there was some ground for its existence. If these schools had been altogether absurd and extravagant, they could not have existed. For total absurdity alone could not have found either place or credit in the human mind, could not have gained so much *eclat*, nor have acquired so much authority, in any age, still less in an age so enlightened as the eighteenth century. Thus, from the simple fact, that the Sensual school has existed, it follows that it had reason for its existence, that it possesses some element of truth. But there are four schools, and not merely one. Now, absolute truth is one ; if one of these schools contained absolute truth, there would be but one school and not four. But they are ; therefore there is

reason for their being, and they contain truth ; but at the same time there are four ; therefore neither the one nor the other contains the whole truth entire, and each of them, with an element of truth which has made to exist, contains some element of error which reduces it, after all, to exist only as a particular school. And recollect that error, in the hands of systematic genius, easily becomes extravagance. It was my duty, then, at once to absolve and to combat all the schools, and consequently that great school which is called the Sensual school, the school of Sensation, from the name of the principle on which it solely rests. I was to absolve the school of sensation, as having had its part of truth ; and I was to combat it, as having blended with the part of truth, which recommended it, many errors and extravagances. And in what way, was I to combat the school of Sensation ? I promised you to combat the errors of one school, by all the truth there was in the opposite school. I was, then, to combat the exaggerations of Sensualism, with what there is of sound and reasonable in Idealism. This I have done. I have combatted the Essay on the Human Understanding with arguments, which I have not always cared, by an untimely show of erudition, to refer in detail to their respective authors ; but which, I avow, belong not to me. Perhaps there is something of my own, if I may be permitted to say it, in the development of these arguments, and in the conduct of the discussion, and above all in its general, and in some sort, its moral spirit. But the arguments in themselves, pertain for the most part to the Spiritual school in its most reasonable, that is to say, its *negative* side, which is always the soundest part of every school. At a future day, I shall take up the Spiritual school ; I shall examine it in its *positive* elements, and there I shall turn against it, against its sublime errors and its mystic tendencies, the solid arms which the good sense of Empiricism and of Scepticism will frequently furnish. In the mean time, it is with the dialectics of Spiritualism, that I have combatted the extravagances of the Empiric school, as they appear in Locke, the representative of that school in the eigh-

teenth century. It is not, however, Ancient Idealism which I have invoked against modern Empiricism ; for the one does not answer to the other ; Ancient philosophy, and Modern philosophy do not serve each other and enlighten each other, except on the highest summits of science, and for a very small number of the *elect* thinkers. It is therefore modern Spiritualism which I have used against modern Empiricism ; I have employed against it in the eighteenth century, the arms which the eighteenth century itself furnished. Thus I have opposed to Locke the great men who followed him, and who, having followed him, were to modify and combat, in order to pass beyond him, and lead onward the march of science. It is not therefore even from Leibnitz, who is too far back, but from Reid and Kant, that I have borrowed arguments. But I have had almost always to change the form of them ; for their form savors a little of the country of those two great men. Both express themselves, as men talk at Edinburg and at Konigsburg ; which is not the way in which men express themselves in France. I have therefore neglected the phraseology of Reid, and particularly of Kant, but I have preserved the substance of their arguments. You are not acquainted with Kant ; one day I shall endeavor to make you acquainted with that mind, so powerful, so deep and sharp thinking, and so elevated, the Descartes of the age. But the works of the judicious Reid are accessible to you, with the admirable commentary of Royer-Collard.* The Scotch philosophy [of Reid and Stewart] will prepare you for the German philosophy. It is to Reid and Kant I refer in great part the controversy I have carried on against Empiricism as represented in the person of Locke.

I was also to be just towards the Empiric school ; while combatting it, I was to take up its part of truth as well as of error. Have I not also done this ? I have recognized and signalized every thing good in different parts of the Essay on

* *Oeuvres completes de Reid, avec les leçons de M. Royer-Collard, par M. Jouffroy. 6 vols.*

the Understanding. I have carefully brought out the happy commencement of Locke's method, and explained his theories before attacking the errors into which the spirit of system threw him. Finally, I have rendered full homage to Locke as a man and a philosopher. I have done this with all my heart ; for, in fact, philosophy is not such or such a particular school, but it is the common foundation, and so to say, the life of all schools. It is distinct from all systems, but it is blended with all ; for it manifests, develops, and advances itself, only by them. Its union is even their variety, so discordant in appearance, and in reality so profoundly harmonious. Its progress and its glory, is their mutual perfectionment by reciprocal pacific counteraction. When we attack, without qualification, any considerable particular school, we proscribe unawares some real element of the human mind and of truth, and philosophy itself is in some part wounded. When we do indiscriminating outrage to the work of a celebrated philosopher, to whatever school he may belong, we outrage philosophy, reason, and human nature itself in the person of one of its choicest representatives. I trust that nothing of this kind will ever come from me ; for what, before all things, I profess to teach, is not such or such a philosophy, but philosophy itself ; not attachment to such or such a system, however grand it may be ; not the admiration of particular men, whatever their genius ; but the philosophic spirit, superior to all systems and all philosophies, the boundless love of truth wherever it may be met ; the understanding of all systems which, pretending to contain all the truth, at least contain something of the truth, and respect for all men who seek for it with talent and loyalty. The true muse of the historian of philosophy is not Hatred, but Love ; and the mission of philosophical criticism is, not merely to signalize the extravagances, too real and too numerous, of philosophical systems, but also, to disengage from the folds of error, the truths which may and must be involved in them, and thereby to absolve philosophy in the past, to embolden and enlighten it for the future.

ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY.

APPENDIX

TO

COUSIN'S EXAMINATION OF LOCKE.

NOTES AND ADDITIONS.



NOTES AND ADDITIONS.

NOTE A, p. 12.

Consciousness.—The fact of consciousness is the condition of all knowledge and all philosophy. It is “the light of all our seeing.” The various definitions which have been given to this word by different writers, and the vagueness with which it has been used, appear to result from the difficulty of distinguishing the different elements which, in their inseparable and blended action, make up the complex whole of intellectual reality and life; or rather, in which variety the unity of intellectual life manifests itself. It is difficult to see the distinct in the inseparable; to see a part in a whole, without confounding it with the whole. It is difficult, on the other hand, to distinguish without separating and destroying. And again, where any one element is present, and inseparably connected with each and all the other elements of a complex whole, there is great danger of confounding it with some one or other of those elements, apart from which it is never found, while yet it is distinct from each and all of them.—This is the case with regard to Consciousness. It is not the mind itself, but the light in which all the phenomena of the mind are reflected to itself. We know ourselves and every thing that we know, only in the light of consciousness. We find ourselves and all things in consciousness. It is the light in which we see all things, yet it is not the *seeing* itself. It reveals to the mind its various modifications, its feelings, sensations, thoughts, and volitions; yet, though connected with them, it is distinct from them all. It is neither a pure passivity nor a voluntary activity, though it may appear on both hands to partake of the nature of the modifications of which it informs us. It is a spontaneity, a fact. It is neither a machine nor an agent. It is not a product of the mind, nor an effect of the will. Thought and volition are produced; but consciousness is a

witness of our thoughts and volitions; though the most eminent fact of consciousness—self-affirmation—may indeed be *conditioned* by an act of the will; yet this reflective act is ulterior to the primitive, spontaneous fact of consciousness, in which the *me* is first revealed in opposition to the *not-me*.

Consciousness, considered as the condition of perceiving immediately whatever passes within us, has, by some, been confounded with the internal sensibility.—Reid, on the contrary, appears to regard it as a distinct and special faculty of the mind, whose office is in general to observe the operations of the other faculties.—This view is rejected by Brown, who seems to consider consciousness as nothing more than a general word to express the aggregate of the phenomena or states of the mind.—Many nice questions have been made by other writers, in regard to the discrimination of the sense of the words consciousness, self, and the I. “We know nothing of ourself,” says Heinroth, “without consciousness. What is consciousness? Is it the I itself; or is it a special property, operation, activity of the I; or something different, only standing in necessary connexion with it? At least, we cannot separate the I from consciousness: it is found only in and with our consciousness, and cannot be thought apart from consciousness. They are therefore inseparable. Are they, then, one and the same thing? Let us consider. I find myself in consciousness: the I is my *self*, illuminated and revealed by the light of consciousness. Without the rays which fall from consciousness upon my self, this self would be no I. The brute is, without doubt, a self, but he is no I; for consciousness is wanting in him. I can and must think that my self might have been, and may be, without consciousness; for I know as certainly as I now am, that I *was*, before I became an I.”*

These distinctions may seem more nice than valid. It is indeed true, that the words *self*, *I*, and *consciousness*, considered as objects

* HEINROTH'S *Psychologie*, p. 27. His *Lehrbuch der Anthropologie* likewise contains very interesting developments of this subject, though not comparative and critical. For these, see TENNEMAN'S *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, 5th Edition, by WENDT, Leipzig, 1829. A poor translation of this work has been published in England. There deserves to be a good one.—Cousin has likewise translated the same work into French. His extensive and accurate acquaintance with the history of philosophy in general, and of the German in particular, enabled him to make as good a translation as the genius of the French language would permit.

of reflection in the human mind, are so intimately blended and so inseparable, that they are and can be used interchangeably, without error of thought, even in general philosophical discussion. Yet still there may be ground for the distinctions above made, viz., *self*, as denoting *existence* distinct from consciousness, not, however, existence in general, but a particular, determinate, distinct existence, a particular *actual being*; *I*, as denoting the conscious feeling and affirmation of actual existence as the distinct and permanent *subject* of all the phenomena by which the self is manifested; and *consciousness*, as the *condition*, a priori, of that feeling, the law or principle from which it arises, and by which the *I* knows and affirms itself, and knows and distinguishes itself from all the mind's representations, whether referable to the subject or object, to the *me* or *not-me*.—Certainly we apply the word *self* in common language, in this sense, to a variety of objects, where we do not imply consciousness in the objects, but only a particular, distinct, and determinate *actual existence*.—Passing by all this, however, thus much may be held as certain, that consciousness, and the *I* are inseparable. There is no *I* without consciousness: and the eminent fact of the consciousness is the separating of the *I* from the representations of the mind, as the *subject* from the *object*: "*Quod representatio ad objectum et subjectum refertur, et ab utroque discernitur, oritur conscientia.*" (Bewusstseyn.)**

It is enough, however, for our purpose, here to say, that consciousness is not to be confounded neither with the sensibility (external or internal,) nor with the understanding, nor with the will; neither is it a distinct and special faculty of the mind; nor is it the principle of any of the faculties; nor is it, on the other hand, the product of them. Still less is it a mere generalization to express the total series of representations, a merely verbal or logical bond to bring into a collective unity the various phenomena of the mind. It is the condition of all knowledge: it is that in which all the representations of the mind are revealed to the *self*, in opposition to the *not-self*. It is not the result of experience, (though conditioned by it,) since it is pre-supposed in experience, and renders experience possible. For there is no experience without knowledge; and in order to knowledge it is not only necessary that the *sensibility* should be affected, but that the *mind*,

* *Reuss, Initia Doctrinæ Philos. solidioris*, Salzbr., 1798, Part I. p. 6.

re-acting upon the sensibility and connecting itself with it, *representations*, or mental phenomena, as the joint effect, should be produced ; and these representations, as *objects*, when perceived through the light of consciousness, by the intelligence as the *subject*, constitute knowledge direct and immediate, which, in its most general term, is *feeling* ; or, if the conscious representation is referred exclusively to the subject, *sensation* ; if to the object, *perception*. Consciousness has been defined in the Critical Philosophy, as the act of referring that *in a phenomenon* which belongs to the subject, to the subject ; and that which belongs to the object, to the object : as the power of distinguishing ourselves from external objects, and from our own thoughts. Perhaps the most correct description of the mind *in* consciousness, i. e., of the *conscious states* of the mind, is the being aware of the phenomena of the mind—of that which is *present to the mind* ; and if self-consciousness be distinguished, not in genere, but as a special determination of consciousness, it is the being aware of ourselves, as of the *me* in opposition to the *not-me*, or as the permanent *subject*, distinct from the phenomena, and from all the outward causes of them.

NOTE B, p. 13.

The Natural and the Philosophical Consciousness.—Reflection is used by Locke in the signification of the *natural consciousness* common to all reflecting beings ; but is taken by Cousin, in this passage, to imply a particular determination of consciousness by the will. It is a voluntary falling back upon the natural and spontaneous consciousness ; it is an act of self-reduplication. It is in this sense that he regards reflection as the special attribute of the philosophic mind. All men are endowed with the natural consciousness, while in many the faculty of higher speculation never appears. The one is like the scales in common use, and answers the ends of ordinary life ; the other is like the golden scales of the chemist, to appreciate the slightest weight : or the one is the vision of the unaided eye, the other the vision aided by the microscope. —In this connexion, I am reminded of a passage in COLERIDGE'S *Biographia Literaria*, Vol. I. p. 151, New-York edition. The reader will observe that he does not consider the power of philosophical insight to be as common as Cousin would seem to make

it. "It is neither possible nor necessary for all men, or for many, to be PHILOSOPHERS. There is a *philosophic*, (and inasmuch as it is actualized by an effort of freedom, an *artificial*) *consciousness*, which lies beneath, or, (as it were,) *behind* the spontaneous consciousness natural to all reflecting beings. As the elder Romans distinguished their northern provinces into Cis-Alpine and Trans-Alpine, so may we divide all the objects of human knowledge into those on this side, and those on the other side of the spontaneous consciousness; *citra et trans conscientiam communem*. The latter is exclusively the domain of PURE philosophy. The first range of hills, that encircles the scanty vale of human life, is the horizon for the majority of its inhabitants. On *its* ridges the common sun is born and departs. From *them* the stars rise, and touching *them* they vanish. By the many, even this range, the natural limit and bulwark of the vale, is but imperfectly known. Its higher ascents are too often hidden by mists and clouds from uncultivated swamps, which few have courage or curiosity to penetrate. To the multitude below these vapors appear, now, as the dark haunts of terrific agents, on which none may intrude with impunity; and now all *a-glow*, with colors not their own, they are gazed at as the splendid palaces of happiness and power. But in all ages there have been a few who, measuring and sounding the rivers of the vale, at the feet of their furthest inaccessible falls, have learnt, that the sources must be far higher and far inward; a few, who even in the level streams have detected elements, which neither the vale itself nor the surrounding mountains contained or could supply." "It is the essential mark of the true philosopher to rest satisfied with no imperfect light, as long as the impossibility of attaining a fuller knowledge has not been demonstrated. That the common consciousness itself will furnish proofs by its own direction that it is connected with master-currents below the surface, I shall merely assume as a postulate *pro tempore*. This having been granted, though but in expectation of the argument, I can safely deduce from it the equal truth of my former assertion that philosophy cannot be intelligible to all, even of the most learned and cultivated classes. A system, the first principle of which it is to render the mind intuitive of the *spiritual* in man, (i. e. of that which lies *on the other side* of our natural consciousness) must needs have a great obscurity for those who have never

disciplined and strengthened this ulterior consciousness."—"A system which aims to deduce the memory with all the other functions of intelligence, must of course place its first position from beyond the memory, and anterior to it, otherwise the principle of solution would be itself a part of the problem to be solved."

He then goes on to show the nature and necessity of POSTULATES in philosophy, and illustrates them from the science of mathematics, in which the first construction in space, the point, is not demonstrated but postulated; and that Geometry, beginning not with a demonstration, but with an intuition, a practical idea, furnishes an illustration of a primary intuition, from which every science that lays claim to *evidence* must take its commencement.

"But here" he goes on "an important difference presents itself. Philosophy is employed on objects of the INNER SENSE, and cannot, like geometry, appropriate to every construction a correspondent *outward* intuition. Nevertheless, philosophy, if it is to arrive at evidence must proceed from the most original construction, and the question then is, what is the most original construction or first productive act for the INNER SENSE. The answer to this question depends on the direction which is given to the INNER SENSE. But in philosophy the INNER SENSE cannot have its direction determined by any outward object. To the original construction of the line, I can be compelled by a line drawn before me on the slate or on sand. The stroke thus drawn is indeed not the line itself, but only the image or picture of the line. It is not from it that we first learn to know the line; but, on the contrary, we bring this stroke to the original line, generated by the act of the imagination; otherwise we could not define it as without breadth or thickness. Still, however, this stroke is the sensuous image of the original or ideal line, and an efficient mean to excite *every* imagination to the intuition of it.

"It is demanded then, whether there be found any means in philosophy to determine the direction of the INNER SENSE, as in mathematics it is determinable by its specific image or outward picture. Now, the inner sense has its direction determined for the greater part only by an act of freedom. One man's consciousness extends only to the pleasant or unpleasant sensations caused in him by external impressions; another enlarges his inner sense to a consciousness of forms and quantity; a third, in addition to the

image, is conscious of the conception or notion of the thing ; a fourth attains to a notion of notions—he reflects on his own reflections ; and thus we may say, without impropriety, that the one possesses more or less inner sense than the other. This more or less betrays already that philosophy, in its principles, must have a practical or moral, as well as a theoretical or speculative side. This difference in degree does not exist in the mathematics. Socrates in Plato shows, that an ignorant slave may be brought to understand, and, of himself, to solve the most geometrical problem. Socrates drew the figures for the slave in the sand. The disciples of the critical philosophy could likewise (as was indeed actually done by La Forge and some other followers of Des Cartes) represent the origin of our representations in copper-plates ; but no one has yet attempted it, and it would be utterly useless. To an Esquimaux or New Zealander our most popular philosophy would be wholly unintelligible ; for the sense, the inward organ, is not yet born in him. So is there many a one among us, yes, and some who think themselves philosophers too, to whom the philosophic organ is entirely wanting. To such a man, philosophy is a mere play of words and notions, like a theory of music to the deaf, or like the geometry of light to the blind. The connection of the parts and their logical dependencies may be seen and remembered ; but the whole is groundless and hollow, unsustained by living contact, unaccompanied with any realizing intuition which exists by, and in the act that affirms its existence, which is known, because it is, and is, because it is known.”

NOTE C, p. 15.

Ideology.—*M. Destutt de Tracy.*—The word Ideology came into use in France, about the beginning of the present century, and became the general designation of philosophy in the Sensual school. One of the most distinguished writers of the Ideological school is the Count *Destutt de Tracy*, to whom perhaps the word owes its origin. He was born in 1754. His *Elemens d' Ideologie* 2v. 8vo. were published at Paris 1801—1804. Among his other works are : *Traité de la Volonté*,—*Commentaire de l'Esprit des Lois*, Paris, 1819,—*Principes logiques*, Paris, 1817.—He is the metaphysician of the Sensual school at the period when *Cabanis*

may be considered as its physiologist, and Volney its moralist. From the strictness of his thinking, and the clearness of his style, Cousin considers him the most faithful and complete representative of his school. His writings are characterized by the attempt at logical simplicity, and by a great talent for it. He excels in abstraction and generalization ; he reasons with strictness from the data he starts from, but without much scrutiny of the grounds on which those data rest, or the processes by which they were furnished. His theory of the mind is very simple. The mind, according to him, is nothing but sensation, or more properly the sensibility, of which sensation is the exercise. The sensibility is susceptible of different sorts of impression : 1. those which arise from the *present* action of objects upon its organs ; 2. those which result from their *past* action, by means of a certain disposition which that action left upon the organs ; 3. those of things which have *relations*, and may be compared ; 4. those which spring from our wants and lead us to satisfy them. Every thing thus comes from the exercise of the sensibility through *impressions* made upon the organs of sense. When the sensibility is affected by the *first* sort of impression, it *feels* simply, when by the *second*, it repeats or *recollects* ; when by the *third*, it feels the relations or *judges* ; when by the *fourth*, it desires or *wills*. Thus *Sensation*, according to the nature of its objects, manifests itself respectively as pure perception, or memory, or judgment, or will. It is therefore the sole principle of all our faculties and of all the operations of the mind ; since there is none of them which may not be reduced to one or the other of these forms of sensibility.—See *Damiron's Histoire de la Philosophie en France au 19 me Siecle*, vol. I. p. 99, for a special examination and refutation of this theory.

NOTE E, p. 24.

Maillet's Tellamed.—Benedict de Maillet, born in Lorraine in 1659 ; French Consul in Egypt, and afterwards at Leghorn ; died at Marsailles in the year 1738. He was an ardent student of natural history, and a man of a fanciful turn of mind. He produced a system which for some time excited considerable interest. He maintained that all the land of the earth, and its vegetable and

animal inhabitants rose from the bosom of the sea, by successive contractions of the waters ; that men had originally been Tritons with tails ; and that they, as well as other animals, had lost their marine, and acquired terrestrial forms, by their agitations when left upon dry ground. The work was published after the death of its author by La Mascrier, who also published in 1743 a "Description of Egypt drawn up from the papers of De Maillet."

NOTE F, p. 25.

Of Method, and the order of philosophical questions.—Although this chapter exhibits the most material points in regard to the doctrine of Method, yet the subject is so important that a few additional remarks may not be out of place. For as Cousin justly observes, the adoption of a method decides the destinies of a philosophy. A system is scarcely any thing but the developement of a method applied to the objects of investigation and explanation. The history of philosophy shows that every doctrine which has exerted a decided influence upon the human mind, has done it by the new direction it has given to thinking by the new point of view it has taken, that is by its Method. Every philosophical reform has its principle in a change, or extension and improvement of method.—There is no longer any question at the present day what the true method of philosophy is. It is the experimental method, the method of Observation and Induction. The problem of philosophy is the analysis of consciousness. Psychology is contained entire in the consciousness ; it is formed by the observation and arrangement of facts. These facts are the phenomena of consciousness. Yet it is by no means a random observation ; it must be guided, as in the correct application of the method of observation to the phenomena of the outward world, by the experimental *intention* ; the facts are not only to be observed, that is the phenomena in their actual appearance, but their characteristics and relations ; they are to be classified, and the laws also of the mind which *necessarily* operate upon the facts of observation, are not only to act as they do and must, but as likewise themselves phenomena of the consciousness, they are to be observed and recognized.—Now a method may be sound in principle, and yet it may

be imperfectly comprehended, not understood in its extent ; it may be partially applied ; and it may not take up the questions in their proper order. In this view we have the key to the history and fortunes of philosophical systems : both of their success and spread, and of their subsequent decline and overthrow by other systems. Their power is in the element of truth ; their overthrow in the error, the defect, exaggeration, or wrong application of method. Take the history of Sensualism. In England and France in the eighteenth century, as Cousin remarks in his *Philosophical Fragments*, Locke and Condillac supplanted the great schools of a preceding age, and have reigned nearly up to the present time. Instead of being angry at this fact, our business is to understand it. For after all, facts do not make themselves ; they have their general laws, laws resulting from the structure of human nature. If the philosophy of Sensation became accredited in England and France, there is reason for the fact. This reason does no discredit to the human mind. It is not its fault, that it could not remain within bounds of Cartesianism. For Cartesianism did not satisfy the conditions necessary to its permanent dominion as a system. In the general movement of things and the progress of time, the spirit of analysis and observation was to have its place ; and it filled the eighteenth century. The spirit of the eighteenth century needs no apology. Its best apology is in its existence. The age is not to be accused of scepticism, because it required observation as the condition of faith. The human race like individual man lives only by faith ; but at this period observation and experiment became its necessary conditions. But Cartesianism, especially such as it had become in the hands of Malbranche, Spinoza, and Wolf, abandoning observation at the second step and burying itself in ontological hypotheses and scholastic formulas, had no claim to the title of an experimental science. When therefore another system appeared claiming this title, it was under this title accepted. This is the secret of the downfall of Cartesianism and the fortunes of Locke and Condillac. The philosophy of Sensation was not admitted as Materialism, but as Experimental. To a certain extent it really was a science of experiment and observation. The success of this philosophy was not due to its dogmas, but to its method, which again was due to the spirit of the age. That the experimental method was not the work of

this philosophical sect, but the necessary fruit of time, is evident from the fact that the partizans of an entirely opposite school, who arose to combat the doctrines of Locke, exhibit only another application of the same method. Reid in Scotland, and Kant in Germany, claiming the method of observation, attacked and overthrew the system of Locke.*

The different conflicting systems which have sprung up since the time of Bacon, do no discredit to the method of observation. The method is good in itself; it should only be rightly applied. The study of human nature is a real science of observation; but it is necessary to observe every thing. No other method is necessary; but it should not be corrupted by any system; it should be applied to all the facts, all the phenomena, whatever they are, provided they exist. Its exactness is in its impartiality and in its completeness. It should exhaust all the facts. Facts are the starting-point of philosophy. But facts, whatever they may be, exist for us only so far as they appear in the consciousness. It is there only that observation can find them, and describe them, before delivering them to induction to deduce the consequences they contain. The field of philosophical observation is consciousness; there is no other, but in that it is necessary to observe every thing, for every thing is important. To fall back upon the mind, to study carefully all its phenomena, their differences and relations, is the first study of philosophy: its scientific name is *psychology*. Psychology is the condition and vestibule of philosophy.†

I will here present the reader with two extracts from the work of Cousin before referred to, the Philosophical Fragments. The first is from the "Program of a course of Lectures delivered in 1817." *Phil. Fragm.* p. 228.

Division and Classification of Metaphysical Questions.

DIVISION.

All metaphysical questions are contained in the three following:

1. What are the actual characteristics of human intellections (*connaissances, knowledges*) in the developed intelligence?
2. What is their origin?
3. What is their legitimacy or validity?

* *Fragmens Philosophiques*, Preface, p. 3—5.

† Preface to *Fragmens Philosophiques*.

The questions concerning the *actual* state and the *primitive* state of human knowledge, regard it as in the human mind, in the *subject* where it resides. It is the *subjective* point of view.

The question concerning the *validity* of human knowledge regards it in relation to its *objects*, that is in an *objective* point of view.

CLASSIFICATION.

1. To treat the actual before the primitive, for in commencing with the primitive we might obtain nothing but an hypothesis, a false primitive, which would give only an hypothetical actual, whose legitimacy would be that of an hypothesis.

2. To treat the actual and the primitive before the legitimate ; for the questions concerning the actual and the primitive pertain to the subjective system, that concerning the legitimate to the objective system, and we cannot know the objective before the subjective : in fact it is in the internal, by and with the internal, that we conceive the external.

All our objective intellections being facts of consciousness, phenomena, we call *Psychology* or *Phenomenology*, the science of the subjective, primitive and actual.

The study of our objective intellections considered relatively to their objects, that is to say to real external existences, is called *Ontology*. Every thing objective is called *transcendental*, and the appreciation of the legitimacy of the principles by which we attain the objective is called *Transcendental Logic*.

The whole science bears the name of *Metaphysics*."

The other passage is from an "Essay on a classification of philosophical questions and schools." *Fragm. Phil.* p. 295.

"When I think of all the questions that have occupied my mind, when I compare them with those that have occupied all philosophers, when I interrogate both books and myself, and above all when I consult the nature of the human mind, reason as well as experience, in my view, reduce all the problems of philosophy to a very small number of general problems, whose character is determined by the general aspect under which philosophy, and in philosophy, metaphysics, presents itself to my mind.

Philosophy, in my opinion, is only the science of human nature considered in the facts which it gives to our observation. Among these facts there are those which refer more particularly to the intelli-

gence, and are therefore commonly called *metaphysical*. Metaphysical facts—the phenomena by which the intelligence displays itself—when reduced to general formulas, constitute intellectual principles. Metaphysics is therefore the study of the intelligence in that of our intellectual principles.

Intellectual principles present themselves under two aspects ; either relatively to the intelligence in which they exist, to the *subject* that possesses them, to the consciousness and reflection which exercises and contemplates them,—or relatively to their *objects*, that is, no longer as in themselves and in ourselves, but in their consequences and external applications. Every intellectual principle indeed has reference to the human mind ; and at the same time that it refers itself to the human mind as the subject of all knowledge and all consciousness, it likewise has respect to objects as lying without the mind that conceives them : or to adopt those celebrated expressions, so convenient by their conciseness, precision, and force, every intellectual principle is either *subjective* or *objective*, or *subjective* and *objective* at the same time. There is no principle, no knowledge, no idea, no perception, no sensation, which does not come under this general division,—a division which includes and divides at the outset all the problems of philosophy into two great classes : problems relative to *subject*, and problems relative to *object* ; or to speak more rapidly, *subjective* problems, and *objective* problems.

Let us unfold this general division, and deduce from it the particular questions it contains. Let us examine first the intellectual principles, independently of the external consequences deducible from them. Let us develop the science of the *subjective*.

This science is that of the internal world. It is the science of the *me*, a science entirely distinct from that of the *objective*, which is, properly speaking, the science of the *not-me*. And this science of the *me* is not a romance concerning the nature of the soul, its origin, and its end : it is the true history of the soul, written by reflection, at the dictation of consciousness and memory. It is the mind falling back upon itself, and giving to itself the spectacle of itself. It is occupied entirely with internal facts, phenomena perceptible and appreciable by consciousness. I call it *psychology*, or, again, *phenomenology*, to mark the nature of its objects. Now, in

spite of the difficulties with which a being, thrown at first, and constantly drawn to the outward by the wants of his sensibility and his reason, has to encounter in the process of reflection, yet this science, entirely subjective as it is, is not above man, not beyond the reach of human nature. It is certain, for it is immediate. The *self*, the *me*, and that with which it is occupied, are both contained in the same sphere, in the unity of consciousness. There the object of the science is entirely internal; it is perceived intuitively [in immediate apperception,] by the subject. The subject and the object are taken intimately connected, the one with the other. [The subject and the object are the same. The *ego*, the *I*, as the subject, constructs itself *objectively*, as the *object* to itself; that is, the *I*, the subject, considers *itself*, makes itself the *object* of reflection.—ED.] All the facts of consciousness are evident by themselves, as soon as consciousness attains them; but they frequently escape its grasp, by their extreme delicacy, or from being enveloped in others foreign to themselves. Psychology gives the most perfect certainty; but this certainty is found only at a depth which it belongs not to all eyes to penetrate. To arrive there, it is necessary to abstract one's self from the world of extension and figure in which we have lived so long, and whose colors now-a-days tinge all our thoughts and language, though we are so little aware of it. It is necessary also to abstract one's self from the external of being and of the absolute, which is even more difficult to remove than the former; that is to say, abstract one's self from an integrant part of thought itself, for in all thought there is being and the absolute; and, again, it is necessary to separate and distinguish thought without mutilating it, to disengage the phenomena of consciousness, both from the ontological notions which naturally envelope them, and from the logical forms which, in the developed intelligence, repress and restrain them; and to do this without falling into mere abstractions. In fine, after having established our position in this world of consciousness, so delicate and fugitive, it is necessary to make a wide and profound review of all the phenomena that it comprehends; for here, phenomena are the elements of science. We must be sure of having omitted no element, otherwise the science will be incomplete. We must be sure of having taken none upon supposition. We must be careful that

we omit no real element, that we admit no foreign element, and, finally, that we view all the real elements in their true aspect, and in all the aspects which they present. When this preliminary labor has put us in possession of all the elements of science, it remains to construct the science, by bringing the elements together, by combining them, so as to exhibit them all in the different classes which result from their different characteristics, just as the naturalist arranges the varieties of the vegetable and mineral world, under a certain number of divisions which comprehend them all.

This done, all is not yet done, the science of the subjective is not yet exhausted : the greatest difficulties remain to be overcome. We have recognized the internal world, the phenomena of consciousness, as consciousness at the present time displays them. We know the actual man, but we are still ignorant of primitive man. It is not enough for the human mind to contemplate the analytical inventory of its intellections, arranged under their respective titles. The unwearied curiosity of man cannot rest in these careful classifications : it goes on after higher problems, which at once daunt and attract it, which charm and defy it. We seem not lawfully to possess present reality, until we have obtained the primitive truth ; and we ascend continually to the origin of our intellections, as to the source of all light. Then the question of the origin of knowledge makes a new question spring up, as difficult, perhaps more difficult. It is the question concerning the relation of the primitive to the actual. It is not enough to know where we now are, and from whence we started ; we must know all the road by which we arrived at the point where we now find ourselves. This third question is the complement of the two others. Here the whole problem is solved, the science of the *subjective* is truly exhausted ; for when we have the two extreme points and the intermediate space, nothing more remains to ask.

Let us now consider the intellectual principles relatively to their external objects.

A strange thing is this ! A being perceives and knows, out of his own sphere ; he is nothing but himself, and he knows something besides himself. His own existence is, for himself, nothing but his own individuality ; and from the bosom of this individual

world which he inhabits, and which he constitutes, he attains to a world foreign to his own, and that, by powers which, altogether internal and personal as they are, in reference to their subject in which they inhere, extend beyond its boundary, and discover to him things lying beyond his reflection and his consciousness. That the mind of man is provided with these wonderful powers, no one can doubt; but is their reach and application legitimate? and does that which they reveal really exist? The intellectual principles have an incontestible authority in the internal world of the *subject*; but are they equally valid in reference to their external *objects*?

This is eminently the *objective* problem. Now, as every thing which lies out of the consciousness is objective, and as all real and substantial existences are external to the consciousness, which is exercised only upon internal phenomena, it follows, that every problem relating to any particular being, or in general implying the question of existence, is an objective problem. Finally, as the problem of the legitimacy of the means we have of knowing the objective, whatever it be, is the problem concerning the legitimacy of the means we have of knowing in an absolute way, (the *absolute* being that which is not relative to the *me*, which refers to *essence*,) it follows, that the problem concerning the legitimacy, the validity, of all external, objective, and ontological knowledge, is the problem concerning absolute knowledge. The problem concerning the *absolute*, constitutes the *Higher Logic*.

When we are assured of the validity of our means of knowing in an absolute way, we apply these means to some object, that is, to some particular being; and we raise the question concerning the reality of the substantial *me*, of the soul which conceives, but does not perceive itself, and of that extended and figured substance which we call *matter*, and of that Supreme Being, the last reason of all beings, of all external objects, of the subject itself, likewise, who rises to him,—*God*.

At length, after these problems relative to the existence of different particular objects, those come up which pertain to the modes and characteristics of this existence, problems superior to all others; since, if it is strange that the intellectual being should know that there are existences out of its own sphere, it is still more

strange that it should know what passes in spheres beyond its own existence and consciousness.

These special researches constitute the *Higher Metaphysica*, the science of the objective, of essence, of the invisible; for all essence, every thing objective, is invisible to the consciousness.

Let us resume. The objective problems divide themselves into two great problems, the one logical, the other metaphysical; namely, 1, the problem of the absolute, the question concerning the reality of the existence of any thing objective; 2, the question concerning the reality of different particular objects. Add to these two *objective* questions the three questions involved in general question concerning the *subjective*, and you have all the questions of metaphysics. There is none which will not fall within this general frame-work. We have therefore satisfied the first law of classification. Let us endeavor to satisfy the second, and ascertain the order in which it is proper to examine each question.

Let us first consider the two problems which contain all the others, that of the subject, and that of the object.

Whether the object exists or not, it is obvious that it exists for us, only as it is manifested to us by the subject; and if it is maintained that the subject and the object are actually and primitively given us, the one with the other, it must always be admitted that, in this natural relation, the term which knows, should be considered, as in truth it is, the fundamental element of the relation. It is, therefore, by the subject that we are to commence. It is ourselves we are first to know; for we know nothing but in ourselves, and by ourselves. It is not ourselves who move round the external world, it is rather the external world which moves round us; or if these two spheres have each their proper motions, and are solely correlative, we know it not, except as one of them teaches us. It is thereby, always, that we are to apprehend any thing, even the existence, the independent existence of the other.

We are, then, to commence by the subjective, by the *me*, by the consciousness.

But the question concerning the subjective, involves in itself three others. By which of them are we to commence? In the first place, one of these questions consists in determining the relation of the two others, the relation of the primitive to the actual.

It is clear that this cannot be treated, until after the two others. It remains to determine the order of the two others. Now a strict method will not hesitate to place the actual before the primitive ; for, by commencing with the primitive, we might obtain only a false primitive, which, in deduction, would give only an hypothetical actual, whose relation to the primitive would be only the relation of two hypotheses, more or less consistent. In commencing with the primitive, if a mistake is made, all is lost ; the science of the *subjective* is falsified, and then what will become of the *objective* ? Besides, commencing with the primitive, is to start from one of the most obscure and embarrassing problems, without guide and without light ; whereas, to begin by the actual, is to begin with the easiest question, with the one which serves as the introduction to all the others. On every hand, experience and the experimental method has been celebrated as the conquest of the age, and the genius of our epoch. The experimental method, in Psychology, is to begin with the actual, to exhaust it, if it is possible ; to take a strict account of all the principles which now actually govern the intelligence ; to admit only those which actually present themselves, but of those to repel none ; ask none of them from whence they come, or where they go,—it is enough that they are actually present in nature, they must have a place in science. No arbitrary judgment is to be passed upon facts, no systematic control. We are to be contented to register them, one with the other ; nor are we to be in any haste to torture them, in order to force from them some premature theory. We are to wait patiently, until their number is complete, their relations unfolded, and the theory comes forth of itself.

If we pass now from the subjective to the objective, and if we investigate the order of the two questions of which the objective is composed, it is easy to see that the logical question is to be treated before the metaphysical, the problem of the absolute and of existence in general before that of particular existences ; for the solution, whatever it be, of the first problem, is the principle of the second.

Here then are the laws of classification satisfied ; the framework of philosophy divided and arranged : now who will build and fill it up ?

In the first place, has there hitherto been a philosopher who has done this ? If there were, there would be a metaphysical science,

just as there is a geometry and a chemistry.—But have not philosophers at least distinguished these different parts, if they have not filled them up? Have they not sketched the outlines and proportions of the edifice, if they have not yet been able to realize it? If this were the case, there would be a science commenced, a route opened, a method fixed.—But if philosophers have done neither of these, what have they done? A few words will explain.

The first philosophers have treated everything and resolved everything, but it is confusedly; they have treated everything, but without method, or with arbitrary and artificial methods. There is not a metaphysical problem which has not been agitated in every form and analysed in a thousand ways by the philosophers of Greece, and by the Italian metaphysicians of the sixteenth century; nevertheless, neither the former, with their wonderful genius, nor the latter, with all their sagacity, could discover or settle the true limits of each problem, their relations and their extent. No philosopher previous to Descartes has laid down precisely and distinctly the very first problem of philosophy, the distinction between the subject and the object: this distinction was scarcely any thing but a scholastic and grammatical distinction, which the successors of Aristotle vainly agitated without being able to deduce anything from it but consequences of the same kind as their principle, grammatical consequences which, passing from grammar into logic and from thence into metaphysics, corrupted intellectual science and filled it with empty verbal arguments. Descartes himself, notwithstanding the force and strictness of his mind, did not penetrate the whole reach of this distinction; his glory consists in having made it and having placed the true starting-point of philosophical investigations in the mind, in the *me*; but he was not so much aware as he should have been of the abyss that separates the subject from the object; and after having laid down the problem, this great man too rapidly resolves it.—It was reserved for the 18th century to apply and extend the spirit of the Cartesian philosophy, and to produce three schools which, instead of losing themselves in external and objective investigations, began by an examination, more or less strict, more or less profound, of the human mind itself and its faculties. It belonged to the greatest philosopher of the last age, by the very title of his own philosophy to mark the characteristic of modern philosophy. The system of

Kant is called the *Critical Philosophy* (*Kritik*.) The two other European schools, the one anterior, the other contemporaneous, the school of Locke and the school of Reid, are both far below the school of Kant, by the inferiority of their master's genius, and by the inferiority of their doctrines, and both very different from each other in their principles and in their consequences, yet both belong to the school of Kant, and are intimately connected with each other by the spirit of criticism and analysis which recommend them. If the analysis of Reid is stricter and more extended than that of Locke, we must not forget that he had the advantage of all the light which the works written in the system of Locke shed upon that system, and we are to beware of injustice towards Locke, who will always be regarded as one of the most moderate and sensible philosophers; and particularly guard against being unjust to Descartes the founder of the modern philosophy.

But much as the three great schools of Europe are allied in the general spirit that animates them, they differ as greatly in their positive principles: and the reason of this difference is the particular point of view under which each of these schools has considered philosophy. All philosophical questions being reducible to three great questions, in regard to the objective, to the question concerning the absolute and the reality of existences, in regard to the subjective, to that of the actual, and that of the primitive, the weakness of the human mind, which is seen in the strongest intellects, did not permit Locke, and Reid, and Kant to bestow their attention equally upon these three questions. It was directed respectively to one. Locke, Reid, and Kant took each a different question; so that by a fortune sufficiently remarkable, each of the three great questions which make up metaphysics became the special object and the exclusive possession of one of the three great schools of the 18th century. The school of Locke seeks after the *origin* of knowledge [*the subjective primitive*]; the Scotch school of Reid seeks rather after the *actual* characteristics which human knowledge presents in the developed intelligence [*the subjective actual*]; and the school of Kant is occupied with the legitimacy of the passage from the subjective to the objective [*the objective logical—transcendental logic*]. Let me explain: I do not mean to say that each of these three schools has taken up but a single problem; I mean that each of them is more especially occupied

with a particular problem, and is eminently characterized by the mode in which that problem is resolved. All the world is agreed that Locke has misconceived many of the actual characteristics of human knowledge; Reid does not conceal that the question of their origin is of little importance to him; and Kant contents himself with indicating in general the source of human knowledge without investigating the special origin of each of those intellectual principles, those celebrated categories which he established. Now it seems to me that in following this parallel division of the questions and schools of philosophy, the history of philosophy might be viewed under a new aspect. In the three great modern schools we might study the three great philosophical questions; each of these three schools, partial and incomplete in itself, might be extended and enlarged by the vicinity of the others: opposed, they would reveal their relative imperfections, brought together, they might mutually communicate what each one is defective in. It would be an interesting and instructive spectacle to show the vices of the modern schools by engaging them one with the other, and to bring together their several merits into one vast central *Eclecticism* which should contain and complete all three. The Scotch philosophy would demonstrate the vices of the philosophy of Locke; Locke would serve to question Reid on subjects which he has too much neglected; and the examination of the system of Kant would introduce into the depths of a problem which escaped both the other schools."

[NOTE G, p. 48.—NOTE H, p. 48.]

[These two references were inserted by mistake.]

NOTE I, p. 50.

Logical and Chronological order of Knowledge.—At this place Cousin refers the reader to the "Program of a course of Philosophy" for 1817, inserted in the *Philosophical Fragments*. The portion which refers to the *logical and chronological order of knowledge* is so brief and general that perhaps it will add but little to what may be thought sufficiently explained in the text. In giving it, however, I have thought best not to separate it from the rest of

the Program, as that syllabus, though containing only brief sketches, and often merely the annunciation, of topics discussed at large in the lectures of which they are the outline, may possibly give the reader some insight into the author's general system of philosophy, whereof only a part, and that of course under a particular form, appears in the special criticisms to which the examination of Locke is devoted. I have therefore given this Program entire at the end of the notes, where the reader will find the portion concerning the logical and chronological order of knowledge referred to.

NOTE K, p. 62.

Royer-Collard.—Origin of the conception of duration.—See Oeuvres complètes de THOMAS REID publiées par M. TH. JOUFFROY avec des Fragmens de M. ROYER-COLLARD. Paris, 1829.—Jouffroy was the pupil of Royer-Collard. To the third and fourth volume of this edition of Reid's works the editor has attached copious extracts and reports of Royer-Collard's lectures, delivered in 1811—1814.—An extended discussion concerning duration may be found in Vol IV. p. 347—426. It is too long to be introduced in this place; a brief view of its results is all that can be given.

The first duration we conceive is, according to Royer-Collard, *our own*. It is not in the succession of our feelings that our duration consists; for succession presupposes a duration in which it takes place.—Our duration results from the sentiment of our continued identity which results from the continuity of our activity, attested by consciousness and memory. To act, with consciousness and memory of acting is to endure.—Whenever, in the consciousness of our own activity and the succession of its acts, we acquire the conception of the duration (our own) in which that succession takes place, it becomes independent of the sentiment of our own identical and continuous existence, which contained it. By occasion of our own duration, we conceive a necessary and illimitable duration, the eternal theatre of all existences and all contingent successions; and not only do we conceive it, but we are invincibly persuaded of its reality. This passage from the conception of time within us to time without us, is made, in the opinion

of Royer-Collard, by what he calls a *natural induction*. His view of this point seems unnecessary and burdened with difficulties, the nature of which the reader will apprehend from the criticism of it, by Cousin, as applied to the conception of causality, in the next chapter.—To explain the origin of the conception of Time, it seems to us sufficient to say that when by occasion of experience any particular succession is given, the mind, in virtue of its own activity and by its own laws, forms the necessary and universal conception of time. The primitive succession given in consciousness and memory (that is, according to Royer-Collard, the acts of our own will,) furnishing us the notion of time concrete, particular and determinate (our own duration) suffices to supply the condition under which the mind in virtue of its own laws, without resorting to the process of *induction*, but *immediately* forms the conception of duration without us, time absolute, unlimited.

NOTE L, p. 68.

The idea of the infinite.—This criticism is unquestionably valid as against Locke's reduction of the infinite to number, his confusion of the idea of the infinite with that of the finite, and consequent destruction of the former idea. But there still remains a higher question concerning the positive science of the infinite, which involves the possibility of philosophy itself, considered as the positive knowledge of the absolute and infinite, the unconditioned, or viewed as any thing more than the observation and analysis of the *phenomena* of consciousness. The possibility of philosophy, in this sense of the word, is indeed the grand problem of speculative inquiry; the resolution of it, explicit or implied, determines the most general character of the great systems of philosophy. It is a question however which we do not intend here to discuss. We will only remark that the position taken by Cousin on this subject, in his other works, constitutes the chief pretension and systematic peculiarity of his philosophy. It is a position certainly not without grave difficulties. Those who desire to get a general view of this subject, will find it in an article on Cousin's *Introduction to the History of Philosophy* contained in the *Edinburgh Review*, No. 99, October, 1829. Those who have read that article will probably be reminded, by our author's discussion, of the objection rais-

ed by the reviewer against the doctrine of Cousin, namely that the idea of the infinite is purely relative and negative: and perhaps some will consider the remarks made on this point by Cousin, in the text to which this note belongs, as a sufficient answer to the objection. The article to which we allude is certainly very learned and profound, and written with an air of the very highest ability. The writer justly considers the whole doctrine of M. Cousin [i. e. taking philosophy in the sense of positive knowledge of the unconditioned, and as something *beyond* Psychology, or the mere observation and analysis of the *phenomena* of consciousness] to be "involved in the proposition that the unconditioned, the absolute, the infinite, is immediately known in consciousness by difference, plurality, and relation." In explaining the nature of the great problem itself of philosophy, and the character of Cousin's solution of it, he goes on to state that the possible opinions on this subject "may be reduced to four:—

1. The unconditioned is incognizable and inconceivable; its notion being only negative of the conditioned, which last can alone be positively known or conceived.
2. It is not an object of knowledge; but its notion, as a regulative principle of the mind itself, is something more than a mere negation of the conditioned.
3. It is cognizable, but not conceivable; it can be known by a sinking back into identity with the absolute, but is incomprehensible by consciousness and reflection, which are only of the relative and the different.
4. It is cognizable and conceivable by consciousness and reflection, under relation, difference, and plurality."

"The first of these opinions" the reviewer adds, "we regard as true; the second is held by Kant; the third by Schelling; and the last by our author (Cousin)." In explaining and supporting the position which he holds as true, the writer says: "thought cannot transcend consciousness; consciousness is only possible under the antithesis of a subject and object of thought, known only in correlation and mutually limiting each other; while, independently of this, all that we know either of subject or of object, either of mind or matter, is only a knowledge in each of the particular, the different, of the modified, *of the phenomenal*. We admit that the consequence of this doctrine is, that philosophy, if viewed as more than a science of the conditioned, is impossible. Departing from the particular, we admit that we can never in our highest

generalizations, rise above the finite ; that our knowledge, whether of mind or matter, can be nothing more than a knowledge of the relative manifestations of an existence which in itself it is our highest wisdom to recognize as beyond the reach of philosophy :—*cognoscendo ignorari, et ignorando cognosci.*” “The conditioned” he goes on, “is the mean between two extremes, exclusive of each other, neither of which can be conceived as *possible*, but of which, on the principle of contradiction, one must be admitted as *necessary*. On this opinion, therefore, reason is shown to be weak, but not deceitful. The mind is not represented as conceiving two propositions subversive of each other as equally possible ; but only as unable to understand as possible either of two extremes : one of which, however, on the ground of their mutual contradiction, it is compelled to recognize as true. We are thus taught the salutary lesson, that the capacity of thought is not to be constituted into the measure of existence ; and are warned from recognizing the domain of our knowledge as necessarily co-extensive with the horizon of our faith. And by a wonderful revelation, we are thus, in the very consciousness of our inability to conceive aught beyond the relative and finite, inspired with a belief in the existence of something unconditioned beyond the sphere of all comprehensible reality.”

In regard to the doctrine of Cousin, the writer then endeavors to show : “in the *first* place that M. Cousin is at fault in all the authorities he quotes in favor of the opinion that the absolute, infinite, unconditioned, is a primitive notion, cognizable by the intellect ; in the *second*, that his argument to prove the co-reality of his three ideas [the finite, the infinite, and their relation] [on the ground that the notion of the one necessarily suggests the conception of the other] proves directly the reverse ; in the *third*, that the conditions under which alone he allows intelligence to be possible, necessarily exclude the possibility of a knowledge of the absolute ; and in the *fourth*, that the absolute, as defined by him, is only a relative and a conditioned.”

“The unconditioned,” he concludes, “is not a positive conception ; nor has it even a real or intrinsic unity ; for it only combines the absolute and the infinite, contradictory in themselves, into a unity *relative to us* by the negative bond of their inconceivability. It is on this mistake of the relative for the intrinsic, of the negative for the positive, that M. Cousin’s theory is founded.”

NOTE M, p. 77.

Idea of Substance. Royer-Collard.—*Fragments of the Lectures of M. Royer-Collard* published in Jouffroy's edition of the works of Reid, vol. iv. p. 305. On this subject Royer-Collard shows : 1. that we perceive the objects of our external perceptions as qualities, and therefore we conceive them as in a subject in which they co-exist and to which they belong ; that the conception of a subject necessarily accompanies the perception of qualities, but is distinct from it ; the subject is not perceived by the senses, it is conceived by the mind. 2. That the judgment by which we attribute the qualities that are the objects of our perceptions to a subject conceived by the mind, is a primitive judgment, a constituent law of the human understanding. It is the same with regard to this judgment as with that of causality ; it cannot be derived from an anterior principle without pre-assuming the thing in question. He applies the same positions likewise to *spiritual* substance, conceived by occasion of observing the phenomena of the mind as qualities.

In examining the theory of Locke, and also of Condillac, which resolves substance into the aggregate of qualities, Royer-Collard remarks that a " collection supposes three things : individuals, objects really existing in nature ; a relation of resemblance between the individual things ; the perception of this relation by a mind. What then are the individuals of which in this case the collection is formed ? They are, says Locke, *simple ideas* obtained by sensation and reflection ; they are, says Condillac, in regard to material substance, the *perceptions* of magnitude, solidity, hardness. Thus mind is a collection of sensations, of perceptions, of recollections ; body is a collection of magnitude, solidity, hardness. I beg pardon of Locke and Condillac ; the affections and operations of mind, on one hand, the qualities of matter, on the other, are not real and individual things, but pure abstractions which we form by separating in thought what is never separated in nature, namely, that which perceives from that which is perceived, the act of thought from that which thinks, solidity from the solid thing, &c. But if the elements of the collections, the aggregate, into which they pretend to resolve substances, are nothing but abstractions, substances themselves are nothing but collections of abstractions ; there

are no substances in nature, neither minds nor bodies. This is enough. But let us go on.

The second condition of a collection, is, that there should be some relation of resemblance between the individuals which compose it. But what relation is there, for example, between extension and impenetrability? No other is, or can be, assigned, but that of co-existence in place. In the first place, co-existence in place is not an analogy, and not a single instance of an aggregate conceived by the human mind upon this ground alone, can be cited. Moreover, co-existence in place supposes place and the notion of place. From whence is this notion gotten? What is place? The relation in question is co-existence in place; place is, then, anterior to this relation. Is it itself a relation? But what is co-existence in a relation? Is it a quality? Let it be added to the collection, and then let the mode of co-existence be pointed out. Is it something real? It was not worth the while to deny reality to body, and give it to place. But let us pass over co-existence and place; our thoughts have no place, and they do not co-exist; they are successive, and there is no succession but in a relation of number. Our minds then are collections purely numerical, additions which begin with life and end with death. The total varies at every moment of our duration, and as we consist solely of this total, we are not, any two moments of our duration, one and the same; self is not determined until the end of the addition. This is not all; we had in the former case a mind to form the collection of the qualities of *matter*; but who is to make the collection of our *thoughts*, since the mind is nothing but that collection itself? We must therefore have another mind to perform the operation, or else the addition, the aggregate, which constitutes ourselves, is made and reckoned up of itself.

Finally: the third condition of a collection is, that the relations of resemblance should be perceived by the mind. It is the mind in fact which creates the collection; it is in vain that things have more or less resemblance,—in vain that they co-exist in time and in place; they remain individual and isolated for the mind, as they are in nature, until the mind perceives and seizes their different relations. The collection results from the perception of these relations. A collection is therefore one or several general ideas. But general ideas have this peculiar character, that their

object has no real existence, and the reality of the ideas themselves consists solely in their being acts of the mind. If therefore substances are collections of simple qualities, they are nothing more than acts of our minds, and those acts whose objects do not really exist in nature. Here returns the difficulty again. In commencing with the collection of the qualities of *matter*, we know where to place the collection; the mind is still there to conceive it; but where shall we place the collection of the operations of the *mind*?

This discussion might be prolonged much farther; and at every step monstrous absurdities might be deduced from the theory of Locke. But I close with this remark: there is nothing we know better than our *general ideas*; it is we ourselves who made them; they are precisely such as we make them, and they contain nothing but what we have placed in them. If then our ideas of *substance*, spiritual and material, are nothing but *general ideas*, they must be as *clear* as our other general ideas, e. g. the idea of a tree, and as easy to decompose and to reconstruct again. How is it then, that we hear [in Locke and the Sensual School] such frequent complaints against the idea of substance as *obscure*; and that they in some places make this obscurity a reason for denying substance?" *Œuvres de Reid*. Tom. iv. p. 317—320.

NOTE N, p. 85.

Hume.—Kant.—See Hume's *Essays on the Human Understanding*, Essay 7th. Hume's philosophical genius was of a very superior order. Justice was never done to it by his cotemporaries, nor has it since been done in the general estimation of the English. In logical force, acuteness, and at the same time clearness and elegance of mind, he had few equals. His [philosophical] scepticism was the consistent result of the principles at that time almost universally adopted. The difference between himself and his cotemporaries and opposers, was only that he was more acute and consequent than they. In the first place, he clearly and fully established the essential *difference* of the notions of succession and causation, notions which Locke had confounded for the sake of his system, and which every body continued to confound. Hume showed that the conception of cause, and of the relation of cause and

effect, could not be resolved into, or explained by, the notion of succession: they were two distinct and different conceptions. 2. He proved, beyond contradiction, that the idea of cause and effect is not derived from experience, either external or internal, from sensation or from reflection; but, 3. He still continued to hold, and seems not to have suspected the questionableness of, the grounding principle of Locke's system, that all our real knowledge must be derived from experience. Hence, 4. He was consistently led to deny the truth, the objective reality of the relation of cause and effect. He therefore explained it as a delusion of the imagination, the result of association and habit; as a very useful idea, having a *subjective* necessity and reality, (being held, that is *by us*, as true,) but having no *objective* reality, no reality but *to us*.

Thus, Hume, for want of elucidation on the third point, remained a sceptic. His opponents, Beattie, Oswald, and Priestley, were entirely unable to shed any light upon the subject; for they equally failed in perceiving the point to which criticism should have been directed.

But Kant, struck with the truth and profoundness of Hume's analysis and discrimination of the ideas of succession and cause, and the impossibility of deriving the latter from experience, was led directly to question the grounding principle of Locke's system, and thus to discern a way of avoiding the sceptical conclusion of Hume, and establishing the objective reality of the relation.

Upon investigation, he perceived that the idea of cause and effect was *not the only one* that is *applied to* experience, with the consciousness of its necessity, yet without being derived *from* experience. Hence, the very first position of his Critique of Pure Reason is, that we are in possession of knowledge, *a priori*; and the first sentence of his work contains the annunciation of the important distinction, that although all our knowledge *begins with* experience, yet it is not therefore all derived *from* experience.

NOTE O, p. 95.

See Laromiguière's *Leçons de Philosophie*, and also M. de Biran's *Examen des Leçons de M. Laromiguière*, Ch. 8, p. 140—152.

NOTE P, p. 95.

See *Examen*, p. 109, 110—151; also, M. de Biran's Article *Leibnitz*, p. 15, in the *Biographie Universelle*, tom. 23; also, the *Fragments* of Royer Collard, in Jouffroy's *Œuvres de Reid*, tom. 3 and 4.

NOTE Q, p. 102.

For illustration, you may suppose a hundred revolutions of a wheel in a hundred minutes. You can then *vary the two terms* (100 rev.=100 min.) in any way you please: e. g., varying the *second* term, you may suppose the hundred revolutions to take place in five, ten, or a thousand minutes (100 rev.=5 min., 100 rev.=10 min., 100 rev.=1000 min.); or, varying the *first* term, you can suppose five revolutions, or ten, or a thousand, made in the hundred minutes; or, varying *both* terms, sixty revolutions made in sixty seconds, &c. But the *relation* of this succession of revolutions to *time*, to some measure of time, is not variable. You cannot conceive of these revolutions as made in *no time*, or apart from the consideration of any time: it is impossible, it is contradictory.

NOTE R, p. 103.

Concrete numbers have reference to particular determinate objects or things, and are not taken apart from the notion of some particular objects; as, six balls, and ten balls, and two balls, are equal to eighteen balls. The numbers here are *concrete*. But when we say, six, and ten, and two, are equal to eighteen, ($6+10+2=18$), the numbers are *discrete*.

NOTE S, p. 107.

Cause and Effect. *Brown*.—It will be perceived that the discussion of Cousin on this subject, is a substantial refutation of the leading positions of Brown in his *Essay on Cause and Effect*.—Brown defines the relation of cause and effect, by “immediate and invariable antecedence and consequence.” A cause is nothing

more than "an immediate and invariable antecedent." This is only another form of resolving the idea of causation into succession. In the criticism of Brown's theory, the epithets "immediate and invariable," may and should be thrown off. The sole proper question is, whether antecedence and causation are the *same* idea. Otherwise, the only possible difference of the two ideas is presumed to consist, not in *kind*, but in *degree*. But if the ideas of *mere* antecedence and of causation can be shown to be *essentially* different, then no addition of the epithets "immediate and invariable" can elevate or change the idea of antecedent into that of cause. Brown is therefore bound to maintain the identity, in kind, of the idea of antecedence simply, with the idea of cause.

But this is a position contradicted by consciousness, by the usage of all languages, by every thing to which the decision of the question can be referred. The *universality* and *necessity* of the idea of cause, prove the contrary of Brown's position; and announce in the notion of cause and effect, a higher than a merely empirical character,—give it a pure, original character. It must, therefore, be regarded as a *LAW* of the mind, (considered as the faculty of knowing,) that we should refer things, so far as they are objects of knowledge for us, i. e., are phenomena of our perception, to one another in such a manner that the one determines the other, in respect to its essence and existence. Consequently, we must suppose an *objective* connection between them, answering to the *subjective* connection, or concatenation of phenomena in our minds.

If now the question be asked, how Brown came to confound antecedence and causation, the answer is not difficult. It arose from confounding the phenomenal with the pure,—phenomena with the original action of the mind,—the *occasion*, the *condition* of an idea, with the *idea itself*.

It is undoubtedly true, that the perception of some change, antecedence, succession, is the occasion and condition of the mind's forming the notion of cause, or of the evolution in the mind, of the principle of causality : *that every phenomenon has a cause*.

Still, the perception of a single change is sufficient for the development, in the mind, of this universal and necessary conviction. Consequently, Brown's epithets, "immediate and invariable," have no application in explaining the origin of the simple idea of

cause ; but only apply to the use of the principle of causality in experience ;—to the determination of *the* cause of a phenomenon for which the mind *necessarily* supposes *a* cause, even upon the *first* perception of it, and without any successive observations of “ immediate and invariable antecedence.” A single experience is sufficient to awaken the principle of causality, which is thenceforward of universal and necessary application, by the mind, to all phenomena. But in the *application* of this principle to *particular* phenomena, the mind may err. Several or many experiences may be necessary, in order to determine *what is the precise cause* of a given phenomenon. And here it is that the consideration of the *immediateness and invariableness* of a particular sequence comes in as the result of experience, as that which is *phenomenal*, and *determines* us to the *application* of the idea of cause, to the *particular* antecedent in question.

This distinction Brown seems to have failed to perceive : indeed, he seems to have had no distinct idea of the principle of causality ; and every thing of plausible and of true in his analysis of the notion of cause into that of “ immediate and invariable antecedence,” applies merely to the ulterior question concerning *the* cause in a given phenomenon, or the application of the necessary idea of cause and the principle of causality to particular phenomena.

But the truth is, that, in regard to any particular instance of causation, while the “ immediate and invariable antecedence” is all that is *phenomenal*, all that we *observe*, it is not all that we *believe*. It is the signal, the occasion, for the mind forming the idea and belief of something *more* and *different*, in regard to the given immediate and invariable antecedent, namely, that it is the *cause*. And this latter idea is discriminated from the other, by its character of necessity. The necessary is revealed to the mind in the phenomenal and contingent.

Brown’s whole argument—its falseness and its plausibility—may be explained by the simple statement, that when the conception of “ immediate and invariable antecedence” is presented to the mind, then also, in virtue of the mind’s own law of action, the idea and belief of a *cause* necessarily springs up, and connects itself with the former notion. Hence, the confusion of the two conceptions, unperceived by him, as also by many others to whom his analysis appears satisfactory.

NOTE T, p. 114.

Reference is here made to a discussion of the doctrine of Epicurus concerning virtue, page 297 of the first volume of this course. In the example as there given, there is however a very material element included, which is here omitted, the supposition, namely, that there is no future life. To the argument as here given, it might be objected, that, on the hypothesis of a future existence, the man who sacrifices his life upon the scaffold for the cause of truth, may make a very prudent calculation for his best interest. Still, the position that prudence is not the essence of virtue, (though virtue may be prudent,) and that what mankind admire in an act of virtue, is something more than the sagacious calculation of the agent for his interest, is unquestionable.

NOTE U, p. 115.

Moral Principles.—In his Program of a Course of Philosophy, Cousin classes the moral principles under the two general divisions of (*contingent* and *necessary* principles) the former of which, he observes, are not in fact principles, properly speaking, but sentiments, emotions, general indeed, but contingent and variable. They are referable to the two general moral instincts,—Expansion and Concentration.

Contingent Moral Principles.

The general principles which refer to the instinct of *expansion*, constitute what may be called the morality of sentiment, variable, and not obligatory.—The morality of pity, of sympathy, of benevolence, considered merely as sentiment or emotion.

The general principles which refer to the instinct of *concentration*, or self-love, constitute the morality of self-interest, variable, and not obligatory.

Fundamental principle of the morality of self-interest, in regard to an action to be performed: look only at its consequences relative to personal happiness.

The most important general principles which form the morality of self-interest:

Do right, abstain from wrong, from hope or fear of the rewards or penalties of civil society;—

Do right, abstain from wrong, from hope or fear of divine rewards or punishments ;

Do right, abstain from wrong, from fear of blame from others, and even of remorse, and in order to gain the pleasure of a good conscience and internal happiness.

All these contingent general principles relate to the sensibility, and have respect only the individual, to the self.

Necessary Principles.

There is within us a moral principle which is necessary and universal, which embraces all times and all places, the possible as well as the real,—principle of right and wrong. This principle distinguishes and qualifies actions. Moral reason.

Special characteristic of this principle : Obligation.—The moral law.

Enunciation of the moral law : Do right for the sake of right ; or rather, Will the right for the sake of right. Morality has to do with the intentions.

The moral principle being universal, the sign, the external type by which a resolution may be recognized as conformed to this principle, is the impossibility of not erecting the immediate motive of the particular act or resolution into a maxim of universal legislation.—Moral casuistry. *Fragmens Philosophiques*, p. 248—250.

NOTE V, p. 116.

Principle of Merit and Demerit.—"Not only do we unceasingly aspire after happiness, as sensitive beings, but when we have done right, we judge, as intelligent and moral beings, that we are worthy of happiness.—Necessary principle of merit and demerit,—the origin and foundation of all our ideas of reward and punishment ;—a principle perpetually confounded either with the desire of happiness, or with the moral law.

"Hence the question of the sovereign good,—*summum bonum*,—never yet solved. A single solution has been sought for a complex question, from not possessing the two principles capable of solving it.

"The Epicurean solution : Satisfaction of the desire for happiness.

"The Stoic solution : Fulfilment of the moral law.

“The true solution is in the harmony [or connexion] of virtue and happiness, as merited by it; for the two principles are not equivalent: virtue is the antecedent. It is not alone the sole and sovereign good, but it is the chief good.” *Fragm. Phil.*, p. 251.

NOTE W, p. 118.

Foundation of Punishment.—Cousin here refers to his translation of the works of Plato Vol. III. argument of the Gorgias. We translate the passage which relates most directly to this subject; it will be read with interest.

“Publicists still seek for the foundation of penalty. Some, who regard themselves as enlightened politicians, find it in the utility of punishment for those who witness it, who are deterred from crime by its threatenings, and its preventive efficacy. This is indeed one of the effects of punishment, but not its foundation.—Others, through affectation of greater humanity, wish to consider the legitimacy of punishment as grounded wholly on its utility to him who endures it, by its corrective efficacy. This, again, is certainly one of the possible effects of punishment, but not its foundation; for in order that the punishment be corrective, it is necessary that it should be submitted to as just.—We are therefore always compelled to return to the idea of justice. Justice is the true foundation of punishment; personal and social utility is only a consequence. It is an undeniable fact, that after every wrong act, the unjust man thinks, and cannot but think, that he is ill-deserving, that is, is worthy of punishment. In the intelligence, the idea of punishment corresponds to that of injustice; and when the injustice has been committed in the social sphere, the punishment ought to be inflicted by society. Society can do it only because it ought. The right here has no other source than the duty to inflict—duty the most strict, the most evident and the most sacred,—without which this pretended right would be nothing but that of force, that is to say an atrocious injustice, even though it be to the moral advantage of him who received it, and a salutary spectacle for the people; which in fact could not then be the case, for the punishment would then find no sympathy, no echo, neither in the public conscience, nor in that of the individual punished. Punishment is not just because it is useful, as a preventive or a

corrective; but it is useful in either or both these ways, because it is just.—This theory of punishment, by demonstrating the falseness, the incomplete and exclusive character of the two theories which divide publicists, completes and explains them, and gives to both a centre and legitimate basis." *Cousin's PLATO*, Vol. iii. p. 167—169.

NOTE X, p. 119.

Divine Justice.—"When I turn my eyes from the spectacle of the external universe inward upon myself, the divine justice is revealed to me in the principle of justice implanted in my conscience. I say to myself: God having made the world, was behooved to make it according to the laws of supreme justice; so that if the external world were still more involved in darkness, and given up to apparent disorder, the absolute principle of justice, directed by that of causality, would lead me still to say with confidence: what I see, and what I do not see, every thing, is not only for the best, but it is all perfectly good, for it is ordered or permitted by a just and all powerful cause.

"The principle of justice, transferred from myself to God, sheds the light of justice upon the external world; the judgment of merit and demerit transferred from myself to God, affords me new light. The judgment of merit, passed by a moral being, pronounces that virtue is worthy of happiness. This judgment being absolute, has an absolute transcendental validity. Now, when once God is conceived by me as a moral being, supremely just, I cannot help conceiving that the absolute principle of merit and demerit includes God himself within its empire. The principle of merit and demerit thus transferred to God as just, I attribute to this just and all powerful God the obligation of re-establishing the legitimate harmony between happiness and virtue, infringed here below by external causes. God can re-establish it, if he wills; he wills it because he is supremely just, and he judges absolutely that virtue merits happiness. Conception of a future life."—*Fragm. Philos.* p. 257—258.

NOTE Y, p. 121.

Divine Government. Plato.—"God being goodness, rectitude itself, moral order taken substantially, it follows that all moral truths refer to him, as radii to a centre, as modifications to the subject which is the ground of their existence and which they manifest. So far therefore from being in contradiction, morality and religion are intimately connected with each other, both in the unity of their real principle and in that of the human mind which simultaneously forms the conception of them. But when Anthropomorphism, degrading theology to the drama, makes of the Eternal a God for the theatre, tyrannical and passionate, who from the height of his omnipotence arbitrarily decides what is right and what is wrong, it is then that philosophical criticism may and ought, in the interest of moral truths, to take authority from the immediate obligation which characterizes them, to establish them upon their own basis, independently of every foreign circumstance, independently even of their relation to their primitive source.—Such is the particular point of view in which the Euthyphron is to be regarded.—Socrates eagerly acknowledges that there is an essential harmony between morality and religion, that every thing which is right is pleasing to him whom we are behooved to conceive as the type and substance of eternal reason. But he inquires *why* right, the morally good, is pleasing to God; and if it might not be otherwise; if it is not possible that wrong, the morally evil, might be pleasing to him? No. Why is it then that the good cannot but be pleasing to God? It is, in the last analysis, solely because it is good; all other reasons that can be given always presuppose and return to this. It must therefore be admitted that good is not such because it pleases God, but it pleases God because it is good; and consequently it is not in religious doctrines that we are to look for the primitive title of the legitimacy of moral truths. These truths, like all others, legitimate themselves, and need no other authority than that of Reason which perceives and proclaims them. Reason is for itself its own sanction. This conception of the morally good, or to speak in the language of the time of Socrates, this conception of the *holy* in itself, disengaged from the external forms in which it may be clothed, from the circumstances which accompany it, and even from the

necessary consequences which are derived from it,—and considered in regard to what is peculiar and absolute in it, in its immediate grandeur and beauty, is an example of an *IDRA* in the system of Plato.” *Cousin’s Plato. Argument of the Euthyphron*, Vol. i.

NOTE Z, p. 132.

Of Language.—“ Nothing leads to more vicious reasoning in a circle than habituation to logical abstractions which commonly bring you back to the point from which you started. M. de Tracy, inquires why the brute has no signs. It is, says he, because the brute is not capable of distinguishing the particular sensations contained in a complex sensation ; but as the animal could not perform this operation without signs, it follows that the brute has no signs because he has no signs.

It is absurd to say that man does not think but by means of signs, unless it is added that he has no signs, but because he thinks. Signs do not create our faculties. They presuppose an anterior intentional activity, which had the power to create them because it willed it ; and it is to this productive will that we are to refer, and not to the signs which exist only as its products.

Why does not the brute think ? Because he has no signs, say some. But why has he no signs ? Because he does not think ; and he does not think because he does not will, that is, does not produce voluntarily ; and consequently what he does, not being an effect which he can distinguish from its cause, he is always under the law of passive affection, he has not, and consequently does not conceive of an intention, and cannot attach a metaphysical signification to a material sound.

Man is essentially a free force, that is the title of his dignity, the origin, or at least the condition of all his knowledge. There is activity in all knowledge, and all activity is essentially free. Rest is not of action, but of motion. Our true power is our will. If man did not will, he could do nothing. He could do nothing more than the brute, that is, nothing more than the universal force of nature, with the aid of external circumstances and internal correspondences or susceptibilities should determine in him, by impressions and motions purely organic. Among these motions is to be reckoned the primitive language, every involuntary and ir-

reflective sign. If the systematic imagination should lend them characteristics of which they are entirely destitute, and as perfect as they are supposed to be, yet, considered apart and in themselves, they could never serve as the means of recalling or communicating thought ; they would never even be signs ; they would be precisely as though they were not, unless, as is commonly said with sufficient justness, man had not some thought to give them to signify ; or rather, unless he had the power of appropriating them to himself, and of perceiving them ; for every thing unperceived is null, and void of significance. Now the essential condition of all apperception is internal activity. This personal and fundamental action is what the scholastic writers call the substantial form of existence. It is not the apperception which constitutes ourselves ; it is rather we ourselves who constitute the apperception. Where the internal action is wanting, the apperception fails, and there is nothing for us. In vain would the animal within us utter its cries, and execute a thousand motions ; knowing nothing, because it knows not itself ; and not knowing itself because it has never acted or willed, it could never know neither that itself, nor, a fortiori, any other being had *produced* an external motion, and still less that it had *willed* to execute it, and that this motion reflected a sentiment, an idea. It is not, then, the power of speech and of signs, considered in themselves, that produces the miracles which now astonish us, and in the splendor of which, speech and language conceal their origin. For, take away human activity, and this mysterious power is reduced to nothing. Let the activity remain, however, let it perceive the cries, the gestures, which, so far as they are foreign to it, are insignificant in themselves. It perceives them : soon it comes to repeat them freely, and then to appropriate them to itself ; renders them significant for the mind which comprehends them, because it produced them, and produced them since it freely repeated them ; for every voluntary repetition is a true production. See in this way signs invented ; the intelligent activity has nothing more to do but to perfect them, to modify, to vary, to combine them, and to make them in the sequel for the mind, those means of recollection, of communication, and even of ulterior production, so active and so powerful, since they are the depositaries of all the activity and of all the power of the voluntary and free intelligence, of which they are at once the ef-

fects and the instruments. Signs, language, are nothing in themselves. They are nothing but what the will makes them to be : and in this, as in many other cases, it is a hard thing to hear the effects every where celebrated, when the cause is neglected, or misconceived, or denied. Let it be considered, the theory which we have combatted goes no less than to make man the product of language ; but the man of such a theory is nothing but a machine, which language makes use of more or less skilfully,—while the latter comes, we know not from whence. Is not this truly suicidal ?”—*Fragments Philosophiques*, p. 168—172.

NOTE AA. p. 162.

Theory of perception.—On the subject of this chapter the reader is referred to a very able article on the “Philosophy of Perception,” in the *Edinburgh Review*, No. 103, for Oct. 1830, in which the doctrines of Reid and Brown are examined. We regard this article as one of the best specimens of philosophical criticism that has recently appeared in the English language. It shows great power of thinking,—great comprehension and great acuteness, united with an extent, a depth and accuracy of erudition, seldom met together.—The writer shows that our knowledge of the external world,—the qualities of matter, is direct and immediate. “*Consciousness declares our knowledge of material qualities to be intuitive.*—Nor is the fact, as given, denied even by those who disallow its truth.” “According,” says he, “as the *truth* of the fact of consciousness in perception is *entirely* accepted, accepted in part, or *wholly* rejected, *six* possible and actual systems of philosophy result.

“1. If the veracity of consciousness be unconditionally admitted,—if the intuitive knowledge of mind and matter, and the consequent reality of their antithesis be taken as truths, to be explained if possible, but in themselves are held as paramount to all doubt, the doctrine is established which we would call the scheme of *Natural Realism* or *Natural Dualism*.—2. If the veracity of consciousness be allowed to the equipoise of the object and subject in the act, but rejected as to the reality of their antithesis, the system of *Absolute Identity* emerges, which reduces both mind and matter to phenomenal modifications of the same common substance.—3

and 4. If the testimony of consciousness be refused to the co-existence of the subject and object, two schemes are determined, according as the one or the other of the terms is placed as the original and genetic. Is the object educed from the subject, *Idealism*; is the subject educed from the object, *Materialism*, is the result.—5. Again, is the consciousness itself recognised only as a phenomenon, and the substantial reality of both subject and object denied, the issue is *Nihilism*.

"6. These systems are all conclusions from an original interpretation of consciousness in perception, carried intrepidly forth to its legitimate issue. But there is one scheme which, violating the integrity of this fact, and, with the idealist, regarding the object of consciousness in perception as only a modification of the percipient subject, endeavors, however, to stop short of the negation of an external world, the reality of which, and the knowledge of whose reality, it seeks to establish and explain by various hypotheses. This scheme, which we would term *Hypothetical Realism* or *Hypothetical Dualism*, although the most inconsequent of all systems has been embraced, under various forms, by the immense majority of philosophers." All the possible forms of Hypothetical Realism, or the representative theory, are reducible, in the opinion of the writer, to three, and these have all been actually maintained.

1. The representative object not a modification of mind.
2. The representative object a modification of mind, dependant for its knowledge, but not for its existence, on the act of consciousness.
3. The representative object a modification of mind, non-existent out of consciousness;—the idea and its perception only different relations of an act (state) really identical.

Of the six possible systems above given, it is then shown that Reid held the first, that of *natural realism*; while Dr. Brown held the last, that of *hypothetical realism*; and of its three forms, adopted the *third*. The writer fully makes out his case, "that Brown's interpretation of the fundamental tenet of Reid's philosophy, is not a simple misconception, but an absolute reversal of its real and even unambiguous import,—and is without a parallel in the whole history of philosophy."

The writer goes on to demonstrate Brown's inadequate conception of the problem in question, his ignorance of the history of opinions on the subject, and his remarkable misconception of the

The representative object a sensation—produced by cause out of the mind, which sensation is also arising out of the mind—conceived as produced by a cause which is within the mind and recognised as produced by a cause which is within the mind.

very writers whom he criticises. In regard to the latter point, among other philosophers Locke is mentioned; and it is principally for the sake of adducing the passage in regard to Locke's theory of perception, that we have introduced this note.

"Supposing always that ideas were held to be something distinct from their cognition, Reid states it as that philosopher's opinion, [Locke's,] that images of external objects were conveyed to the brain; but whether he thought with Descartes" [*lege omnino* Dr. Clarke,] "and Newton, that the images in the brain are perceived by the mind there present, or that they are imprinted on the mind itself, is not so evident." This, Dr. Brown, nor is he original in the assertion, pronounces a flagrant misrepresentation. Not only does he maintain that Locke never conceived the idea to be substantially different from the mind, as a material image in the brain, but that he never supposed it to have an existence apart from the mental energy of which it is the object. Locke, he asserts, like Arnauld, considered the idea perceived, and the percipient act, to constitute the same indivisible modification of the conscious mind. We shall see.

"In his *language*, Locke is, of all philosophers, the most figurative, ambiguous, vacillating, various, and even contradictory, as has been noticed by Reid, and Stewart, and Brown himself; indeed, we believe by every author who has had occasion to comment on this philosopher. The opinions of such a writer are not therefore to be assumed from isolated and casual expressions which themselves require to be interpreted on the general analogy of his system; and yet, this is the only ground on which Dr. Brown attempts to establish his conclusions. Thus, on the matter under discussion, though *really* distinguishing, Locke *verbally* confounds the objects of sense and of intellect,—the operation and its object,—the object immediate and mediate,—the object and its relations,—the images of fancy and the notions of understanding. Consciousness is converted with Perception,—Perception with Idea,—Idea with the Object of Perception, and with Notion, Conception, Phantasm, Representation, Sense, Meaning, &c. Now, his language, identifying ideas and perceptions, appears conformable to a disciple of Arnauld; and now, it proclaims him a follower of Digby,—explaining ideas by mechanical impulse, and the propagation of material particles from the external reality to the brain. In

one passage, the idea would seem an organic affection,—the mere occasion of a spiritual representation ; in another, a representative image in the brain itself. In employing thus indifferently the language of every hypothesis, may we not suspect that he was anxious to be made responsible for none ? One, however, he has formally rejected, and that is the very opinion attributed to him by Dr. Brown,—that the idea or object of consciousness in perception, is only a modification of the mind itself.”

A passage is then quoted from Locke's *Examination of Mallebranche's Opinion*, published subsequently to his Essay, expressly establishing this assertion. It is too long to give here. The reviewer concludes : “If it be thus evident that Locke held neither the *third* form of representation,—that lent to him by Brown,—nor even the *second* ; it follows that Reid did him any thing but injustice, in supposing him to maintain that ideas are objects *either* in the *brain*, or in the *mind* itself. Even the *more material* of these alternatives has been the one generally attributed to him by his critics, and the one adopted from him by his disciples. Nor is this to be deemed an opinion too monstrous to be entertained by so enlightened a philosopher. It was, as we shall see, the common opinion of the age,—the opinion, in particular, held by the most illustrious of his countrymen and cotemporaries,—by Newton, Clarke, Willis, Hook, &c.”

NOTE BB, p. 184.

Innate Ideas.—The whole system of Locke is built upon a confusion of ideas. The comprehending sophism from which it derives all its plausibility, is the mistaking the *conditions* of a thing for its causes and essence. The exhaustion of the air from a receiver, is the *condition* of the falling in equal time, of a guinea and a feather ; but gravitation is the *cause* of the phenomenon. To any one to whom this distinction is clear, and who will apply it to the discussion concerning *innate ideas* in Locke's first book, it cannot but appear surprising that he should ever have gravely instituted such a *polemique*, or that it should ever have gained such celebrity. This has, we trust, been rendered sufficiently evident from the discussions of this work, and particularly in the first chapters, where the distinction between the logical and chronologi-

cal order of knowledge is unfolded and applied. "The first book of Locke's Essay," says Coleridge, "(if the supposed error which it labors to subvert, be not a mere thing of straw, an absurdity which no man ever did or ever could believe,) is formed on a *σophισμα ερισπολητικόν*, and involves the old mistake of *cum hoc : ergo, propter hoc*. We learn all things indeed by *occasion* of experience; but the very facts so learnt, force us inward upon antecedents, that must be presupposed, in order to render experience itself possible." "The position of the Aristotelians: *Nihil in intellectu, quod non prius in sensu*, on which Locke's Essay is grounded, is irrefragable: Locke erred only in taking half the truth for a whole truth."

Experience (sensation and reflection) is the occasion and condition of all knowledge, but not the ground and source of all knowledge. The notion of space, for instance, would never have been formed, if the notion of body had not first been derived from sensation. By occasion of the former, the mind is awakened to the idea of the latter; and, of itself,—in its own proper action, and by its own laws, forms the idea of space. If this were all that Locke meant in refuting innate ideas, he refuted what nobody can distinctly believe. If he meant more than that experience is the necessary occasion, the condition, of all knowledge, he asserts what is false. As to any thing else, his first book is idle and nugatory.

While, therefore, all our knowledge begins *with* Experience, while no knowledge precedes Experience, it does not therefore follow, as Kant well observes, that all our knowledge springs *from* experience. It may still be the fact, that even our empirical knowledge is compounded partly of that which we *receive* through impressions, and partly of that which the understanding *produces of itself*, barely through *occasion* of sensible impressions. This we hold to be the true explanation. The understanding, when called into exercise by and upon the data of experience, is, in virtue of certain previous laws of its activity, *itself the source* of much of our knowledge,—knowledge which we could never derive *from* experience. Now these laws and original conceptions of the understanding, (known in our modern English philosophy as first principles, necessary truths, &c.,) are sometimes called *constituent forms* of the understanding, and knowledge *a priori*.

"They are called *constituent*, says Coleridge, because they are not *acquired* by the understanding, but they are implied in its con-

stitution. As rationally might a circle be said to acquire a centre and circumference, as the understanding to acquire these, its inherent *forms*, or ways of conceiving. This is what Leibnitz meant, when, to the old adage of the Peripatetics : *nihil in intellectu, quod non prius in sensu*,—he replied : *præter intellectum ipsum*.”

They are also, we have said, called knowledge *a priori*.—“ This phrase,” as Coleridge remarks, “ is in common most grossly misunderstood. By knowledge *a priori*, we do not mean that we can know any thing previously to experience, which would be a contradiction in terms ; but that, having once known by occasion of experience, (i. e. something acting upon us from without,) we then know that it must have pre-existed, or the experience itself would have been impossible. By experience only, I know that I have eyes ; but then my reason convinces me that I must have had eyes, in order to the experience.”

NOTE CC, p. 191.

Coincidence of Lord Bacon and Plato.—The remark concerning Bacon, requires some explanation for those who are accustomed to consider Bacon as really the father of the Sensual school, in the sense of being strictly and exclusively Empirical, and opposed to all *a priori* principles of investigation and knowledge. Amidst the many common-places about Bacon, and the Inductive philosophy, and the Experimental method, which have obtained currency and popular credence, an erroneous impression has been taken up, as if there was a radical opposition between Bacon and the elder philosophy, and Plato in particular. For the correction of this erroneous opinion, we refer the reader to Coleridge's *Friend*, Essay 8th, p. 204, Lond. edition ; also, Essay 5th, p. 166, note ;—where it is shown that the doctrine of the *Novum Organum* agrees in all essential points with the true doctrine of Plato, that “ the distinction between Plato and Lord Bacon is simply this : that philosophy being necessarily bi-polar, Plato treats principally of the truth as it manifests itself at the *ideal* pole, as the science of intellect (i. e., *de mundo intelligibili*) ; while Bacon confines himself, for the most part, to the same truth as it is manifested at the other, or material pole, as the science of nature (i. e., *de mundo*

sensibili):—that a LAW and an IDEA are correlative terms, and differ only as object and subject, as being and truth.”

The true sense of cogito, ergo sum.—[The following extract from Cousin's Philosophical Fragments, relates to page 200, and was by mistake referred to this note.]

Referring to Stewart's remarks on this celebrated enthymeme of Descartes, and on the *petitio principii* with which he has been charged, Cousin observes that “Stewart is correct; Descartes did not mean to indicate a process of logical deduction by his *ergo*. He knew that he did not reason; and he declares it expressly. He knew the intellectual process which reveals our personal existence to ourselves; and he describes it with as much or more precision than any of his adversaries. This process is not, according to Descartes, *reasoning*, but reason itself, one of those pure, immediate, and absolute conceptions which, a century after Descartes, were rendered celebrated by Reid and Kant, under the title of *Constituent principles* of the human mind, and *intellectual categories*.

Before Spinoza and Reid, Gassendi had attacked the enthymeme of Descartes. “The proposition, *I think, therefore I am*, supposes,” says Gassendi, “this major: *that which thinks, exists*; and consequently involves a begging of the question.” To this Descartes replies: “I do not beg the question, for I do not suppose any major. I maintain that the proposition: *I think, therefore I exist*, is a particular truth, which is introduced into the mind without recourse to any more general truth, and independently of any logical deduction. It is not a prejudice, but a natural judgment, which at once and irresistibly strikes the intelligence.” “The notion of existence,” says he, in his reply to other objections, “is a primitive notion, not obtained by any syllogism, but evident in itself; and the mind discovers it by intuition.”—Reasoning does not logically deduce existence from thought; but the mind cannot think without knowing itself, because being is given in and under thought: *cogito, ergo sum*. The certainty of thinking does not go before the certainty of existence; it contains and envelopes it: they are two contemporaneous verities blended in one fundamental verity. This fundamental, complex verity is the sole principle of the Cartesian philosophy.”—*Fragmens Philos.*, 314—321.

NOTE DD, p. 233.

Leibnitz. Faith and Reason.—The following passage is from the *Nouveaux Essais* of Leibnitz. It is curious and interesting. “I find something to remark on your [Locke’s] definition of that which is above reason, at least if you take the received usage of this word; for it seems to me, that, from the manner in which that definition is framed, it goes too far on one side.—I approve very strongly of your disposition to found faith in reason; for without this, why should we prefer the Bible to the Koran, or to the sacred books of the Bramins? This is recognized by theologians and other learned men; and hence it is, that we have such excellent treatises on the truth of the Christian religion, and so many fine arguments put out against the pagans and other infidels, ancient and modern. Hence, also, enlightened men have always held as suspicious, those persons who have pretended that it is not necessary to put one’s self to the trouble of reasons and proofs, when the question is about believing; a thing impossible, in fact, unless believing signify reciting or repeating, and then letting pass away, without troubling ourselves to understand, which many persons do, and which is also characteristic of some nations more than of others. This is why some Aristotelian philosophers of the 15th and 16th centuries, wishing to maintain two contrary truths, the one philosophical, the other theological, were rightly opposed by the last Lateran council, under Leo X. A similar dispute formerly arose at Helmstadt, between Hoffman, the theologian, and Martin, the philosopher; but with this difference, that the philosopher would conciliate philosophy with religion, while the theologian wished to reject the use of it. But the founder of the university, the Duke Julius, decided in favor of philosophy. It is fact, indeed, that in our times, a person of the highest eminence has declared, in respect to articles of faith, that it was necessary to shut the eyes in order to see clearly; and Tertullian says somewhere, this is impossible, therefore it is true; it is to be believed, for it is an absurdity. But if the intention of those who express themselves in this way, is good, the expressions themselves are extravagant, and may do hurt.—Faith is grounded on the motives to belief, and on the internal grace which determines the mind immediately. It must be allowed that there are many judgments

more evident than those which depend on these grounds or motives of credibility. Some are further advanced in a knowledge of them than others, and there are many persons even, who have never known, and still less weighed, and consequently have not any thing that can be called the [external] ground, or evidence of their faith. But the internal grace of the Holy Spirit supplies it immediately.—It is true that God never gives it, but where the faith which it produces is in something that is really grounded in reason, otherwise he would destroy the means of knowledge; but it is not necessary that all those who have this divine faith should know those reasons or evidences, and still less that they should have them always before their eyes; for in such a case, feeble minded persons and idiots could never have true faith, and the most enlightened would not have it when they might stand most in need of it, for they could not always recollect the reasons for believing.—The question of the use of reason in theology has been greatly agitated, as much between the Socinians and the Catholics, as between the Reformed and the Lutherans.—We may say that the Socinians go too far in rejecting every thing that is not conformed to the order of nature, even when they cannot prove its impossibility; but their adversaries go too far in sometimes urging mysteries to the borders of contradiction, by which they injure the truth they wish to defend.—How can faith establish any thing that overthrows a principle, without which all belief, affirmation, or denial, would be vain? But it seems to me there still remains a question, which the authors of whom I speak have not sufficiently examined. It is this: Suppose that on the one hand we have the literal sense of a passage of Scripture, and on the other a great appearance of logical impossibility, or, at least, of acknowledged physical impossibility; is it more reasonable to hold to the literal sense, or to the philosophical principle? It is certain that there are passages in which we have no hesitation in departing from the literal sense, as when, &c.—It is here that the rules of interpretation come in.—The two authors of whom I speak, (Musaeus and Videlius,) still dispute concerning the attempt of Kekerman to demonstrate the Trinity by reason, as Raymond Lully had attempted before. But Musaeus acknowledges with great fairness, that if the demonstration of the reformed author had been good and sound, he should have had nothing to say; and that the author would have been right in

maintaining that the light of the Holy Spirit could be increased by philosophy."

NOTE EE, p. 235.

See Introduction to the History of Philosophy, translated by Linberg, Lect. 6.—On this subject Fenelon has the following exquisite passage: *Existence of God*, Part I. ch. IV. *Of Human Reason*. "In truth, my reason is in me, for it is necessary that I should continually turn inward upon myself in order to find it; but the higher reason, which corrects me when I need it, and which I consult, is not my own, it does not make a part of myself. Thus, that which might seem the most our own, and to be the very foundation of our being, I mean our reason, is that which least belongs to us, which we are to believe the most borrowed. We receive continually, and at every moment, a reason superior to ourselves, as we continually breathe an air which is not of ourselves; or, as we constantly see the objects around us by the light of the sun, whose rays do not belong to our eyes.—There is an internal school, where man receives what he can neither acquire himself, nor learn from other men who live by alms like himself. Where is this perfect reason which is so near me, and yet so distinct and different from me? Where is this Supreme reason? Is it not God himself, the being for whom I am inquiring?"—This is beautiful. See also Bossuet, *Introduction to Philosophy*, ch. IV. sect. 5—9; and the entire system of Malebranche, whose "Vision in God" comes to the same thing.

NOTE FF, p. 237.

Impersonality of Reason. Inspiration.—"Such is the original fact of affirmation, anterior to all reflection and without any negation; it is this fact which the human race have called inspiration. Inspiration is, in all languages, distinguished from reflection; it is the perception of truth, (I mean, of essential and fundamental truths) without the intervention of volition and of individual personality. Inspiration belongs not to us. We are but simple spectators of the fact; we are not agents; at least, all our agency consists in being made conscious of what passes in our view; in

this, there is, doubtless, already some activity ; but it is not an activity reflected upon, voluntary, and personal. The characteristic mark of inspiration is enthusiasm ; it is accompanied with that forcible emotion, which bears the soul away from its ordinary and subaltern state, and disengages from it, the sublime and godlike portion of its nature :

Est Deus, in nobis, agitante calescimus illo.

In effect, when man is conscious of the wondrous fact of inspiration and enthusiasm, and feels himself unable to refer it to himself, he refers it to God ; and gives to this original and pure affirmation the name of revelation. Is the human race wrong ? When man, conscious of his feeble intervention in the fact of inspiration, refers to God the truths which he has not made, and which rule over him,—does he deceive himself ? No, certainly not ; for what is God ? I have told you ; he is thought in itself, with its fundamental momenta ; he is eternal reason, the substance and the cause of the truths which man perceives. When man therefore refers to God that truth which he cannot refer either to this world, or to his own personality, he refers it to Him to whom he ought to refer it : and the absolute affirmation of truth, without reflection—inspiration—enthusiasm, is veritable revelation. This is the reason why in the cradle of civilization, the man who, in a higher degree than his fellow creatures, possesses the marvellous gift of inspiration, passes in their sight, for the trusted friend and interpreter of God. He is so, in respect to others, because he is so in respect to himself ; and he is so in respect to himself, because in a philosophic sense, he is so in fact : and this is the sacred origin of prophecies, pontificates, and of religious rites." *Introduction to the History of Philosophy*. Lect. 6. p. 165. Am. Ed.

NOTE GG, p. 240.

"I am happy" says Cousin at this place, "to confirm an opinion so dear to me by the greatest authority that I recognize among the moderns, that of Leibnitz. The following is his reply on this point to Locke : 'the justice you would do to the human race does not turn to its credit ; for men would be much more excusable in following their opinions sincerely, than in counterfeiting them from motives

of interest. Perhaps however there is more sincerity in point of fact than you seem to accord ; for without any knowledge of the cause, they may have come to exercise an implicit faith by submitting themselves generally and sometimes blindly, but always in good faith, to the judgment of others whose authority they have once recognized. It is true that the advantage they may find in it may contribute something to producing this submission ; but this may not prevent their opinions being heartily entertained."

NOTE HH, p. 241.

The reader is referred to Vol. I. of the course of Lectures of which this work forms a part, Lect. 8th for a view of Grecian philosophy from the time of Plato and Aristotle to the Alexandrian school.

NOTE II, p. 248.

"Thus, to explain my position by a common example, to have the eyes open before a book of mathematics ; to perceive the impression of the characters ; to be affected by all the sensations which come from the presence of the book, is a condition and even an indispensable preliminary, of the mind's discovering the intellectual and mathematical sense contained in it. Moreover it is necessary that the voluntary activity, which is profoundly distinct from the sensibility, should add itself to it, and direct itself to the pages placed before the eyes ; it is necessary that the attention, wakeful and strict, should remove the diverse sensations, images, ideas, all the distractions which may interpose between the mind and the book ; as soon as the eye ceases to see, and the attention fails, the mind pauses and ceases to comprehend. To feel and to will, are therefore necessary in order to comprehend ; but while admitting the necessity of the second condition as well as the first, it is not necessary to believe that the will is any thing else than the condition of intelligence, that it is the principle of it ; this would be, it is true, a very common confusion, but not very philosophical. The fact of the perception of the truth is veiled beneath the more apparent facts of sensation and volition, and the more easily conceals itself from the consciousness as it is more intimate to it : but

this fact is not the less real ; it even contains the most elevated part of human nature. The understanding is a special faculty which has its principle only in itself, even as the will and the sensibility. To judge of the true and the false, of right and wrong, are acts which have nothing to be confounded with those of the will, although a voluntary and free being alone can perform them. I will, or I do not will, I give my attention or do not give it ; here all is in my power, and nothing takes place but at my pleasure : but it is not so in regard to judgment. Undoubtedly, I can judge, or not judge, in this sense, that I can fulfil, or not, the fundamental condition of all judgment, namely attention. But as soon as this condition is fulfilled, then appears a fact different from the former, and whose characteristics are altogether opposite ; the first is free, the second is not. This second fact, undecomposable and simple, is the perception of truth ; a perception that is irresistible, whose light breaks upon the mind necessarily, whenever we freely place ourselves in a state to perceive. Thus, to recur to the example already employed, every man is free to study or not to study Arithmetic, that is, to direct or not to direct his attention to this subject ; some do it, others do not ; but as soon as one directs his attention to this matter, and has studied it sufficiently, it is then certain that he perceives various relations of numbers. We do not make these relations ; for they would then vary at the caprice of the will that made them ; consequently the will does not intervene in their perception : we do not make them, we say ; we do not constitute, we perceive them." *Fragmens Philosophiques* p. 32—34.

NOTE JJ, p. 251.

[Inserted by mistake.]

NOTE KK, p. 258.

Doctrine concerning the Will and Freedom.—In this discussion, Cousin *presumes* the Freedom of the Will, in opposition to the doctrine of Philosophical Necessity, as maintained by many English and American philosophers and theologians. This is obvious throughout, and particularly from his definition of Liberty, as referring to "those acts which we perform with the consciousness of

doing them, and of being able not to do them," at the same time.—By this, he obviously does not mean to assert,—and he does not think it necessary to say that he does not,—that this consciousness always and necessarily accompanies the act of the will at the moment of its performance; because we may sometimes not *reflect* at all about it. But that such a conviction is inseparable from every free act, is apparent to every one who will *reflect*, that is, observe his consciousness.

It may be doubted whether Cousin has rightly taken up Locke on one part of this subject. Though the system of Locke involves the necessarian scheme of the will, and in strict logical consistency results in the destruction of freedom; yet Locke's denial of freedom to the will, can in propriety be made only a verbal question: for what he denies to the *will*, he expressly attributes to *man*. Nothing, therefore, in regard to the question concerning Liberty and Necessity, in the ordinary sense of these terms, can be argued from the distinction made by Locke. The proper question is, whether that kind of liberty which Locke attributes to man [and not to his will] is Necessarianism or Self-determination.

It may be doubted, also, whether the process of voluntary action, as described by Cousin, be sufficiently *general* to include all cases;—whether, in *every instance*, there is such a process of deliberation, preference, choice, as he describes to be the condition and antecedent of the pure act of willing. This, however, will invalidate neither the general conclusion that liberty is to be sought for in the Will, and not in the Sense nor Intellect, nor his subsequent reasoning; because the act of *willing*, to which liberty will not be denied, if it is allowed or pretended any where, is an element of universal consciousness in the complex process of action; whether the limits where necessity ceases and liberty begins, be made a little too broad or too narrow; and of course necessarians, while making the *whole* complex process necessary, cannot quarrel with the concession that a *part* is so.

The great question on this subject, doubtless is, whether the will, in all its particular volitions, is *necessarily* determined by causes from without:—whether the will, in its acts, is subjected to the law of necessity, equally with the phenomena of the outward world. This is the only question of material importance. If this be not the question, then there is nothing in question worth con-

tending about. Those who hold the Freedom of the will, in opposition to the Necessarian scheme, maintain that the will is itself the efficient cause of its own volitions ;—that it is not determined by any necessity *ab extra* ; that it is not subjected to the mechanism of cause and effect. They hold an essential difference between Nature and Spirit,—and that this difference is, that the former *is*, and the latter is *not*, subjected to the law of necessity. They hold Freedom and Necessity to be incompatible, exclusive of each other ; that the Necessarian doctrine destroys the difference in kind, between Nature and Spirit, between Freedom and Mechanism. They regard Freedom as the essential attribute and characteristic of the Will, and hold that the very idea of Freedom, both in itself, and as the principle of personality and the foundation of moral responsibility, excludes any such necessary determination as is maintained by the necessarians. They hold that the will is a Law to itself, and not subjected to a Law out of itself. Like other powers, however, *conditions* of its action are requisite. These conditions are what is commonly included in the word *motives*. Motives are the occasion, the *condition* of volitions, but not the *cause* of them.

The whole necessarian scheme is grounded upon the *assumption* that the will is not a law to itself, but is subjected, equally with external nature, to a law out of itself. The whole necessarian argument proceeds upon the confusion of the *conditions* of volition with its *cause*, upon the *assumption* that motives stand to volition, in the relation of cause to effect ; and involves the old sophism : *quod hoc, ergo, propter hoc*. Now motives may be allowed to be the universal and necessary *condition* of all special determinations of the will, i. e., of all particular volitions ; and yet it would by no means *therefore* follow that those volitions are necessarily determined, produced, caused by the motives. Though man never acts *without* motives, it would not necessarily follow that his actions are caused by motives ; for the motives may be simply the occasion and condition of his volitions : and it would remain to be proved that they are any thing more. Unless they do this, Necessarians beg the very thing in question, which is, not whether there is a constant and necessary co-presence of motives whenever a particular volition is so and not otherwise, but whether those motives stand in a relation of a *cause* to the volition being so and

not otherwise, or only in the relation of a *condition* to the acting of the will, while the will of itself, as an efficient power and the principle and cause of its own volitions, determines the particular volition so and not otherwise. In an exhausted receiver, a guinea and a feather will fall through an equal space in the same time; but it would be absurd, in strict language, to call the exhaustion of the air the *cause* of the phenomenon: it is only the occasion and condition, while the cause is gravitation.

In this view, the celebrated axiom of Edwards, "that the will is as the greatest apparent good," if it be taken to mean any thing more (as he unquestionably did take it) than that motives are the condition of volition, is reduced to the flat truism, that the will is as the will is.

In regard to the objections brought against the doctrine of Freedom, a few words may be offered.

The doctrine is said to involve the position, that *men act without motives*. This objection is already sufficiently disposed of. It is no more a part of the doctrine of Liberty than of Necessity. To pretend that man acts or wills without motive or reason, would be a contradiction; it would be to confound the human will with the animal instinct, where, reason being wanting, the will is merged in a higher law, of which it is an organ, instrument, or manifestation;—or rather where there is *no* will, in a proper sense of the word. That men act from reasons, with a motive, is fully asserted. It is only denied that these motives are the necessary causes of volition.—It is very true, that there are cases in which the maxim, *stat voluntas pro ratione*, holds good; that is, in the absence of other motives, the will decides for the sake of deciding. If a purse is filled with pieces of gold, and it is offered to me upon condition of saying correctly whether the number of pieces be *equal* or *unequal*, and I say *equal*, it may be solely because I *will* to say so; that is all the reason I can give. It is very much my interest to say something; but no interest may determine me to say equal, rather than unequal: and this very consideration of the absence of motives, may be sufficient to constitute the condition, or previous deliberation, required in order to the exercise of the free will. The presence of motives is fully admitted, as the condition of volition.

It is also objected, that *as every event must have a cause, if motives are not the cause of volitions, we have phenomena without a cause.*—Not to advert here to any higher considerations which might vacate the objection, it is sufficient to reply, that the consequence by no means follows. For it may be said the Will itself is the cause. The will is a faculty or power of acting, limited indeed, and conditioned ; but within its limits, and when its conditions are supplied, capable of acting, of determining itself in a special direction, that is, of originating particular volitions ; and therefore as truly a cause as God or a physical efficient. The will is a general power or faculty of acting, that is, of willing. Volitions are special actual exertions of this power, particular actual determinations of it. The latter are the effect, the former is their sole principle and cause. In this view, Edwards' famous *reductio ad absurdum* falls to pieces. His argument is, that if a given volition be not determined by motives as its cause, it must be without a cause ; or else it must be determined by a *previous volition*, and that by another, and so on, *ad infinitum*. But deny his inference ; lay your finger upon the given volition, or upon any one in the series, and call upon him to prove that the general faculty of willing is not a power adequate to the direct production of the given volition,—and his reduction is at an end, at all events, stopped, till he fulfil the demand.

But what, after all, is this pretended denial of causation charged upon the doctrine of free will ? So entirely the reverse of the fact, is the assumption made in the objection, that without the very liberty which necessarians deny, there would be no true causes. It is this alone which gives us the true notion of cause. It is precisely because the free agent determines himself, and is not determined, that he really produces an effect.

There is another objection made in the interest of Theology, and which, at the present day, attaches many to the doctrine of necessity : *that the doctrine of liberty contradicts divine prescience, and certainty in the moral government of the world.*

This objection is as old as Cicero, to go no farther back, and may be well enough presented in his words. " If the will is free, then Fate does not rule every thing ; if Fate does not rule every thing, then the order of all causes is not certain, and the order of things is no longer certain in the prescience of God ; if the order

of things is not certain in the prescience of God, then things will not take place as he foresees them ; and if things do not take place as he foresees them, there is in God no foreknowledge." St. AUGUSTINE may supply the answer : " Although the order of causes be certain to God, it does not follow that nothing depends upon our will ; for our wills themselves are in the order of causes which are certain to God, and which he foresees, because men's wills are also the causes of their actions ; so that he who has foreseen all causes, has also foreseen our wills which are the causes of our actions."* " If God foresees our will," says the same writer in another place, (*De libero arbitrio*, lib. iii. c. 3,) " as it is certain that he foresees it, there will therefore be the will ; and there cannot be a will if it is not free ; therefore this liberty is foreseen by God. Hence, his prescience does not destroy my liberty." The answer is certainly as good as the objection.

In short, as the knowledge which we have of present things, so far forth as knowledge imposes no necessity upon them, although it is certain that they are taking place as we see them ; so the prescience of God, which sees the *future* as the *present*, imposes no necessity upon future events or actions, although they will certainly take place as he foresaw them.

NOTE LL, p. 263.

[Inserted by mistake.]

NOTE MM, p. 269.

Descartes, who presented it in the 17th century, under a form at once the most rigid and the most paradoxical, believed he had created it ; but he owed it, without any doubt, to his previous studies, to scholastic tradition, and to St. Anselm.—St. Anselm was born in 1034, died 1109. His two most important works are, 1,

* Non est autem consequens, ut si Deo certus est omnium ordo causarum, ideo nihil sit in nostræ voluntatis arbitrio. Et ipse, quippe, nostræ voluntates in causarum ordine sunt, qui certus est Deo, ejusque præscientia continetur, quoniam et humanæ voluntates humanorum operum causæ sunt. Atque ita, qui omnes rerum causas præscivit, profecto in iis causas etiam nostras voluntates ignorare non potuit, quas nostrorum operum causas esse præscivit.—AUGUSTIN. *De Civitate Dei*, V, 9.

his *Monologium, seu exemplum meditandi de ratione fidei*. His method in this work consists in deducing all theological truths from a single point,—the essence of God.—The difference and plurality of the beautiful, the grand, the good, suppose a common measure, an ideal *One* of beauty, goodness, &c., a unity who is the essence of all beauty, goodness, &c. It must exist, for it is this which is the necessary form of every thing which exists.—The unity is anterior to the plurality, and is its root. *Est, ergo, aliquid unum, quod, sive essentia, sive natura, sive substantia, dicitur, optimum et maximum est, et summum omnium quæ sunt*. This unity is God: from hence St. Anselm deduces the whole system of theology.—2. The second work is entitled *Proslogium, seu fides querens intellectum*. The name of St. Anselm is attached to the argument which, solely from the idea of God, deduces the demonstration of his existence,—an argument which has experienced many changes of fortune. It was much derided in the 18th century, but in the 17th it was regarded as invincible. The *Proslogium* consists of twenty-six short chapters, and has for its motto this passage of Scripture, *The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God*. The argument is this: the most hardened Atheist has in his mind the idea of a highest good, beyond which he can conceive no other. Now this supreme good cannot exist solely in thought, for a still greater would then be possible to conceive; it must therefore exist out of the human mind; therefore God exists.—Without quoting St. Anselm, or the *Proslogium*, with which he was perhaps unacquainted, Descartes has reproduced this argument in his *Meditations*. Leibnitz has also brought forward the same argument under a form at once the most simple and precise. He refers the honor of it to St. Anselm.—See Cousin's *Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie*, Tom. I. p. 346—348.

NOTE NN, p. 270.

The following passage from the *Nouveaux Fragmens*, Art. *Xenophanes*, may be interesting.

“The Ionian and Pythagorean schools have introduced into Greek philosophy the two fundamental elements of all philosophy, namely, *Physics* and *Theology*. Thus we see philosophy in Greece in possession of the two ideas, upon which it altogether

proceeds,—the idea of the world, and that of God. The two extreme terms of all speculation being thus given, nothing remains but to find their relation. Now the solution which first presents itself to the human mind, preoccupied as it necessarily is with the idea of unity, is to absorb one of these two terms into the other,—to identify the world with God, or God with the world; and thus to cut the knot instead of untying it. These two exclusive solutions are both very natural. It is natural, when we feel the sentiment of life, and of that existence so diversified and so vast, of which we form a part; when we consider the extent of this visible world, and at the same time the harmony which reigns throughout, and the beauty which shines in every part, to pause where the senses and imagination are arrested, and to suppose that the beings of which this world is composed, are the only existences, that this great whole, so harmonious and so one, is the true subject and ultimate application of the idea of unity; in one word, that this whole, the universe, is God. Express this result in the Greek language, and you have Pantheism. Pantheism is the conception of the universe as the sole God.—On the other hand, when we discover that the apparent unity of the universe is only a harmony, and not an absolute unity, a harmony that admits an infinite variety, that strongly resembles a perpetual conflict and revolution, it is not less natural, in this point of view, to detach the idea of unity, which is indestructible within us, from the world; and, thus separated from the imperfect model of the visible world, to refer it to an invisible being placed above and beyond the world,—the sacred type of absolute unity, beyond which there is nothing to be conceived or sought after. Now when once we have arrived at the absolute unity, it is not easy to pass from it, and to comprehend how, the absolute unity being given as the principle, it is possible to arrive at the plurality as its consequence; for absolute unity excludes all plurality. Nothing remains, then, relatively to this consequence, but to deny, or at least to overlook it,—and to regard the plurality of this visible world as the unreal and delusive shadow of the absolute unity, which alone has existence, as a fall scarcely comprehensible, a negation and evil from which it is necessary to get free, in order to tend perpetually towards the only true being, the absolute unity, towards God. This system is the opposite of Pantheism. Give it any name you please, it is nothing


else than the idea of unity applied exclusively to God, as Pantheism is the same idea applied exclusively to the world. Now, to repeat once more, these two exclusive solutions of the fundamental problem are each equally natural, and this is so true, that they perpetually come up in all the great epochs of the history of philosophy; with modifications, however, due to the progress of time, but at the bottom always the same; so that it may be said with truth, that the history of their perpetual conflict and the alternate domination of one or the other, has been hitherto the history of philosophy itself. This is because these two solutions are intimately connected with the human mind, which perpetually reproduces them, with an equal inability to disconnect itself from the one or the other, and be at rest. In effect, neither of them, taken singly, satisfies the human mind; and these two opposite points of view, so natural, and consequently having so much the quality of continual existence and recurrence, exclusive as they respectively are of each other, are, for this reason, equally defective and insufficient.

* * * On both hands, equal error and equal danger, equal forgetfulness of human nature, equal forgetfulness of one essential side of the human mind, and of things. Between these two abysses, long has the good sense of the human race kept its way; far from schools and systems, the human race has long believed with equal certainty in God and in the world."—*Nouveaux Fragmens Philosophiques*, p. 69—73.

NOTE OO, p. 276.

Sankhya of Kapila.—See Cousin's *Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie*, Vol. I. Sect. 5. The sources from which Cousin principally drew, are the Memoirs of Colebrooke, published in the Transactions of the London Asiatic Society, from 1824 to 1827.—The *Sankhya* is an oriental system, embracing physics, psychology, dialectics, and metaphysics,—in short, a complete philosophy. The meaning of *Sankhya* is *λογος*, reason. Its author is Kapila. It is a system of Sensualism: starting from sensation as the principle of knowledge, and applying induction only to its phenomena, it results in materialism. Denying also the idea of cause, it comes out to fatalism and to atheism. Nor is this latter consequence

disguised. Kapila denies the existence of a personal God and of Providence, on the ground, that not being perceivable by the senses, nor deducible from sensation by induction, there is no legitimate ground for these truths. Intelligence is admitted; but only as an attribute of matter, and the God of Kapila is a sort of *anima mundi*, or soul of the world.



IDEA OF A SYSTEM OF METAPHYSICS.

[Program of a Course of Philosophy given in 1817.—From the *Fragments Philosophiques*, p. 230.]

System of the Subjective.—Psychology or Phenomenology. Of the Actual and of the Primitive.

OF THE ACTUAL.

Of the *psychological* method, or of internal observation.

Of the division and classification of human cognitions, according to the distinction of their actual characteristics.

Vices of many of the classifications. True classification : distinction of human cognitions, according to their characteristics of contingency or of necessity.

Theory of contingent principles. It is necessary to range under the class of contingent principles, those principles which force belief, though without implying a contradiction, [in the denial of them,] and which are therefore not necessary, but irresistible, natural beliefs, actual and primitive, instinctive ; such as the belief in the stability of the laws of nature, the perception of extension, &c., &c.

Theory of principles truly contingent, neither necessary nor irresistible, but solely general.

System of Empiricism ; of analysis, and its office. Refutation of Empiricism beyond the limits of the contingent.

Theory of necessary principles. Of the characteristics which accompany that of necessity. That every necessary principle is a synthesis. Of synthesis opposed to analysis, and distinguished from identity.

Questions concerning the enumeration of necessary judgments. Difficulty of the enumeration. That it has not been attempted by any philosopher before the 18th century. Leibnitz and Malebranche distinguish necessary truths from contingent truths, but without describing nor counting them.

HISTORICAL PART.

CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

Reid and Kant.

Exposition of the doctrine of Reid, concerning necessary truths or first principles. *Constituent laws of the human mind.*

By his own admission, Reid has not exhausted them.

Kant. Exposition of the Kantian necessary principles: *the forms of the sensibility, the categories of the Understanding and of the Reason.*

A complete list is not attempted in this course, but the attempt is made to describe with exactness the actual characteristics of the following principles :

Principle of substance thus announced : every quality supposes a subject, a real being.

Principle of unity : all plurality supposes unity.

Principle of causality ; every thing which begins to exist, has a cause.

Principle of final causes : every means supposes an end.

OF THE PRIMITIVE.

Of the order of the deduction of human cognitions, and of the order of their acquisition ; of the rational or logical order, and of the chronological or psychological order.

A knowledge is anterior to another in the logical order, in as far as it authorizes the other ; it is then its logical antecedent.

A knowledge is anterior to another, in the psychological order, in as far as it springs up before the other in the human mind ; it is then its psychological antecedent.

Hence the two-fold sense of the word *primitive* ; a knowledge may be primitive either logically, or psychologically.

This being laid down, we are to examine whether our actual cognitions, both contingent and necessary, are primitive, either logically or psychologically ; and if they are not, to ascertain the antecedents, logical or psychological, which they suppose.

THE LOGICAL PRIMITIVE.

Contingent *empirical* judgments have a logical primitive; the certainty of a general principle rests upon that of the determinate individual facts of which it is the generalization.

On the contrary, contingent, *not-empirical* judgments, and necessary judgments, have not, and cannot have a logical antecedent; no individual fact being sufficient to ground either the necessary, or the irresistible.


PSYCHOLOGICAL PRIMITIVE.

Both orders of contingent general judgments have their psychological primitive in a determinate individual fact.

Necessary judgments have also their determinate individual psychological primitive; for nothing is originally given us under a pure and universal type; but every primitive is individual and determinate; now, every psychological primitive being a determinate individual fact, and every individual fact being a fact of the *self*, it is in the *self*, that is, in the modifications and individual determinations of the self, perceived by consciousness, that we find the psychological origin of all our knowledge. The self, the centre of the sphere of intelligence.

But there is this difference between the primitive of an empirical *contingent* principle, and that of a *necessary* principle,—that the one has need of new individual determinate facts, more or less similar, and never identical—since they are all individual and determinate, in order to engender the contingent general principle, which is nothing else than the comparative result of a certain number of individual differences;—while, to engender the necessary principle, the determinate individual fact, which serves as its psychological antecedent, has no need of new facts, but already contains the principle whole and entire. In a word, *contingent* principles have their psychological primitive, the multiple in a succession of individual facts compared. *Necessary* principles have their psychological primitive in a single determinate fact.

The knot of the difficulty and of the apparent contradiction which here presents itself, is in this truth, the basis of the intellectual system, to wit, that every individual fact is a concrete, composed of two parts, of which the first is eminently individual and



determined in itself; and the second, individual and determinate in its contact with the first, is nevertheless considered in itself, neither individual nor determinate.

EXAMPLE.

The energy of my will produces an internal movement* which it is not necessary here to describe with precision.

This fact, individual and determinate in its totality, resolves itself finally into two elements very distinct: first, an individual determinate will, that of myself; an individual determinate movement whose intensity is in proportion to that of the will and depends upon it;—second, a relation of the movement produced, to the producing will.

The first part of this fact, which embraces the determinateness of the effect and the cause, is personal and relative to the self; it varies with its two terms. It is the empirical part of the fact. When comparative abstraction collects under one point of view the successive differences of this empirical part, it composes from them a general idea, and the possibility for us of now applying this general idea to a certain number of particular cases, constitutes the actual contingent knowledge which we call a contingent general principle.

But the second part of the fact, that is to say, the relation of such or such a determinate cause to such or such a determinate effect, although individualized in the former part, is yet distinct from it. Vary the terms, the relation remains the same. Abstract all the individuality of the cause and of the effect; yet the relation of cause and effect remains in the mind. This second part of the fact is the absolute part of it.

Now, the moment the concrete and individual appear in my consciousness, I am not free to make or not to make an abstraction of its individuality; this abstraction is made necessarily and independently of my will, and I have the notion of the relation of cause to effect.†

* Movement, taken metaphorically, without relation to place, a working, internal effect, here of the will, and=volition.—Tr.

† By the necessity of my intellectual structure, as a relation independent of that particular movement or phenomenon of consciousness, by occasion of which the

This relation, which was contingent in the concrete, because it was attached to a determinate and therefore contingent cause and effect, is no sooner separated by abstraction from that concrete, than it appears to me absolute and necessary.

As soon as I have the notion of the necessary relation of cause to effect, I have the actual necessary knowledge that: every fact which begins to exist has a cause, I have the principle of causality, which is nothing else than the impossibility of not applying to all possible cases the notion obtained by abstraction from individuality in the concrete.

This abstraction is not the same with that which, in the formation of *contingent* general knowledge, gives me a *general* idea: this latter proceeds by the aid of comparison and generalization; it is *comparative* abstraction:—the other proceeds by simple separation, and we therefore call it *immediate* abstraction.

The process of immediate abstraction operates only upon a single fact, (at least it does not appear that the second gives any thing more than the first*) and takes place inevitably; while the other has need of many facts in order to take place, its conditions of action, its limits, is progressive developement,—and finally, is voluntary. He who does not wish to compare will never generalize. This synthesis is arbitrary; the other is necessitated.

Such is the origin and mode of developement of all actual cognitions.

understanding in virtue of its own proper activity and by its own laws, was led to conceive the principle of causality, as universal, necessary, and applicable to every possible movement and change.—Tr.

*That is—to illustrate still by the notion of cause—in the *first* instance of a change observed by consciousness, the mind as necessarily conceives the notion of cause, of the relation of cause to the effect, as in the second or the thousandth instance;—and in the second or the thousandth instance the mind can do nothing more than apply the same principle. Though this necessary process of the mind may become clearer to consciousness by *reflection*, yet it is as actually a necessary process in the first as in the thousandth case; it is a necessary and universal law of the mind which acts in the first case as in the last; and its necessity and universality do not depend upon, and are not the result of many particular facts; while those contingent *general* conceptions which depend upon comparison and generalization, require several observations, and derive their extension and *comparative* universality from them. What is thus true of the principle of causality—the relation of cause to effect, as a necessary and universal law, given by *immediate* abstraction in a *single* concrete fact, is true of all other necessary principles.—Tr.

TABLE OF THE CONTINGENT AND THE NECESSARY.

CONTINGENT.	NECESSARY.
1. <i>Psychological Primitive.</i>	1. <i>Psychological Primitive.</i>
Individual fact.—Matter of the concrete.—Succession of several individual facts.	Individual Fact.—Concrete composed of an individual empirical part and of an absolute part.—No succession.
<i>Process.</i> —Abstraction, comparison, generalization.	<i>Process.</i> —Immediate abstraction.—Elimination of the empirical part, and disengagement of the absolute.
<i>Result.</i> —General idea.	<i>Result.</i> —Pure notion of the absolute.
2. <i>The Actual.</i>	2. <i>The Actual.</i>
Possibility of applying the general idea to a certain number of cases, or general principle.	Impossibility of not applying the notion to all cases, or necessary absolute principle.

Contingent *not-empirical* principles are obtained by the same process as necessary principles; the only difference is in the results. We do not obtain the absolute nor the necessary in itself, but the irresistible.

We shall not endeavour to determine strictly the number and order of actual necessary principles, nor the origin of all those principles, nor their dependence, nor the different faculties to whose exercise they are attached.

Nor shall we attempt to describe the primitive internal facts with all the circumstances which accompany them.

Nevertheless we shall attempt to recognize the origin of the necessary principles of substance, of unity, of causality, and of final causes, because we particularly describe the actual characteristics of these principles, and because they embrace and constitute all intellectual life.

PRIMITIVE INTERNAL FACTS.

1. Affection or volition and in general a determinate modification.—Relation.—The <i>I</i> .	Elimination of the modification and of the <i>I</i> .—Disengagement of the absolute relation of attribute to subject.
2. Succession of passions or volitions and in general determinate plurality. Relation.—The <i>I</i> identical and one.	Elimination of the determinate plurality, and of the <i>I</i> identical and one.—Disengagement of the absolute relation of plurality to unity, of succession to duration.
3. Voluntary fact and in general determinate effect willed.—Relation.—Power and Willed of the <i>I</i> .	Elimination of the determinate effect willed, and of the <i>I</i> .—Disengagement of the absolute relation of cause to effect.

4. Intentional volition and in general Elimination of the means and of
 determinate direction of the volunta- the end determinate.—Disengage-
 ry power, that is to say, a determin- ment of the absolute relation of means
 ate means.—Relation.—Determinate to end.
 End.

The principle of identity is connected with the principle of substance, as the principle of intentionality with that of causality.

These two orders of principles have a primitive difference which consists in this, that the relation which connects the determinate effect to the determinate cause, the determinate end to the determinate means, is an apperception of consciousness, while the relation which connects the determinate modification to the *I*, the determinate being, is not an apperception of consciousness, but an instinctive manifestation of the principle of substance in the consciousness ; and so, also, the relation which connects the *I* identical and one to the determinate succession and plurality, is not an apperception of the consciousness, but an instinctive manifestation of the necessary principle of unity in the memory.

The absolute, being before us, governs us primitively, in the original action of the mind, (though without appearing to us primitively under its pure form,) and forces us to conceive at once, under any determinate quality, a determinate being, which is the *I* ; a natural hypothesis.* But as soon as the relation has been suggested to us by the force of the absolute in a determinate primitive concrete, of which the self, *I*, is one of the terms, it disengages itself from the *I*, and appears to us under its pure form, and in its universal evidence which explains and legitimates the primitive hypothesis. It is the same in regard to the manifestation of the identity of self, by the principle of unity in the memory.

The primitive manifestation of the existence of the *I*, and of its duration in consciousness and memory by the absolute principles of substance and of unity, is the primitive bond or link which connects Ontology to Psychology, and the first light which illuminates and discloses the objective in the subjective.

* *ὑποτίθημι*, *suppono*, to place under as a support, to take as the ground :—*ὑποθεσις*, *supposition*, placing under as the ground of the phenomenal.—*Tr.*

OBJECTIVE SYSTEM.

Ontology and Logic.

External objects of knowledge ; means by which we attain them ; legitimacy of those means.

THE SOUL, MATTER, AND GOD.

The Soul.

The soul or the real substantial *self* [not merely the phenomenal self, the *I* of consciousness] is objective : for it does not fall under the eye of consciousness. Examination of the opinion which makes the *me* a phenomenon or a succession of phenomena.

The knowledge of the soul or of the self real and substantial is the result of the application of the principle of substance.

Application primitive and not logical, which gives a being determinate, and real, the *me* ; a primitive fact made up : 1. of an individual modification : 2. of a *me*, and 3. of a relation individualized in its terms, but which discovers to us a fundamental and essential relation between every modification and every being, by a disengagement of the absolute. Thus the adequate knowledge of the absolute principle gives us a knowledge of *self*, of the *me*, as an objective substance.

The soul is a complex word which comprises, both the determinate real substantial *me*, the knowledge of which, without being an apperception of consciousness, is a primitive conception, psychological and ontological, and the substance of the *me*, which, considered in itself and not as in any particular individual, is an ulterior and purely ontological conception.

The self is the part of the objective sphere which manifests itself to us the first. It is the first step that we take beyond our consciousness.

Identity and unity of the Soul, [the substantial I.]

Manifested by a judgment of the memory, as the *I*, by a judgment of consciousness.

Opinion which makes the identity and unity of the *I* a perception of the consciousness, examined.

The judgment of [personal] identity disengages and brings out

the *absolute* relation of plurality to unity, of succession to duration. Distinction between a primitive judgment conformed to the natural laws of all judgment, and a logical judgment starting from a logical and indeterminate principle, in order to arrive at a logical and indeterminate consequence.

Matter.

Two principles manifest it to us.

The principle of causality and of intentional causality,—obtained in a primitive fact of consciousness, and become an absolute principle,—makes us conceive in certain cases external intentional causes. The intervention of perception which is not a principle, but an instinctive judgment, manifests to us, so to say, the mode of these causes, extension. The principle of substance gathered in the primitive fact of self, and become an absolute principle, suggests to us necessarily the conception of a real but indeterminate being under extension, and then extension appears as the quality of a substance which we call matter.

External causes vary, that is, the qualities of matter; but the principle of identity and unity gathered in the judgment of memory, and become an absolute principle, necessarily suggests to us the conception of an identical being in the midst of the variations of these qualities, of a unity under this plurality, of a duration in which this succession takes place.

Perception has been taken upon supposition, and not demonstrated, as a necessary intermediate.

God.

Experience withdrawing from matter the causality and intentionality which had at first been applied to it, and leaving to it only physical powers or forces, the principles of causality and intentionality remain, and, aided by the principle of unity, lead us to place the true causality and intentionality in a single supreme cause, which the principle of substance makes us conceive as a real and substantial being, that is, God.

LEGITIMACY OF THE MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE.

In order to invalidate the certainty of the existence of the objects of our knowledge, it has been said that the principles which give us these judgments, being only *subjective* principles, cannot have an objective authority.

Discussion of the Objective and Subjective.

If, by subjective, be understood that which is relative to a particular subject, and, by objective, that which is absolute, then it is not true that we obtain the objective by subjective principles. For instance, what, in point of fact, is the principle of causality? It is the impossibility of not applying to all possible cases (of change), the necessary relation of effect to cause. But we have obtained this necessary relation by abstracting it from the individual, that is, the determinate subject. This necessary relation constitutes the necessary principle of causality. The principle of causality, therefore, supposes the non-relation to any particular and determinate subject whatever. Far from being a conception of the self, it is an abstraction of it. The principle of causality is not, then, subjective, in the sense of being relative to a particular individual subject. When therefore this principle makes us conceive, e. g., the existence of God, we do not believe in the absolute on the faith of the relative, in the objective on the faith of the subjective; but we believe in the absolute on the faith of the absolute, in the objective on the faith of the objective.


The principles which give us external existences, give them therefore legitimately; for the absolute legitimately gives the absolute.


But if subjective be understood, as it is by us, to mean every thing which is internal, and objective every thing which is external, it is right to say that we believe in the objective on the faith of the subjective. But how would it be possible for us to know the external, but by an internal principle? It is we who know. Now we are a determinate being, who knows only within himself, because his faculty of knowing is his own. No principle could make him conceive an existence, if it did not appear to his faculty of conceiving, that is to say, if it were not within him, if it were not internal.

But this principle does not lose its authority, because it appears in a subject. Because an absolute principle falls under the consciousness of a determinate being, it does not follow that it becomes relative to that being: the absolute may appear in the determinate, the universal in the particular, the necessary in the contin-

gent, intelligent personality in the *I*, man in the individual, the reason in consciousness, the objective in the subjective.

The first act of faith is the belief in the soul, and the last, the belief in God. The intellectual life is a continual series of beliefs, of acts of faith in the invisible revealed by the visible, the external revealed by the internal.







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